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Progressive Society is an initiative by the Parliamentary Group of the Progressive Alliance 
of Socialists & Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D Group) under the joint leader-
ship of S&D Group President Iratxe Garcia Pérez and Vice-President Eric Andrieu.
It was launched in January 2018 and its mission is to enrich the S&D Group’s political work 
across a wide range of European and global policies in a framework of sustainable devel-
opment. 
The initiative produced a first policy report in November 2018 in view of the subsequent 
European elections and the 2019-2024 parliamentary term. This report was developed 
with a first Independent Commission for Sustainable Equality, co-chaired by Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen and Louka Katseli. It helped to shape the 2019 electoral programme of the 
Party of European Socialists and many of its policy recommendations then found their way 
into the work programme of the new European Commission.
The S&D Group is the only parliamentary group in the European Parliament to apply a 
coherent sustainable development strategy to the policies it pursues. In order to support this 
approach with vision and ideas, and to connect its political action with other stakeholders, 
particularly in the trade unions and among non-governmental organisations, Progressive 
Society will continue to deepen and to broaden our understanding of sustainability chal-
lenges, and of how progressive policies must change to drive the on-going transformation 
towards our ultimate goal - a society of sustainable well-being for everyone.
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Imagine a society that puts people‘s well-being first, where policies and politics are 
driven by a sustainable and inclusive model. Imagine a society where economic growth 
is not the only measure of success. The progressive society we believe in is not a utopia. It 
is both possible and essential to guarantee a sustainable way of life. However, our ambi-
tions require a Great Shift. More and more people share our collective aspirations. More 
people are aware that capitalism has become an unfair and inhumane economic par-
adigm. More people understand that the fixation with economic growth is taking our 
planet to its limits, creating bigger gaps between the rich and the poor and undermining 
our social models. Our aspirations are now widely accepted at the highest political level 
in Europe. EU heads of state and government reached the conclusion at a recent Social 
Summit in Porto that growth means nothing if it does not make people’s lives better.
People and their problems need to be at the heart of public policies. Instead of addressing 
systemic failures in the current model, citizens have been made to believe that GDP-led 
policies and fiscal consolidation were the only options on the table. This is how austerity 
came to dominate the EU as a fatalistic truth over the past decade. Austerity is a failed 
political choice, and the pandemic has exposed the underinvestment in key public ser-
vices, especially on health and research, in the cruellest way. The time has come to look 
beyond GDP. We need to stop the human suffering and environmental destruction that 
we find behind today’s macroeconomic models and move away from an excessive focus 
on economic gains. 
We are living in extraordinary times and future generations will judge us on our efforts 
to emerge from this pandemic stronger and to help those that need it the most. Despite a 
sluggish initial response, the crisis has turned into a wake-up call. EU leaders are show-
ing they have learned the lessons from the past. COVID-19 has affected our lives in major 
and unprecedented ways, socially, economically and culturally. The pandemic has exac-
erbated existing inequalities in almost all sectors of society. The post-pandemic future 
cannot be based on a “business as usual” approach, but rather requires a radical rethink-
ing of our society and economy. Sustainable well-being, including ecological, health and 
social progress and gender equality, must be at the heart of how we shape the future.
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by Iratxe García Pérez, President of the S&D Group 
in the European Parliament 
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Citizens expect politicians to provide new and concrete answers. People demand a 
new European social contract. To respond to people’s expectations, we have decided 
to revive the work of Progressive Society and provide a comprehensive and horizon-
tal outlook on all our policies as a guide for our political action. This is not a mere 
philosophical or intellectual exercise. Through this work, the S&D Group is looking to 
deliver real change. We have done it before and we will do it again. In the Progressive 
Society’s last report, more than half of the 110 recommendations were incorporated 
into the current Commission Work Programme, including the European Green Deal, 
the Action Plan to implement the European Pillar of Social Rights and the reform of 
the European Semester based on the UN Sustainable Development Goals. We have left 
a clear footprint in the European agenda with historic achievements such as the Next 
Generation EU. Our focus is on a socio-economic recovery that leaves nobody behind. 
However, given the magnitude of the challenges ahead, we need to do even more. 
The Great Shift is the result of dedicated work by the Independent Commission 
for Sustainable Equality, co-chaired by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and Teresa Ribera 
Rodríguez. The Great Shift is about ensuring we are equipped to cope with the 
demanding times that we live in by pursuing a new, forward-thinking, ambitious and 
realistic set of policy proposals. The Great Shift is our shared vision for a progressive 
society, where carbon neutrality and sustainable equality by 2050 are at the heart of 
our strategy. 
In the S&D Group, we have already changed our decision-making process to make it 
more inclusive and more participatory. We integrate new ideas and translate them into 
concrete political action. We are ready to continue to do this for the task ahead with the 
vision and the plan to achieve it. Starting now through to 2024 and beyond, it is time to 
make the great shift towards a better future. 
Iratxe García Pérez
President of the S&D Group  
in the European Parliament 
The Coronavirus pandemic the world is currently fighting confirms that health and 
ecological emergencies are more closely linked than we thought. The pandemic is also 
having increasingly destructive effects on the economy and on the social fabric of our 
societies. How dramatic these effects will ultimately be is still difficult to gauge. This 
will largely depend on the political choices we make today. Beyond, the pandemic and 
its social and economic impact add to the urgency with which the further development 
of an alternative development model must be pursued in Europe and globally. 
The present crisis reveals the limits and contradictions of our societies and of our pre-
vailing socio-economic system. In a globalised world that remains excessively shaped 
by increasingly concentrated economic interests, an over-concentration of wealth, and 
a contraction of the role of government and too many laissez-faire policies, our planet’s 
natural habitats and our climate continue to be relentlessly destroyed and vast num-
bers of peoples and territories are being left behind.
A pre-requisite for an alternative model of development is a comprehensive political 
agenda capable to address and overcome the full complexity of the intertwined and sys-
temic crises we are facing. While the world’s leading climate scientists are ever more 
concerned that global heating will reach unprecedented levels in the history of Earth’s 
natural systems, which could lead to widespread and possibly irrevocable disaster, it is 
also increasingly recognised that the climate and ecological crisis will unleash a whole 
new source of social injustice. If this growing injustice is not addressed, more inequali-
ties will arise and deepen our social crisis, in a never-ending and vicious circle.
We cannot end poverty and build a much fairer society while leaving our planet at the 
mercy of exploitation, nor will we be able to reign in climate change and biodiversity 
loss while letting social injustice untouched. 
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by Eric Andrieu, Vice-President of the S&D Group  
in the European Parliament 
The most critical message of this policy report is that progressives must build a new 
alliance between ecological and social progress. The fight for the environment and the 
fight for a more equal and fair society are part of the same battle. 
With this second report of the Progressive Society initiative, the ICSE is proposing 
nothing less than a new sustainable development path, filled with a large set of inno-
vative policy proposals. It will contribute to bring us closer to a truly progressive and 
comprehensive policy strategy to tackle the ongoing climate and biodiversity emergen-
cies, while building a more resilient society based on social fairness and solidarity. 
This report is a radical roadmap that can meaningfully inspire and sustain the future 
of the European project, but it does not end there. It also has a global reach, since it will 
be equally important to push Europe’s ambition to become a stronger global player in 
the field of sustainable well-being. 
As socialist and social democrats, our political family has always fought for a more 
egalitarian, fairer, a more sustainable society. We are more than ever determined to 
deliver a society that works for all. We are committed to reconnect the EU with the 
well-being of its citizens. We are convinced that this is more than ever within reach, 
provided we act on all fronts. 
This is no small task, but as progressives we cannot afford to fail. The great shift is 
before us - we will ensure it is a journey for the many rather than the few. The general 
interest must always prevail over individual interests. 
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Eric Andrieu
Vice-President of the S&D Group  
in the European Parliament 
Progressive Society is an initiative of the Socialists 
and Democrats Group (S&D Group) in the European 
Parliament under the political leadership of S&D 
Group President Iratxe García Pérez and S&D Group 
Vice-President Eric Andrieu. 
The initiative’s aim is to support the S&D Group in 
its political work with analyses and policy recom-
mendations on a broad range of issues within the 
framework of sustainable development. 
A first policy report produced by the initiative at the 
end of 2018 already coined the notion of sustainable 
well-being as one that encapsulates the ultimate goal 
of future progressive politics based on sustainable 
development. In order to achieve such sustainable 
well-being, the social-ecological nexus has been 
identified as a central one. 
This second policy report chose an even broader 
scope than the first report, and provides nearly 
250 policy recommendations across the economic, 
social and ecological policy areas at European and 
at global level. It is the result of a one-year process 
led by an Independent Commission of renowned 
experts and policy-makers (Independent Commis-
sion for Sustainable Equality, ICSE), co-chaired by 
the Vice-Prime Minister of Spain, Teresa Ribera 
Rodríguez, and the former Prime Minister and 
former President of the Party of European Social-
ists, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen.
14 





nexus has been 





At its outset, the ICSE agreed on a set of seven conceptual notions which form the 
frame of its ensuing policy recommendations across all policy areas. These conceptual 
notions are detailed in the report’s first chapter and consider that:
The ICSE furthermore agreed on a detailed definition for the central notion of sustain-









In today’s climate of precarity, policy change must address anxiety, exis-
tential uncertainty and re-build trust in a regenerated political system 
genuinely dedicated to peoples’ needs 
As different forms of inequality intersect with each other and form com-
plex interrelationships, future policy must be tailored to address this 
complexity to generate multiple dividends for society
Social and ecological policies must be systematically combined in order 
to produce innovative and powerful forms of what the report coins as 
social-ecological progress 
Sustainable well-being requires vibrant democracy and widespread par-
ticipation at all levels
Countering precarity and inequalities in the future will depend on the 
emergence of a social-ecological state beyond the traditional social wel-
fare state
The traditional approach of economic policy focussing on GDP as the 
metric of success must be overcome in favour of a new approach focussed 
on sustainable well-being
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed deep-entrenched vulnerabilities of 
today’s system and provides additional arguments and references for a 
far-reaching policy shift.
Our societies are embedded in a global system that 
can be generically designated as capitalism. In its 
prevailing form, it rests first and foremost on a 
short-term minded dynamic of intense competition 
next to an increasing concentration of market and 
economic decision-making power as its main (and 
somewhat conflicting) sources of energy, in order 
to generate a continuous creation of wealth and, 
through it, economic and social progress. 
However, this dynamic has also been allowed to 
lead to an inflated and short-term focussed financial 
sector, an increasingly concentrated accumulation 
of wealth and power supported by massive globally 
organised tax evasion, as well as it has provoked a 
monstrous damage to our planet. 
ANOTHER FUTURE  
IS POSSIBLE
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Public opinion is rapidly 
becoming aware of the full extent 
of these crises, sparking anxiety 
and alienation among ever larger 
social groups.«
»
Executive Summary Executive Summary
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Despite historic levels of progress in human 
prosperity and security in many parts of the 
world, and certainly so in the European Union, it is 
strikingly evident today that the system’s inherent 
flaws and conflicts have become unsustainable. 
They have generated human and planetary costs 
of a magnitude that increasingly outweighs its 
traditional benefits. At the same time, the joint effect 
of the global pandemic and the defeat of trumpism 
open a global political window of opportunity 
of potentially historic significance, which the 
European Union is ideally placed to seize upon in 
the interest of global sustainable well-being. 
A new model of progress needs to be defined 
for another future – one that will be freed from 
continuous crisis management and focussed on 
sustainable human and planetary well-being. This 
is the challenge that the Independent Commission 
for Sustainable Equality (ICSE) strives to meet with 
this policy report. To this end, it follows the aim of 
providing people and institutions with a credible 
and feasible choice to comprehensively rebuild our 
model of development. 
This new model of progress should cater for society’s 
shared well-being, prove resilient and replace 
radical uncertainty with radical sustainability in all 
dimensions of human existence and cooperation. 
It should also be embedded in a new contract 
with planet Earth, ensuring its preservation and 
regeneration. 
The policy roadmap we seek to define rests on the 
conviction that, in full respect of the clear natural 
limits policymakers across the globe are gradually 
acknowledging, humanity can still turn this planet 
into a place of well-being for all. This should be 
viewed as the guiding light for all progressives in 
politics and beyond, in a common battle for another 
future. 
We appeal to progressive forces in Europe and 
globally to engage with us at this level of ambition. 
Progressives at large need to further strengthen and 
enrich the policy recommendations in this report 
and beyond, and they need to join and mobilise 
forces and energies to achieve the necessary 
transformation. This collective contribution will 
be key and, hence, the associated responsibility is 
immense.
The world’s richest 1 percent, those with 
more than $1 million, own 44 percent of 
the world’s wealth
44%
A new model of progress needs to 
be defined for another future.«
»
Executive Summary Executive Summary
Around the world, policymaking and governance 
since World War II have followed a single, overriding 
objective: maximising gross domestic product (GDP) 
through measures that spur economic growth. 
Although this policy orientation has been able to 
create unprecedented material wealth, its limits 
and shortcomings are becoming increasingly 
evident. During the past forty years in particular, 
the narrow-minded fixation on GDP growth has gone 
hand in hand with widening inequalities, poverty, 
and existential insecurity affecting large parts of the 
population and accelerated the destruction of the 
planet’s climate and biosphere. 
Overcoming these multiple social and environmental 
crises requires more than the current modest 
attempts to tame the growth dogma through the 
adoption of climate action targets. Fostering 
widespread well-being and social cohesion under the 
conditions of environmental sustainability requires 
that Europe adopts an agnostic outlook on economic 
growth. 
It depends on a framework for governance that 
places legally binding policy objectives that directly 
support the sustainable well-being of people 
and planet at its core and systematically aligns 
policymaking and public finances. Such objectives 
must relate to the social, economic, and ecological 
dimension of sustainability and well-being, hence 
include targets for the reduction of poverty and 
inequalities, and greenhouse gas emissions, and 
translate into evidence-based long-term-oriented 
policies that are underpinned by sufficient financial 
resources to mobilise the necessary investments. 
This implies comprehensive reforms of the EU 
fiscal and financial framework, as well as effective 
governance mechanisms through which EU Member 
States, parliaments and stakeholders jointly identify 
challenges, set priorities, and implement policies 
that enhance the well-being of people and planet on 
a lasting basis. 
18 
LIVING IN AN ECONOMY 
DEDICATED TO SUSTAINABLE 
WELL-BEING FOR ALL
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Achieving sustainable well-being for all will also 
require reforms in the financial sector and the digital 
economy, the two sectors in which the paradigm of 
limitless and extractive growth continues to ravage 
most forcefully, and which continue to shape 
the entire economy along these lines. In terms of 
financial sector reform, a key challenge lies in 
re-allocating capital from unsustainable forms 
of economic activities into sectors, projects, and 
businesses with clear benefits for the sustainable 
human and planetary well-being. This implies 
deepening and accelerating the EU sustainable 
finance agenda, including by complementing 
measures aimed at the promotion of ‘green’ finance 
with action to bolster socially sustainable finance. 
In the digital economy, new regulatory frameworks 
and more capable public authorities, both in terms 
of regulation and enforcement, are key to ensure 
digitalisation, a mega-trend shaping lives and 
livelihoods around the world in ever more powerful 
ways, is no longer driven exclusively by a small 
number of global mega-corporations that discount 
the public interest in the pursuit of profits.
Economic change in the interest of sustainable well-
being for all also relies on far-reaching changes 
in the corporate sector, where environmental 
sustainability and the well-being of people and 
their communities must become central concerns 
in all aspects and at all stages of business activities.
This can be achieved by means of a European 
Responsible Capitalism Act that replaces the 
pursuit of shareholder value with a broadly defined 
sense of Corporate Social Responsibility, inter alia 
by obliging companies to define comprehensive 
sustainability strategies and to report on their 
implementation, respect for environmental 
standards, and fundamental rights through 
effective due diligence provisions. Supporting 
stakeholder-oriented companies, for instance 
benefit corporations or the social economy, are 
another building block of such a strategy. Lastly, 
engaging the private sector in productive, so-called 
mission-oriented forms of innovation that deliver 
solutions to meet well-being and sustainability-
related challenges must be considered key putting 
economic activity in Europe at the service of 
sustainable well-being for all. 
Recent years have led citizens 
around the world to understand 
the destructive nature of the 
global race for profits and 
growth.«
»
15% of the EU workforce live on wages 
that are below the national poverty line, 




LIVING IN A SOCIETY OF 
CHANGE: THE IMPERATIVE 
OF A JUST TRANSITION
At the beginning of this year, the European 
Commission published a legislative proposal 
which aimed to create a “Just Transition Fund” 
within a mechanism of the same name (JTM). The 
operationalisation of the just transition concept is an 
indisputably meaningful political step in the right 
direction since it aims at ensuring that the transition 
towards a climate-neutral economy happens in a 
fair way. It however lacks a substantial definition of 
a just transition for people and communities. Yet, a 
too limited approach, blind to the actual magnitude 
of the social crisis, would be dangerous, because it 
could understate the grave social and political risks 
associated with a climate policy that is not embedded 
in equally ambitious social policy.
This is where our approach of a “just transition” can 
be a powerful policy concept of the early 21st century, 
when addressing the mega-crisis we face—provided 
we embrace its full meaning. We can by no means 
allow a conflict between social and environmental 
policy objectives to happen. Because it would mean 
that the most vulnerable sectors of society would 
bear alone the consequence of a failed transition. 
Instead, a true social-ecological transition must 
answer environmental change with social progress. 
The transition we are calling for must be fair, it 
must offer stability, and it must promise protection. 
A particular focus will therefore be placed on 
anticipative and inclusive policymaking: building 
capacity to anticipate structural changes in order 
to allow policy to intervene before harm is caused is 
key to achieve fairness and sustainable well-being. 
»A widespread and narrow 
understanding of resilience is 
that of returning to a previous 
state after a disturbance (a 
shock, a crisis…). This is not our 
understanding.«
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Our societies are embedded in a global system that 
can be generically designated as capitalism. In its 
prevailing form, it rests first and foremost on a 
short-term minded dynamic of intense competition
In this respect, we provide an inclusive definition 
of Resilience to implement transformative policies. 
This definition will require from policy-makers to 
understand resilience in the context of sustainability 
by looking at the entire ecological-social-economic-
political system. Its transformative approach leads 
to a major question: who decides when and why a 
particular system should be considered “resilient” 
and what would be the political objective we want to 
achieve via the transformation phase. This is where 
strong social consensus on the goal and pathways 
to sustainability is fundamental. In fact, such an 
approach to a just transition should even be used 
to (re-)vivify democracy itself. A true participatory 
democracy must define the nature of the ambitious 
reform the EU should undergo to achieve human 
well-being goals and to co-create the society of 
tomorrow.
This section proposes to create inclusive 
governance mechanisms at all levels, so that 
citizens, communities, trade unions and employers 
can be part of implementing a strategy they co-
decided. Along the same lines, this section seeks 
to reaffirm the crucial role of education, training 
and lifelong learning in paving the way towards a 
sustainable future for Europe and beyond.
However, if this transformation is not set within 
a comprehensive approach to the wide-ranging 
distributional impacts on social groups, regions 
and localities, it cannot suffice to meet the EU’s 
pledge of ‘leaving no one behind’. Our definition of 
a Just transition requires the application of a place-
sensitive approach which would invite to create a 
greater variety of regional development strategies, 
opening the door for more complex but fairer 
solutions that cannot be achieved through a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach.
Finally, and in order to ensure a just transition, 
we need to address the two dimensions of 
the challenges faced when pursuing climate 
justice objectives, namely: tackling the unequal 
vulnerability and exposure to environmental risk 
in society and at work, on the one hand, and the 
need for social fairness in environmental policies, 
on the other hand. 
Extreme weather events across Europe 
between 1980 and 2019 inflicted 
economic losses amounting to almost 
€446 billion
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All the evidence indeed suggests that Humans 
have gone too far in the destruction of the only 
planetary ecosystem they have, leading to them 
now being endangered. The world’s leading climate 
scientists are increasingly concerned that global 
heating will trigger tipping points in Earth’s natural 
systems, which will lead to widespread and possibly 
irrevocable disaster, unless action is taken urgently.
Reducing greenhouse gas is therefore a matter of 
absolute necessity. The EU cannot afford to fail, 
because the target is still close, and because our 
chances of a second try constrained. These shocks 
would indeed not only damage the environment on 
which we depend, they also weaken our political, 
economic and social systems. 
Climate change is a “crisis multiplier” that has 
profound implications for international peace and 
stability. It is indeed common knowledge that the 
environmental degradation and anthropogenic 
climate change caused by an exploitative world 
economy is the prime example illustrating 
the unsustainable nature of today’s model of 
development. Less noticed are its unequal 
fundamental components: the richest 1% on 
the planet is responsible for twice as many CO2 
emissions as the poorest half of humanity, as the 
devastating effects of climate change are felt more 
than ever. The same goes for global pollution and 
its detrimental effects to Nature and Human, which 
generate unacceptable injustices. Ecological crises 
reinforce inequalities, just as inequalities increase 
environmental damage.
LIVING A HEALTHY LIFE 
ON A DECARBONISED AND 
PRESERVED PLANET
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It is indisputable that the European Union displays 
unprecedented environmental policy ambitions to 
deal with the threats that are now facing us. The goal 
of climate neutrality by 2050 has become a legally 
binding target, paving the way for a much-needed 
ambitious environmental agenda.
In the view of the ICSE, the opportunity of the 
ongoing EU climate action should be seized to 
propose a sustainable transformation of Europe. A 
true environmental agenda not only aims to protect 
our livelihood and that of planet Earth, but to 
actively improve our future sustainable well-being 
through a fully-fledged social-ecological response to 
climate change.
This section proposes a comprehensive approach on 
carbon emissions reduction with the aim of aligning 
carbon pricing, effort sharing and climate policies in 
order to carry out a fair distribution of the emissions 
space among countries and among people. If carbon 
pricing and environmental taxation are important 
instruments to implement the green transition, it is 
equally crucial to take into account the distributional 
effects of these instruments and to put in place 
accompanying policies to mitigate their potentially 
socially unfair effects. In particular, carbon pricing 
revenues should be used to counter potential negative 
social and economic consequences resulting from 
the decarbonisation process. 
It is equally important that the 2030 climate target 
is translated into a concrete and adequate policy 
framework to achieve ambitious environmental 
goal. To do so, the EU should act as the leading 
promoter of transformational measure by : designing 
an integrated industrial policy focused on strategic 
missions linked to decarbonisation; aligning 
infrastructure policies and mobility policies to this 
long-term vision; boosting sustainable production 
and consumption; and proposing a comprehensive 
framework for improving natural carbon sinks.
Besides, we must make it clear that applying a 
well-being lens when designing climate mitigation 
policies has the potential to deliver wider well-being 
benefits both in the short and the long term. A co-
beneficial approach should recognise the intrinsic 
interconnections between our social and ecological 
systems as the basis for a just and sustainable 
economy, with health as the great connector. 
Along these lines, the revalorisation of biodiversity 
into the political agenda of the European Union is 
necessary to emphasise the interactions between 
human activities, ecosystems and climate. With the 
same view of aligning policies with the objectives 
of sustainable well-being, this section will seek 
to re-affirm that health, in a wide sense, is “one”, 
which implies that policy responses must be 
guided by a coherent approach towards human 
and environmental health. Furthermore, a shift in 
perspective is needed to better integrate growing 
challenges to the sustainability of the food system, 
and the CAP should ensure full policy coherence 
covering agricultural, food, environment, and 
climate policies. Finally, and as air, water and soil 
pollution, as well as the use of hazardous chemicals, 
can undermine the health of all citizens, the ICSE 
is calling for an overarching framework at EU level 
that can address the complex interlinkages across 
policy domains relevant to environment and health.
To stay within 1.5 degrees warming, the 
carbon budget left is around 416GtCO2, 
or 10 more years of emissions at our 
current rate. 
1.5°C
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Already at the end of 2019, 21% of the EU 
population, more than 90 million citizens, were 
considered to be at risk of poverty and exclusion. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has added to this further, 
with first projections estimating that especially 
low-income earners are bearing the brunt of the 
crisis’ economic fallout. At the same time, 1% of 
households in Europe hold an approximate 25% 
of the continent’s net wealth, without paying any 
tax on such assets in all but a single EU country. 
Such precarity and inequalities drive European 
societies apart and undermine their ability to cope 
with the testing effects of change that is inevitable 
in light of the climate crisis, demographic change, 
and digitalisation. Rebuilding European societies 
in line with the principles underlying the notion 
of sustainable well-being for all is thus a matter of 
urgency.  
Related work must commence by developing effective 
backstops against poverty. Despite the magnitude of 
the European poverty crisis, EU policy action to date 
has failed to address it with sufficient determination. 
To rectify this, a European anti-poverty law should 
be adopted that defines the full eradication of 
poverty in Europe by 2050 as a legally binding target 
for EU policy in the same way as the EU climate 
law does in the field of climate action. Eradicating 
poverty requires that its drivers are being choked. 
Bolstering social security systems and re-regulating 
labour markets, which, at present, are rife with 
precarious and atypical forms of low-wage and 
insecure employment, is key in this regard. Solving 
the current housing crisis that forces families to 
overstretch their budgets due to a lack of affordable 
homes constitutes another necessity, as does action 
to bolster care infrastructure and capacity across 
the Union to stop workers, especially women, from 
being excluded from labour markets. Defining 
common policy strategies and supporting them with 
EU investment to bring these emergencies under 
control would amount to a forceful manifestation of 
the EU’s commitment to the well-being of its citizens. 
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A FAIR, EQUAL, AND 
DIVERSE SOCIETY 
»Next to poverty, inequalities in 
terms of incomes and wealth 




Next to poverty, inequalities in terms of incomes and 
wealth represent key dimensions of the European 
social crisis. As is becoming increasingly clear, tax 
and wage setting systems in Europe have evidently 
lost their effectiveness in view of increasingly fierce 
global competition and footloose capital. Rebuilding 
collective bargaining systems , adapting them to 
new labour market realities, and fotering wage 
transparency are crucial steps that must be taken. 
Likewise, ensuring a fairer and effective taxation 
of private wealth and corporate income, through 
coordinated action at the EU and global levels, are 
necessary elements of an effective strategy to close 
the growing gap between the rich and the rest. 
However, relying on a more egalitarian distribution 
of wealth and income among the individual members 
of society has its limits, especially given the need 
to ensure a more efficient use of resources that 
stems from the ecological crisis. Building common 
wealth for the collective use of resources through 
the expansion of public services and support for 
citizen-led initiatives to build common wealth must 
therefore be central elements of social policy going 
forward. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted how our 
societies critically rely on the contributions of social 
groups that are in many respects left standing at the 
margins of our economic and social model. While 
women, ethnic minorities, migrants, the young, and 
others have had to deal with exceptional hardship 
to keep society running, their access to social, 
economic, and political opportunities remains 
unequal. The post-COVID-era must therefore be an 
era of a concerted push of equality of opportunity for 
all members of society to turn sustainable well-being 
for all into an inclusive and non-discriminatory 
project. This will require both targeted strategies, for 
instance to address the specific situation of women, 
youth, and migrants, as well as horizontal action to 
strengthen fundamental rights and the rule of law. 
More than 90 million citizens, almost 21% 
of the EU population, are considered to 
be at risk of poverty and social exclusion
21%
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A helicopter view of today’s global policy landscape 
is not one of a well engaged and ongoing global 
transformation, but of a transit zone in which 
certain areas are being reshaped while others 
remain untouched, and where activity in one area is 
not clearly related to activity in another area. There 
is no clear and unifying sense about where exactly 
this transit zone leads towards.
In this politically unpredictable and unstable 
context, the pandemic has shed new light on the 
global ecological and social consequences of an 
economic system in which prosperity is equal to 
short-term minded economic growth, instead of 
long-term minded sustainable well-being; and it 
has made one point clearer than ever before: the 
billions of human destinies on our planet are more 
intertwined than they have ever been. 
This must help us understand the real meaning of 
human well-being (the well-being-environment 
nexus), the fact that well-being policies fare better 
on all fronts than growth policies and finally the fact 
that we should take care of welfare states, in the EU 
and elsewhere, because it is the backbone of our 
societies and our shield to face ecological shocks.
LIVING IN A WORLD 
DEDICATED TO PLANETARY 
AND HUMAN SUSTAINABLE 
WELL-BEING
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The multiple economic and social damages induced 
by the pandemic are very far-reaching even in 
the richest parts of the world and are already 
devastating in more vulnerable countries and world 
regions. At any rate, they will take many years to 
overcome. 
This is also a major set-back for the sustainable 
development agenda embodied by the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), 
as critical progress achieved since their launch in 
2015 is being reversed for several goals at a critical 
point in time.
The pandemic has hit a world already entangled in 
a global meta-crisis, in which climate change, the 
large-scale loss of biodiversity, entrenched poverty 
and gaping inequalities increasingly interact. The 
global meta-crisis can eventually only be addressed 
as one. It requires a new generation of cross-
sectional and multi-crisis approach policies - in 
particular along the social-ecological nexus - as 
much as it demands policies and regulations that are 
powerful enough to reset the prevailing economic 
model’s underlying logic, from the discredited and 
unsustainable post-war growth/progress concept to 
a new and sustainable well-being/progress concept.
In a global strive towards sustainable well-being, 
EU leadership will be critical and its own (positive 
and negative) experiences in addressing challenges 
that are global as much as they are European is 
essential, for instance when it comes to climate 
change or poverty. Including through much more 
vigorous and targeted EU actions at global level, 
game-changing global policy change must address 
solidarity in the global pandemic, achieve a new 
boost for UNSDGs, re-launch the fight for the 1.5 
climate change target, develop a global approach to 
a green deal, build a global social contract, set the 
activity of global corporations within a rules-based 
frame, achieve truly sustainable global trade, 
turn development aid into a sufficiently powerful 
lever for sustainable development, rethink global 
governance and open innovative pathways for 
human and planetary development such as through 
global common wealth.
The total value of only the ten 
largest mega-firms in the world 
is comparable to the bottom 180 
countries.
»The EU has a direct interest in 
promoting well-being, because 
well-being is a vector of peace 
worldwide.«
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Since the Independent Commission launched its 
work, a major change occurred in global politics 
in the midst of the global pandemic. The defeat of 
trumpism and the election of a democrat president 
in the United States has significantly widened the 
global political window of opportunity already 
created by the pandemic’s own challenge to the pre-
vailing global system. First global moves by the new 
US administration, on a global minimum corporate 
tax, on climate policy, and on a vaccine waiver have 
already come to confirm this for real. 
This new global context also strengthens the EU’s 
stances and views for a more progressive and fair 
world. It creates a new form of global responsibility 
for European policy-makers to use this opportunity 
wisely and decisively in favour of global human and 
planetary progress towards sustainable well-being 
for all.
Europe has been founded on the promise of greater 
well-being for all, individually and collectively. This 
pledge is associated with social justice and cohe-
sion, the protection of our individual and common 
livelihood, as well as with democracy, freedom and 
peace. At global level, a similar pledge is found in 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
But the ability to achieve these goals is being chal-
lenged by widespread inequality and poverty, 
environmental destruction and now the lack of 
preparedness for global interdependent fragilities 
such as the COVID-19 has shown. 
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One of the main drivers of this situation is that 
our societies are embedded in a global capitalist 
system that has traditionally paid more attention 
to macro-economic growth data than to the way 
wealth is distributed. 
It rests foremost on a short-term minded dynamic 
of intense competition next to an increasing 
concentration of market and economic deci-
sion-making power as its main (and somewhat 
conflicting) sources of energy, in order to gen-
erate a continuous creation of wealth and, 
through it, economic and social progress. How-
ever, this dynamic has also been allowed to lead 
to an inf lated and short-term focussed financial 
sector, an increasingly concentrated accumula-
tion of wealth and power supported by massive 
globally organised tax evasion, as well as a blind 
destruction of nature, the physical capital to pro-
vide wealth and prosperity being abused well 
beyond its limits. 
The improvement of living conditions, which 
seemed self-evident in the first decades after 
WWII, has gradually come to a halt for large parts 
of our population. Inequalities seem endlessly 
entrenched and affect a staggering one fifth of the 
European population. The gap between the high-
est and the lowest income has increased as ever. 
In the EU, the 1% highest earners take 11.3% of 
national income and the 10% highest earners take 
a hefty 35.4%.1 Many across our continent - inside 
our cities, around them and across rural areas - 
are being left behind as they disconnect from the 
economic activity around them. Even middle class 
families now face a risk of social regression and 
increasingly fear for the future of their children. 
A sense of precarity has spread widely across our 
societies - insecurity, anxiety and fear about what the 
future will bring. And many young people are partic-
ularly concerned about the consequences of climate 
change for their own and the planet’s future. 
The increasing sense of growing inequality, injus-
tice, entrenched unemployment and increasing 
job precariousness in a society in which ever richer 
super-rich individuals co-exist with the rest of society 
de-constructs the necessary societal consensus and 
fuels anti-system and extremist positions through 
destructive identity politics. In such a society, respect 
for diversity and the economic, social and cultural 
capacity to integrate and live with people from dif-
ferent ethnic or religious backgrounds is gravely 
undermined, feeding systemic hostility and mistrust. 
1 World Inequality Database, November 2020
In the EU, the 1% highest earners take 
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Over time, political parties in government from left 
to right have in turn either encouraged, ignored or 
underestimated these negative developments. The 
inherent short-termism of government, business 
and finance has certainly played an important 
role in this respect. Responsibilities for the sit-
uation we face are widespread. We all have to 
learn. We all have to do better. This process does 
not start from scratch, but it needs to accelerate 
and strengthen. The European Union has started 
to do so in the face of the pandemic by creating 
a large-scale Eurobond issuance to finance the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility, of which a signif-
icant part will directly support investment into the 
ecological and digital transitions. This is of great-
est importance with regard to our youth, whose 
future hinges upon a major and lasting policy shift 
outlined in this report. They bear no responsibil-
ity for the current state of our societies and of our 
planet - but if radical change for the better is not 
achieved, they will bear the highest cost. 
 
Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
there is a fundamental contradiction between 
Europe’s founding pledge and the effectiveness of 
our response in an interdependent and complex 
market. Equally, the promise of an increasingly 
fair and cohesive world, conveyed by the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals, clashes 
against the limits of what the existing form of 
global capitalism can deliver.
This form of capitalism has permitted major eco-
nomic and social development over past decades. 
It has notably been driven by formidable scientific 
and technological innovations and by social sup-
port provision and legislation, the combination of 
which allowed for Europe’s economic, social and 
political re-building after the second World War. 
However, the excesses of the prevailing system 
clash systemically with natural and human limits 
and needs. Government legislation and policies 
have only partially and imperfectly been able to 
ring-fence and compensate for these fractures 
over time. 
Therefore, this inherent conflict between eco-
nomic, social and ecological imperatives remains 
unresolved, and has led the world into a perma-
nent state of multiple and intertwined political, 
economic, social and ecological crises. Together, 
they form a meta-crisis, of which the current pan-
demic is the latest episode, which our historical 
approach to legislation and compensatory public 
policy is unable to prevent or stop. 
It is the product of the prevailing system. It is not 
a plague from outer space. Humanity can change 
it. This meta-crisis transforms an allegedly effi-
cient system of wealth creation into one which is 
highly inefficient and costly. But more fundamen-
tally, it pushes our human societies to the future 
possibility of global collapse. And it threatens 
the very foundation of modern democracy and of 
individual freedom because it creates a dangerous 
space for antagonising, extremist and nationalist, 
political forces in Europe and beyond.
Humankind has grown increasingly aware of these 
conflicts and of the imperative to resolve them. Global 
and European efforts to limit climate change and to 
preserve and re-build biodiversity have taken center 
stage in recent years, notably in Europe’s Green Deal 
launched in January 2020. 
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and human limits 
and needs.«
»
Social and political concerns have received far less 
attention, despite the 2015 United Nations’ ambitious 
agenda for sustainable development (17 goals to be 
achieved by 2030 across the globe) which stresses the 
need for balanced economic, social and environmen-
tal progress.
However, the economic fundamentals of the pre-
vailing system have not been questioned. It remains 
widely believed that through a combination of new 
regulations, technological innovations and stronger 
resilience in the face of future crises and shocks, 
prevailing capitalism can save itself and resolve its 
own conflicts and crises. This unfounded optimism 
disenfranchises from interrogating the system’s fun-
damental flaws, questioning the over-riding pursuit 
of economic growth at societal level and of short-term 
minded profit maximisation at corporate level, and of 
contemplating the full extent of long-term economic, 
environmental and social investment needs required 
to succeed.
Most regrettably, the linkages between ecological and 
social sources of progress continue to be by and large 
ignored or under-rated in the political and public 
debates - although a journey out of the meta-crisis is 
just not conceivable without relying fundamentally 
on social-ecological progress. 
This central call was already promoted by the first 
Independent Commission’s policy report at the end of 
2018.2 
This report developed the idea of sustainable well-be-
ing for all and already identified a wide range of 
policy recommendations with a focus on economic 
and social action. More than half of those recom-
mendations found their way at least partly into the 
current European agenda thanks to the insistence 
of the S&D Group in the European Parliament in the 
aftermath of the 2019 European elections. 
Through this new report, the current Independent 
Commission for Sustainable Equality widens the 
scope of the first report. 
It ambitions to re-think today’s laudable, yet insuf-
ficient, policy actions in order to fully address 
capitalism’s meta-crisis. It aims to advance a new 
comprehensive path towards truly sustainable 
human and planetary well-being. However, we do 
not pretend to have all the answers. But what we can 
do is to insist on the need for radical change, and to 
contribute to needed action through a comprehen-
sive set of transformative policy proposals. 
It should be taken for granted that the post-pandemic 
world within reach should not go back to business-
as-usual, but that it must considerably complete, 
accelerate, deepen and broaden those constructive 
policies already under way, such as the reform of the 
European Semester and of its underlying fiscal rules, 
the European Green Deal, or the Action Plan of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights.
2 https://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/sites/default/files/2020-06/en-report-of-the-independent-commission-for-sustainable-equality-2019-2024.pdf
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We need to shape a common 
future built on solidarity, human 
dignity and respect for nature, 
where economic activity is firmly 
framed within societal needs and 
planetary boundaries.«
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We need to shape a common future built on solidar-
ity, human dignity and respect for nature, where 
economic activity is firmly framed within societal 
needs and planetary boundaries. This model must 
lead to widespread sustainable human and plane-
tary well-being. This is most critical for our youth, 
to whom we owe a different and better future. We, 
progressives, want to commit to a new social and 
environmental contract signed between genera-
tions, ensuring justice between current and next 
generations but also among the existing ones.
Hence, a central endeavour for the Independent 
Commission for Sustainable Equality is to promote 
the view that it is both possible and necessary to 
reshape the system in which our societies operate in 
a way which will guarantee prosperity for all without 
depleting and destroying our planet, without exploit-
ing workers and without witnessing an ever-growing 
concentration of wealth and power that unduly limit 
individual freedom and opportunity and undermine 
democracy. 
Markets must function efficiently within a 
renewed regulatory framework to also serve the 
common good. Entrepreneurship and individual 
success will be safeguarded, and is recognised as 
one of the drivers of successful innovation, but 
it cannot be used to justify an excessive concen-
tration of wealth in the hands of the few. It must 
rather be based on equal opportunities, shared 
knowledge and access for all to a society without 
precarity. Innovation, scientific and technolog-
ical progress will be needed and fostered, but 
should serve the well-being of all, with their 
benefits fairly shared and widely accessible. 
Strong democracies must combine legitimate 
representation with widespread public partici-
pation and transparency at all stages and levels 
of political decision-making notably because 
improving public trust and cohesion in an era 
where they are being increasingly undermined by 
fake news and hostile propaganda is decisive.
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and profit-making. It will be 
measured against its wider ability 
to deliver sustainable well-being 
for all.«
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This society will not measure its performance 
essentially against the limited concepts of growth 
and profit-making. It will be measured against its 
wider ability to deliver sustainable well-being for 
all - catering for widely shared existential secu-
rity, stability, inclusion, opportunity and freedom 
in a society of equals who share a common destiny 
and on a, once again, healthy planet.
This report is a roadmap that should inspire the 
European project and also have a global reach. The 
European Union should recognise this path as global 
and universalist, by embracing the transition to a 
society of solidarity, human dignity and respect for 
nature as a fundamental undertaking for all human 
beings. This transition cannot be achieved by any 
of our member countries alone, nor ultimately by 
the European Union’s actions alone. In an intercon-
nected world, no single continent could lastingly 
sustain such a new model, not least the EU whose 
proportion in economic or demographic terms is 
becoming ever smaller. 
Nor could the EU’s isolated efforts towards restor-
ing global biodiversity, building climate resilience 
or ensuring social justice prove game-changing at a 
global scale. 
In its ambition to become a stronger global player, the 
European Union must actively seek to mobilise other 
world regions and countries. First of all, building on 
the existing United Nations agenda of sustainable 
development goals, which Europe needs to cham-
pion at home and abroad. Europe should sponsor new 
long-term strategic partnerships with other countries 
and regions across the world, to lay the foundations 
for stronger global governance. 
Last, we appeal to progressive forces in Europe and 
globally to engage with us. Progressives at large need 
to further strengthen and enrich the policy recom-
mendations in this report and beyond, and we need 
to join and mobilise forces and energies to achieve 
the necessary transformation. Our contribution will 
be key and, hence, our responsibility is immense.
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The policy proposals set out in this report 
are based on a number of concepts and 
analytical findings that figured centrally 
in the work of the ICSE and are part of new 
(or existing but up until now marginal) 
ways of thinking. By introducing and 
unpacking them, this section seeks to 
provide deeper insight into the emerging 
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Precarity: policy change must 
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Sustainable well-being requires 
vibrant democracy and widespread 
participation at all levels
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A recurring theme in the exchanges among ICSE 
members was that the decades-long adherence to 
neo-liberalism in the governance of advanced econo-
mies has created a widespread sense of anxiety among 
citizens that is rooted in ‘precarity’– a condition of 
economic insecurity and social vulnerability that 
harms people’s material and psychological welfare, 
as well as society’s capacity to cope with adversity 
and govern itself. Its source can be traced back to the 
central tenet of neo-liberal economic doctrine, which 
believes that, to remain competitive in the global race 
for profits and growth, societies need to fully embrace 
market forces and ensure they can play out as freely 
as possible in how resources, including labour, are 
allocated for production. Across Europe and much of 
the developed world, this belief has encouraged often 
painful reforms of labour markets, social security 
systems, and public services through deregulation 
and liberalisation projects. 
As a result, citizens are left exposed to the competi-
tive pressures of the increasingly integrated global 
economy and its volatility, without having much 
protection against social and material hardship as a 
result of social security reforms and labour market 
deregulation. The social consequences of this harsh 
credo include the striking result that no less than a 
fifth of the EU population is presently considered to 
be at risk of poverty and social exclusion. The political 
implications spread even further. Threats to individ-
ual and societal well-being do not seem to be being 
brought under control and, as a result of climate and 
demographic change, multiply further. 
Doubts are therefore being nurtured among the 
entire population as to whether dignified lifestyles 
and decent livelihoods can be maintained in the 
future, including among those who at present suc-
ceed in upholding comfortable middle class or even 
higher living standards. This generalised sense of 
vulnerability is making people averse to change, 
which is an additional obstacle for the large-scale 
social transformation that is urgently necessary.3 
In this climate of precarity, support for anti-estab-
lishment and anti-system discourses and movements 
abound, while trust in the ability of established 
political systems to foster individual and collective 
progress wane. This political alienation needs to be 
addressed and reversed if sustainable well-being for 
all is to become a reality. 
1.1.  Precarity: policy change must address  
anxiety, existential uncertainty and 
re-build trust in a regenerated political 
system genuinely dedicated to meeting  
people’s needs




a state of existence in 
which material provision 
and psychological 
wellness are adversely 
affected by a lack of 
secure livelihood
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1.2.  Inequalities:  
intersectionality 
and multiple  
dividends 
Another focal point of discussions was the impor-
tance of recognising the interrelationships between 
different kinds of inequality, of income and wealth 
or disparities relating to gender, ethnicity, or geog-
raphy. We discussed evidence that such inequalities 
are not only serious concerns for progressive pol-
itics, but also grave societal dysfunctions. For 
example, unequal societies create a climate of com-
petition, stress, and disillusionment that leads all 
members of society, not just the deprived, to suffer 
from reduced levels of well-being. 
Due to their detrimental impact on the overall perfor-
mance of societies across key well-being indicators 
such as mental and physical health, trust in democratic 
institutions, as well as on social peace and security, the 
radical reduction of such inequalities is a crucial pre-
requisite for achieving sustainable well-being for all.4
Different forms of inequality intersect with each 
other and form complex interrelationships. Recent 
contributions to the study of inequalities suggest 
that a systematic understanding of this intersecting 
and systemic nature of inequalities is aided by intro-
ducing a distinction between two broad categories of 
inequalities, and their distinct ways of influencing 
well-being outcomes. Firstly, inequalities stemming 
from demographic and geographic factors, such as 
those between men and women, ethnic groups, those 
with disabilities and those without, as well as between 
neighbourhoods or cities, are ‘horizontal’. In other 
words, they create divides between different sub-
groups of the population. Secondly, socio-economic 
inequalities, such as those of income and wealth, 
educational attainment, and access to political par-
ticipation and power, act vertically by creating social 
hierarchies within and across social groups in terms 
of access to resources and power (see Figure 1 below).
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Figure 1. Greater Manchester Independent Inequalities Commission (2021)
Such vertical inequalities act as pressures that 
aggravate horizontal inequalities. For example, soci-
eties marked by high degrees of income disparity 
(vertical) generally exhibit higher levels of gender 
inequality (horizontal) than countries with more 
equal distributions of income and wealth.5 We are 
not suggesting that vertical or horizontal forms of 
inequalities are more significant than others, but 
rather that it is important to understand how these 
various inequalities interlock and interact to deter-
mine well-being outcomes in societies. 
This way of looking at inequality, despite being rela-
tively complex and challenging progressives to avoid 
working on each separately, is instead extremely 
useful and productive. It heightens our understand-
ing of how policies can simultaneously be designed 
to produce beneficial results across various dimen-
sions of inequality. For example, policies aimed 
at mitigating vertical inequalities of educational 
opportunity can also soften disparities between 
native and migrant communities, thereby creating 
‘multiple dividends in terms of societal well-being. 
1.3.  Social-Ecological 
Progress: environ-
mental action as 
social policy
Social Justice and ecological justice have for long 
been in tension: solving the climate crisis and other 
environmental harms will need the mobilisation of 
massive economic resources, which at least in the 
short term threatens growth and jobs – the mate-
rial basis of social justice in present-day society. To 
reconcile social and environmental justice, it is not 
enough to do more about each. Thus, a return to the 
post-war growth-and-distribution policy formula is 
not advisable because this formula incurred a grave 
ecological trauma. We must find an alternative way 
to deliver social justice that is compatible with eco-
logical justice. Such an alternative is to replace the 
objective of increased affluence with a commitment 
to well-being, in which the pursuit of material pros-
perity is replaced by economic stability and social 
solidarity.6
Further, it has become clear that poverty, inequal-
ities, and ecological harm are closely related. In 
recent years, evidence has grown of how the socie-
tal impact of environmental degradation, climate 
change, and biodiversity loss is unevenly distributed 
among social groups along the same lines as pre-ex-
isting socio-economic inequalities.7 For example, 
poorer people find it harder to adapt their homes 
to changing environmental conditions than their 
wealthier neighbours, or low-income earners may be 
forced to live in areas which are particularly prone 
to environmental stress, such as those of flooding or 
pollution. Such divergences may also act as a driver 








5 Pickett, K. (2021): Fissures that tear us apart and pressures that weigh us all down, available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/fissures-that-tear-us-apart-and-pressures-that-weigh-us-all-down 
6 A. Azmanova, “Precarity, populism, and prospects for a Green Democratic Transformation,” openDemocracy (18/01/2021); A. Azmanova, “The big Green New Deal and its little red social question,” 
Social Europe (30/10/2019). 
7 European Environment Agency (2019): Unequal exposure and unequal impacts: social vulnerability to air pollution, noise and extreme temperatures in Europe, available at: https://www.eea.
europa.eu/publications/unequal-exposure-and-unequal-impacts and OECD (2021), “The Inequality-Environment Nexus: Towards a people-centred green transition”, OECD Green Growth Papers, 
2021-01, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/ca9d8479-en
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holds tend to rely more on food that comes from 
relatively low-cost but pollution-intensive industrial 
agriculture practices than do high-income families. 
It is therefore clear that all climate change and envi-
ronmental degradation-related policies, include a 
social dimension, inasmuch as they inevitably and 
automatically interact with existing social dispar-
ities. Addressing the socio-economic dimension of 
environmental policy and climate action explicitly 
not only constitutes basic fairness, but also creates 
opportunities to realise broader well-being gains for 
all and create virtuous circles rather than negative 
feedback loops. An example of this more positive 
and ‘joined up’ approach would be where policies 
designed to reduce income inequalities also reduce 
status consumption and consumerism, thus reduc-
ing over-consumption. By yielding both social and 
ecological gains, such policies can therefore be 
understood as social-ecological progress. 





participation at  
all levels
Participatory democracy must define the nature 
of the ambitious reform the EU should undergo to 
achieve human well-being goals and co-create the 
society of tomorrow. Participation is indeed not only 
a dimension of the transition to well-being, but also 
the method that must govern its definition and gov-
ernance: it is both an input and an output of human 
well-being. It should fight neoliberalism’s main fea-
ture that governed top-down decisions for too long, 
where citizens “count by voting, consuming and 
exerting their freedom to exit – from services, jobs 
and territories – not by using their voice and partici-
pating in a heated and open debate”. 
From participatory budgeting to workplace democ-
racy, from anti-consumerist consumption and 
supply chains to public utilities, the overriding goal 
is the re-articulation of power relationships between 
state, markets, and civil society. Restoring public 
debate, within parties and between public institu-
tions and stakeholders and people, place by place, is 
not only “just” in itself, but it is instrumentally nec-
essary in order to extract dispersed information and 
knowledge needed to design the necessary policies 
to achieve socio-ecological progress.
The work of the ICSE therefore rests on a synergetic 
approach to social and ecological justice that heals the 
tensions between the two through a comprehensive 
approach to well-being centred on social and eco-
logical solidarity. To this adds a three-dimensional 
approach to tackling social-ecological inequali-
ties with a view to reversing them into instances 
of social-ecological progress. Firstly, this means 
addressing inequalities of exposure and access, in 
other words, the unequal distribution of qualitative 
aspects of the natural environment between indi-
viduals and groups. The ‘quality’ in question may 
be negative (exposure to harmful environmental 
impacts) or positive (access to environmental ame-
nities such as water, energy, and green spaces). This 
would be the case, for instance, when policies to 
reduce income inequalities are combined with mea-
sures to alter consumption patterns so as to favour 
higher quality and more sustainably produced 
goods and services. Secondly, the report addresses 
the unequal effect of environmental policies on 
social groups (e.g., the unequal distribution of the 
effects of the energy, or circular economy, transition 
among individuals and groups). Thirdly, it addresses 
inequalities in participation in public policymaking 
not only as an issue of fairness, but also as a prereq-
uisite to ensuring a far better understanding of the 
possibilities of policies, increasing the likelihood of 
their acceptance by different groups in society, as 
well as their effective implementation.8 In effect the 
complex challenges of our time require a renewed 
democracy, which moves away from just being a top-
down expert informed and representative model, to 
one with wider engagement and deliberation.
8 Laurent, E. (2021): The European Green Deal: from growth strategy to social-ecological transition? In: Vanhercke B., Spasova S. and Fronteddu B. (eds.): Social policy in the European Union: state of play 
2020. Facing the pandemic, Brussels, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and European Social Observatory (OSE)
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1.5.  Countering 
precarity and 
inequalities 
depends on the 
social-ecological 
state
Dealing with what citizens today experience as 
uncontrolled threats to their well-being into man-
ageable, and hence acceptable, social risks requires 
rebuilding inclusive safety nets and collective insti-
tutions that address precarity, impoverishment and 
inequalities and keep them in check. At the same 
time, public authority – at all levels of government 
- needs to regain its capacity to govern in a socially 
responsible manner. 
The ICSE believes that this calls for more than a 
revival of the traditional social welfare state and 
its safeguards against the inevitable social and eco-
nomic risks of life. As sources of uncertainty and 
inequality multiply, new, particularly environmen-
tal risks, need to be integrated into what could be 
seen as a new form of social-ecological statehood.9 
Similarly to the traditional social welfare state, the 
social-ecological state must be concerned with pro-
tecting its citizens against precarity, deprivation 
and mitigating inequalities. This should include 
collective insurance mechanisms against all signif-
icant forms of economic, social, and environmental 
risks, as well as providing public goods and services 
that support individuals and communities in secur-
ing their livelihood and working towards a state of 
sustainable well-being for all through policies that 
foster social-ecological progress. 
This new logic of state action cannot be reduced 
to simple questions about the size of the state. 
The overarching question for the existence of the 
state is, rather, what objectives should governance 
follow and how should it act to achieve them. 
What is now clear, and has been particularly high-
lighted during COVID, is that state action is of 
vital importance to steer the transformation on 
the scale needed, but by itself is insufficient. We 
need to rather “recast the way in which economic 
organisations are governed, how their relation-
ships are structured and how economic actors and 
civil society relate to each other”.10 In other words, 
we need a much more widely spread participatory 
democracy where collaboration amongst different 
actors enables and ensures that well-being goals 
are met. The state should therefore not only be 
a provider of services, but also an ‘animator’ of 
action and partnerships at all levels, from local to 
national and international, as well as within eco-
nomic sectors, that are best placed to respond to 
multiple overlapping challenges. 
9 Laurent, E. (2021): The European Green Deal: from growth strategy to social-ecological transition? In: Vanhercke B., Spasova S. and Fronteddu B. (eds.): Social policy in the European Union: 
state of play 2020. Facing the pandemic, Brussels, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and European Social Observatory (OSE)
10 Mazzucato, M. (2021): Mission Economy – A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism, Allen Lane), p. 23
The 
social-ecological 










1.6.  Moving beyond 
growth and GDP 
as metrics of 
successful gover-
nance 
Despite related discussions in the past few years, 
most policymaking and governance in advanced 
economies remains based on the assumption that 
the expansion of societies’ economic capabilities, 
as expressed in terms of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and its growth, automatically leads to gains 
in societal well-being, as long as the traditional 
social welfare state ensures that the benefits of 
growth are fairly shared among the members of 
society. This is despite clear evidence that this 
approach has not benefited all people and areas, 
and has now been unmasked as constituting a 
threat to societal well-being itself. It also clashes 
with the natural limits of our environment. To 
fully realise a more social-ecological state requires 
replacing this single goal and measure. 
In contrast to growth-focussed ideas of human 
progress that equate well-being with affluence 
and cast it as a linear expansion of GDP, recent 
contributions to the economics of sustainability 
embrace different logics. 
A simple and now fairly well-known model of the 
‘doughnut economy’, for example, works within 
limits, firstly that societal and economic activity 
has to be confined by a range of environmental 
limits (beyond which humanity must reach) as well 
as an inner or lower boundary of limits which rep-
resents the minimum amount of resources, rights 
and capabilities necessary to ensure a fair and 
functioning world. Within those two limits a regen-
erative and distributive economy can operate. The 
task of the state and governance, in this reading, 
is to remain within the two limits demarcated by 
the doughnut, ensuring that citizens’ foundational 
well-being needs, e.g., for food and shelter, health 
care, education, and political participation, are 
fulfilled, and that the economy does not transgress 
the outer environmental limits (see Figure 2 - next 
page).11
The logic of social-ecological progress, builds on 
this model by emphasising that the relationship 
between society and its natural limits does not 
have to be restrictive but rather can be productive 
through policies which recognise and positively 
amplify the interrelationships mentioned above 
as well as by using available resources more effec-
tively and efficiently. In this way, we can see social 
progress and ecological progress working together. 
Government’s task is therefore to ensure that social 
and ecological systems relate to each other in ways 
that produce mutually reinforcing, positive feed-
back loops.12
To achieve this, the social-ecological state has to 
systematically be able to recognise opportunities 
to unlock multiple dividends in terms of social and 
ecological well-being. In other words, addressing 
social inequalities and vulnerabilities in ways that 
simultaneously reduce society’s ecological foot-
print and vice versa. 
We can see social progress and 
ecological progress working 
together.«
»
11 Raworth, K. (2017): Doughnut Economics – Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist, Random House




































































































































































































An example of this approach would be when policies 
to mitigate housing inequalities and deficiencies are 
delivered through investments in energy-efficient 
social housing, and thus establish a ‘justice-sus-
tainability nexus’. Social policy of this kind thus 
contributes to the achievement of environmental 
objectives, such as less dependence on fossil fuels. 
At the same time, this leads to environmental gains 
that yield further social dividends by reducing the 
incidence of air pollution-induced illnesses among 
the population, thereby opening up a health-envi-
ronment or ‘full health nexus’. In turn, this leads to 
cost savings in public health systems that increase 
the social-ecological states’ ability to invest in fur-
ther positive feedback loops of social-ecological 
progress (see Figure 3). 
1.7.  COVID-19 allows 
us to question the 
status quo and to 
bounce forward
Creating positive feedback loops of social-ecolog-
ical progress will also require work on the part of 
the social-ecological state to support and enable 
behavioural change in society. Western societies for 
example have been built on the understanding that 
well-being can be described as a direct function of an 
individuals’ access to goods and services. Therefore, 
ensuring that citizens are able to enjoy constantly 
expanding consumption opportunities counts as the 
most meaningful way to achieve progress at the indi-
vidual and collective levels. This ‘consumerist’ and 
‘individualist’ concept of well-being and progress, 
however, is viable only as long as it is embedded in 
an extractive, growth-focused, and hence unsus-
tainable economic model. 
Alongside a more productive and regenerative use of 
available resources, (made more urgent considering an 
increasing population worldwide), the need to reduce 
growing isolation and recognising the well-being ben-
efits of more connection and collaboration between 
people, will require broadening and overcoming this 
conception as an important way to achieving sustain-
able well-being for all, now and for future generations. 
Arguably, the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a water-
shed moment that has helped citizens to understand 
that far-reaching changes in the organisation of society 

































Reduced desire for 
material consumption
Figure 3, Eloi Laurent (2021)
By providing first-hand experience of how conven-
tional thinking and lifestyles have been disrupted, the 
coronavirus crisis has led societies around the world 
to understand how seemingly mundane and natural 
activities can also be sources of profound risk. In this 
sense, the pandemic has created a paradoxical situa-
tion in which people had to endure isolation, anxiety, 
and, in many cases, reduced access to many resources, 
yet experienced and valued many acts of solidarity, 
communitarianism, and collective kindness. Despite 
the deeply challenging and often troubling way in 
which citizens have come to understand this, the 
experience of the pandemic is also rife with exam-
ples which may serve as a source of encouragement 
for the transformation that the social-ecological state 
will need to lead. For example, local initiatives to orga-
nise assistance for the elderly and isolated, as well as 
the widespread acceptance of changes in personal 
behaviours for the good of the community, can be read 
as articulations of a desire for more common purpose 
and social cohesion.13 Encouraging examples of local 
community activism can be observed in localities that 
are already applying a collaborative and well-being-fo-
cussed logic in local self-governance and the provision 
of public services.14 
As an existential crisis, the pandemic has thus led many 
in our communities to re-evaluate what is important for 
building a fair, healthy, and resilient society, and how 
individual freedom is only really possible in conjunction 
with collective engagement. Arguably, this exemplifies 
and perhaps marks the launch of a much needed trans-
formation of society and its consumerist foundations, 
through bottom-up processes driven by citizens’ sense 
of civic duty, as well as the personal and collective ben-
efits from acting together for the common good. It also 
provides an opportunity to take the notion of freedom 
back from its neoliberal and individualistic meaning, 
towards a more responsible and connected one, to the 
community/society as a whole and to the planet.
Similar reactions to the disruption of ‘business as usual’ 
can also be seen at the political level – even if they 
remain, as this report argues, embryonic and incom-
plete. In the European Union, calls quickly emerged 
that the economic and social crisis caused by the pan-
demic must not lead to the abolition, but instead to the 
acceleration of the transformational ambition of EU 
policy started by the European Green Deal. 
This quickly developed into a broad political consensus 
across party lines, and the collective sense of urgency 
has provided fertile ground to enable a similar, 
although incomplete impetus to accelerate Europe’s 
transition to a carbon-neutral economic model by 
2050. This includes the deployment of policy measures, 
such as joint public debt issuance under the EU ‘Recov-
ery and Resilience Facility’, that would have been 
met with insurmountable resistance from certain EU 
Member States under normal circumstances. Similar 
developments are gaining traction in the United States, 
where a new administration has pledged to roll out a 
number of large-scale investment packages focussing 
on climate action and the mitigation of socio-economic 
inequalities that represent a clear breakaway from 
deeply entrenched policy path dependencies. 
However incomplete these initiatives may be, espe-
cially as regards the lack of a clear focus on social 
objectives such as the mitigation of social vulnera-
bilities and inequalities in the case of the EU policy 
response, they clearly indicate that governments 
across the global West are opening a window of 
opportunity for decisive policy change. If this 
opening is not to be transitory, we must seize this 
opportunity for fundamental change.





The journey away from the traditional vision of 
human development, centered around GDP, to a new 
vision of sustainable human progress is collective 
as much as individual. The different dimensions of 
such development need to be in harmony, from the 
individual, to the local, regional, national, European, 
and global, as much as for human and non-human 
forms of life within the planetary ecosystem. 
13 Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2020): Why coronavirus might just create a more equal society in Britain, available at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/04/coronavirus-equal-society-britain-well-being-economic-growth 
14 A compilation of such examples has been put together by the PES Group in the European Committee of the Regions:  
https://www.pes.cor.europa.eu/covid-19-progressive-cities-and-regions-share-solidarity-projects 
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15 Pickett, K., Wilkinson, R. (2010). The spirit level: Why equality is better for everyone. Penguin 
Pickett, K., Wilkinson, R. (2019). The inner level: How More Equal Societies Reduce Stress, Restore Sanity and Improve Everyone’s Well-being. Penguin
16 Azmanova, A. (2020). Capitalism on Edge: How Fighting Precarity Can Achieve Radical Change Without Crisis or Utopia. Columbia University Press ; Azmanova, A., “Countering precarity: social resilience through a 
political economy of trust,” in Resilience in EU and International Institutions. Redefining Local Ownership in a New Global Governance Agenda, edited by Elena Korosteleva and Trine Flockhart (Routledge, 2020).
17 Laurent, E. (2020). Et si la santé guidait le monde? L’espérance de vie vaut mieux que la croissance. LLL, Les liens qui libèrent.
Such development, as this report argues, can only be 
achieved by moving today’s global economic model 
from its dominant reliance on intense competition 
at all levels, to a new model built on cooperation and 
participation in full respect of our planet’s boundar-
ies. 
However, while collective notions of sustainable 
development are widely used and interpreted, the 
individual implications may be overlooked and 
therefore lack clear implications and interpreta-
tions, especially for their use at political level. The 
ground-breaking work on inequalities,15 and on pre-
carity16 as set out in previous sections above, have 
provided essential elements to bring the collective 
and the individual together. Further elements of cre-
ating a new synthesis or way forward has also been 
developed through the social-ecological framework 
notably in the context of the ongoing health crisis).17 
Further work in these directions is needed.
Any attempt to provide a comprehensive academic 
frame would go well beyond the remit and role of this 
report. However, it is important to signal that the 
global transformations this report calls for need to 
clearly relate to the individual level and have results 
which people see as positive improvements in their 
lives. The ICSE calls this ‘sustainable well-being for 
all’. This is not just a new concept or way of seeing 
things but needs to be a political framework which 
is relevant for effective, convincing political action, 
narratives and discourses that promote sustainable 
transformations in a way that resonates with, and 
has the backing of individual citizens.
It is therefore important to set out some principles 
or ground rules for this concept in a way which can 
inform political action :
• The realisation of individual sustainable 
well-being has to be framed within the wider 
imperative of sustainable development, 
bringing individual and planetary well-being 
together. Hence, policies supporting individual 
needs and aspirations must be compatible with, 
and a driver of the realisation of sustainable 
development at aggregate level. 
• The achievement of sustainable development 
as a whole must lead to an enhanced and wide-
spread fulfilment of sustainable well-being 
in terms of human needs and aspirations at 
the individual level. This can be achieved by 
unlocking the full potential of social-ecological 
progress through appropriate policies and by 
ensuring widespread democratic and civic par-
ticipation in their realisation.
• The achievement of sustainable well-being 
for all is driven primarily by the dynamics of 
cooperation instead of competition. This prin-
ciple should apply at all levels from the local to 
the global and across economic sectors ensur-
ing that increased well-being of some does not 
lower or limit the well-being of others, or of 
the ecosystem. This will require, as this report 
argues, a comprehensive transformation of the 
underlying model of capitalism
• Sustainable well-being for all is conditioned 
upon sustained, far-reaching, coordinated 
and participative public policy at all levels, 
which ensures a far higher degree of equality 
and cohesion across our societies, a truly just 
transition to a sustainable economy, a solid and 
shared sense of socio-economic security, wide-
spread resilience and adaptive capacity in the 
face of future risks and crises, as well as trans-
parent, and participatory democracy.
• Last, but not least, it is crucial that sustainable 
well-being for all is incompatible with the 
persistence of poverty or social exclusion in 
any form or shape. Hence, any future sustain-
able society worthy of this qualification must 
be built on the premise that “nobody is left 
behind”. Appropriate public policy mechanisms 
will need to be in place both to realise these 
outcomes and also to ensure that this is as an 
individual and enforceable right which is acces-
sible to anyone. 
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The economic system that gradually 
emerged from the second World War 
and progressively took hold across the 
globe, has been associated with historic 
levels of progress in human prosperity 
and security in many parts of the world, 
and certainly so in the European Union. 
However, it is strikingly evident today 
that its inherent flaws and conflicts have 
become unsustainable.
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The economic system that gradually emerged from 
the second World War and progressively took hold 
across the globe, has been associated with historic 
levels of progress in human prosperity and secu-
rity in many parts of the world, and certainly so in 
the European Union. However, it is strikingly evi-
dent today that its inherent flaws and conflicts have 
become unsustainable. They have generated human 
and planetary costs of a magnitude that increasingly 
outweighs the system’s traditional benefits. At the 
same time, the joint effect of the global pandemic 
and the defeat of trumpism open a global political 
window of opportunity of potentially historic signif-
icance, which the European Union is ideally placed 
to seize upon in the interest of global sustainable 
well-being.
Our societies are entangled in a succession of multi-
ple crises. While the devastating effects of the 2008 
financial crisis are still being felt after more than 
a decade, the COVID-19 pandemic spread across 
the globe. It threatens to make the world and the 
EU lastingly more fragile: more divided politically, 
economically and socially, leaving more people and 
regions behind as unemployment and poverty rise 
exponentially. At the same time, climate change and 
the continuing destruction of our planet’s biodiver-
sity are increasingly endangering human livelihoods 
across the globe. They reveal new sources of inequal-
ity, such as those of responsibility and vulnerability. 
Public opinion is rapidly becoming aware of the full 
extent of these crises, sparking anxiety and alien-
ation among ever larger social groups. 
If nothing or too little is done in due time, the risk 
that this rapid succession of crises multiplies and 
accelerates even further is real, and their effects 
could become irreversible and uncontrollable in the 
course of this century. 
There should be no doubt that these crises are borne 
out of a flawed global economic system, itself embed-
ded in an outdated system of global governance 
largely inherited from the post-war time. For many, 
these crises are the striking and chilling expressions 
of those deep-rooted flaws. But they are not the only 
ones. Rising inequalities, persistent poverty and 
precariousness, left-behind regions and entire coun-
tries, mass migration or the widespread attacks on 
democracy and rule of law are equally worrying and 
unsustainable. Together, they form a complex net-
work of grave dysfunctions in the global economic 
system. They constantly feed into each other, ampli-
fying each other’s destructive effects on the system 
as a whole.
While the COVID-19 pandemic may come to an end, 
its aftermath is here to stay. Furthermore, we cannot 
exclude new pandemics emerging as long as we do 
not address their root causes. 
2.1.  The need for 
another future
Public opinion is rapidly 
becoming aware of the full extent 
of these crises, sparking anxiety 




The pandemic has sent unprecedented shockwaves 
through our economic and social structures, expos-
ing deep flaws and creating new hazards, notably for 
future financial stability and for the social fabric. 
Inappropriate post-crisis macroeconomic gover-
nance could easily trap European economies in 
persistently low growth and high unemployment, 
with a new risk of secular stagnation or even decline. 
Second, a sober analysis of the root causes of the 
global public health crisis leads us to assume that 
a further proliferation of pathogenic viruses can 
only be judged as likely, especially as one recalls the 
long list of zoonotic diseases, such as SARS, MERS, 
Ebola and Zika, that have led to serious epidemics in 
recent decades. The expansion and intensification of 
farming and livestock activities has also contributed 
to declining biodiversity, increasing animals’ and 
humans’ vulnerabilities. In addition, high popula-
tion density in close proximity to volatile ecosystems 
and their immersion into global trade and supply 
chains has clearly increased the risk of transmission 
of deadly pathogens to humans. The next outbreak 
may well deal a fatal blow to the worlds and Europe’s 
societies and economies. 
Yet even if the COVID-19 pandemic has already 
caused more than two million fatalities and laid 
bare global fragilities, the disruption it caused 
will, according to UN Secretary-General António 
Guterres, be ‘pale in comparison’ to what is to be 
expected if the global community fails to act in the 
face of climate change. 
While the climate crisis is currently at a relatively 
early stage, humanity is already moving towards a 
situation where the planet could become increasingly 
uninhabitable. Further inaction would cause major 
and irreversible damage, leading directly to what the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
defined as “tipping points” two decades ago: high 
impact events that are interconnected across different 
ecological systems, setting off uncontrollable chain 
reactions. In this scenario, humanity would be faced 
with a rapid succession of varied shocks, increas-
ingly strong and close: heat waves, droughts, floods, 
cyclones, and emerging diseases. Areas that are home 
to a large part of the world’s population would either 
become unliveable or no longer exist as they are sub-
merged by rising sea levels. 
As individual events, such crises may appear man-
ageable, but their constant repetition, with only 
short phases of stability in between, would make it 
impossible to bounce back. If not properly addressed, 
climate change and other major environmental 
threats could thus erode the range of human rights 
and possibilities available to future generations – 
putting the right to life, food, shelter and health at 
bay, first and foremost for those who are not part of 
the exclusive group of the privileged. 
The COVID-19 and climate crises also exacerbate 
the growing emergency generated by economic and 
social inequalities, as well as profound pressures on 
the health system from an ageing population and the 
rising burden of mental health (itself partly related 
to economic insecurity and poverty). 
As a result, certain groups in society are much 
more exposed than others to the health and eco-
nomic risks caused by the spread of the current 
pandemic after two decades marked by the burst-
ing of financial bubbles fuelled by inequalities 
within and between countries. The same holds true 
for the climate crisis. Available evidence indicates 
that pre-existing inequalities cause disadvantaged 
groups to suffer disproportionately from the adverse 
effects of climate change. This leads to the further 
aggravation of such divides, and the bill for the 
seemingly endless multitude of crises is handed 
down to ordinary citizens. In a way similar to the 
austerity following the financial crash of 2008, they 
see their well-being dwindle while the profiteers of a 
crashed system leave the scene unscathed, and even 
further enriched. This is especially unfair since the 
poorest sectors of the world population, including in 
Europe, have limited responsibility for greenhouse 
gas emissions and other environmental detriments.
The world’s richest 1 percent, those with 




As our societies and economies fall from one crisis 
to the next, ever larger social groups already either 
experience hardship and deprivation themselves 
or fear that this is what the future will hold. In this 
context of radical uncertainty, the trust gluing soci-
ety together is replaced with unpredictability that 
haunts everyone except a select few (the world’s rich-
est 1 percent, those with more than $1 million, own 44 
percent of the world’s wealth). Potentially, this could 
lead us into a society in which low-income earners are 
exposed to environmental stress and collapse while 
their privileged peers enjoy safety, continue to amass 
wealth and influence, and steer the political agenda 
in their self-interest. In all likelihood, this massive 
concentration of resources in the hands of ever fewer 
people poses a real threat to economic, social and 
democratic systems that we all need to address. 
Ultimately, the accumulation of more severe crises 
in the longer term would make it impossible for gov-
ernments and society at large to safeguard the social 
fabric that underpins our democratic societies. They 
would literally deconstruct our societies, towards a 
journey into the unknown. 
2.2.  The possibility of 
another future
These crises are not born out of nowhere. They are 
the recurring and intensifying product of a global 
economy built on market rule, excessive economic 
power accumulation and a single overriding pur-
pose: the relentless pursuit of short-term oriented 
maximum growth at societal and at company levels 
coupled to an increased concentration of private 
wealth. This has led national economies and com-
panies worldwide into an endless competitive race 
within an increasingly de-regulated frame, feeding 
itself with environmental destruction, the disrup-
tion of the planet’s climate, widespread precarity, 
persisting unemployment and a rising concentration 
of wealth in the hands of the few.
 
This process is magnified today by the global tech 
giants - threatening privacy and autonomy, paying 
absurdly low levels of tax on their profits, neutral-
ising start-up innovations through wide-spread 
buy-ups, and blocking social progress where ever 
possible.18 While for decades this model’s benefits 
appeared to outweigh its costs, this trade-off has 
reversed and its costs increasingly outweigh any 
benefits.
Thanks to an increasing awareness and recognition 
of the challenges at stake, in 2015, the United Nations 
agreed on a worldwide sustainable development 
strategy, embodied in the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals to be achieved by 2030, and gov-
ernments signed up to the Paris climate agreement. 
The first report by Progressive Society’s Independent 
Commission for Sustainable Equality was launched 
at the end of 2018 to promote a radically new 
approach towards sustainable well-being in the eco-
nomic and social spheres. In 2019, the new European 
Commission formed after the European elections, 
responded to these and other calls from progres-
sive political forces for an alternative policy agenda 
with the European Green Deal and with a promise 
to leave no-one behind through a just transition. 
These policy changes are milestones in the pursuit 
of an alternative model of development. However, 
they still fall short of defining the full terms of the 
transformative changes we need, notably because 
they stop short of changing the over-reliance on 
economic growth and profit-maximisation, and of 
incorporating powerful social-ecological levers of 
progress into their policy logics. Furthermore, the 
on-going pandemic provides an even more press-
ing but also positive opportunity for major change, 
which we have to seize.
In most parts of the world, including much of the 
EU, prevailing climate policies remain well below 
what is required to avoid devastating climate change 
in the future. Environmental progress remains too 
determined by what markets are ready or able to 
achieve. It also stays largely disconnected from 
social progress, while they should go firmly hand in 
hand. The root causes of precarity remain largely 
unaddressed, poverty persists, and the growing con-
centration of wealth remains largely unchallenged. 
Regional divides between poorer and wealthier ter-
ritories remain entrenched or grow even further.
18 Notably exemplified by Amazon’s on-going battle against the unionisation of its staff
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Democratic participation remains too limited to 
traditional forms, while the rule of law and free-
dom of expression are increasingly challenged. 
Policies to build new resilience and adaptive 
capacity to future shocks, especially with regard 
to climate change impacts, are only in their 
infancy and risk falling short of a socially embed-
ded approach.
A new model of progress needs to be defined 
for another future – one that will be freed from 
continuous crisis management and focused on 
sustainable human and planetary well-being. It 
is crucial to make a clear distinction between the 
notion of progress and the notion of growth in the 
political discourse, the common understanding 
and the vast array of policies needed to achieve 
such well-being.
This is the challenge that the Independent Com-
mission for Sustainable Equality (ICSE) strives to 
meet. To this end, it follows the aim of providing 
people and institutions with a credible and feasi-
ble choice to comprehensively rebuild our model of 
development. This new model of progress should 
cater for society’s shared well-being (human ful-
filment), prove resilient (resistance to shocks) and 
replace radical uncertainty with radical sustain-
ability (caring about the future) in all dimensions 
of human existence and cooperation. It should also 
be embedded in a new contract with planet Earth, 
ensuring its preservation and re-generation.
Existing political paradigms define proxies of 
human progress, such as economic growth or the 
advancement of a national cause and calibrate 
their political compasses accordingly. The ICSE 
rejects such reductionist and ill-fated strategies 
and instead embraces the fact that well-being is a 
multi-facetted, complex, and fluid matter. It cannot 
be re-framed as a one-dimensional problem, be it in 
economic, social, or environmental terms. Instead, 
it defines its mission as the pursuit of sustain-
able human and planetary well-being. It sketches 
out proposals for a societal framework that gives 
room to achieve the aspirations and ambitions 
of all individuals and their local, regional, and 
global communities without exploiting others, the 
environment or future generations, and without 
creating new and further risks. For the pursuit of 
this form of well-being, it is critical to understand 
and to ensure that human well-being is only possi-
ble in a sustainable and widespread way if it falls 
within our planet’s well-being, hence our repeated 
insistence on the central importance of a social-eco-
logical nexus in all policies.
The policy roadmap we seek to define rests on the 
conviction that, in full respect of the clear natural 
limits policymakers across the globe are gradually 
acknowledging, humanity can still turn this planet 
into a place of well-being for all. This should be 
viewed as the guiding light for all progressives in 
politics and beyond, in a common battle for another 
future.
Human well-being is only 
possible in a sustainable and 




Transforming Europe into a continent 
that caters for sustainable well-being 
for all, challenges us to embark on 
a journey of fundamental change. 
Changing, and indeed re-defining 
capitalism, lies at the core of this 
challenge. Recent years, particularly 
since the global financial crisis of 2007-
8, have led citizens around the world to 
understand the destructive nature of 
the global race for profits and growth. 
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Around the world, policymaking and governance 
since World War II have followed a single, overrid-
ing objective: maximising gross domestic product 
(GDP) through measures that spur economic growth. 
Although this policy orientation has been able to 
create unprecedented material wealth, its limits 
and shortcomings are becoming increasingly evi-
dent. During the past forty years in particular, the 
narrow-minded fixation on GDP growth has gone 
hand in hand with widening inequalities, poverty, 
and existential insecurity affecting large parts of the 
population and accelerated the destruction of the 
planet’s climate and biosphere. 
Overcoming these multiple social and environmen-
tal crises requires more than the current modest 
attempts to tame the growth dogma through the 
adoption of climate action targets. Fostering wide-
spread well-being and social cohesion under the 
conditions of environmental sustainability requires 
that Europe adopts an agnostic outlook on economic 
growth. It depends on a framework for governance 
that places legally binding policy objectives that 
directly support the sustainable well-being of people 
and planet at its core and systematically aligns poli-
cymaking and public finances. Such objectives must 
relate to the social, economic, and ecological dimen-
sion of sustainability and well-being, hence include 
targets for the reduction of poverty and inequalities, 
and greenhouse gas emissions, and translate into 
evidence-based long-term-oriented policies that 
are underpinned by sufficient financial resources 
to mobilise the necessary investments. This implies 
comprehensive reforms of the EU fiscal and finan-
cial framework, as well as effective governance 
mechanisms through which EU Member States, 
parliaments and stakeholders jointly identify chal-
lenges, set priorities, and implement policies that 
enhance the well-being of people and planet on a 
lasting basis. 
Achieving sustainable well-being for all will 
also require reforms in the financial sector and 
the digital economy, the two sectors in which 
the paradigm of limitless and extractive growth 
continues to ravage most forcefully, and which 
continue to shape the entire economy along these 
lines. In terms of financial sector reform, a key 
challenge lies in re-allocating capital from unsus-
tainable forms of economic activities into sectors, 
projects, and businesses with clear benefits for 
the sustainable human and planetary well-being. 
This implies deepening and accelerating the EU 
sustainable finance agenda, including by com-
plementing measures aimed at the promotion 
of ‘green’ finance with action to bolster socially 
sustainable finance. In the digital economy, new 
regulatory frameworks and more capable public 
authorities, both in terms of regulation and 
enforcement, are key to ensure digitalisation, a 
mega-trend shaping lives and livelihoods around 
the world in ever more powerful ways, is no longer 
driven exclusively by a small number of global 
mega-corporations that discount the public inter-
est in the pursuit of profits.
Economic change in the interest of sustainable 
well-being for all also relies on far-reaching 
changes in the corporate sector, where environ-
mental sustainability and the well-being of people 
and their communities must become central 
concerns in all aspects and at all stages of busi-
ness activities. This can be achieved by means 
of a European Responsible Capitalism Act that 
replaces the pursuit of shareholder value with 
a broadly defined sense of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, inter alia by obliging companies 
to define comprehensive sustainability strategies 
and to report on their implementation, respect 
for environmental standards, and fundamental 
rights through effective due diligence provisions. 
Supporting stakeholder-oriented companies, for 
instance benefit corporations or the social econ-
omy, are another building block of such a strategy. 
Lastly, engaging the private sector in productive, 
so-called mission-oriented forms of innovation 
that deliver solutions to meet well-being and sus-
tainability-related challenges must be considered 
key putting economic activity in Europe at the 
service of sustainable well-being for all. 
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Transforming Europe into a continent that caters 
for sustainable well-being for all, challenges us 
to embark on a journey of fundamental change. 
Changing, and indeed re-defining capitalism, lies at 
the core of this challenge. Recent years, particularly 
since the global financial crisis of 2007-8, have led 
citizens around the world to understand the destruc-
tive nature of the global race for profits and growth. 
According to a poll published shortly before the out-
break of the COVID-19 pandemic, which itself laid 
bare even more of global capitalism’s fault lines, a 
majority of respondents in advanced economies do 
not believe they will be better off in five years’ time. 
Additionally, more than half of respondents globally 
believe that capitalism in its current form is doing 
more harm than good in the world.19 Such fears 
and resentment are not fantasy. Every year, global 
capitalism consumes almost twice as many natural 
resources as the planet is able to regenerate,20 while 
the wealthiest 1% earn more than the entire bottom 
half of the population.21
As discussed in chapter 1 of this report, the sense 
of anxiety, the impoverishment, and the constantly 
growing inequalities have no place in a society of 
well-being for all. 
This calls for a social-ecological state to emerge 
which changes our course to ensure the well-being 
of people and planet. 
Such sweeping change is only conceivable through 
joint change at all levels of our economic system 
- and the way it is governed, particularly within 
the two most pivotal sectors of our economy today 
(financial and digital), and at the level of each and 
every company.
At the macro level of economic governance and policy, 
this requires a new political compass. While govern-
ments in Europe are hesitant to accept that society’s 
well-being and progress cannot be equated with the 
growth rate of the economy, trailblazers across the 
world are showing that a different approach is pos-
sible and delivers better outcomes for people and 
planet. We therefore invite the EU, its institutions and 
Member States to get serious and to adopt a different 
set of policy objectives that go beyond GDP growth, 
implement improved fiscal and economic policies to 
achieve them, and get serious through policy coor-
dination and governance which makes sustainable 
well-being for all a reality for all Europeans. 
Thinking about economic reform without con-
sidering the role of the financial sector would be 
doomed to fail. Like no other sector, finance has 
nurtured the logic of eternal growth propagated by 
neo-liberalism. Switching to a more sustainable and 
well-being-oriented model must therefore necessar-
ily encompass financial sector reform of a kind that 
not only opens new, sustainable markets but truly 
re-allocates capitalism towards more sustainable 
and well-being-related goals. 
3.1.  Introduction
Recent years have led citizens 
around the world to understand 
the destructive nature of the 
global race for profits and 
growth.«
»
19 Edelman Trust Barometer 2020, available at: https://www.edelman.com/trust/2020-trust-barometer
20 https://www.overshootday.org/
21 Thomas Blanchet, Lucas Chancel, Amory Gethin (2019): Forty years of inequality in Europe: Evidence from distributional national accounts, available at: https://rb.gy/fdzslf
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Alongside the financial sector, the digital economy 
has emerged as a new, all-permeating force that 
works to submit all of society and the economy to a 
logic of maximum profit extraction to the benefit of 
a tiny number of overly powerful companies. Digital 
technologies create fantastic opportunities to nur-
ture freedom, equality, and efficiency in the pursuit 
of sustainable well-being. But they must be used 
wisely within a framework that ensures their com-
mitment to the principles of sustainable well-being. 
At the micro level, an economy nurturing the sus-
tainable well-being of society requires all businesses 
to become committed to creating public value in 
all dimensions of their operations. This requires 
rethinking the rulebook by which corporations play, 
as well as rethinking who should have a say in com-
pany matters and what goals such organisations 
pursue. Fortunately, already today, there are feasible 
concepts of corporate governance and approaches to 
doing business that can make a difference if used 
wisely and nurtured properly. 
3.2.  The time to move 
beyond GDP is now
Around the world, policymaking since the end of 
World War II has been guided by the idea that the 
success of societies can be measured in terms of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) they generate. 
According to this logic, societies managing to grow 
the total output of goods and services are thought 
to be experiencing progress, based on the belief 
that economic growth automatically translates into 
employment and income growth for households, 
while at the same time growing the tax base and 
income of welfare states that foster the well-being of 
society at large (see figure).











This reductionist paradigm does not constitute a fact 
of nature. In fact, the notion of equating economic 
growth with societal well-being and progress proved 
contentious even among the economists on whose 
work it builds, and only succeeded due to the unique 
historic and political context of the post-World War 
II era.22 Once accomplished, however, the fetishiza-
tion of economic growth has led to drastic outcomes 
over time. Being judged in terms of the GDP growth 
its policies foster at regular intervals, government 
action is driven mainly by considerations pertaining 
to the short-term needs of the economy. Trusting in 
the teachings of neo-liberal economics, which posits 
that intense global competition constitutes the safest 
route to growing GDP, politics, for decades, has been 
occupied with organising the submission of society 
and nature to growth paradigm. 
In the European Union, this model of policymaking 
continues to enjoy the support of an almost orthodox 
following. Despite growing awareness of how the 
highly negative externalities of the race for the con-
stant expansion of GDP lie at the core of the mounting 
climate emergency, EU policy fails to come to terms 
with this. Indeed, by presenting the European Green 
Deal (EGD), its foundational strategy piece for the 
22 Lepenies, P. (2016): The Power of a Single Number - A Political History of GDP. Columbia University Press, New York
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coming years that aims to make the achievement 
of greenhouse gas-neutrality by 2050 possible, as 
‘Europe’s new growth strategy’, the European Com-
mission hardly leaves a doubt about its adherence to 
the belief that limitless economic continues to rep-
resent the high road to catering for the well-being of 
people and planet. 
Accordingly, EU policymaking remains based above 
all on considerations relating to the economic cost 
of regulation and has obliged itself to refrain from 
advancing regulation altogether if expected benefits 
cannot be proved to outweigh economic costs with 
certainty.23 As will be discussed in further detail 
below, this policy approach is further fortified by a 
tightly knit framework for the economic and fiscal 
policies of Eurozone countries. Out of concern for the 
prevention of fiscal instability, the members of the 
Economic and Monetary Union are obliged to comply 
with precise target values for their fiscal performance 
that are defined in proportion to the GDP their econo-
mies turn out and, by extension, effectively lock them 
into a race for continuous economic growth. 
This stubborn orientation of EU policy towards the 
single, overriding goal of GDP growth contrasts 
sharply with scientific evidence built over the past 
decades. As is becoming increasingly clear, the vir-
tuous circle that classical economic theory assumes 
to exist between GDP growth, jobs, income, and 
society’s wealth and well-being does not only seem 
to have fallen apart in the era of neo-liberal globali-
sation but, in important respects, has reversed into 
a vicious circle. 
The link between growth and jobs is broken
Research conducted by the OECD finds that GDP 
expansion in advanced economies increasingly 
fails to translate into proportional increases in 
employment. Accordingly, periods of dynamic GDP 
expansion in advanced economies now frequently 
go along with only modest employment gains or 
even co-exist with employment stagnation. At the 
same time, economies in which significant rises in 
employment rates are recorded, as in the case of Ger-
many since 2005, do so even under the conditions of 
modest growth.24, 25 Accordingly, growth and employ-
ment, at least in OECD countries, are becoming 
economic variables that grow increasingly indepen-
dent of each other. What is more is that the quality 
of employment appears to be declining both in econ-
omies with strong and those with weak growth. As 
chapter 6 of this report will discuss in more detail, 
the EU workforce is increasingly affected by forms of 
insecure and precarious employment and struggles 
to make ends meet. At present, a full 15% of the EU 
workforce live on wages that are below the national 
poverty line, despite working full time.26
Growth does not make (most of) society any more 
wealthy
A similar decoupling has occurred in relation to 
income. As a result of pro-market reforms aimed at 
boosting the economy’s growth potential, inequali-
ties in terms of income and wealth have widened to 
an extent that GDP growth translates into greater 
income only for the top echelons of society, while 
large parts of society hardly benefit from the econo-
my’s expansion at all. Of the GDP growth recorded in 
the EU between 1980 and 2017, 17% has ended up in 
the pockets of the top 1% of the income scale, while 
the entire bottom 50% had to scramble for a 15% 
slice of such growth.27 
At the same time, the increased international 
mobility of capital and wealth that goes along with 
globalisation exposes welfare states to intense 
competition, implying that a lesser faction of such 
income can be levied to finance welfare policies that 
foster the well-being of society at large. 
23 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making, available at:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016Q0512%2801%29 
24 OECD (2020) How’s life? 2020: measuring well-being, Paris, OECD Publishing
25 Klinger S. and Weber E. (2020) GDP-employment decoupling in Germany, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 52, 82-98.
26 European Trade Union Institute (2021): Benchmarking Working Europe 2020, p. 110-1
27 Thomas Blanchet, Lucas Chancel, Amory Gethin (2019): Forty years of inequality in Europe: Evidence from distributional national accounts, available at: https://rb.gy/fdzslf 
15% of the EU workforce live on wages 
that are below the national poverty line, 
despite working full time.
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Accordingly, neither household income nor public 
income benefit from the growth advanced econo-
mies manage to turn out under the conditions of 
present-day globalisation, causing the link between 
the expansion of GDP and the expansion of societal 
well-being to wane.28 
The effects of the growth paradigm undermine its 
own viability
What is more is that the relentless pursuit of GDP 
growth it is evidently turning into a self-defeating 
strategy, which, if nothing else, should concern even 
the most enthusiastic proponents of the GDP mantra.
 
Research conducted by the OECD finds clear evi-
dence of how the rise of inequalities that has been 
associated with GDP growth in recent decades 
progressively undermines the ability of advanced 
economies to sustain such growth, as growing parts 
of society lack the income necessary to generate suf-
ficient economic demand to keep the growth engine 
running.29 This illustrates the absurdity of the 
mantra of trickle-down economics, which assumes 
that income growth at the top of society automat-
ically leads to greater income and wealth for all. 
Instead, the evidence suggests that such an unequal 
distribution of income stalls the growth cycle from 
within, and thus represents a recipe for economic 
decline and not success. 
Moreover, given the pressure public finances are 
faced with under the conditions of global tax com-
petition, welfare states are at increasing difficulty 
to finance the social policies, such as education, 
healthcare, social security, and social protection, 
that are necessary to preserve the very foundation 
of a productive economy, i.e., a healthy, skilled, and 
cohesive population. Not only does such under-in-
vestment in social and human capital act as a drag 
on (labour) productivity, without which economic 
growth is becoming more and more elusive.30 The 
ramifications of such attacks on social well-being 
also include the fuelling of existential anxiety that 
causes the effects of precarity described in chapter 
1 of this report and creates social emergencies, for 
instance in terms of increasing physical and mental 
ill-health, poverty, and crime, that expose society to 
the threat of disintegration once they develop into 
full-blown social crises.31 Although the prevention 
and resolution of such crises in fact spurs economic 
activity through social spending and thus – absurdly 
– fosters growth, this could hardly be the beneficial 
and self-sustaining effects of GDP expansion that its 
proponents mistakenly cherish. 
Growth and ‘green’ do not go together
At the same time as eroding its own economic and 
social foundations, the growth dogma creates exter-
nalities that threaten the existence of civilisation 
as such. As the relentless expansion of GDP has his-
torically been linked with rising greenhouse gas 
emissions and natural resource depletion, in Europe 
as much as globally, its responsibility in manufac-
turing the climate crisis and collapse of ecosystems 
constitutes an undisputable fact. Although efficiency 
gains as regards energy production and resource use 
have been achieved, such ‘decoupling’ of growth 
from environmental destruction remains only par-
EU policymaking remains based 
above all on considerations 
relating to the economic cost of 
regulation.«
»
28 For a more detailed discussion, see: Laurent, E. (2021): From welfare to farewell: the European social-ecological state beyond economic growth, ETUI WP 2021.04, available at:  
https://www.etui.org/publications/welfare-farewell 
29 Cingano, F. (2014), “Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 163, OECD Publishing.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxrjncwxv6j-en
30 Hemerijck, A. et al. (2020): Social Investment Now! Advancing Social Europe through the EU Budget, available at:  
https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/editing%20of%20a%20study-%20public%20investment%20now_12%20-%20pp%20%20links.pdf 
31 Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2010): The Spirit Level – Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger, Bloomsbury
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tial and far from sufficient to render the continued 
adherence to the fetishization of GDP growth com-
patible with respect for the physical limits of the 
planet’s natural environment (see also chapter 5 of 
this report).32
Already today, the massive burden that environ-
mental deterioration is imposing on society’s 
well-being has assumed destabilising dimensions. 
With the rising number of lives lost and large-
scale disruption caused by the amplified frequency 
of heatwaves and floods, persistently high levels 
of air pollution, and zoonotic diseases such as 
COVID-19, the toll that the ecological externalities 
of past growth are taking on present-day society is 
becoming increasingly obvious.33 Naturally, such 
ecological crises also incur huge financial costs, 
e.g., through rises in healthcare spending and the 
need to rebuild infrastructures and communities in 
the aftermath of environmental disasters. What is 
thus becoming obvious is that the ruthless destruc-
tion of ecosystems in the pursuit of growth indeed 
resembles a loan that global capitalism has taken 
out from nature and that will have to be repaid. 
Mildly put, standard conceptions of GDP thus 
clearly fail to deliver an exact approximation of 
the wealth of society by failing to account for lia-
bilities accumulated in the past and giving rise to 
the illusion of wealth instead. What likewise seems 
to be an accurate description, though, is that GDP 
covers up a massive robbery committed against 
future generations, who will have to shoulder the 
cost of past generations living beyond the means of 
the planet. 
In light of such evidence, the promise of societal 
well-being through the relentless pursuit of contin-
ued economic growth is unmasked as a myth that has 
already gone to considerable lengths in debunking 
itself. Instead of working efficiently and reliably to 
expand the income at the disposal of society at large, 
it is evidently becoming increasingly incapable of 
preserving its own social and economic founda-
tions at the same time as it is creating liabilities that 
threaten to impose immense social, environmental, 
and financial costs on society. Because of its inabil-
ity to foster societal well-being in a lasting, inclusive, 
and sustainable fashion, the strategy of outsourcing 
the achievement of progress to economic growth, 
and orienting policymaking towards this single 
overriding goal, needs to be dismissed if humanity is 
to come to terms with the social and economic chal-
lenges it is faced with today. 
3.2.1.  Sustainable well-being for all  
as a paradigm for policymaking  
and governance
Achieving sustainable well-being for all compels pol-
icymakers to recognise that human and planetary 
well-being is a matter of complex interrelation-
ships between people in terms of both different 
social classes and generations (present and future), 
between society and the economy, and between 
human civilisation and the planet. 
As chapter 1 of this report has pointed out, this 
depends on the creation of economic, social, and 
ecological co-benefits in the organisation of society, 
so that good living and working conditions for all 
go hand in hand with the protection of the planet’s 
regenerative capacities. Given the apparent incapac-
ity of GDP growth to achieve this, this challenges 
policy to develop an essentially agnostic perspective 
on such economic expansion and to actively explore 
co-benefits instead of restricting its role to passively 
trusting in the ability of largely self-regulating mar-
kets.
While this adds complexity to policymaking and 
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much of the developed world in radical ways, it is 
no longer a dream far removed from reality. Since 
the adoption of the Paris Climate Agreement and 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 
momentum for the comprehensive reconsideration 
of policymaking to comply with sustainability 
and well-being imperatives has been created and 
is beginning to bear fruit. Around the world, gov-
ernments, parliaments, regional authorities are 
pioneering alternative approaches that enable con-
sidered assessment of future risks and threats to 
society’s well-being, sustainability, and intergenera-
tional equality. Examples range from sustainability 
impact assessments and well-being budgeting prac-
tices applied in New Zealand, to the Committee of 
the Future in the Finnish Parliament, and the Welsh 
Well-being of Future Generations Act. 
The approaches and methods developed as part of 
such innovative concepts of governance and policy-
making allow governments to overcome the fixation 
on short-term economic gains that the logic of GDP 
growth cherishes even if they are associated with 
prohibitive long-term costs. Aided by the insights 
yielded by the emerging sustainability sciences, 
such opportunities to unlock joined-up social and 
ecological gains through pro-active policymaking 
are becoming increasingly multiple, obvious, and 
concrete. Examples include the drawing up of elab-
orate scientific scenario analyses, which find that 
investment into the full decarbonisation of global 
energy production by 2050 goes beyond unlocking 
the obvious environmental gains but would also 
decrease the price of energy, require less invest-
ment, and create more jobs than the continuation of 
current policies.34 However, as cheaper user prices 
and lower investment volumes imply that the related 
market transactions are of lesser financial value and 
thus contribute less to GDP than the continuation 
of business as usual, the obvious benefits of such 
policies would be at risk of going unnoticed by the 
entrenched logic of economic growth at all costs. 
A new matrix for policymaking and governance
Operationalising such a well-being and sustain-
ability-focussed approach to policymaking and 
governance requires a clear compass and elabo-
rate methodologies to guide its implementation. 
Fortunately, given the experience derived from the 
pioneering engagement with such concepts on the 
part of the above-mentioned front-runner govern-
ments, the constantly growing body of academic 
literature on related topics, as well as the work of 
international organisations, above all the OECD, 
valuable guidance in this respect is already available. 
Building on this knowledge would allow the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States to adopt an 
entirely new and more successful approach to gover-
nance than it currently possesses. 
Instead of defining proxies of well-being, as is the 
case with policy outlooks that equate societal prog-
ress with economic growth, this new policy matrix 
would build on a detailed consideration of the eco-
nomic, social, and ecological preconditions for 
society’s well-being and define their achievement as 
the central objective of governance across all fields 
of policymaking. According to the OECD, such objec-
tives should cover at least the following dimensions 
that are considered to relate to key determinants of 
34 Jacobson, M. et al. (2019), Impacts of Green New Deal Energy Plans on Grid Stability, Costs, Jobs, Health, and Climate in 143 Countries, One Earth 1, 449–463, available at:  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2019.12.003 
»Achieving sustainable well-being 
for all compels policymakers to 
recognise that human and 
planetary well-being is a matter 
of complex interrelationships.«
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sustainability and well-being in fair, productive, and 
democratic societies:35 
• environmental health and stability. 
• human health. 
• subjective well-being. 
• social connections and cohesion. 
• civic engagement. 
• income and wealth. 
• work and job quality. 
• work-life balance. 
• access to housing. 
• access to knowledge and skills development. 
• public safety.
Effective objectives require legal force
To achieve these objectives, loosely defining them 
as considerations that should be reflected in pol-
icymaking across the board is insufficient. This 
is illustrated not least by previous attempts in the 
European Union to achieve broader goals of progress 
than just economic growth, such as the Lisbon and 
Europe 2020 strategies, which, beyond espousing 
good intentions, have remained largely ineffective. 
In fact, many of the targets defined by these strat-
egies, for instance in terms of poverty reduction 
or investment in education and research, were not 
only not achieved but actually affected by setbacks, 
because legal obligations imposed on policymak-
ing and governance, especially in the field of fiscal 
policy, compelled governments to disregard them. 
To effectively guide the work and behaviour of pol-
icymakers as well as economic and societal actors 
at all levels, endowing policy objectives with legal 
force is thus indispensable. While this does not, in 
and of itself, prevent trade-offs between potentially 
conflicting policy objectives to emerge, it requires 
policymakers and stakeholders to think and work 
harder to mitigate and resolve them. That such use of 
the force of the law can bear fruit is shown not least 
by EU policy to fight climate change. While the first 
generation of EU vehicle emissions standards that 
took the form of voluntary self-regulation on the part 
of carmakers remained essentially inconsequential, 
their iteration in the form of binding legislation as of 
2008 has been able to unlock progress, albeit to date 
on an insufficient scale. Yet, by clearly proving that 
improvements are possible, policymaking can now 
point to the fact that enforcing such climate ambi-
tion is feasible, as the industry evidently possesses 
the ability to internalise such broader societal objec-
tives without having to close shop. 
This should serve to encourage the legisla-
tive approach to iterating clearly defined policy 
objectives in a binding and enforceable fashion 
across all dimensions of critical importance to 
the achievement of sustainable well-being for all. 
Examples of such legislation that this report elab-
orates on in further detail include the proposed 
introduction of an EU anti-poverty law, an EU sus-
tainable jobs guarantee (cf. chapter 6), as well as 
binding targets for climate justice policies (cf. 
chapter 4), preventive health, sustainable production 
and consumption and the protection of biodiversity 
(cf. chapter 5).
Evidence-based and participatory policymaking 
for equal and place-sensitive outcomes
Achieving sustainable well-being for all hinges on 
the ability to create living conditions that foster sus-
tainability and well-being for individuals and their 
communities in their daily lives. Moreover, what 
citizens and their communities grasp as progress in 
this regard is a matter of their individual and collec-
tive aspirations and is determined by the concrete 
experiences they make in their daily environments. 
As Europe is characterised by considerable heteroge-
neity in this regard, in-depth insights into conditions 
‘on the ground’ is crucial to enable policymaking in 
the interest of sustainable well-being for all to be 
effective. To this end, policymaking and policy sur-
veillance need to be able to draw on detailed and 
sophisticated evidence, including in form of statisti-
cal indicators. Accordingly, the collection of related 
data as well as the development of reliable models 
and methodologies that allow for the simulation of 
the likely effects of planned policies through robust 
impact assessments is key. Two considerations are of 
crucial importance in this regard. 
35 See for instance: Llena-Nozal, A., N. Martin and F. Murtin (2019), “The economy of well-being: Creating opportunities for people’s well-being and economic growth”, OECD Statistics Working 
Papers, No. 2019/02, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/498e9bc7-en.
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First, given the interdependence between the eco-
nomic, social, and ecological determinants of 
sustainability and well-being, statistical indicators 
as well as the impact assessments carried out in 
relation to them must take account of such inter-
sectionality and possible feedback between them. 
Second, given the heterogeneity of social, economic, 
and territorial conditions in Europe, related datasets 
must be of a sufficiently granular nature to enable 
their disaggregation along a variety of dimen-
sions. For instance, to allow for the detection of 
inequalities in the social, economic, and ecological 
conditions determining the well-being of citizens, 
including inequalities in terms of access to oppor-
tunities to enhance such well-being, these datasets 
must contain specific information as to how key 
determinants of inequality, such as gender, age, 
ethnicity, migration status, educational attainment, 
and income, play out in relation to the underlying 
subject matter. Given the territorial diversity of 
Europe, which causes citizens and communities, 
in large part due to the negative externalities of 
previous and entirely growth-focussed policies of 
economic modernisation, to be faced with starkly 
diverging starting positions in their pursuit of sus-
tainability and well-being objectives depending on 
their geographic location, ensuring that regional 
and local specificities are reflected in such data is 
likewise crucial. 
To ensure democratic legitimacy, ensuring high 
degrees of democratic participation in related poli-
cymaking constitutes another crucial success factor. 
This is likewise important to take place-based con-
siderations into account, which is necessary for 
policies to empower local communities to improve 
their well-being in light of the actual living con-
ditions they are affected by in their geographic 
location. This should include extensive parliamen-
tary involvement and oversight but also go beyond 
institutionalised forms of democratic represen-
tation through active outreach and meaningful 
involvement of stakeholder communities and civil 
society more broadly. 
From reaction to prevention: long-term oriented 
policies and well-being budgeting
Recognising the interdependence of ecological, 
social, and economic systems this new approach 
to governance is driven by the goal of identifying 
social, economic, and environmental challenges 
early on to disrupt their aggravation and to prevent 
future damages and costs, even if such develop-
ments go along with economic gains in the short 
term. Based on considered assessments of the inter-
related economic, social, and environmental effects 
of policies across their entire lifecycle, related poli-
cies adopt and essentially long-term-oriented focus 
and seek further societal well-being without trigger-
ing unexpected and costly externalities. 
Instead of passively standing by mitigate the exter-
nalities associated with the current growth-focussed 
economic and social model, for instance through 
public spending on poverty alleviation and health 
care for victims of air pollution, public budgets need 
to be actively engaged in directing economic and 
social activity away from the build-up of future lia-
bilities. This implies that long-term-oriented policy 
and regulation need to go hand in hand with invest-
ment in public goods and services that allow society 
to fulfil its well-being-related needs and aspirations 
under the conditions of environmental sustainabil-
ity. Given the extensive amounts of spending that 
are currently required to manage social and envi-
ronmental emergencies, the prevention of related 
emergencies through such forms of well-being bud-
geting can actually be expected to lead to substantial 
savings instead of adding to the pressure weighing 
down on public finances.36 
36 Laurent, E. (2021): The European Green Deal: from growth strategy to social-ecological transition? In: Vanhercke B., Spasova S. and Fronteddu B. (eds.): Social policy in the European Union: 




















Decent income for all























Figure: simplified ‘policy matrix’ to guide policymaking towards sustainable well-being for all
3.2.2.  Making EU policymaking fit for 
sustainable well-being for all
In the European Union, too, the adoption of the 
Paris Climate Agreement and the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs) have 
caused calls to align EU policy with sustainability 
and well-being-related considerations to grow too 
loud to ignore. Further catalysed by the 2019 Euro-
pean elections, during which electoral campaigns 
as much as public discourse more broadly were 
influenced by the mobilisation of global youth raise 
public awareness of the global climate crisis, the 
European Union has begun to reconsider its policy 
priorities. 
Clearly impressed by these events, EU Heads of 
State and Government convened in October 2019 to 
engage with the notion of the ‘economy of well-be-
ing’. Based on input received from the OECD,37 
leaders discussed how a “policy orientation and 
governance approach which aims to put people and 
their well-being at the centre of policy and deci-
sion-making” is vital to the future of the European 
Union and in fact constitutes its “raison d’être”.38 
The summit’s final declaration goes on to discuss 
vital elements of a potential policy shift, such as the 
need to tackle mounting social inequalities and cli-
mate change and to ensure stronger cross-sectoral 
policy coordination to unlock co-benefits in the 
pursuit of societal well-being. Since then, related 
debates have not slid off EU leaders’ agenda. 
As a sign of their continued awareness of the politi-
cal desirability of such action, EU heads of state and 
government welcomed the European Social Partners’ 
joint call for the attachment of greater importance to 
well-being-related considerations in EU policy and 
governance on the occasion of the informal Porto 
Social Summit of the European Council in May 2021.39
Since taking office in December 2019 and in reaction to 
demands issued by progressive forces in the European 
Parliament, especially the S&D Group, the current 
European Commission, too, has announced its inten-
tion to address critical challenges to the sustainable 
well-being of people and planet during the 2019-24 
mandate. As its predecessor even failed to acknowl-
edge and engage constructively with the UNSDGs, the 
new executive’s unequivocal assertion of how gloss-
ing over the imperative of sustainable development 
no longer constitutes a possibility clearly represents 
an important sign of movement. And in fact, by pre-
senting the European Green Deal (EGD) within the 
first month of its tenure, its key policy project for 
the 2019-24 mandate that aims to lay the foundations 
for the achievement of greenhouse gas-neutrality by 
2050, it certainly succeeded in nurturing high hopes 
and expectations. 
As the discussion of various fields of policy in the 
remainder of this report will illustrate in detail, the 
obstacles that remain in place to foster the sustain-
able well-being of people and planet in Europe and 
worldwide are of a sheer colossal scale. 
»The current European 
Commission, too, has announced 
its intention to address critical 
challenges to the sustainable 
well-being of people and planet 
during the 2019-24 mandate.«
37 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10414-2019-ADD-1/en/pdf
38 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13171-2019-INIT/en/pdf , p. 2
39 Article 13 of the Council conclusions adopted at the informal Social Summit state that the Council welcomes “that the European Social Partners have made a joint proposal for an alternative 




To understand the momentous nature of the task 
at hand, it suffices to note the massive shortfall of 
annual investment in the EU to transform economic 
activity and upgrade social conditions in Europe so 
that the achievement of greenhouse-gas neutrality 
by 2050 and the resolution of the most severe forms 
of inequality and poverty become a possibility. As 
suggested by studies on the investment volumes 
necessary to meet the objectives iterated in the EGD 
and on the financing needs for the social services 
and infrastructures required to preserve social 
cohesion in the EU, this overall investment gap is 
likely to amount to almost €900 billion annually 
(see table below). 
Against this backdrop, there cannot be reasonable 
doubt that Europe indeed requires political ambition 
and leadership of a kind unseen in recent history to 
transform its society and economy and to mobilise 
massive quantities of financial resources. Judged 
against this benchmark, what the European Com-
mission that took office in 2019 has been able to 
deliver to date must, however, be considered to fall 
of the mark. 
Annual European Green Deal Investment Gaps (Excluding transport, in billion Euros) 
Based on: Wildauer, R. et al. (2020)
Sector Current policies Required investment Investment gap
Energy efficient 
renovation of buildings 1,130 1,510 380
Electricity production 67 151 84
Sustainable industry 210 290 80
Research and 
development 302 503 201
Total European Green 
Deal Investment Gap 745
Annual EU Social Investment Gap (in billion Euros) 
Based on: Fransen, L. et al. (2018) 
Education & lifelong 
learning 65 80 15
Health & long-term 
Care 75 145 70









In spite of its clearly laudable intentions, the Euro-
pean Commission’s decision to present the EGD as 
the ‘European Union’s new growth strategy’ was 
read as an early sign by progressive stakeholders of 
how the Commission’s ambition in developing a new 
model of policymaking in the EU could be much more 
limited than the EGD’s headline target of achieving 
climate-neutrality by 2050 might suggest at first sight. 
As discussed previously, history as much as scientific 
evidence clearly illustrates how the alignment of pol-
icymaking with well-being and sustainability-related 
objectives requires that the orientation of policy across 
all fields towards the single and overriding goal of 
maximising economic growth is discontinued. Given 
that the structure of policymaking in the EU, where 
specialised administrations work in sectoral silos 
to enhance the growth potential of the economy, in 
fact represent a prime example of this dysfunctional 
approach, an unequivocal acknowledgement of the 
need to address the key challenge of liberating policy-
making form the growth dogma would have been an 
important task for the EGD. Unfortunately, almost two 
years after the presentation of this new policy strategy, 
progress in this regard continues to be absent.
Although the EGD and the multiple policy propos-
als issued as part of its roll-out go hand in hand with 
a series of innovations within the system of EU pol-
icymaking, the effectiveness of such innovations in 
uprooting path dependencies within the silo-based 
EU policy process remains modest to date. The Com-
mission’s commitment to integrating the UNSDGs in 
its yearly assessment of Member States’ economic 
policies and the revision of the scoreboard used for 
the assessment of the impact these policies have on 
social policy objectives constitute a case in point in 
this respect.40 Although clearly representing relevant 
projects in principle, they currently remain stuck at a 
stage where the yearly assessment of Member States’ 
policies includes an analysis of their impact in relation 
to the SDGs and social indicators, but where the identi-
fication of potential challenges and shortfalls remains 
entirely inconsequential. 
A similar dynamic appears to be in place with regards 
to the newly created office of a dedicated Commis-
sioner for Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight. 
Being charged with the monitoring of long-term 
social, economic, and environmental developments 
and ensuring that these are adequately addressed in 
EU policy, this role entails the potential to act as a 
veritable policy coordination function in the Euro-
pean Commission.41 Moreover, by working closely 
with a network of ministers that possess a similar 
remit in Member State governments, the office of 
the Foresight Commissioner could act as a driving 
force towards the adoption of a more holistic, long-
term-oriented, and horizontally coherent model of 
policymaking at the EU and national levels. How-
ever, its value added in effectuating real policy 
change hinges on this office’s ability to trigger the 
initiation of concrete policy proposals, especially in 
terms of legislation, to ensure the insights yielded 
by such methodologies are followed up on with con-
crete policy measures. At present, however, it seems 
that such initiatives are pursued at the margins of 




that took office 
in 2019 has been 
able to deliver to 
date must be 
considered to 
fall of the 
mark.«
40 the revised social scoreboard was published as an annex to the European Commission’s European Pillar of Social rights Action Plan of March 2021, which is available at: https://op.europa.
eu/webpub/empl/european-pillar-of-social-rights/en/#annex2 
41 see https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategic-planning/strategic-foresight_en#documents for further information
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Against this backdrop, it should not be seen as a 
surprise that the European Commission’s output 
with regards to sustainability and well-being-re-
lated policies has so far been incomprehensive 
and indeed one-legged. In this sense, the pro-
posal for an EU climate law, the related ‘Fit for 55’ 
package, and announced legislation in the field of 
biodiversity protection go to considerable lengths 
in establishing a detailed and legally enforceable 
EU framework for the achievement of environ-
mental sustainability objectives.
As regards the social dimension of sustainable 
well-being, however, EU policy action has so far 
failed to develop an equally robust and systematic 
approach. While individual pieces of legislation 
with clear merit have been proposed, such as 
an EU directive for adequate national minimum 
wage frameworks, an encompassing legislative 
approach to developing the social dimension of 
sustainability and well-being does not appear to be 
under preparation, despite the EU’s and Member 
States’ shared competence in the fields of social 
policy and employment. The European Pillar of 
Social Rights Action Plan presented in March 2021 
serves as a case in point in this regard.42 
Although defining specific social policy targets for 
Member States and the EU as a whole, for instance 
as regards the reduction of poverty, it fails to back 
up such goals with concrete legislative measures 
to ensure effective steps are taken towards their 
achievement. To rectify this, chapter 6 of this report 
contains a set of proposals for legislation that should 
be acted upon to fill this void, especially in the form 
of an EU anti-poverty law, a zero precarious employ-
ment strategy, and an EU sustainable jobs guarantee
Europe is continuing to wear a financial straight 
jacket
Another and perhaps the most critical omission in 
the re-orientation of EU policy towards the effec-
tive pursuit of sustainability and well-being related 
policy objectives concerns the persistent failure to 
engage in comprehensive and permanent reforms to 
the EU economic, fiscal, and financial framework. 
Of key concern in this are the obligations applying 
to Eurozone countries as part of the ‘Stability and 
Growth Pact’ (SGP) and its related enforcement 
framework, the European Semester of Economic 
Policy Coordination. 
By defining precise quantitative limits for national 
budget deficits relative to the size of the national 
economy, the SGP obliges governments to cut spend-
ing whenever the GDP of their national economies 
declines, although it is precisely in situations of this 
kind that the provision of stabilisation and stimulus 
through expansive fiscal policies would be critical to 
safeguard the well-being of citizens. Moreover, the 
SGP also defines precise targets for the total stock 
of public debt governments are allowed to main-
tain, again as a function of GDP, which not only lack 
a ‘valid scientific basis’43 but also appear entirely 
unrealistic. Given that a large number of Euro Area 
countries are plagued by high levels of legacy debt, 
not least as a result of the havoc caused by the global 
financial crisis, pressures of fiscal consolidation in 
fact apply to them on a permanent basis. As both 
the SGP’s targets for annual budget deficits and for 
the stock of public debt are defined as functions of 
Member States’ GDP, its rulebook obliges govern-
ments to aggressively comply with the dogma of 
relentless GDP growth in their attempts to comply 
with it. 
Despite the widespread criticism and obvious deficien-
cies of the SGP, its successive reforms during the past 
decades have mainly worked to increase its stringency. 
The establishment of the European Semester, an annual 
cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination among 
Eurozone countries, represents the prime example in 
this respect. As part of the Semester, Eurozone coun-
tries’ economic and fiscal performance undergoes 
in-depth assessments carried out by the European 
Commission. As part of its ‘Alert Mechanism Report’, 
the Commission carries out meticulous analyses to 
determine Member States’ fitness to foster continu-
ous growth in their economies and to comply with the 
densely knit rules of the SGP. If compliance risks with 
the SGP’s provisions are identified, the Commission is 
required to issue Country-Specific Recommendations to 
rectify the situation through growth-enhancing struc-
tural reforms and cuts in public spending, which are 
formulated as part of essentially opaque deliberations 
and void of meaningful opportunities for participation 
by affected stakeholders. 
42 https://op.europa.eu/webpub/empl/european-pillar-of-social-rights/en/ 
43 De Grauwe, P. (2009): The Economics of Monetary Union, eighth edition, Oxford University Press, p. 250
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If Member States fail to bring the identified weak-
nesses under control by following up on such 
recommendations, the imposition of financial fines 
may be decided.44
As chapter 6 of this report will illustrate in more 
detail, the mix of fiscal restraint and structural 
reforms that directly follow from the SGP and its 
inherent policy orientation has led to the build-up of 
grave social emergencies in the European Union. By 
requiring Member States to cut spending on social 
security and the provision of public services while 
at the same time reforming labour markets to foster 
greater flexibility for employers and less job security 
for workers, the policies Member States are obliged 
to carry out to comply with the SGP and its underly-
ing focus on maximising economic growth lie at the 
core of the rise in inequalities and poverty in Europe.
Although the European Commission had agreed to 
engaging in a revision of the SGP and its accompa-
nying enforcement framework prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic, and indeed launched a related public con-
sultation in early 2020, this process was suspended 
once the global public health crisis erupted. Fortu-
nately, Eurozone governments, on the proposal of 
the Commission, could find agreement to temporar-
ily suspend the rules of the SGP until the end of 2022 
in order to enable an active fiscal policy response 
to the economic and social fallout of COVID-19 that 
would have been impossible had its provisions relat-
ing to public deficits and debt continued to apply. 
At the same time, agreement within the EU could be 
reached to launch an unprecedented, joint investment 
effort to prevent the pandemic from translating into a 
full-blown economic and social crisis. As part of the 
Next Generation EU programme, with the Recovery 
and Resilience Facility (RRF) at its core, €750 billions 
financed by the issuance of joint debt instruments are 
made available to fund policies in Member States that 
combine economic stimulus with targeted measures 
to modernise the EU economy, especially policies 
with a focus on climate action and reaping the efficien-
cy-enhancing effects of digital technology. Together 
with the 2021-2027 EU Multi-annual Financial Frame-
work (MFF), which was negotiated alongside the RRF, 
EU spending over the coming years thus possesses a 
total volume of more than €1,800 billions, of which at 
least 30% are required to benefit climate action poli-
cies and are thus dedicated to fighting key threats to 
the sustainable well-being of EU citizens. 
Also, by establishing an obligation on national gov-
ernments to engage in meaningful consultations with 
stakeholders in the definition of national investments 
plans under the RRF, in particular social partners and 
civil society organisations, this programme seeks to 
build on a more participatory model of governance 
than previous EU policies. Despite representing 
an unprecedented instance of financial solidarity 
among EU Member States and clearly taking account 
of the need to deliver bold policy action in view of 
climate change, Next Generation EU and the 2021-27 
EU MFF do not amount to a miracle solution. 
»The mix of fiscal restraint and 
structural reforms that directly 
follow from the Stability and 
Growth Pact and its inherent policy 
orientation has led to the build-up 
of grave social emergencies in the 
European Union.«
44 Further information on the European Semester process and its different stages can be found on the website of the European Commission at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester_en 
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Given that the annual investment relating to the 
achievement of sustainable well-being for all in 
Europe, as discussed above, must be considered 
to be at least in the region of €900 billion annually, 
their combined amounts of €1,800 billion to be dis-
bursed over seven years appear rather modest. What 
is more is that Next Generation EU, accounting for 
€750 billion of the overall volume, was incepted as a 
one-off effort that, once phased out, is likely to leave 
behind a gap that aggravates the problem of underin-
vestment in sustainability and well-being in Europe. 
Additionally, by privileging climate action and dig-
ital transition policies but not establishing similar 
spending targets for genuinely social objectives, 
especially the RRF replicates the EU’s one-legged 
approach to well-being and sustainability-related 
policymaking identified above. 
This is further reinforced by the fact that the dis-
bursement of investment funds under the RRF is 
made conditional on Member States’ compliance 
with the Country-specific Recommendations issued 
as part of the European Semester that seek to ensure 
compliance with the fiscal straight jacket that is the 
SGP. Although, as noted before, the provisions of the 
SGP relating to public deficits and debt are temporar-
ily suspended, a commitment on the part of Member 
States and the European Commission to implement 
meaningful reforms of this framework prior to its 
re-application, currently scheduled for 2023 is cur-
rently missing. 
Accordingly, it stands to fear that, going forward, the 
limited progress towards more well-being and sus-
tainability-focussed policymaking and investment 
at the EU level will have to co-exist with the contin-
uation of the generalised austerity bias of economic 
and fiscal policy.
In sum then, the shift towards a new model of pol-
icymaking promised by the European Commission 
at the start of its mandate in 2019 remains incom-
plete and indecisive in important respect at present. 
Although initiatives that, on their surface, appear 
to add value to a more horizontally coherent and 
long-term-oriented approach to policy and gover-
nance have been launched, they are so far lacking 
the status and power to have a real impact on EU 
policymaking. Additionally, in lack of comprehen-
sive and permanent reforms of the EU fiscal and 
financial framework, the growth-oriented and aus-
terity-focussed bias of EU policy must be expected 
to kick back in with full force once the RRF and 
the temporary suspension of SGP rules are phased 
out. Essentially, this fiscal and financial framework 
makes a the much-needed turn towards well-be-
ing budgeting practices that must be considered to 
form an essential part of effective policymaking in 
the interest of sustainable well-being for all entirely 
impossible. 
Against this background, the ICSE issues the follow-
ing recommendations. 
»The Sustainable Well-being Pact 
would work to establish a 
horizontal obligation on EU and 
Member State policy to work 
towards the achievement of 
sustainable well-being for all.«
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Reform the foundations of EU policymaking through 
the adoption of a Sustainable Well-being Pact
To ensure EU policymaking is aligned with the objective of achieving sustainable well-being for all in Europe and is 
equipped with the legal frameworks and governance tools that enable it to undertake effective policy action to this 
end, the European Union requires a fundamental reorientation of its foundational policy approach. To this end, the 
Commission should, under the joint leadership of its President and the Foresight Commissioner, table a proposal 
for a European Sustainable Well-being Pact. The pact should develop specific proposals to ensure that objectives 
relating to the social, ecological, and economic dimensions of societal well-being are addressed centrally and on 
an equal footing in its policy development, surveillance, and coordination actions across all areas under EU compe-
tence. The proposal should be based on a mapping of existing work and experience, both in academic research and 
detail a concrete set of specific social, ecological, and economic objectives it intends to operationalise to this end. 
These objectives should reflect the EU’s existing international and internal commitments that are relevant in 
this regard, including those stemming from: 
· the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 
· the Paris Climate Agreement, 
· the European Climate Law, 
· the European Charter of Fundamental Rights,
· the European Pillar of Social Rights.
The Sustainable Well-being Pact should further contain proposals that serve to translate the proposed economic, 
social, and environmental well-being and sustainability objectives into legally binding commitments that offer action-
able guidance for EU and national policy. While such obligations partially exist in relation to environmental sustainability 
objectives, in particular through the EU climate law that obliges EU and national policy to ensure consistency with the 
aim of achieving climate-neutrality by 2050, this will require a considerable additional effort to develop a comparable 
legislative framework as regards broader matters of sustainability and well-being. As chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this report 
will discuss in more detail, this should lead to the preparation of further legislative proposals, which the Sustainable 
Well-being Pact should translate into binding and actionable policy commitments in particular for:
· the complete eradication of poverty in Europe by 2050 (EU Anti-Poverty Law),
· the elimination of precarious forms of employment by 2030 (EU Zero Precarious Employment Strategy),
· the prevention of unemployment (EU Sustainable Jobs Guarantee),
· effective measures in the fields of employment policy and social security to close the gender pay and 
pensions gaps by 2030,
· a fair and inclusive transition to climate-neutrality (European Climate Justice Governance Regulation),
· a greater focus on preventive care and sustainable healthcare systems (European ‘One Health’ approach),
· the protection of lives and jobs in view of the expected impacts of climate change (legally binding EU  
climate change adaptation strategy),
· a social-ecological approach for the protection of ecosystem services (EU Biodiversity Law).
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Moreover, the Commission proposal should contain indicators that serve to determine the performance of 
the EU against these overall policy objectives. Specific attention in the selection and development of indi-
cators should be paid to ensuring that they take account of the interdependent nature of the underlying 
policy objectives. This is important to effectively guarantee that policies implemented to achieve them 
avoid negative feedback loops and are guided towards the identification of opportunities for the creation 
of co-benefits, e.g., in terms of simultaneous progress towards the achievement of both social and ecolog-
ical objectives as part of a single regulatory or policy intervention. 
The Sustainable Well-being Pact would work to establish a horizontal obligation on EU and Member State 
policy to work towards the achievement of sustainable well-being for all by ensuring policy action in all 
relevant fields, including economic, fiscal, social, and environmental policy. Moreover, the pact should 
stipulate procedural provisions to ensure the execution of the EU budget and Member States’ policies 
support the achievement of the policy objectives iterated by the Sustainable Well-being Pact by way of 
an EU well-being budgeting framework, which is developed in more detail below.
Develop institutional fitness in the EU through a 
Futures Capacity in the European Commission, 
a Sustainable Well-being Board in the European 
Parliament, and a Sustainable Well-being Council
Policymaking in the spirit of sustainable well-being for all requires the adoption of an essentially long-term-fo-
cussed approach to policymaking as well as strong forms of horizontal coordination between all relevant policy 
fields to ensure consistency. This contrasts sharply with the approach traditionally underlying EU policymaking, 
where specialised administrations and decision-making structures work to deliver governance and regulation 
in distinct policy silos without sufficiently strong mechanisms of cross-sectoral coordination. Rectifying this 
requires that the EU institutions driving legislative and policy processes in the EU, i.e., the European Com-
mission, Parliament, and Council, engage in meaningful reforms of their internal structures to ensure greater 
capacity for the horizontal coordination of long-term-oriented policies. Additionally, this process should also 
serve as an opportunity to explore ways to enable more meaningful and systematic participation of relevant 
stakeholder communities, especially as national and sub-national parliaments, civil society representatives and 
scientific experts, in the policymaking process. 
As part of its actions to adopt and mainstream sustainable well-being-related policy objectives, the European 
Commission should therefore set out a concrete and time-bound roadmap to establish a fully-fledged EU 
futures capacity as a dedicated Commission service. Its mandate should endow it with adequate resources 
and horizontal coordination competences to align EU policy with the above-mentioned sustainable well-be-
ing-related policy objectives and to provide the space and skills to explore emerging risks, such as from climate 
change and environmental degradation, structural change in the economy, changing social and demographic 
conditions, and rapidly developing technology. 
Tools and instruments at the disposal of the capacity should include scientific foresight approaches, scenario 
planning, and risk analysis methods. 
Within the EU policymaking process, the futures capacity should have central authority to coordinate the work 
of the European Commission and its Directorates General as part of the sustainable well-being budgeting 
process outlined further below. Moreover, it should oversee the conduct of impact assessments relating to the 
Commission’s future policy proposals. Such impact assessments should deliver robust evaluations regarding 
the likely impact of proposed policy measures on the EU’s sustainability and well-being-related policy objec-
tives and work to deliver considered assessments of related risks. This should include specific impact and risk 
assessments in relation to individual social groups, such as women, minorities, or youth, and territories that are 
at present frequently affected by inequalities, for instance as part of place-sensitive and gender impact assess-
ments. To this end, the European Commission should revise its ‘Better Regulation’ agenda, which defines 
key principles and procedures to guide the preparation of EU legislative and policy proposals. As part of this 
revision, the futures capacity should be endowed with a robust mandate to ensure sustainability and well-be-
ing-related policy objectives and assessments of likely impacts and risks are incorporated centrally at all stages 
of the policymaking process.
To ensure adequate and knowledge-based parliamentary involvement and oversight of EU sustainable 
well-being policies, the European Parliament should likewise develop a Sustainable Well-being Board. The 
parliamentary capacity should have a dual mandate of delivering critical and constructive assessments of 
EU policies throughout all stages of their formulation and implementation with a view to determining their 
contribution to the achievement of sustainable well-being-related policy objectives and issue reasoned recom-
mendations for the improvement of future policy. 
In terms of composition, the Board should comprise Members of the European Parliament representing all 
relevant parliamentary committees, members of national parliaments, members of the European Committee 
of the Regions as representatives of regional and local parliaments to include a place-specific perspective in 
the evaluation of EU policy, scientific experts, and representatives of civil society. This formation should be 
equipped with adequate resources, especially in terms of secretariat and research capacity to support the body 
in formulating informed views of the impact of EU policy that take a plurality of academic and regional per-
spectives into account and have the right to conduct hearings of stakeholders and representatives of the EU 
institutions. The parliamentary sustainable well-being board should convene in regular intervals and provide 
input relating to the European Parliament and its committees’ legislative work as well as with regard to Parlia-
ment’s involvement in the EU Well-being Budgeting Procedure outlined below. 
As a counterpart to the related Futures and Sustainable Well-being Capacities in the European Commission 
and Parliament and to develop similar cross-sectoral capacity, a dedicated sustainable well-being formation 
should be established in the European Council. This formation could build on the Foresight Network between 
Member States that is currently being created on the initiative of the EU Foresight Commissioner and should 
comprise ministers that are equipped with a mandate to ensure adequate policy coordination on behalf of 
their national governments. Next to acting as the interface of the European Council as part of the well-being 
budgeting process outlined below, its mandate should cover the monitoring and coordination of specialised 




Adopt an inter-institutional agreement on cooper-
ation and parliamentary involvement on matters 
relating to the sustainable well-being pact and its 
governance
Align the EU fiscal policy framework with  
sustainable well-being-related policy objectives
To ensure close cooperation between the European Parliament, Commission, and Council in the execution 
of the European sustainable well-being pact and its governance, in particular in the framework of the Euro-
pean well-being budgeting procedure laid out below, an inter-institutional agreement should be adopted. The 
agreement should lay out the respective responsibilities of the participating institutions and structure their 
joint working progress. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring that the European Parliament is ade-
quately involved and can exercise effective oversight at all stages of related policymaking and governance 
processes. 
To align fiscal policies of Eurozone countries with the goal of achieving Sustainable Well-being for all, the existing 
rules of the Stability Growth Pact need to be revised and made compatible with the policy objectives defined 
by the Sustainable Well-being Pact laid out above. This new set of fiscal rules should avoid the formulation of 
quantitative targets relative for national budgets and public debt stocks to the size of GDP to ensure Member 
States are no longer locked into a perpetual race for constant economic growth. Instead, it should encourage 
sustainable well-being-oriented investments and reforms and acknowledge their beneficial long-term effects, 
including in terms of the sustainability of public finances due to their contribution to the prevention of future 
social and ecological imbalances and emergencies. Related action should be undertaken urgently in order to 
ensure a revised Eurozone fiscal framework is in place before the currently suspended Stability and Growth 
Pact is due to re-enter into force in 2023. 
To this end, the use of fiscal standards instead of fiscal rules should be considered in the revision of Eurozone 
fiscal rules. Such standards could be defined in an essentially qualitative fashion, committing government 
spending to the pursuit of sustainability and well-being-related policy objectives, and set out an effective 
methodology to assess and ensure the sustainability of public finances over time. In terms of their concrete 
iteration, inspiration could be drawn from the experience of New Zealand, where the approach was pioneered 
in the early 1990s and has since proven its potency.45 In this vein, Member States could be obliged to: 
· maintain prudent public debt ratios, hence contain the stock of public debt at a level that is highly 
unlikely to lead to unsustainable re-financing pressure in the future. 
· proactively identify and manage risks to their fiscal balance and sustainability.
45 New Zealand Treasury. 2015. An Introduction to New Zealand’s Fiscal Policy Framework. Wellington: Government of New Zealand.
· assess the likely impact of fiscal strategy on present and future generations, including in terms of social 
cohesion and environmental sustainability. 
· consider the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy to avoid debt-deflation spirals.
Member States would thus be incentivised to design spending programmes in a way that privileges the long-
term stability and sustainability of the economy and society, and to take such considered assessments of future 
impacts into account also in the pursuit of short-term policy objectives. Instead of obliging Member States to 
cut public spending in times of economic distress, as is the case with the current fiscal framework stipulated by 
the SGP, such modernised provisions would enable governments to provide economic stabilisation and stim-
ulus through spending programmes with proven benefits for long-term economic and fiscal sustainability, for 
instance in the form of investments in education and resource-efficiency. 
The stringent application of such standards could be ensured by a set of criteria and methods that guide their 
implementation. Standardised, transparent, and scientifically validated debt sustainability analysis tools could 
play a central role in this regard. These tools, with whose development and application both the European 
Commission and the International Monetary Fund possess significant experience, could serve to deliver robust 
assessments of fiscal stability over time. Crucially, such tools possess the ability to take into account the long-
term impact of Member States’ fiscal policies by bringing into view the implications of current fiscal spending 
for the future ability of governments to service public debt.46
Where fiscal adjustment measures are required from Member States, these should generally be formulated 
in a way that prevents the postponement of reforms and investments with a clear and proven value for the 
enhancement of sustainable well-being for all. To this end, related provisions that are at present contained in 
the Stability and Growth Pact’s ‘expenditure rule’ should be revised to include a ‘golden rule’ that excludes the 
net value of related investments from the calculation of expenditure targets. Failure to ensure this would lead 
to counter-productive outcomes where Member States experiencing acute adversity are unable to undertake 
measures aimed at preventing future adverse social, economic, and environmental shocks, which themselves 
are likely to have detrimental impacts on public finances. The assessment of whether national reform and 
investment measures satisfy the criteria for eligibility under the golden rule should be carried out by use of the 
same methodology used as part of the implementation of fiscal standards (see above) or, in case of delays in its 
adoption, by use of the green and prospective social taxonomies developed in the context of the EU sustainable 
finance strategy (see section 3.3.1 below). 
Establish a meaningful EU fiscal capacity to  
provide stabilisation for Eurozone economies
Due to the particularly high degree of economic integration in the Eurozone, which, as the European sovereign 
debt crisis has demonstrated forcefully, creates contagion risks and the danger of chain reactions in times of 
acute economic distress, the European Economic and Monetary Union needs to be bolstered through a central 
fiscal capacity. Such a stabilisation component should work to protect social protection spending, especially in 
the form of a permanent European unemployment re-insurance scheme. Given the openness demonstrated by 
Member States towards the establishment of SURE, a temporary EU re-insurance scheme to finance national 
short-time work schemes in the context of the erupting Coronavirus crisis in 2020, progressives should be 
46 A similar proposal has recently been developed by Blanchard, O.; Leandro, A. and Zettelmeyer, J. (2021): Redesigning EU Fiscal Rules: From Rules to Standars, Peterson Institute for Interna-
tional Economics Working Paper 21-1, available at: https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp21-1.pdf
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encouraged by the evident feasibility of proposals of this kind and seize the momentum towards the creation 
of a permanent and comprehensive unemployment re-insurance instrument within the EU framework. In the 
same vein, progressives should engage with the possibility to enlarge such re-insurance schemes over time to 
include other social security systems, such as national minimum income guarantees (see also chapter 6 of this 
report). As a second component, this stabilisation arm should comprise an investment protection function that 
assists Member States in financing long-term-oriented reforms despite experiencing temporary economic 
adversity and tightening fiscal space. 
To ensure the consistency of related instruments with the updated EU sustainable well-being-related policy 
objectives (see above), the Eurozone fiscal capacity should be integrated into the EU budget and thus the EU 
community framework, in which the ordinary parliamentary oversight and accountability mechanisms apply. 
Such support to Member States should be temporary and be made available automatically, based on pre-de-
fined eligibility criteria and thresholds. Related financial operations should be conducted in the form of interest 
free loans that are income-contingent, hence with repayment obligations kicking in once the economic dis-
tress leading to reliance on such EU support has been resolved. To finance related instruments, integrating 
the European Stability Mechanism and its unused guarantee funds into the formal structures of the European 
Union and its budget should be considered.
Align the EU budget with more balanced  
sustainability and well-being objectives
To drive and accelerate the transition of Europe to a carbon-neutral and well-being-oriented model of society, 
ensuring adequate financial solidarity among Member States through the EU budget must be considered key. 
Already today, EU investment programmes, such the European Just Transition Fund and the European Regional 
Development Fund are delivering valuable contributions in this regard by co-financing related policies at the 
national and sub-national levels. Local and regional authorities play a key role in the implementation of these 
policies and deal as the closest link between EU investment projects and people living in our cities and regions. 
To date, however, these programmes remain largely embedded in a logic that favours the formation of economic 
capital, especially in terms of upgraded physical infrastructures and the roll-out of efficiency-enhancing technol-
ogies. While this is complemented with a laudable focus on environmental sustainability objectives, with 30% of 
the funds available under the current EU Multiannual Financial Framework being earmarked for climate action 
policies and another 7.5-10% for biodiversity protection during the second half of the 2021-27 MFF, similar provi-
sions relating to social objectives, for instance as regards social and territorial cohesion, are currently missing. As 
long as policies to drive the sustainable transformation of Europe remain focussed on capital-intensive and not 
on people-centred investments, such as investments in social policies, the modernisation of social security sys-
tems, and more and better jobs across all parts of the European Union, the structural change fostered through 
the EU investment programmes in their current form risks accepting setbacks in terms of human well-being. 
As chapter 6 of this report will argue, measures such as the creation of an EU sustainable jobs guarantee, 
a European care deal, and decent minimum income schemes for all Europeans are critical elements of a 
successful re-orientation of EU policy towards sustainable well-being for all and should thus likewise be pri-
oritised under the EU investment programmes. The foreseen mid-term review of the MFF, which is to be 
completed by the end of 2024, should therefore serve to introduce stringent spending targets relating to 
social sustainability and well-being objectives. While the European Commission is already committed to 
engaging in preparatory work for the establishment of specific provisions relating to gender equality, similar 
initiatives should be taken with regard to additional social objectives, in particular in relation to poverty alle-
viation and prevention, employment, and social services. 
Moreover, in the future the preparation and execution of the EU budget should be closely coordinated with sus-
tainable well-being-related policy action at the EU and national levels. To this end, the annual EU budget procedure 
should be integrated into a broader process of a European Well-being Budgeting procedure outlined below. 
Enlarge the EU budget through new own 
resources
Next to broadening the focus of EU investment policies, permanently enlarging their financial capacity must 
likewise considered key to bring the sustainable well-being-oriented transformation of Europe to fruition. In this 
regard, the expansion of EU own resources should be favoured, i.e., funding channels that do not depend on 
financial allocations from EU Member States. As part of the negotiations on the RRF, agreement in principle on 
expanding such own resources as well as a time-bound roadmap for structured negotiations on the creation of 
related streams of revenue for the EU budget could be reached. Accordingly, the European Parliament and Council 
will over the coming years engage in negotiations on the allocation of revenue from the taxation of non-recyclable 
plastics, the trade of industrial pollution rights as part of the EU emissions trading system, a special tax on large 
digital services providers, a future financial transaction tax, and from corporate taxation directly to the EU budget. 
While the timely implementation of this roadmap is liable to a number of uncertainties, stemming especially from 
its limited enforceability, the increase of the ceiling for EU own resources and concrete engagement with poten-
tial sources of revenue clearly indicates that momentum for a larger EU budget to achieve commonly accepted 
policy objectives can be created. Progressives in the European Parliament and Council should work hand in hand 
over the coming years to ensure the existing roadmap is implemented fully and to identify and agree on addi-
tional sources of EU own resources. As chapter 6 of this report will argue, the creation of an EU net wealth tax 
could act as such an additional stream of revenue. 
In the same vein, the European Commission should explore the feasibility of introducing a European Sovereign 
Wealth Fund. Such a fund could be structured in a way that large companies, for instance enterprises with an 
annual turnover of €500 or €750 million in the European single market, would be obliged to issue new shares 
every year equivalent to 20% of their profits generated in the EU.47 These shares would then be held by a central 
fund that disburses its income into the EU budget. To launch debate on such a proposal, the European Commis-
sion should issue a communication outlining different options for the establishment of an EU sovereign wealth 
fund, including estimates regarding its revenue over time.
Additionally, progressives should consider working towards the establishment of a permanent borrowing capac-
ity of the EU budget, building on the experience of the RRF. Although the success of such an agenda is likely to 
be met with resistance on the part of some Member States, the experience of the pandemic clearly indicates that 
radical political change is possible in light of changing framework conditions. By working towards a successful 
implementation of the RRF, keeping the momentum for jointly debt-financed investments with clear sustainabil-
ity and well-being benefits may be possible and should therefore be regarded as a priority. 
47 A similar model has been discussed in Gough, I. (2017) Heat, Greed and Human Need – Climate Change, Capitalism and Sustainable Well-being, Elgar, Cheltenham, p. 181
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Ensure greater consistency between sustainable 
well-being objectives and monetary policy
Ensure policy coherence through a European  
Sustainable Well-being Budgeting Procedure
Over the past decade, the European Central Bank (ECB) has demonstrated its impressive ability to stabilise the 
EU economy and maintaining financial market conditions that prove highly conducive to the pursuit of long-
term oriented fiscal policies without creating risks for price stability. To date, the ECB has, however, stuck rigidly 
to the principle of ‘market neutrality’ in associated financing and bond purchase programmes. Guided by this 
principle, the ECB upholds a structure its balance sheet as a mirror image of bond markets, for instance by 
limiting its purchases of bonds related to renewable energy projects to amounts that ensure such assets have 
no greater weight in the ECB’s balance sheet than renewable energy-related bonds have in the bond market 
in general. Given the evident need to re-balance economic activity in Europe, away from polluting and desta-
bilising activities towards more sustainable sectors and economic activities, such monetary policy is in fact far 
from neutral but instead continues to channel funding into economic activities that will necessarily have to be 
unwound in the not-so-distant future.48 
As part of a comprehensive review of the ECB mandate, the principle of market neutrality should be abandoned 
and replaced by an explicit bias towards sustainable investments and those with a highly likely positive impact 
on long-term societal well-being. Moreover, this revision should broaden the ECB’s mandate so that its task of 
ensuring price stability is complemented by the duty to support the European Union and its Member States 
in the achievement of sustainable well-being-related policy objectives. Knowing that such a revision of the 
ECB mandate would require changing the European treaties, which requires unanimity on the part of Member 
States, related advocacy by progressive actors should target national governments in particular.
To bring the adoption of sustainable well-being for all as the foundational policy paradigm in the EU to frui-
tion, purpose-built procedural arrangements are required to fill the above-described innovations as regards 
the updated set of EU policy objectives and related fiscal and financial capabilities with life. With the European 
Semester, an annual governance cycle designed to align national policy with EU policy objectives that was intro-
duced in reaction to the global financial crisis and its aftermath, the EU effectively possesses a system following 
similar aims. However, being primarily concerned with the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact and its 
underlying short-term-oriented economic growth paradigm, the Semester is incompatible with the aims and 
orientations stemming from sustainable well-being as a policy paradigm. The European Semester should there-
fore be replaced by a new framework of policy coordination, which is to follow the logic of well-being budgeting. 
As part of such a European sustainable well-being budgeting procedure, the European Commission, Parliament, 
and Council would jointly define long-term-oriented well-being and sustainability-related policy priorities for EU 
and Member State action and ensure public spending and investment under the EU and national budgets is 
consistent with their achievement. 
48 van’t Klooster, J. and Fontan, C. (2021) Central bankers remain stuck in the myth of ‘market neutrality’, available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/central-bankers-remain-stuck-in-the-
myth-of-market-neutrality
Its operationalisation could follow the following regular processes and timelines:
November: Annual Sustainable Well-being Survey
Each year in November, the European Commission, based on the work of its futures capacity, would publish 
a detailed surveillance report, the Annual Sustainable Well-being Survey, measuring the performance of the 
EU and its Member States regarding the sustainable well-being-related policy objectives enshrined in the 
European Sustainable Well-being Pact. This annual assessment should be provided in the form of a single 
scoreboard that assesses all relevant areas of social, environmental, economic, and fiscal policy with regard to 
their performance against the set of indicators developed to operationalise the Sustainable Well-being Pact’s 
objective for the purposes of policy surveillance, including the UNSDGs. On this basis, it should further contain 
an in-depth analysis of manifest risks and opportunities for the achievement of the policy objectives going 
forward to inform related policymaking and make proposals for policy priorities to address them. The Annual 
Sustainable Well-being Survey and its accompanying single scoreboard would thus replace the Annual Sustain-
able Growth Survey and the adjacent Alert Mechanism report used to kick off the current European Semester. 
December through March: In-depth consultation and initiation of EU budget procedure
Based on the Annual Sustainable Well-being Survey, the European Commission, Parliament, and Council 
would engage in in-depth consultations to discuss the policy priorities proposed by the Commission. To ensure 
the adequate involvement of national parliaments, the European Committee of the Regions, social partners 
and civil society organisations, the contribution of the European Parliament to such consultations should 
make extensive use of the input provided by its Sustainable Well-being Board (see above). On the part of the 
European Council, the Sustainable Well-being formation would act as the interface of Member States. Related 
exchanges should ensure that ample attention is being paid to the need to ensure policy consistency over time, 
hence ensure that forward-looking policy priorities are being formulated in way that continuity with policy 
interventions carried out as part of the previous governance cycle is given. 
Alongside and in close coordination with the consultations on the Commission’s Sustainable Well-being Survey, 
the European Parliament and Council engage in their annual negotiations on the priorities for the EU budget 
for the following year with a view to ensuring that the policy priorities defined as part of the governance cycle 
are supported by the spending priorities defined under the EU budget. 
April: Publication of Country Reports and draft EU budget for the following year
Based on the input received during the previous stage, the European Commission would publish country 
reports containing proposals for national policy measures to follow up on the policy priorities defined on the 
basis of the Sustainable Well-being Survey. The reports would set out a cross-sectoral frame of policy orienta-
tion in direct relation to the policy objectives set out in the Sustainable Well-being Pact and lay out specific 
policy guidance for policymaking across the relevant policy fields at Member State level.
At the same time, the Commission tables its draft for the EU budget for the following year that flanks the pro-
posals issued to Member States with proposals for the allocation of funding priorities under the EU investment 
programmes to support national policy action through the EU budget. The Commission’s presentation of the 
draft EU budget then initiates the ordinary budget procedure. 
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April through July: Definition and Coordination of National Sustainable Well-being Plans
Based on the guidance received as part of the country reports, Member States would draw up National Sus-
tainable Well-being Plans to lay out reform and policy proposals in their areas of competence. The formulation 
of such national plans should involve national parliaments and foresee mandatory consultations with public 
authorities at the sub-national levels, social partners, and civil society. The output of this national policy for-
mulation and coordination exercise would be submitted to the European Commission as a draft, which then 
engages in their in-depth scrutiny based on a pre-defined and transparent methodology and has the right to 
propose amendments through Country-specific Recommendations (CSRs). Such CSRs would again be submit-
ted to the European Council for scrutiny, amendment, and adoption. 
July through November: Implementation and Assessment
Once the National Sustainable Well-being Plans are amended through the CSRs and adopted, Member States 
would work to implement them. Their implementation would be closely followed by the relevant Commission 
services to yield insight and data to inform the following Annual Sustainable Well-being Survey that kicks off 
the next annual Well-being Budgeting cycle. 
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49 Soshana Zuboff (2019): The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, Profile Books, London, p. 513
50 Financial Stability Board (2020): The Implications of Climate Change for Financial Stability, report available at: https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P231120.pdf
3.3.  Make finance 




Re-defining capitalism to turn it into a driver of sustain-
able well-being for all without addressing the crucial 
roles the financial sector and the digital economy play in 
our economies today is bound to be a futile endeavour. 
Due to one of its main functions as allocating capital 
across the real economy, finance can play a key role in 
aligning economic activity with well-being objectives, 
or it may act destructively against these goals. How-
ever, much of the financial capital currently circulating 
in advanced economies is tied up in purely financial 
investments, with only a small fraction supporting 
actual productive uses. In addition, the incentive to 
ensure continuous high returns that lies at the core of 
today’s financial markets has biased such investments 
towards those which generate such returns in the short-
term, and which therefore act to reinforce the drivers 
towards unsustainable and extractive growth. How-
ever, while the European Commission has been able to 
implement first steps in facilitating the access to finance 
for environmentally sustainable or ‘green’ investments, 
it has so far not embarked on a mission to support and 
incentivise a comprehensive re-allocation of capital 
away from short-term focussed, socially divisive and 
unsustainable activities to more sustainable uses. 
At the same time, the digital economy is beginning to 
assume a function that sets it on a par with the finan-
cial sector in terms of its infrastructural importance for 
economic and social life. However, its functioning and 
continued development to date remains entirely under 
the control of a small number of large companies that 
resolutely build and defend dominant market positions, 
engage in rent-seeking behaviours, and manipulate 
markets and consumers to increase profits. To prevent 
the digital economy from turning into an ‘antidemo-
cratic and anti-egalitarian juggernaut’,49 as some fear 
has happened already, decisive regulatory intervention 
will have to be staged. As part of its work on the intro-
duction of a Digital Services Act and a Digital Markets 
Act, the European Union should therefore ensure such 
needs for regulation are addressed effectively. 
3.3.1.  Making finance work for  
sustainable well-being for all
Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement and the 
United Nations Agenda 2030, the European Commis-
sion has been engaged in work to mobilise and prepare 
the financial sector for the sustainable transformation 
of the EU economy. Related actions reflect both a sense 
of opportunity and necessity. Climate change and 
environmental degradation have ceased to pose only 
theoretical threats to financial stability. Compared to 
the 1980s, the economic cost of natural disasters, such 
as floods, droughts, and devastating tropical storms, 
has more than tripled during the last decade, put-
ting the financial institutions whose balance sheets 
are exposed to the underlying assets under increas-
ing strain. Today, it is widely accepted that failure to 
address climate change would give rise to financial 
implications that the global financial system would 
hardly have the capacity to absorb.50
Additionally, and despite some regulatory progress 
since the global financial crisis of 2007-8, the finance 
sector continues to apply excessive pressures to compa-
nies to deliver high short-term returns. This pressure 
has resulted in a situation where the value created in 
the economy disproportionately benefits creditors and 
investors, rather than being fairly allocated to stake-
holders (particularly employees) or being available 
for reinvestment in the business, not least to finance 
the necessary transitions towards more sustainable 
modes of production. Next to comprehensive reforms 
in corporate governance frameworks (cf. section 3.4. of 
this report) this will also require that financial markets 
take incorporate sustainability concerns that shift the 
focus to the creation of long-term value that also reflect 
a concern for social justice. 
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At the same time, consumers across advanced econ-
omies are realising the importance of sustainability 
principles and the need to de-carbonise the economy, 
and demand that financial markets allocate their sav-
ings and investments in ways that reflect their updated 
consciousness.51 And of course, Europe’s envisaged 
transition to a carbon-neutral economic model by 2050 
will not come for free, but demands massive invest-
ments, to which private finance will have to contribute 
to a significant degree. At present, however, only about 
20% of finance in advanced economies ends up in the 
‘real economy’, e.g., to finance industrial innovation 
or infrastructure projects, while the lions’ share flows 
into the FIRE sectors, hence Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate, whose over-exposure to private credit 
caused the global financial crisis of 2007/8.52
Against this backdrop, the critical importance of the 
European Commission’s ‘sustainable finance’ strat-
egy can hardly be overstated. Its systematic and 
evidence-based approach, in which scientific expert 
groups are mandated to feed directly into the legisla-
tive process geared towards a gradual transformation 
of the EU financial system, constitutes a real chance to 
deliver meaningful financial reform that is not deter-
mined by what markets are willing to accept but by what 
is objectively needed. Nevertheless, related regulatory 
processes have so far failed to pass crucial tipping 
points. While agreement between the EU co-legislators 
on the establishment of a ‘green taxonomy’, a coherent 
classification system for investments with clear bene-
fits for environmental sustainability, could be reached 
in 2020, the definition of technical standards defining 
what exact technologies and investment projects may 
fall under the taxonomy are drawing intense lobbying 
pressure from Member States and industry stakehold-
ers. This risks hollowing out this regulatory project 
and derailing its foreseen implementation timetable. 
Additionally, the tangible outputs of the EU sus-
tainable finance agenda so far relate entirely to 
environmental sustainability aspects, although it is 
widely accepted, both in relevant academic and polit-
ical discourses, that sustainable finance must build on 
the three dimensions of environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) factors. Rectifying this shortcoming 
requires that the green finance taxonomy is flanked 
with complementary standards for investments with 
benefits for the missing dimensions, for instance in 
terms of the creation of quality employment, human 
capital formation (e.g., through investment in knowl-
edge and skills), social cohesion, and good corporate 
governance (e.g., in terms of engagement in social 
dialogue and effective measures against bribery and 
corruption). While the Commission is able to draw on 
relevant expertise to this end, thanks to the work of the 
Sustainable Finance Platform whose work it sponsors, 
it has so far refrained from issuing a clear commitment 
to developing legislative proposals to include the social 
and corporate governance dimensions in its sustain-
able finance agenda. Persistent inaction in this regard 
would mean that Europe continues to miss out on the 
development of evident channels to support the prop-
agation of sustainable corporations and sustainable 
economic activity through financial regulation. 
Lastly, the Commission’s approach to sustainable 
finance appears to be framed in a way that suggests 
that related reforms should work to mobilise additional 
liquidity to satisfy demand for sustainable invest-
ment, which is viewed as coming on top of traditional 
investment activities. Not only does this disregard the 
imperative to divest from certain forms of economic 
activity, for instance because they are carbon-intense, 
but also does it entail the risk of swamping financial 
markets with excess liquidity that fuels destabilising 
financial bubbles as well as perpetuating an excessive 
growth imperative which further reduces the ability of 
companies to pay employees appropriately and invest 
in measures to enable sustainability transitions. To 
avoid this, the sustainable finance agenda must at least 
partially be of a re-allocative nature insofar as support 
measures for sustainable investments go hand in hand 
with measures to penalise unsustainable investment 
practices, as well as promote the concept of a ‘fair’ 
return to capital, not just the highest.
Against this backdrop, the ICSE issues the following 
recommendations: 
51 A survey of 7,000 respondents in 22 countries by Natixis Global Asset Management in 2017 found that social and environmental objectives are an important factor for around 70% of retail investors.
52 Estimate is based on figures relating to the US and UK financial sectors, see Mazzucato (2021): Mission Economy, A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism, Allan Lane, p. 16
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Uphold the original timeline for the  
implementation of the EU green taxonomy 
The EU green finance taxonomy, defining consistent standards for investment assets delivering a clear and 
proven contribution to the achievement of six environmental objectives,53 must be prepared for implementation 
no later than January 2022, as originally foreseen. The European Commission’s recent decision to delay the deci-
sion on whether natural gas and nuclear energy can be defined as ‘transition technologies’ risks derailing this 
implementation roadmap. Considering strong pressure from industry stakeholders and some Member States 
to make such concessions, progressives in the European Parliament and Council, civil society, and the business 
community should close ranks and engage in coordinated action. A general classification of natural gas and 
nuclear energy as transition technologies would amount to the ‘greenwashing’ of outdated technologies that 
will have to be phased out to achieve the EU climate action and environmental protection targets and should 
therefore be avoided. Where industries rely on transition technologies, these could be covered in a separate tax-
onomy, built on clear criteria to ensure their time-limited use for transition purposes, but not for simple purposes 
of substitution. 
53 Article 9 of the taxonomy regulation ((EU) 2020/852) defines these environmental objectives as (a) climate change mitigation; (b) climate change adaptation; (c) the sustainable use and protection of 
water and marine resources; (d) the transition to a circular economy; (e) pollution prevention and control; (f) the protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems. Article 17 of the directive 
further specifies that covered investments must add value to one or several of the abovementioned objectives, while avoiding ‘significant harm’ for any of the other objectives. 
Complement the green taxonomy with a social 
taxonomy
Based on the results of the work of the ‘social taxonomy’ working group of the EU platform on sustainable 
finance, the European Commission should prepare a legislative proposal for an investment taxonomy defin-
ing criteria for socially sustainable investments in early 2022. Underlying social objectives should be clearly 
connected to key dimensions of social well-being, including the creation of fairly remunerated quality employ-
ment, investment in human capital, the preservation of cultural heritage, social cohesion, and decent living 
conditions for all. The definition of such objectives and related standards should be informed by an analysis of 
social vulnerabilities brought to the fore during the COVID-19 crisis and aim to address them. Particular atten-
tion should be paid to the structure and financing needs of the social economy, the cultural sector, and projects 
in the context of a socially just transition to a carbon-neutral economy. To speed up the related legislative and 
implementation processes as much as possible, the Commission should begin work on the definition of tech-
nical standards required to ensure the full operationality of the social taxonomy alongside the preparation of 
the legislative proposal. 
54 EU Green Bond Standard Working Group (2019): Report on EU Green Bond Standard, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/190618-sustainable-finance-teg-report-green-bond-standard_en.pdf
Define a horizontal ‘do no significant harm’ 
principle
Improve the availability of sustainability  
information in financial markets
Establish uniform EU green and social bonds 
standards 
To ensure full complementarity and synergy between the green and social taxonomies, they should be con-
nected by a horizontal regulatory provision that builds on the do no significant harm principle developed in 
the green taxonomy regulation. Consequently, green or social investments under the taxonomy should clearly 
contribute to the achievement of one or multiple environmental and/or social objectives, while at the same 
time avoiding harmful impact on any of the other objectives laid out by the two taxonomies. Additionally, this 
horizontal safeguard mechanism should work to ensure that companies issuing bonds under the taxonomies 
comply with good corporate governance principles, e.g., in terms of respect of worker and fundamental rights, 
involvement in social dialogue, and tax compliance. 
Ensuring that financial firms and the companies to which they allocate capital through investments and 
credit provide meaningful and public information as regards their sustainability impact is key to ensure that 
the EU sustainable finance agenda can achieve its goals. In this regard, the European Commission’s work to 
ensure that financial firms (through the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) adopted in 2019) 
In line with the green and social taxonomies, the European Commission should propose standards for related 
listed bond instruments for public and private issuers, hence a social bond standard in addition to the green 
bond standard currently under preparation. These standards should be structured in a way that ensures that 
the proceeds of such bonds are used exclusively to finance eligible green and social projects, as defined by the 
respective taxonomies. The proposals should include measures to avoid that the issuance of such bonds mainly 
serves to re-finance existing projects but benefits the development of new, additional projects. As proposed 
by the High-level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, the alignment of bonds with the criteria set out in the 
underlying taxonomies should be verified by independent reviewers that have obtained accreditation from the 
European Securities Markets Agency to ensure robust and reliable information. To increase the attractiveness 
of green and social bonds, their introduction should be flanked by incentive measures, such as preferential 
treatment of such bonds in the ECB’s asset purchase programmes or financial support for issuers in meeting 
the associated verification requirements.54
86 
87 
and SMEs and large firms (through the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) proposed in April 
2021) disclose such information are steps in the right direction. The concrete reporting standards proposed 
by the Commission to date, however, fail to ensure that company disclosures are of an appropriate quality. 
As regards climate-related reporting obligations, the SFDR only stipulates non-binding guidelines and thus 
accepts simple, qualitative management statements. As part of the CSRD, the Commission has announced its 
intention to develop binding reporting standards to be introduced by way of a delegated act in 2022 but has so 
far failed to assure that these will lead to the disclosure of meaningful and comparable information relating to 
environmental and social sustainability objectives. 
To ensure that adequate, transparent, and comparable sustainability information is available to financial market 
participants, the forthcoming standards to be developed as part of the CSRD should ensure that companies 
disclose information on a comprehensive set of sustainability objectives covering the full ESG (environmental, 
social, governance) spectrum, use clear and comparable metrics and indicators in such reporting, and thus 
allow for a clear assessment of whether their business strategy is aligned with EU and global environmental, 
climate and social standards. The same reporting should then also be included in an updated SFDR. 
Penalise ‘brown’ investments
Next to the introduction of new taxonomy instruments to cover additional dimensions of sustainability, such 
as social objectives, the EU sustainable finance taxonomy regulation foresees the possibility of defining tech-
nical screening criteria for investment assets causing significant harm to environmental objectives by way of a 
review clause. As part of its forthcoming report detailing necessary measures to complement the existing EU 
legislative framework on sustainable finance, due by the end of 2021, the Commission should lay out steps to 
prepare related legislative proposals with the aim of defining a ‘brown’ investment taxonomy for environmen-
tally harmful and unsustainable investments. Where polluting technologies or investments are necessary to 
enable the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy, i.e., as transition technologies, these should be clas-
sified accordingly as part of a separate ‘transition taxonomy’ that temporarily exempts them from the brown 
taxonomy. 
These Commission proposals for the establishment of a brown taxonomy should also contain provisions to link 
it with EU prudential financial sector regulations, i.e., provisions governing the capital requirements and risk 
management of financial firms. This should work to increase the cost of brown lending and investments rela-
tively to that of activities with a positive and without significant impacts on sustainability objectives through 
the introduction of a ‘brown penalising factor’. Available simulations suggest that such a penalising factor could 
have significant effects on the re-allocation of capital within the financial system if set at an adequately high 
level, for instance at a rate 50% above the standard capital requirements.55 Additionally, the European Commis-
sion should consider ways to extend the scope of such provisions beyond banks and lending institutions falling 
under the scope of the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation and into regulatory regimes covering 
the shadow banking sector.56 
55 2° Investment Initiative (2018): The Green Supporting Factor, Report available at: https://2degrees-investing.org/reports/?fwp_search=green%20supporting%20factor 
56 Daniela Gabor (2020): Greening the European Financial System – Three Ideas for a progressive sustainable finance agenda, FEPS Policy Brief available at:  
https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/feps%20paper%20three%20ideas%20gabor.pdf
Submit the financial sector to carbon stress tests
Already in February 2016 the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) suggested that regulators and financial 
market supervisory authorities in the EU should run dedicated ‘carbon stress tests’ for banks, pension funds 
and insurers, to assess their exposure to climate change-related financial risks. Since then, the Dutch Central 
Bank has developed and run such stress tests, finding that the identified risks to financial stability, through 
adverse climate events and stranded assets, are significant.57 At the EU level, where most related regulatory 
competences are centralised, the introduction of similar supervisory procedures could, however, take until 
2024.58 As methodologies for the operationalisation of such stress tests exist, and the EU, with its significant 
(regulatory) ambition as regards climate change, is creating additional pressure for swift and decisive finan-
cial sector reform, this timeline should be accelerated significantly. The European Commission should aim to 
conduct first such carbon stress tests no later than in 2022 in order to be able to draw swift conclusions and 
propose, if necessary, further updates of EU regulation that serve to make the financial sector climate change-
proof before the end of the current parliamentary term. 
Require banks and financial firms to define  
comprehensive carbon net-zero strategies
Update the EU credit rating agencies regulation 
and create a public EU agency
Together with the competent supervisory authorities, the European Commission should draw up a roadmap 
aiming to ensure that the carbon footprint of lending and investment portfolios of banks and financial firms 
in Europe develop in line with EU emission reduction targets and the Paris Climate agreement. The roadmap 
and related actions should seek to ensure that financial institutions unwind their exposure to polluting assets 
in an orderly fashion and take related considerations into account in the future allocation of their lending and 
investment activities. 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have been criticised for their role during the credit crisis – where they failed to 
highlight the risks embedded in the complex financial instruments that were rated “triple A” – and in the subse-
quent European sovereign debt crisis, where they were accused of having contributed to market panic without 
proper justification. The way in which CRAs operate, the lack of competition (only three CRAs control the whole 
market) and the unresolved conflict of interest of CRAs (CRAs are paid by the market participants that issue and 
use the financial products that CRAs have to rate) are all issues that have been only partially tackled by the EU 
Regulation on CRAs adopted in 2012. 
57 Cardona, M. and Berenguer, M. (2020) Quel role pour la réglementation financière dans la transition bas-carbonne, I4CE. Available at:  
https://www.i4ce.org/wp-core/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/RegulationBasCarbone-Rapport_VF.pdf, p. 33
58 Lehmann, A. (2020), ‘Climate risks to European banks: a new era of stress tests’, Bruegel Blog, 05 February, available at www.bruegel.org/2020/01/climate-stress-test
88 
89 
Additionally, credit ratings fail to adequately reflect risks relating to climate change, the financial implications 
of the transition to carbon net-neutrality, and wider sustainability concerns relating to social and governance 
aspects.59 Given that the neglect of such factors does constitute also a form of financial risk for companies 
and their creditors, and given that these factors can no longer be regarded as mere externalities by financial 
market participants if the necessary economic change to foster sustainable human and planetary well-being is 
to come to fruition, credit ratings will have to internalise them going forward. Developing rating methodologies 
that take a comprehensive set of ESG factors into account and adopting legislation to ensure such methodolo-
gies are applied by CRAS should therefore be prepare in due course. 
Additionally, it is striking that the assessment of all kinds of risks, from simple shares to complex derivatives 
or countries’ finances, are solely in the hands of a handful of private companies. Importantly, as risks linked to 
sustainability concern every single member of society, they should be assessed and taken care of by the public 
sector. The creation of a public CRA with the specific task to assess sustainable development risks should be 
created as a matter of priority.
59 Final Report of the High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (2018), p. 76, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180131-sustainable-finance-final-report_en.pdf
3.3.2.  Making the digital economy work 
for sustainable well-being for all
Social media, online search, and e-commerce 
services are deeply integrated into people’s daily 
routines and social lives. The limitation of personal 
contacts and necessary self-isolation during the 
COVID-19 pandemic has further increased society’s 
dependence on such services. Contrary to the nar-
rative associated with the early days of the internet, 
however, the digital realm of today is no longer a free 
and diverse place free of all forms of domination 
and exploitation. Five US companies, the GAFAM 
(Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft) 
dominate the lion share of this constantly growing 
market, commanding a combined market capital-
isation of more than €6,100 billion, almost twice as 
much as the 50 highest valued EU companies com-
bined and almost half the size of EU GDP.60
Such startling economic power has been built on 
ruthless market dominating behaviours and highly 
successful, albeit morally questionable, strategies 
of profit extraction.61 To this end, the GAFAM have 
successfully worked to lock users into closed envi-
ronments made up of the services, applications, 
and equipment they sell. Within this environment, 
users are tracked, and their behaviours analysed 
with remarkable precision, allowing companies to 
predict what online contents are likely to capture 
users’ attention and what kind of products they may 
be willing to purchase. By constantly optimising 
such techniques, the GAFAM lure their customers 
ever deeper into the environment they alone have 
the power to control and thus become all-controlling 
gatekeepers between ‘their’ users and the rest of 
the economy and society. This creates highly prof-
itable business opportunities, for instance in terms 
of online advertising and e-commerce, which the 
GAFAM are happy to seize and flourish on. 
Recent years have seen remarkable growth in 
public awareness of the highly problematic impact 
this highly efficient system of profit extraction has 
already had on society, the economy, and democ-
racy. By reorganising online social activity in the 
interest of data and value extraction, platform’s 
business models can have large unintended conse-
quences for society and democracy. 
For example, with their treatment of information as 
nothing more than a commodity, online platforms 
have degraded public debate by amplifying mis- 
and disinformation, simply because such contents 
do better at gluing citizens in front of their screens 
and thus allow the gatekeepers to extract more data 
from them. Via the control of information flows, 
goods, and services, ranking and rating systems, 
these actors can bend entire markets and social sys-
tems. For instance, when Google decides to change 
its search algorithm, media across the globe have to 
adapt their operations instantly.62
Beyond allowing a very limited number of digital 
companies to extend their dominant market posi-
tions, these forms of data extraction in fact lead to 
the privatisation of huge amounts of data produced 
by the general public. This set up not only amounts 
to a form of expropriation, but also fundamentally 
underestimates the potential the safe, strategic, and 
public purpose-driven utilisation of such data could 
add to the transition to a smarter, more sustainable, 
and fairer model of society. 
60 Nogarede, J. (2021): Governing Online Gatekeepers – Taking Power Seriously, FEPS Study, available at:  
https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/governing%20online%20gatekeepers%201.pdf, p. 15
61 Soshana Zuboff (2019): The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, Profile Books, London
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Instead of contenting itself with regulation the 
extraction of data through private operators, EU 
digital policy should build on an understanding of 
data as a public good and create conditions in which 
non-commercial organisations, such as universities 
and research institutions, gain the ability to draw 
on available datasets to conduct work in the public 
interest. 
This is particularly important given that the undis-
puted and unrivalled efficiency of digital technology 
causes its ever-deeper invasion into all spheres of 
economic, social, and public life. Breakthroughs 
in the development of artificial intelligence, hence 
learning algorithms that have the capacity to 
analyse complex situations and processes within 
milliseconds taking sheer unlimited amounts of 
data into account, make the use of such applications 
practically irresistible in efforts to modernise pro-
duction processes, public and private services. The 
potential of such algorithms to boost resource effi-
ciency, improve decision-making and help humanity 
organise society in better and more fulfilling ways 
is undeniable. However, the impact on society’s 
well-being and its sustainability is only as good as it 
is programmed to be. This requires clear sets of rules 
that guide technological development into the direc-
tion of the public interest and also set strict limits to 
protect fundamental rights and society from detri-
mental outcomes – which have so far not been put 
into place. Rectifying this constitutes a matter of 
highest urgency to avoid that artificial intelligence, 
its further development and proliferation leads to a 
further concentration of power and the acceleration 
of the transformation of society into a profit-making 
machine at the other side of which only a select few 
reaps all the benefits. 
The good news is that the European Union clearly 
possesses the ability to set such rules and has the 
power to shape the digital realm according to its 
values. The General Data Protection Regulation, 
adopted in 2016 and by now considered the global 
‘gold standard’ in terms of data protection, serves 
as a case in point in this respect. Through deter-
mined action, guided by the compass of sustainable 
well-being for all, the European Union still has the 
chance to define a distinctly European approach to 
turn digitalisation into a public good that contrib-
utes to greater equality, freedom, and sustainability.
Related policy and regulatory initiatives are already 
well under way or under preparation. With its pro-
posals for a ‘Digital Services Act’, a ‘Digital Markets 
Act’ and a ‘Data Governance Act’, the European 
Commission has embarked on a mission to level the 
digital playing field and to align further technolog-
ical progress with public interest considerations. 
Moreover, with its proposed ‘Regulation on a Euro-
pean approach for Artificial Intelligence’, it is also 
tackling the crucial question of AI. However, related 
policy debates are already object of intense lobby 
pressure that might lead these proposals of cru-
cial importance and their laudable intentions to be 
derailed. 
Against this backdrop, the ICSE issues the following 
recommendations
»The impact of artificial 
intelligence on society s̓ 
well-being and its sustainability 
is only as good as it is 
programmed to be.«
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Stricter merger control and punish violations of 
related conditionalities
Ensure interoperability across digital services 
and market places
The digital behemoths have secured their dominant market positions through a combination of own growth 
and the strategic acquisition of (potential) competitors. In the past, the European Commission, responsible 
for the enforcement of competition law in the European single market, has routinely granted permission for 
such mergers and acquisitions, albeit with strings attached, for instance by prohibiting Facebook to integrate 
user data from messenger service Whatsapp into its social networks. Today, it is becoming clear that market 
concentration has, as a result, reached excessive levels that enables especially the GAFAM to engage in abu-
sive practices, partly as a consequence of the wilful breach of the conditionality attached to mergers, as in 
the Facebook-Whatsapp case. Where such violations are evident, previously approved mergers should be 
reversed. Going forward, the Commission’s default position regarding requests for mergers between players 
with already significant market share should be to decline them, with all mergers in the digital sector being 
subject to authorisation, as opposed to simple notification, requirements.
The GAFAM strive on their ability to create constantly expanding but nevertheless closed environments for 
users in which they have total control over online communications and transactions. To prevent and fight 
such market domination, the behemoths’ user environments need to be opened. This should take the form 
of comprehensive interoperability requirements that ensure users have real choice between different services 
providers without being locked into the digital environments created by dominant players. This would imply, 
for instance, that social networks or messaging services allow users to connect across different platforms and 
display contents from other networks, too.64 
63 Nogarede, J. (2021): Governing Online Gatekeepers – Taking Power Seriously, FEPS Study, available at: https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/governing%20online%20gatekeep-
ers%201.pdf,
64 Ibid.
Regulators’ mandate must mirror the scope of 
platforms: 
At present, the horizontal impact of online gatekeepers poses serious challenges across numerous policy fields 
and distinct bodies of regulation, such as consumer rights protection, competition policy, and fundamental 
rights protection, that are managed and enforced in silos of sectoral policymaking. Rectifying this requires 
the establishment of a European meta-regulator that mirrors the scope of the economic and social impact of 
online platforms and consists of a pool of experts and purpose-built procedures that enable not just network-
ing or coordination, but swift and decisive decision-making.63 Related institutional capacity should be built up 
within the European Commission and not rely primarily on outsourcing arrangements that currently seem to 
be favoured by the European Commission. 
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65 https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/democracy/the-eu-is-about-to-make-facebook-even-worse-4971/?utm_campaign=en_861_20210212&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter
66 Nogarede, J. (2021): Governing Online Gatekeepers – Taking Power Seriously, FEPS Study, available at: https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/governing%20online%20gatekeepers%201.pdf,
Ban targeted advertisement
Regulate user engagement techniques
By tracking and analysing the behaviour of their users, online gatekeepers have developed the ability to estab-
lish behavioural profiles that have predictive capacity. Accordingly, they possess the ability to determine, with 
significant probability, what kind of commercial offers users may be interested in, what preferences they have 
in terms of the concrete structure and appearance of such offers, and when they are likely to make a related 
purchase. This ability is sold to interested retailers and providers at a premium through targeted advertising 
services, creating a large and steady stream of revenue for online gatekeepers. From the perspective of con-
sumers, such a business model constitutes nothing less than manipulation and an unfair intrusion into the 
private sphere. Targeted advertising should therefore be banned altogether. 
To create ever larger bodies of data that can then be analysed and marketed, online gatekeepers make heavy 
use of so-called user engagement techniques to maximise the time users spend on their platforms. These 
include hyper-targeting of content and advertisements, automated recommendations, and ‘dark patterns’ 
that rely on behavioural ‘nudges’ to manipulate users’ decision-making. Such techniques, have, however been 
found to create addictive behaviours and often work to create so-called rabbit holes, in which users are con-
stantly fed exclusively with certain forms of contents to which they respond particularly strongly. In terms of 
online media consumption, this often leads to situations in which users over time are increasingly exposed only 
to certain types of news and underlying viewpoints, thereby losing sight of other media and other sides of the 
argument that is represented. Such techniques therefore play an important part in the increasing polarisation 
of public debate, both on- and offline, and thus pose risks to the functioning of democracy at the same time as 
constituting perfidious forms of manipulation used to increase corporate profits. To rectify this situation, such 
techniques should be regulated with a view to creating checks and balances and banning particularly harmful 
techniques altogether. As part of such regulatory work, online platforms should be required to notify regulators 
and seek their explicit approval before rolling out engagement techniques. Additionally, authorised techniques 
should be deactivated on platforms as a default setting and only be activated at the explicit request of users.65
Foster diversity in the online marketplace for 
goods, services, and content 
Due to the all-dominating market position the GAFAM have been able to secure for themselves, breaking up 
quasi-monopolies and increasing the permeability of the digital sphere alone may not be sufficient to break up 
the strong grip of online gatekeepers. To increase diversity and to improve the quality of commercial offers and 
information circulating successfully online and to create opportunities for European providers and businesses, 
the EU and Member States should engage in active support policies to boost the chances of success for Euro-
pean players, including by scaling up existing initiatives to make the opportunities of online marketing and 
e-commerce available to European businesses of all sizes, including small and micro enterprises and start-ups.66
Define stringent rules to ensure AI is bound by 
ethical standards
With its proposal for a regulation on a European approach on Artificial Intelligence, the European Commission 
has delivered a good starting point for the ensuing legislative process. Especially as regards matters relating to 
fundamental rights and protection against discrimination, clear and enforceable ethical frameworks are needed 
as AI is increasingly used in sensitive areas, such as the scoring of consumers seeking loans or insurance. As a 
matter of principle, the outcomes and decisions that are based on the use of AI must always be contestable and 
reversible and be linked to stringent duties of care on the part of the principals on whose behalf they are taken. 
In areas in which the use of AI is considered to pose related risks, the preparation of fundamental rights impact 
assessments should be mandatory. In areas in which the risks of AI clearly outweigh potential benefits, its use 
should be banned. The Commission’s proposal to impose such a prohibition for the use in recruitment processes 
is a welcome first step that should be complemented to include areas such as the military use of AI and facial 
recognition technologies in policing. 
A European framework for data altruism
To take account of the fact that data not only represents a commercially exploitable commodity but has the 
potential to contribute to the improvement of society in the interest of all its members, regulation and policy in 
Europe should actively support forms of data altruism that allow for its non-commercial use for purposes that 
are clearly in line with the public interest. This would enable, for instance, that mobility data, which is at present 
only accessible to the operators of the services and applications through which it is produced, is made available 
for research and development to improve public transport and urban planning. 
The European Commission’s proposals to this end, presented as part of the Data Governance Act, constitute 
a promising starting point in this respect. Such processes of data sharing for the common good should natu-
rally be in full alignment with existing data protection frameworks and be subject to stringent transparency 
requirements. To this end, the decision of whether user-generated data is made available for such forms of data 
altruism should be left at the discretion of users, not the operators of the services and applications through 
which such data is sourced. Limited exceptions to this rule through mandatory forms of data sharing could be 
considered where the sharing of data is essential to meet clearly defined public policy objectives, in which case 
the scope of such exceptions should be defined by means legislation. Additionally, related provisions should 
ensure that the organisations gaining access to data through forms of data altruism are clearly bound by public 
interest considerations. Restricting access to certified not-for-profit organisations, such as universities and 
research institutes, should therefore be considered. 
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Require mandatory conformity checks for AI 
applications
AI technologies developed for manufacturing or individual use should be subject to product safety checks by 
market surveillance authorities prior to their introduction. Such checks should cover fundamental rights and 
consumer protection rules, including the possible risk of accidents resulting from interaction with humans. 
Europe should avoid a patchwork of national legislations and instead develop a single set of EU rules taking into 
account the interests of users, businesses and other stakeholders. Going forward, such a framework would be 
aided by the development of internationally recognised standards, which are, however, not available at present. 
Make the use of AI transparent and empower  
citizens
An ambitious industrial policy for ethical AI 
made in Europe
Especially in the public sector, the use of AI should be subject to mandatory disclosure requirements in the 
form of publicly accessible registers. Such disclosure requirements should also be considered to apply to the 
private sector, especially as regards the use of AI in areas posing potential risks to fundamental rights infringe-
ments. The registers should come a legal obligation to disclose and document the purpose of the system, an 
explanation of the model and the information on who developed the system. This information has to be made 
available in a comprehensible and accessible manner. Additionally, Member States should be obliged to put 
into place support and advice services to assist citizens in exercising their right to non-discriminatory treat-
ment vis-à-vis AI applications. 
As a complement to such a legislative framework, the EU should also advance an ambitious industrial policy 
agenda in the field of AI in order to promote this distinct European and well-being-focussed approach to 
AI and enable EU developers and companies to seize related business opportunities. Digital technology, 
including AI, rightly constitutes a key priority in EU research and innovation funding. This focus should be 
maintained and complemented with further support measures to satisfy the funding needs of the sector, 
including through targeted programmes of public and promotional banks for digital start-ups and scale-
ups. Provision of ‘Clean’ Data Sets: To become strong in the field of AI, both in the public and private sector, 
Europe needs to make significant investments in the accessibility of open, high-quality, and non-personal 
data sets, in which potential biases that may lead to discriminatory outcomes of the applications developed 
on their basis have been corrected. This requires an infrastructure where non-personal data can be shared 
in order to stimulate the generation of high-quality data. Related regulatory actions should therefore be 
prepared as part of ongoing legislative work on the Digital Markets Act and the EU Data Governance Act.67 
67 https://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/sites/default/files/2020-02/sd_our_inclusive_digital_europe_en_200205_0.pdf
Establish national expertise centres for ethical AI
As part of a European strategy for a human-centred AI, Members States should be required to establish inde-
pendent centres of expertise to monitor, assess, and provide advice to government, industry and civil society 
regarding the societal and human rights implications of the use of AI systems. As independent statutory bodies, 
the centres of expertise would have a central role in coordinating policy development and national strategies 
relating to AI, and in helping to build the capacity of existing regulators and industry bodies to respond to the 
increased use of AI systems. These centres should but provide essential expertise on how to protect fundamen-
tal rights, including data protection rights, and prevent collective and societal harm. Additionally, they should 
support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in fulfilling their obligations under fundamental rights due 
diligence, including by providing support for the preparation of fundamental rights impact assessments. Such 
centres should involve civil society organisations, stakeholder groups and enforcement bodies, such as Data 
Protection Authorities and National Human Rights Bodies, to benefit all aspects of the ecosystem and build 
trust, transparency and cooperation between all actors.68
Additionally, EU policies designed to support the European AI sector should carefully consider the impact of 
the proliferation of AI on labour demand in the EU economy and prioritise AI applications that complement and 
improve the quality of human labour, especially in terms of job quality. 
68 https://automatingsociety.algorithmwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Automating-Society-Report-2020.pdf
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69 For a good overview, see Paul Collier and John Cay (2020): Greed is Dead – Politics After Individualism, Allan Lane
70 International Labour Organization and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2015): The Labour Share in G20 Economies, available at:  
https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/employment-and-social-policy/The-Labour-Share-in-G20-Economies.pdf; Piketty, T. (2013). Capital in the twenty-first century (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). Belknap Press.
71 Examples include the World Wildlife Fund’s Climate Business Network of companies that have defined scientifically validated climate action strategies and engage in related public reporting activi-
ties: https://wwf.panda.org/discover/our_focus/climate_and_energy_practice/what_we_do/climatebusiness/climate_business_network/
72 Schwab, K. with Vanham, P. (2021): Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy that Works for Progress, People and Planet, Wiley
3.4.  Turn companies 
into agents  
of sustainable 
well-being for all
Transforming the EU economy in line with the 
principles of sustainable well-being for all is an 
endeavour that must involve all economic actors 
and stakeholders. Naturally, this encompasses the 
corporate sector, i.e., companies of all sizes, where 
the decades-long dominance of the growth and prof-
its dogma has given rise to a corporate culture fully 
aligned with the logic of shareholder value and short-
term profit extraction. Recent economic history, not 
only since the 2008 global financial crisis, is rife with 
examples of companies siphoning startling amounts 
of cash into the pockets of shareholders and senior 
management while handing the bill for the long-
term harm caused by such greed to society at large.69 
The societal impacts of such ruthless profit 
extraction are increasingly evident. With more and 
more income being sucked up by top executives and 
shareholders, the share of national income going to 
labour has, particularly since the financial crisis, 
been declining. This is true within Europe, and also 
within the wider G20.70 As chapter 6 of this report 
will describe in more detail, such inequalities are 
posing increasingly severe threats to the cohesion 
and functioning of our societies. 
Guaranteeing that the profit motive of companies is 
kept in check by effective measures to ensure that 
wider societal objectives are taken into account in 
corporate decision-making is therefore key in view of 
the many challenges associated with the transition to 
a carbon-neutral economy and the wider sustainable 
transformation of society. Fortunately, many corpo-
rations in Europe and around the world are already 
realising the problematic impacts of high and rising 
wealth and income inequality as well as climate 
change and environmental degradation, not only 
morally but also to their bottom line and are taking 
steps to improve their impact on human communities 
and the planet. Over the past decades, the concept of 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ has turned into a 
principle by which many corporates abide and that, 
despite examples of so-called greenwashing, has the 
power to yield positive results.71 At the same time, the 
idea of ‘stakeholder capitalism’ is being discussed by 
international groups such as the OECD or the World 
Economic Forum with the implication that there needs 
to be a more considered questioning of the primacy of 
shareholders and a more equitable distribution of the 
value created, particularly to employees.72 
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73 The ruling of The Hague District Court (C/09/571932 / HA ZA 19-379) in English is available at: https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:5339
74 Stiglitz, J (2009) ‘Moving beyond market fundamentalism to a more balanced economy’. Public Coop Econ, Vol. 80, No.3, pp. 345–360
This implies at the very least reconsidering models of 
corporate governance and more radically ensuring a 
‘fairer’ and more equitable return to shareholders.
Despite such positive examples, more is needed to 
achieve an overall improvement of the corporate sec-
tor’s contribution to the sustainable transformation 
of the EU economy. As a recent, highly publicised 
court ruling against the oil company Shell in rela-
tion to its lacking climate ambition illustrates, the 
scale and urgency of global sustainability chal-
lenges has reached such acute levels that continued 
inaction on the side of the corporates constitutes a 
violation of future generations’ fundamental rights, 
even in the view of courts that are required to con-
sider guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt before 
convicting defendants.73 
With company law being a European Union compe-
tence and European single market legislation being 
able to make a substantial contribution in this regard, 
the European Union could and should thus become 
a pioneer of turning corporations into champions 
of regulated corporate social and environmental 
responsibility. By acting on these competencies, it 
has the power to re-define the purpose of business 
as going beyond the maximisation of shareholder 
value and being the creation of ‘public value’ for 
all stakeholders and ensuring its fair distribution 
while minimising negative externalities impacting 
on third parties and the environment. Crucially, this 
implies that company stakeholders, especially the 
workers running their day-to-day business as and 
communities in which they operate, are empowered 
and given leverage to influence companies’ course of 
action and have the means to hold them accountable.
Related policies do not have to be of a restrictive 
character per se. Already today, our economies are 
populated by alternative models of business, such 
as co-operatives, employee-owned businesses, or 
trusts where there is no such shareholder power, 
or new stakeholder models innovating stakeholder 
governance models and distributing fair and appro-
priate return within environmental constraints. The 
difficulty is that these kinds of business or organisa-
tion, as well as wider social economy organisations 
including mutuals and not-for-profits, are existing 
mostly at the margins of our economy. 
Support for such business models, alongside regula-
tory interventions to ensure businesses of all kinds 
adopt a focus geared towards both long-term sus-
tainability and stakeholder value, should therefore 
be a central element of EU company policy going for-
ward. This would serve both to change markets as 
well as to increase the resilience of the economy.74 
Additionally, research on the so-called mission 
economy approach has shown how purposeful coop-
eration between the public and the private sectors, 
can be of instrumental value in turning the necessary 
transition to a new economic model into a successful 
venture for both society and businesses. By engag-
ing and guiding businesses, government can play 
out its strength in seeing the ‘big picture’ and allow 
companies to find success in delivering solutions 
that directly work to nurture society’s well-being. 
The by now famous example of how the technologies 
turning smartphones into life-changing appliances 
have been developed through research and innova-
tion projects in which governments and businesses 
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However, as the story of this example continues to 
describe how only private corporations are reaping 
the profits of such breakthroughs, it also goes to show 
that the public sector will have to wake up, loose its 
naivety, and be firm in guiding the corporates’ hand.75 
By strategically developing its capabilities to lead the 
private sector in the achievement of societal objec-
tives as an active part of the economic landscape, 
not only as regulator but also as an economic player, 
governments possess the power to make a difference 
that markets alone would not be able to achieve. As 
the COVID-19 pandemic and the reliance of society 
and businesses on bold government action has illus-
trated clearly, the decades-long fight of business elites 
against the myth of ‘big government’ that judges active 
involvement of governments in markets as bad per se 
could hardly be more out of tune with the reality our 
societies and our planet is confronted with today. 
3.4.1.  A European accountable  
capitalism act
In market economies, the private sector’s role is one of 
fundamental societal importance. Next to providing 
society with most goods and services that it requires 
to satisfy its immediate needs and build its well-being, 
private businesses account for the lions’ share of the 
employment that citizens rely on to gain income. The 
COVID-19 pandemic, where the notion of ‘essential 
businesses’ was quick to emerge and private compa-
nies were relied on to develop the needed vaccines and 
equipment, has exemplified how in our system certain 
capabilities that society depends on to sustain itself 
are entirely in the hands of the corporate sector. 
Recent decades, especially since the 1980s, have seen 
significant parts of the business community lose the 
sense of responsibility that must go hand in hand with 
its crucial role in society. Especially large businesses 
now define their purpose in creating maximum share-
holder value from one quarter to the next, frequently 
at the expense of their own future viability. Through-
out the last decade, average dividend pay-outs in 
listed EU companies in the STOXX 600 (the 600 largest 
companies listed on European stock exchanges) have 
at times increased to over 70% of profits. Additionally, 
shareholders are increasingly demanding ‘share buy-
backs’, which involve companies using their profits, 
and sometimes even credit, to allow shareholders to 
trade cash for their shares at inflated prices. 
Yet, as was brought to the fore by the pandemic, 
such short-termism and profit-extracting behaviour 
is detrimental to the viability of businesses them-
selves. Citizens across the EU remember well how 
companies, which had bled their coffers empty to pay 
out dividends and bonuses only a few weeks earlier, 
relied on public support to stay afloat shortly after 
the coronavirus crisis struck.76 Moreover, indus-
trial relations research shows that companies giving 
stakeholders a say, especially through employee 
representatives’ involvement in decision-making at 
supervisory or management board level, are more 
profitable in the long run, prove more resilient vis-
à-vis economic shocks, and are less indebted than 
competitors without comparative social dialogue 
practices.77 Additionally, such businesses are found 
to score consistently and significantly better regard-
75 Mariana Mazzucato (2015): The Entrepreneurial State, 2nd revised edition, Penguin Books
76 Mazzucato, M. and Andreoni, A. (2021): No more free-lunch bailouts, available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/no-more-free-lunch-bailouts





say are generally 
more protable 




shocks, and are 
less indebted.«
ing key sustainability indicators such as fair human 
resources management, environmental protection, 
community involvement, and fundamental rights 
protection than less stakeholder-oriented compet-
itors.78 Yet, despite such clear economic, social, and 
environmental advantages for companies and societ-
ies alike, European legislation over the past 40 years 
has worked more to restrict stakeholder rights and 
economic democracy.79
Recognising how the European public demands a 
greater contribution of the business community 
to addressing the manifold challenges society’s 
well-being is faced with in in times of rampant pov-
erty, inequalities, and climate change, and given the 
pressure built by progressive political forces since 
the 2019 European elections, the European Commis-
sion, too, has begun to recognise the importance of 
related action. With its proposal for a Corporate Sus-
tainability Reporting Directive of April 2021 as well 
as its commitment to launch a Sustainable Corporate 
Governance package, expected for publication during 
the second half of 2021, the door may have opened for 
the achievement of meaningful change. However, in 
view of persisting shortcomings of such initiatives, 
and in view of likely resistance from Member States 
and parts of the business community, creating public 
and political pressure remains indispensable to make 
the achievement of meaningful results possible. 
The ICSE therefore proposes to engage with the Euro-
pean Commission’s work and, by building on the 
ideas developed by US Senator Elizabeth Warren,80 
to turn work towards its transformation into a ‘Euro-
pean Accountable Capitalism Act’ that commits the 
business community to work towards sustainable 
well-being for all in Europe and the world. As part of 
this European Accountable Capitalism Act, the ICSE 
issues the following recommendations.
»If companies are found to be 
engaged in opaque ownership 
structures, for instance through 
holding companies in jurisdictions 
that can be classified as tax-havens, 
they should be denied access to 
public contracts and state aid 
unless a binding and time-bound 
roadmap for the unwinding of such 
opaque structures is drawn up.«
Throughout the last decade, average 
dividend pay-outs in listed EU 
companies in the STOXX 600 have at 
times increased to over 70% of profits.
70%
78 European Trade Union Institute (2020): Benchmarking Social Europe 2019, p. 76, available at: https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/BENCHMARKING%202019%20Web%20version%20-%20Copy.pdf





Require large and high-risk corporations to 
define comprehensive sustainability strategies 
As part of its proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, the European Commission has pro-
posed a mandatory requirement for large companies to define concrete strategies, including specific targets 
and concrete measures, to ensure their business model and strategy is compatible with key sustainability 
objectives, including the objective of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees in line with the Paris Climate Agree-
ment. To ensure the measures set out as part of such strategies are defined in adequately robust ways and to 
ensure the transparency of related reporting activities, the Commission intends to work towards the adoption 
of binding standards, which are to be published in 2022, based on a proposal to be delivered by the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG). 
The ICSE invites progressive political forces to engage constructively with the Commission’s proposal, bol-
ster them, and work towards the swift adoption of related legislation. Such action should serve to ensure an 
adequately broad scope of the envisaged legislation. A purely numerical definition of the directive’s scope of 
application should be avoided to ensure that not only large enterprises but also small companies active in sec-
tors in which high risks for environmental and social sustainability are evident are also covered by its provisions. 
Progressives should also defend a broad set of social and ecological sustainability objectives to be included in 
corporate sustainability strategies, including objectives relating to the protection of biodiversity, the protection 
of fundamental and workers’ rights, and respect for good governance and anti-corruption principles. Require-
ments relating to the definition of corporate sustainability strategies, as well as related reporting requirements 
and standards, should be structured in a way that ensures companies are guided by concrete and time-bound 
roadmaps for the improvement of their sustainability impact and that sufficient information is made available 
to assess whether companies comply with the targets set out in such strategies. 
81 European Parliament (2021): Report with recommendations to the Commission on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability (2020/2129(INL)), available at:  
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0018_EN.pdf
A European directive on mandatory corporate 
due diligence 
In March 2021, a broad majority in the European Parliament, led by S&D rapporteurs across all associated par-
liamentary committees, united behind far-reaching proposals to ensure companies that are either registered 
in the EU or are active in its single market respect the fundamental rights of the people and communities they 
engage with, actively contribute to the protection of the environment, and comply with the principles of good 
governance.81 To this end, Parliament called on the European Commission to issue a legislative proposal in the 
form of a directive requiring all companies employing more than 250 workers, publicly listed companies, and 
companies of all sizes active in sectors in which high risks of potential breaches prevail to engage in extensive 
and proactive due diligence practices. Importantly, such due diligence would have to cover companies’ entire 
value chain, including their activities outside the territory of the European Union as well as that of subsidiaries, 
sub-contractors, and suppliers. 
82 The exact content of the legal provisions and standards covered by the directive would be defined as part of the legislative process, hence based on a proposal to be delivered by the European Com-
mission, and, according to the European Parliament, should cover the relevant bodies of EU law as well as internationally agreed standards.
To comply with these requirements, covered undertakings would be required to map out their entire value 
chain and carry out systematic assessments as to the risk of potential infringements of social, worker and 
trade union rights, environmental standards, and good governance principles.82 If actual or potential risks 
of violations are identified, companies would be obliged to draw up comprehensive due diligence strategies 
to contain and eliminate such risks, including through effective measures ensuring compliance on the part 
of sub-contractors and suppliers. Crucially, Parliament calls on the Commission to guarantee that compa-
nies consult with stakeholders, including trade unions, local communities, and civil society organisations in 
the development of such strategies and to ensure that stakeholders are in a position to identify risks to be 
included in due diligence strategies.
As part of their due diligence strategies, companies would also be required to establish grievance mechanisms 
that would serve both early-warning purposes and a mediation function in cases of actual infringements. Such 
mechanisms must foresee a right for stakeholders to activate related proceedings and to remain involved 
throughout the process until its conclusion through effective remedies and compensation measures. Parlia-
ment calls on the Commission to ensure, however, that the existence of such grievance procedures in no way 
affects the right of victims and stakeholders to initiate legal proceedings against non-compliant companies 
in front of ordinary courts. 
In Parliament’s proposal, covered companies would be obliged to make public their due diligence strate-
gies, including in a dedicated online repository managed by the European Commission, to evaluate them at 
least on a yearly basis, and to adapt them whenever their value chains are modified in a way that new risks 
emerge. Compliance with the directive would be enforced by Member States, which would be obliged both 
to carry out pro-active audits and to open investigations through the offices of public prosecutors in cases of 
suspected non-compliance. If companies are found to violate the requirements set out in the due diligence 
directive, Member States would be required to impose sanctions, which may take the form of financial fines, 
the exclusion of companies from state aid measures and public procurement, and the temporary closure of 
EU-registered companies or the revocation of the authorisation to operate in the EU single market of compa-
nies registered outside the EU territory. 
In the view of the ICSE, the European Parliament’s proposal for a directive on mandatory corporate due dil-
igence describes a powerful instrument to enforce strong principles of corporate social responsibility on 
companies operating in the EU single market. By also taking into view the entire value chains of compa-
nies, including subcontractors and suppliers, outside the EU, the proposal has the potential to become a 
ground-breaking project that actively fosters good corporate practice throughout the global economy. To add 
further strength to the proposal, the ICSE encourages progressive political forces to consider the inclusion of 
the corporate sustainability strategies (see previous proposal) under the mandatory due diligence framework, 
including its penal provisions. This would serve to ensure that companies are not only required to define such 
strategies and to report on their implementation but are liable in cases of negligent action leading companies 
to miss the targets set out in such strategies.
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Condition state aid and access to public  
procurement on good corporate governance
Companies wishing to apply for public contracts or depending on state aid, for instance to cope with temporary 
shocks, should be obliged to make public their entire ownership structure and financial interests. If companies 
are found to be engaged in opaque ownership structures, for instance through holding companies in jurisdic-
tions that can be classified as tax-havens, companies should be denied contracts and aid unless a binding and 
time-bound roadmap for the unwinding of such opaque structures is drawn up. Similar practices have already 
been applied in several EU Member States as part of coronavirus crisis support packages and have proven to be 
feasible in avoiding that public funds are used to increase the wealth of the already privileged.83 Moreover, state 
aid packages should be linked to conditionalities that ensure that recipient companies undertake meaningful 
action to contribute to the decarbonisation of the EU economy, refrain from paying out dividends, limit man-
agement bonuses, and refrain from laying off workers within a specified period of time. 
Strengthen employees' right to board-level  
representation
Bolster workers' rights to information and  
consultation
To make full use of the potential of economic democracy and social dialogue in managing the transition 
towards a sustainable economy, the European Commission should propose legislation to establish a man-
datory minimum floor of board-level participation rights throughout the European Union. Such minimum 
standards should apply to all companies in the private and public sectors above a certain size and be formu-
lated in a way that restructuring and cross-border company conversion processes cannot lead to the effective 
restriction of such rights, as is frequently the case in the currently applicable framework.84
Additionally, reforms should be undertaken in the EU legislative framework for workers’ information and con-
sultation rights. In particular, this should lead to the revision of the European Works Council (EWC) directive to 
rectify the situation in which most existing EWCs operate as symbolic bodies without decisive impact.85 This 
would include broadening the mandate of these bodies to include not only matters of transnational company 
strategy but also matters of common concern to the covered workforce, establishing robust provisions to guar-
antee proper information and consultation rights, at the same time as introducing measures to ensure access 
to justice and effective sanctions for violations of EWC rights. This should be flanked by the introduction an 
EU framework directive on anticipation, workers’ information, consultation and co-determination in cases of 
83 https://www.accountancyeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/Long-term-tax-policy-changes-for-a-sustainable-recovery.pdf
84 European Economic and Social Committee (2020): An EU legal framework on safeguarding and strengthening workers’ information, consultation and participation, p. 25-27, Study available at: 
https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/qe-02-20-818-en-n.pdf
85 European Economic and Social Committee (2020): An EU legal framework on safeguarding and strengthening workers’ information, consultation and participation, p. 23, Study available at:  
https://www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/qe-02-20-818-en-n.pdf
Eliminate incentives for company directors to 
focus excessively on shareholder interests
Sales of company shares by the directors and officers of listed companies should be restricted. Especially senior 
managers are today compensated mostly in company equity, which strongly incentivises them to focus exclu-
sively on shareholder interests. To ensure that they are focused on the long-term interests of all corporate 
stakeholders, company directors should not be allowed to sell company shares within five years of receiving 
them or within three years of a company stock buyback.
86 Piketty, T. (2021): Capital and Ideology, Harvard University Press), pp. 974-5
87 Accordingly, a shareholder holding shares equal to 25% of total stock of company shares would hold 15% of the total voting rights (10% of voting rights for the first 10% invested, 5% of voting rights 
for the 15% of shares beyond this).
88 See European Parliament Report on Sustainable Corporate Governance (2020/2137(INI)), available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0240_EN.pdf
change and restructuring to ensure workers representatives, employers, public authorities and other relevant 
stakeholders throughout the European Union prepare and manage corporate change and restructuring in 
socially responsible ways. 
Limit the voting rights of large shareholders
Reward patient shareholding
To limit the concentration of power within large companies, the voting rights of large companies should be 
restricted. To this end, investments beyond a certain threshold, which could be made conditional on the size 
of the company, would not lead to increases in the voting rights of the same magnitude.86 For instance, in 
large companies, investments beyond 10% of the company’s total stock of shares would only lead to increases 
in voting power equal to 1/3 of the amount of investment beyond the 10% threshold, with the remaining 2/3 
of such voting rights being reallocated to smaller investors, employees, or other stakeholders.87 Threshold 
values and re-allocation keys could be made conditional on the size of the company, for instance in terms of its 
employees or turnover, to limit the impact of such a measure on small and family-owned businesses. 
As proposed by a recent report of the European Parliament’s legal affairs committee,88 the European Commis-
sion should propose a revision of the shareholder rights directive to integrate incentives for patient shareholding. 
Such measures should work to discourage frequent sales of company shares, which exert pressure on company 
directors to focus overly on the short-term development of their companies’ share prices, and reward long-term 
commitment on the side of shareholders. This could, for instance, take the form of provisions granting patient 
shareholders additional voting rights, or allowing them to ‘re-gain’ voting rights in the context of the previous 
proposal, when they remain invested in a company for a sufficiently long time. Additional tax incentives for 
long-term shareholding, or disincentives for short-term shareholding, could also be considered in this regard. 
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3.4.2.  A European benefit corporation 
statute
Across Europe and advanced economies more 
broadly, heightened awareness of the climate crisis 
and widening gaps in societies have led to renewed 
interest in responsible entrepreneurship. Compa-
nies, including global mega-corporations, pledging 
to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality within spe-
cific timeframes or companies highlighting their 
commitment to the well-being of citizens and their 
communities through elaborate communications 
campaigns already today constitute commonplace 
phenomena. Such practices often reflect changed 
preferences of consumers in affluent societies 
who are growing increasingly conscious of how 
narrow-minded corporate profit-maximisation fre-
quently leads to detrimental outcomes for society and 
the environment and begin to look for alternatives. 
More often than not, related changes in corporate 
behaviour lack transparency beyond the superfi-
cial claims publicised by businesses themselves and 
thus leave the contribution to the public cause to the 
virtue and goodwill of private enterprise. 
A promising alternative route has been pioneered 
in Italy, where in December 2015 company law was 
amended to create the new statute of ‘Società Bene-
fit’, or benefit corporation.89 
Companies adopting the benefit corporation stat-
ute are guided, next to the profit motif, by clearly 
defined and legally encoded public benefit purposes, 
such as providing low-income or underserved com-
munities with beneficial products and services, 
providing opportunities for the weak or marginal-
ised, or protecting and restoring the environment. 
Moreover, the benefit corporation statute stipulates 
the requirement for the ‘Società Benefit’ to publish 
comprehensive audits and in fact measurements 
of its contribution to such public benefit purposes, 
using externally developed auditing methodologies 
that also take into account all relevant dimensions of 
corporate governance relating to employee and envi-
ronmental matters.90 
As was proposed by the first ICSE policy report, the 
benefit corporation approach should be taken up 
by the European Commission and translated into 
a forceful EU strategy to foster its Europeanisa-
tion with a view to making benefit corporations the 
predominant legal form EU-registered companies 
within ten years. 
To this end, ICSE issues the following recommenda-
tions: 
»Across Europe and advanced 
economies more broadly, 
heightened awareness of the 
climate crisis and widening gaps 
in societies have led to renewed 
interest in responsible 
entrepreneurship.«
89 Note that the concept of benefit corporations used here takes inspiration from the Italian statute of ‘Società Benefit’, hence a business statute entirely governed by public law and with enforceable 
legal obligations. This distinguishes it significantly from the B-Corp approach becoming increasingly popular in the United States, which is mainly driven by private certification schemes and much 
weaker and less enforceable obligations, for instance in terms of reporting. 




An EU directive establishing the benefit  
corporation statute in all EU Member States
Introduce incentives and provide support  
services to promote the uptake of benefit  
corporation statute
The first element in this strategy would be the adoption of an EU directive to create the benefit corporation 
status in all EU Member States. The directive would stipulate the legal requirements for companies seeking 
registration as benefit corporations as well as related reporting duties. Ideally, these requirements would entail 
the ‘do no significant harm’ principle developed in the framework of the EU sustainable finance strategy.91 This 
principle would work to ensure that benefit corporations strive to make contributions to a specific public ben-
efit purpose of their choosing, while at the same time avoiding detrimental impacts (i.e., significant harm) on 
a set of general environmental and social purposes to be laid out by the directive. The Commission’s proposal 
should further include provisions to create a uniform label for benefit corporations in order to ensure consum-
ers can easily recognise benefit corporations as public purpose-driven businesses. 
To promote the uptake of the benefit corporation statute, including among small and medium-sized enter-
prises, it should be structured as simply as possible and be accompanied by EU-level and national incentives, 
for instance through privileged access to public procurement, dedicated investment and investment support 
vehicles. Additionally, national governments should consider establishing dedicated support services to assist 
benefit corporations, especially small and micro enterprises, with the reporting duties associated with this new 
statute. This could, for instance, take the form of the development of standardised reporting tools as well as 
public bodies offering audits at low cost or free of charge for benefit corporations falling below a certain turn-
over threshold. 
91 Cf. Final report of the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (March 2020), available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/200309-sustainable-finance-teg-final-report-taxonomy_en.pdf 
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3.4.3.  Boost the social economy 
The social economy accounts for more than 6% of 
employment and between 6-8% of EU GDP.92 Social 
enterprises, typically taking the form of non-profit 
or not-for-profit forms of businesses, are deeply 
rooted in local communities, operate on the basis 
of participatory and democratic decision making, 
and provide essential services, for instance in social 
care, health, and education. The social economy also 
includes co-operatives and mutuals which, at their 
core, are designed to deliver good pay to employees 
and affordable goods and services to their customers 
rather than serving the interests of shareholders. 
In recent years, there has been a tendency to see the 
social economy as just dealing with market failure, 
in other words, supporting those who are having 
difficulty in finding work or providing goods and 
services that the market fails to deliver or under-
provides. However, they, along with other kinds of 
alternative business such as trusts or new models of 
ecological or stakeholder company need to be rather 
seen as part of market transformation in order 
to reduce income and wealth inequalities, spread 
economic power, as well as contribute to more sus-
tainable futures. 
In many ways, the social economy has been at the 
frontline of the current pandemic and has proven 
critical to communities’ and society’s resilience in 
the face of COVID-19. Making emergency assistance 
available to social economy enterprises has there-
fore rightly been a key area of concern in the delivery 
of EU measures in view of the economic and social 
crisis and has been made eligible to benefit from 
various financial support measures, including under 
the Next Generation EU programme and its adjacent 
Recovery and Resilience Facility.93 Such measures 
amount to important stabilisation efforts, but do 
not, as of yet, constitute a strategic plan to boost 
and develop the potential of the social economy in 
the transition to a sustainability and well-being-fo-
cussed economic model in Europe. 
The European Commission, which committed to 
proposing a social economy action plan in its 2020 
work programme, decided to postpone this strategy 
in view of the Coronavirus crisis, which is now due 
for publication in 2021. The ICSE has already called 
for such a strategic agenda for the social economy in 
its first policy report and therefore wishes to recall 
the importance of following through with their 
implementation. 
IN this regard, the ICSE issues the following recom-
mendations: 
92 European Economic and Social Committee (2015): Recent evolutions of the Social Economy in the European Union, Study available at:  
http://www.ciriec.ulg.ac.be/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/RecentEvolutionsSEinEU_Study2017.pdf 
93 European Parliament Research Service (2020): What future for the social economy? Study available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2020)659336
The social economy accounts for more 
than 6% of employment and between 
6-8% of EU GDP
6-8%
»The social economy has been at 
the frontline of the current 
pandemic and has proven critical 
to communitiesʼ and society s̓ 
resilience in the face of 
COVID-19.«
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An EU social economy action plan that addresses 
current challenges
A dedicated Commission service to coordinate 
policy for the social economy
Include the social economy in the future EU 
social sustainable finance taxonomy
The forthcoming social economy action plan constitutes a chance for the European Commission to build on 
the ICSE’s previous proposals and lay out a consistent frame of legislative and non-legislative action to work 
towards their implementation. Key elements included in this previous ICSE report concern the creation of con-
sistent European statutes for mutual societies, associations, and foundations to facilitate their cross-border 
(co-)operation in the single market, measures to improve access to finance for social economy enterprises, 
developing and collecting better statistics of social economy activities, and action to increase the attractive-
ness of careers in the social economy. The action plan should, as far as possible, be supported by a robust 
assessment of the specific impact of the pandemic on the social economy and, if necessary, include dedicated 
measures to provide further emergency support measures to social enterprises. Beyond this, it should address 
the following strategic actions. 
The European Commission should establish a dedicated service for the coordination of policy for the social 
economy to leverage its potential for societal and environmental change in the interest of sustainable 
well-being for all. To this end, the temporary and informal taskforce created under the joint leadership of the 
Directorates General for ‘Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion’ and ‘Internal Market, Industry, Entrepre-
neurship and SMEs‘ should be formalised and be equipped with a robust mandate to provide effective policy 
development and policy coordination across all policy areas under EU competence with direct relevance for 
the social economy.
The structure and needs of social economy enterprises should be considered closely in the development of 
a social investment taxonomy (see section 3.3.1.) with a view to making social economy activities eligible for 
inclusion under the taxonomy. This should equally be the case in the development of a European social bond 
standard as part of the EU sustainable finance strategy.
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Support the digitalisation of the social economy 
Particular challenges have been detected regarding the uptake of digital technologies and solutions in the 
social economy sector, mainly due to high capital costs.94 This has had severely damaging effects on opera-
tionality of many social economy operators during the pandemic and prevented it from making an even bigger 
contribution to societal resilience in view of the coronavirus crisis. The European Investment Bank and National 
Promotional Banks should therefore launch dedicated support programmes for the digitalisation of the social 
economy, for instance in the form of preferential loan terms or guarantee schemes. 
Foster collaboration between the social economy 
and conventional businesses
A recent study carried out on behalf of the European Executive Agency for SMEs (EASME) has highlighted the 
high value and mutual benefit of cooperation between social economy enterprises and traditional businesses, 
typically leading conventional businesses to adopt new measures of corporate social responsibility and allow-
ing social enterprises to engage in processes of learning and innovation.95 Related programmes should be 
offered and run on a permanent basis and be supported under the European Structural and Investment funds. 
94 European Parliament Research Service (2020): What future for the social economy?, pp.6-7, Study available at:  
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2020)659336
95 EASME (2019) Social Business Initiative (SBI) follow up: Cooperation between social economy enterprises and traditional enterprises, Study and Executive Summary available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/social-business-initiative-sbi-follow-cooperation-between-social-economy-enterprises-and_en
96 European Policy Centre (2021): The Industrial Strategy Refresh: A new opportunity to reboot the EU’s industrial innovation performance, Policy Brief available at:  
https://epc.eu/en/Publications/The-Industrial-Strategy-refresh~3da158
3.4.4.  Innovation for sustainability
The need to embark on a fundamental transformation 
of society to achieve sustainability and well-being 
for all challenges citizens and business to do things 
radically differently. Research and innovation can 
be of instrumental value in this regard, by provid-
ing solutions for the clean and cost-effective energy 
and mobility, new and truly sustainable models of 
consumption, technologies and business models that 
make economic opportunities available for citizens 
in remote regions, or by delivering innovations for 
better and easily accessible public services. 
Using innovation policy to meet societal chal-
lenges, however, necessitates a different approach 
to research, development, and innovation then has 
been followed in the European Union to date. Tra-
ditionally, EU innovation support has mainly been 
preoccupied with questions of industrial competitive-
ness. By focussing funding on industrial champions 
to accelerate innovation cycles and create, defend, 
and enlarge their competitive advantage in global 
markets, EU research and development support has, 
over the years, evolved into an elitist circle accessible 
almost exclusively to the ‘best in class’.96
What is more is that such a narrow focus on industrial 
leadership and competitiveness reduces innovation to 
purely commercial considerations. Accordingly, the 
history of innovation policy of recent decades is rife 
with examples of how publicly funded research has 
led to breakthroughs that were then exploited based 
on entirely commercial considerations by the private 
sector. While this allowed businesses to generate star-
tling profits, frequently through excessive pricing 
strategies, the public interest, for instance in terms of 
ensuring equitable access to new digital technologies 
and pharmaceutical treatments, had to take the back 
seat, despite public funds being critical in launching 
the underlying innovation cycles.97
Innovation policy in support of sustainable and cohe-
sive societies that nurture the well-being of their 
citizens, bridge gaps between the old and the young, 
rural and urban regions requires a shift in focus. It 
requires an understanding of research and innova-
tion as an essential public good that is provided to all 
citizens and communities that rely on its outputs to 
satisfy their well-being-related needs and aspirations. 
Instead of aiming to create and defend a competitive 
edge, this public good function of research and inno-
vation is associated with the objective of equalising 
living conditions and access to social and economic 
opportunities. 
To fulfil this task, innovation processes need to be 
mission-oriented, hence focus on achieving specific 
well-being-related outcomes that are purpose-built 
for the communities they are meant to benefit. Such 
processes rely on networks of actors, comprising 
researchers, businesses, and stakeholders, that are 
led by governments that actively manage them to 
create ‘public value’ by contributing to a common 
societal purpose. Instead of ‘nudging’ markets to 
adapt and hone their capabilities, the role of govern-
ment in missions of this kind is to create entirely new 
markets that work better to satisfy society’s well-be-
ing-related needs and to take the associated financial 
risk by acting as the investor of first, not last resort.98
In the European Union, unique capabilities are 
already available to bring such a mission-oriented 
approach to research and innovation that addresses 
key societal challenges under the leadership of an 
entrepreneurial state to fruition. With more than 
300 major public research infrastructures existing in 
Europe, for instance in the form of research institutes 
and networks that combine world-class scientific 
expertise with funding that does not depend on imme-
diate commercial success, spurring cutting-edge 
innovation for the sake of social and environmental 
justice, and not for maximum profit, constitutes a 
real possibility. This potential to create public value, 
for instance in the energy transition, mobility, digital 
economy, health and demographic transition, must 
be systematically leveraged. 
However, this would imply that such capabilities 
are not only used to conduct fundamental research 
but also remain actively involved throughout the 
subsequent stages of the cycle of innovations, includ-
ing their commercialisation and roll-out. Such 
endeavours could further benefit from structured 
cooperation with public and mixed public-private 
enterprises, which, despite pressures of privatisation 
in recent decades, continue to populate EU markets in 
large numbers. 
Otherwise, the fulfilment of such tasks would 
continue to rely on operators whose only aim is to gen-
erate maximum profit, which too often leads to either 
excessive user prices or the stalling of innovation 
processes that do not promise immediate concerns, 
despite their proven social and ecological value.99 
Next to a shift in focus in the governance of research 
and innovation, the success of mission-oriented 
research also requires reforms in the science sector, 
where over-specialised research has at times lost 
touch with the challenges faced by a global population 
affected by exacerbating inequalities and environ-
mental degradation. As the 2019 Global Sustainable 
Development Report notices, “[t]he world now needs 
more sustainability science. That is a new, more engaged 
academic field of studies that sheds light on complex, 
often contentious and value-laden, nature-society inter-
actions, while generating usable scientific knowledge for 
sustainable development. That means dealing with risks, 
uncertainty, ethical issues and appropriate use of the pre-
cautionary principle. It involves working with affected 
groups to recognise problems and goals and identify key 
trade-offs”.100 Although underdeveloped at present, 
in Europe as much as worldwide, pioneering sus-
tainability science projects have proven their ability 
to create new forms of knowledge and, importantly, 
make them applicable in ways that turn challenges 
and dilemmas into co-benefits for people and planet. 
By combining knowledge from multiple scientific 
disciplines, collaborating with heterogeneous sets of 
citizens, business and government stakeholders, such 
science has a potential to boost sustainable well-be-
ing for all that must be developed and harnessed 
strategically. 
Since its recent overhaul, Horizon Europe, the EU’s 
principal funding programme for research and inno-
vation with a budget of €95.5 billion for the period 
97 Mariana Mazzucato (2015): The Entrepreneurial State, 2nd revised edition, Penguin Books
98 Ibid.
99 Florio, M. and Giffoni, F. (2019): L’impatto sociale della produzione di scienza su larga scala: come governarlo?; Forum Disuguaglianze Diversità, available at:  
https://www.forumdisuguaglianzediversita.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Florio-Giffoni.x96206.pdf
100 Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General (2019), Global Sustainable Development Report 2019: The Future is Now – Science for Achieving Sustainable Development, United 




between 2021-27, has begun to embrace the mission 
orientation as part of its portfolio of research and 
innovation support policies. Accordingly, five mission 
areas (fighting cancer, adaptation to climate change, 
healthy oceans, climate-neutral and smart cities, 
healthy soils and food) have been defined to launch 
related projects.101 In this regard, the European Com-
mission can rightfully claim to assume a pioneering 
role. However, important challenges remain in the 
full and successful implementation of the mission 
approach, which will require the Commission to 
engage in comprehensive processes of experimenta-
tion, learning, and capacity building.
Moreover, mission-oriented innovation should not 
only be a priority for large-scale funding programmes 
at the European level. In fact, similar approaches can 
be duplicated at national, regional, and local levels 
where social and technological innovation solutions 
are urgently needed to meet concrete problems that 
citizens, their communities, and businesses are faced 
with in the transition to a sustainable economy and 
society. The European Commission should therefore 
regard the turn towards this special kind of innova-
tion policy as a process of innovation leadership in 
itself and work to scale it up to bring governments and 
public authorities at all levels on board.  To ensure the 
successful implementation of the mission-oriented 
innovation approach at the level of the European 
Commission and begin its mainstreaming across all 
levels of governance, the ICSE recommends focussing 
on a number of key areas. 
»Mission-oriented innovation 
should not only be a priority for 
large-scale funding programmes 
at the European level but should 
also guide action at the national, 
regional and local levels.«
Building cross-sectoral capacity in the European 
Commission
Mission-oriented innovation requires collaborative and cross-sectoral approaches to the governance of inno-
vation processes and their outputs. To succeed, the Commission services leading the networks of researchers, 
stakeholders, and businesses that are driving the innovation process must stimulate constant exchange, coop-
eration, and mutual learning among these partners and ensure constant feedback between the innovation 
network and the specialised government services responsible for the policy areas concerned throughout 
the process and the lifecycle of the envisaged innovation outputs. This may prove challenging for the Euro-
pean Commission, an institution that is mainly following a sectoral approach in which different departments 
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Draw on the own learning curve to mainstream 
the mission-oriented approach
(Directorates General (DGs)) claim exclusive responsibility for their policy fields and prefer to work in ‘silos’. 
Implementing the mission-oriented innovation approach successfully in the European Commission requires 
that new organisational processes and cross-sectoral coordination capacity is built in the institution. While the 
establishment of so-called mission boards chaired by high-level representatives of different Commission Direc-
torate-Generals for the supervision of the Horizon missions appears to be promising step in this regard, the 
Commission must also ensure that adequate administrative capacity is built for the actual day to day manage-
ment of innovation missions. Unlike in previous Horizon programmes, such project management should not 
be outsourced to external providers. Only this way can a purpose-driven organisational culture develop that is 
key for the success of innovation missions, built on strong horizontal coordination and geared towards building 
institutional knowledge and best practices.102 Crucially, the such governance structures for mission-oriented 
innovation processes should be closely linked to, and build upon the insights generated by, the Future Sus-
tainable Well-being Capacity in the European Commission to ensure high degrees of consistency with the 
objectives and analysis underpinning future EU policy at large. 
This institutional learning process should be documented, evaluated, and developed into a comprehen-
sive mainstreaming strategy targeting all EU policy fields and all levels of government. In practice, all EU 
programmes, especially those with an investment component, can become enablers of mission-oriented inno-
vation. Providing the managing authorities with insights into the benefits of this approach, as well as practical 
guidance for its implementation, can serve to multiply innovation missions and the development of innovative 
solutions far beyond the EU research and innovation programmes. Related guidance should also be provided 
to national, regional, and local authorities where the mission-oriented approach to innovation has already 
sparked significant interest as a lever to boost regional development and to provide locations specific solu-
tions for challenges associated with the necessary transition to a sustainable economic and social model.103 
Additionally, such mainstreaming approaches should also be built into EU development cooperation to assist 
developing and transition countries with the adoption of the mission-oriented approach to research and inno-
vation and build related capacity. 
102 Mazzucato (2021), p. 117
103 https://pes.cor.europa.eu/place-based-approach-key-research-and-innovation
Establish European innovation hubs
To build capacity for mission-oriented innovation in Europe, the European Commission should work towards 
the establishment of European innovation hubs. Such hubs should connect public research infrastructures, 
such as public research institutes and networks, public, private, and mixed companies across borders to col-
laborate as part of long-term-oriented innovation missions. Such collaboration should be geared towards 
the joint development of technology and innovations, as well as to the transfer of knowledge and technol-
ogies across the participating organisations. Through such hubs, which could be structured thematically to 
deliver solutions to address key challenges relating to climate change, the energy transition, mobility, digital 
economy, health and demographic transition, scientific breakthroughs and progress could be made widely 
accessible across Europe and disseminated based on considerations of social and environmental justice, not 
only commercial viability. 
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104 For a detailed discussion of necessary reforms in science and academia with a view to boosting sustainability science, see Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General (2019): 
Global Sustainable Development Report 2019: The Future is Now – Science for Achieving Sustainable Development, United Nations, New York, available at:  
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/24797GSDR_report_2019.pdf
105 OECD (2020): How effective are R&D tax incentives? New evidence from the OECD microBeRD project, available at: https://www.oecd.org/sti/microberd-rd-tax-incentives-policy-note.pdf
106 Mazzucato (2013): pp. 203-4
Boost European sustainability science
To increase sustainability science capacity in the EU, the European Commission should engage with Member 
States to mainstream the approach across the European academic landscape. This would imply updating 
course curricula in a way that equips graduates with the ability to communicate and collaborate across dis-
ciplinary boundaries, to engage with non-academic stakeholder communities, and to identify and address 
socially relevant research questions. To nurture the nascent European sustainability sciences, EU Research 
and Development Funds, in particular the Horizon programme, should make the funding of related research 
projects and the aim of building European excellence in the sustainability sciences a key priority.  Additionally, 
career incentives for professional researchers should be reformed in a way that rewards trans-disciplinarity 
and social engagement, and not only, as is often the case at present, high degrees of specialisation and publi-
cations in a select number of academic publications.104
Adapt private sector research and innovation 
funding 
Boosting private sector mission-oriented research and innovation also requires policy change in the innova-
tion funding landscape. EU governments currently display a strong bias towards supporting innovation mainly 
through tax incentives for private sector companies engaged in research and development. Tax incentives, 
however, are only successful in stimulating research and development in late stages of the innovation cycle, e.g., 
where research and development are conducted to prepare the commercialisation of pre-existing solutions 
or technologies. To stimulate basic and applied research, the key ingredient of mission-oriented innovation, 
tax incentives have much smaller impacts than direct financial support. The shift towards mission-oriented 
innovation should therefore be accompanied by a rebalancing of innovation funding towards more grants and 
less and better targeted tax breaks.105 However, to avoid situations in which public funds are used to take risks 
at early stages of the innovation cycle, yet the profits generated through successful innovations exclusively 
remain with the businesses that commercialise such solutions, public innovation funding bodies should, as 
matter of principle, retain either equity or (partial) intellectual property in them. 
Develop a European standard for innovation funds 
To increase funding available for the support of research and innovation, the equity and intellectual property 
held by governments from innovation projects should be transferred into innovation funds that support the 
next cycle of innovation. Such funds can potentially be established at all levels of government, from the EU 
level down to the local level. Such funds and the arrangements for retaining equity and intellectual property 
should be based on a common European standard to facilitate cross-border cooperation among innovation 
stakeholders. The European Commission should therefore propose a regulation to establish a uniform statute 
for such funds in all EU Member States.106
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At the beginning of this year, the European Com-
mission published a legislative proposal which 
aimed to create a “Just Transition Fund” within 
a mechanism of the same name (JTM). The oper-
ationalisation of the just transition concept is 
an indisputably meaningful political step in the 
right direction since it aims at ensuring that the 
transition towards a climate-neutral economy 
happens in a fair way. It however lacks a substan-
tial definition of a just transition for people and 
communities. Yet, a too limited approach, blind to 
the actual magnitude of the social crisis, would be 
dangerous, because it could understate the grave 
social and political risks associated with a climate 
policy that is not embedded in equally ambitious 
social policy.
This is where our approach of a “just transition” 
can be a powerful policy concept of the early 
21st century, when addressing the mega-crisis 
we face—provided we embrace its full meaning. 
We can by no means allow a conflict between 
social and environmental policy objectives to 
happen. Because it would mean that the most 
vulnerable sectors of society would bear alone 
the consequence of a failed transition. Instead, 
a true social-ecological transition must answer 
environmental change with social progress. The 
transition we are calling for must be fair, it must 
offer stability, and it must promise protection. 
A particular focus will therefore be placed on 
anticipative and inclusive policymaking: building 
capacity to anticipate structural changes in order 
to allow policy to intervene before harm is caused 
is key to achieve fairness and sustainable well-be-
ing. In this respect, we provide an inclusive 
definition of Resilience to implement transforma-
tive policies. 
This definition will require from policy-mak-
ers to understand resilience in the context of 
sustainability by looking at the entire ecologi-
cal-social-economic-political system. 
Its transformative approach leads to a major 
question: who decides when and why a particu-
lar system should be considered “resilient” and 
what would be the political objective we want 
to achieve via the transformation phase. This is 
where strong social consensus on the goal and 
pathways to sustainability is fundamental. In 
fact, such an approach to a just transition should 
even be used to (re-)vivify democracy itself. A true 
participatory democracy must define the nature 
of the ambitious reform the EU should undergo to 
achieve human well-being goals and to co-create 
the society of tomorrow.
This section proposes to create inclusive gover-
nance mechanisms at all levels, so that citizens, 
communities, trade unions and employers can be 
part of implementing a strategy they co-decided. 
Along the same lines, this section seeks to reaf-
firm the crucial role of education, training and 
lifelong learning in paving the way towards a sus-
tainable future for Europe and beyond.
However, if this transformation is not set within 
a comprehensive approach to the wide-ranging 
distributional impacts on social groups, regions 
and localities, it cannot suffice to meet the EU’s 
pledge of ‘leaving no one behind’. Our definition 
of a Just transition requires the application of a 
place-sensitive approach which would invite to 
create a greater variety of regional development 
strategies, opening the door for more complex but 
fairer solutions that cannot be achieved through a 
‘one size fits all’ approach.
Finally, and in order to ensure a just transition, 
we need to address the two dimensions of the 
challenges faced when pursuing climate justice 
objectives, namely: tackling the unequal vulner-
ability and exposure to environmental risk in 
society and at work, on the one hand, and the need 
for social fairness in environmental policies, on 
the other hand. 
4.1.  Introduction
The just transition concept
The concept of just transitions originated in the US labor movement. In the 1970s, Tony Mazzocchi 
(leader of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union) put pressure on the US government to support 
wartime workers at risk of losing their jobs as a result of disarmament. A decade later, the concept was 
adapted by trade unions in response to a wave of new environmental protection policies107 to counter the 
“jobs versus environment” discourse and encourage collaboration between organised labor and envi-
ronmental justice groups. This led to the development of a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder strategy. 
Along these lines, the labor movement’s work on just transitions has significantly contributed to the 
international climate debate over the last two decades. The concept was subsequently incorporated 
into the negotiating text for the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 and later into the preamble to the Paris 
Agreement adopted in December 2015.108
At EU political level, the call for a just transition also became a major demand by the PES and S&D 
Group during the 2019 European election campaign, subsequently taken on board by the new Commis-
sion in its strategic priorities.
On January 14th 2020, the European Commission published a legislative proposal which aimed to create 
a “Just Transition Fund” within a mechanism of the same name (JTM).109 This mechanism, which is 
based on three pillars combining European, national, local and private public funding, is aiming to 
guarantee the professional retraining of people directly affected by the foreseeable disappearance 
of high carbon-emitting activities, as well as the economic revitalisation and land rehabilitation of 
territories located throughout the continent, but mainly in Central and Eastern Europe. The opera-
tionalisation of the just transition concept in the form of the EU just transition mechanism is an 
indisputably meaningful political step in the right direction since it aims at ensuring that the transi-
tion towards a climate-neutral economy happens in a fair way. It however lacks a substantial definition 
of a just transition for people and communities.
107 Mazzocchi acknowledged that the activities associated with their industries were damaging the environment and advocated for public policies that protected the natural environment as well as 
workers. He then proposed a “superfund for workers” following union and employee-sponsored studies citing significant job losses as a result of increased environmental regulation. Just Transition 
Concepts And Relevance For Climate Action- A Preliminary Framework - Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Climate Investment Funds (CIF Ben Cahill (CSIS) and Mary Margaret 
Allen (CSIS) - June 2020
108 The Paris agreement requires that national plans on climate change include just transition measures with a centrality of decent work and quality jobs.
109 COM/2020/22
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The concept of a “just transition” can be a powerful 
policy concept of the early 21st century, when address-
ing the mega-crisis we face—provided we embrace its 
full meaning. 
Yet, political commitments to just transition in con-
nection to climate and ecological policy stop short 
of embracing the magnitude of what is at stake. 
Typically, just transition is defined as a set of com-
pensatory policies directed towards low income 
households and at best as being about leaving no one 
behind. This is the narrative employed, for instance, 
by the European Commission.
We believe this is a limited approach, blind to the 
actual magnitude of the social crisis, and a danger-
ous one, because it could at best understates the grave 
social and political risks associated with a climate 
policy that is not embedded in equally ambitious 
social policy.
Climate experts are well aware of the tipping points 
in the process of global warming and the risk they 
represent.110 A similar risk resides in the social crisis, 
which has been dramatically illustrated by the yellow 
vest protests in France in 2018. It will not be enough to 
try and compensate fragile and lower middle income 
populations. 
Such compensations will not get the job done, because 
they will not resolve the underlying social crisis. Wide 
protests may come again as a result in other parts of 
Europe. In such a tense climate, they may then open 
the road for a resurgence of populist right wing pol-
itics, inspired by the Trump experience in the US. 
Hence, a just transition must live up to the social chal-
lenges our societies face.
As previously stated in the foreword of this report, 
the world is in a permanent state of multiple and 
intertwined political, economic, social and ecologi-
cal crises. The transitions our societies are currently 
experiencing and will be dealing with in the next 
decades will be multifaceted and probably perpetual. 
Transitions will not be temporary phases anymore. 
They are becoming a new normal. Hence, progressive 
policy-makers are facing an unprecedented chal-
lenge: wide-ranging and continuous transitions will 
inevitably occur and it is their prime responsibility to 
guide them to just outcomes. 
We can by no means allow a conflict between social 
and environmental policy objectives to happen. 
Because it would mean that the most vulnerable sec-
tors of society would bear alone the consequence of 
a failed transition.
The social-ecological nexus, which we regard 
as a defining characteristic111 implies that a true 
social-ecological transition must answers environ-
mental change with social progress. This amounts to 
building a social-ecological state to sustain the transi-
tion; and finally aiming to improve present and future 
human well-being rather than increasing economic 
growth, even a “green” one. The transition must be 
fair, it must offer stability, and it must promise pro-
tection.112
In this regard, the substantial contribution of the con-
cept of resilience and its related indicators could help. 
True resilience allows reducing our vulnerabilities, 
preventing risks, and when faced with challenges, 
developing innovative solutions that transform and 
effectively protect our societies against future threats. 
In a socio-ecological transition, resilience is the abil-
ity to face shocks and persistent structural changes 
in such a way that current individual and societal 
well-being is increased, without compromising that 
110 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) introduced the idea of tipping points two decades ago. Tipping points are events that have high impacts and are interconnected across different 
biophysical systems, potentially committing the world to long-term irreversible changes (e.g: runaway loss of ice sheets that accelerate sea level rise; forests and other natural carbon stores such as permafrost releasing 
those stores into the atmosphere as carbon dioxide (CO2), accelerating warming; and the disabling of the ocean circulation system).
111 Readers may refer to our conceptual section 1.3
112 Towards a social-ecological transition. Solidarity in the age of environmental challenge, Eloi Laurent and Philippe Pochet, ETUI, The European Trade Union Institute, 05 November 2020
»We can by no means allow a 
conflict between social and 
environmental policy objectives 
to happen.«
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of future generations. In this section, we will elabo-
rate on polices linked to the transformative capacity 
of resilience.113 The main feature of this transforma-
tive capacity is that it does not only include technical 
and technological changes, but also cultural changes, 
behavioural shifts and institutional reforms. These 
transformations should lead to a new, sustainable 
path, with enhanced levels of well-being.
A just transition requires anticipation and carefully 
calibrated policy interventions to mitigate potential 
conflicts and transitional changes, and, thus, to avoid 
the emergence of additional vulnerabilities while at 
the same time addressing pre-existing inequalities. 
Transparent planning and decision-making that lead 
to just transition measures will prevent fear, opposi-
tion and inter-community and generational conflict. 
People need to see a future that allows them to under-
stand that, notwithstanding the threats, there is both 
security and improvement.
A particular focus will therefore be placed on antic-
ipative and inclusive policymaking: building 
capacity to anticipate structural changes in order to 
allow policy to intervene before harm is caused is key 
to achieve fairness and sustainable well-being. 
A just transition should be guided by the principle of 
recognition, which implies accurate participation, 
at a minimum, of groups vulnerable to impacts in 
the context of transitions. Representation should, of 
course, accurately capture the interests, values, and 
heterogeneity of these groups. To do so effectively, 
groups need the mechanisms and knowledge to be 
involved in decision making, which is often accom-
plished through capacity development. Education 
and training are crucial in this respect to ensure 
the smoothness and inclusiveness of the sustainable 
transformation of society. 
Equally important, a just and meaningful par-
ticipation of a more procedural nature requires 
involvement that affords some degree of weight in the 
decision-making process. 
This could range from consultations through effective 
social dialogue to participation in formal negotia-
tions to resist unequal power relations. The latter 
should include a greater focus on more deliberative 
approaches which better enable people to engage 
in complex discussions on a more equal footing and 
allow them to raise their voice to defend a desirable 
future. Participatory democracy must define the 
nature of the ambitious reform the EU should undergo 
to achieve human well-being goals and co-create the 
society of tomorrow. The possibilities of building new 
hybrid democratic systems that combine direct and 
representative, and digital and territorial forms of 
democracy are crucial to better involve people in the 
political decision-making process.
A social-ecological transition should carry out 
policies ensuring territorial equality, using a 
place-specific approach. In this respect, a greater 
role should be given to the territorial plans estab-
lished and designed at territorial level and involving 
a range of local public and private actors to develop 
local social-ecological indicators and policies. Social 
dialogue, collective bargaining and participation are 
basic values and tools that underpin and can allow to 
reconcile the promotion of social cohesion, the qual-
ity of employment, the creation of jobs, and greater 
innovation and fairness of European economies and 
societies. In that respect, involving trade unions in 
climate action plans to build and develop rights for a 
fair transition will be particularly critical. 
Finally, the notion of climate justice must guide the 
policy-making process to prevent the impacts of the 
transition to be unfairly distributed across gender, 
geographical location and age, which would exacer-
bate already existing inequalities in Europe, while 
the opposite must be achieved. Placing a particular 
focus on issues linked to accessibility, the report will 
offer proposals to tackle emerging inequalities (i.e.: 
the fight against energy poverty, the access to electro-
mobility). Finally, as climate change is already having 
serious consequences in Europe and worldwide, the 
report will explore options for an effective climate 
adaptation strategy incorporating key well-being 
objectives. 
Beyond the non-legislative Communication presented 
by the European Commission last February, this 
chapter will propose un upgraded policy agenda with 
binding targets at the EU level (with a series of recom-
mendations ranging from adaptation stress tests, the 
integration of adaptation into macro-fiscal policy to 
common EU ‘taxonomy’ for sustainable investments 
in risk preparedness and prevention). 
113 Three related attributes of social–ecological systems determine their future trajectories and can be can be classified as “absorptive capacity”, “adaptive capacity” and “transformative capacity”. For 
Good Measure - Advancing Research on Well-being Metrics Beyond GDP - Marleen de Smedt, Enrico Giovannini, Walter J. Radermacher
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The concept of resilience already has a long history 
behind it. It has been investigated in different scientific 
disciplines, from biology and ecosystems to engi-
neering (e.g. elasticity of materials) and health (e.g. 
psychological trauma), and for different contexts and 
entities (communities, organisations114 and nations).
Resilience is by now a widely used and increasingly popular 
word in the public and political spheres. However, its precise 
meaning can vary, which has major policy implications.
A widespread and narrow understanding of resil-
ience is that of returning to a previous state after 
a disturbance (a shock, a crisis…). This is not our 
understanding. Resilience is more than that. In par-
ticular, unless a system can stay within its state of 
equilibrium despite the disturbance that affected it, 
the goal must be to bring it back to a new state of equi-
librium - precisely because the disturbance exposed 
the failure of the anterior measures that were meant 
to prevent it. Hence, these two different understand-
ings of resilience can lead to radically different policy 
conclusions.
Furthermore, when a disturbance becomes unbearable 
while an adaptation to it would lead to an excessively 
detrimental change (in terms of higher inequality and 
vulnerability, for example), resilience must become 
transformative. For instance, in the context of the cur-
rent pandemic or of climate change, transformative 
resilience can be defined as the capacity to learn from 
past events to engineer changes towards a better con-
dition.115
To allow for an approach that is not field-specific, we 
build on previous work,116 and operationalise the 
notion of resilience as the ability to face shocks in such 
a way that societal well-being is reinforced, without 
compromising that of future generations. 
This requires from policy-makers to understand resil-
ience in the context of sustainability by looking at the 
entire ecological-social-economic-political system.
4.2.1.  Recovering from the COVID pan-
demic and “build back better”
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown how vulnerabili-
ties in health systems can have profound implications 
on health, economic activity, social cohesion or trust in 
government, and beyond this how the underlying causes 
behind the occurrence of such a disease in humans can 
destabilise the world. Accordingly, for the recovery 
from the pandemic to be durable and resilient, a return 
to ‘business as usual’ must be avoided. A transformative 
resilience approach to dealing with such future shocks 
is required. Such a transformative approach should lead 
policy-makers to a range of actions: 
114 2014 Human Development Report “Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience”
115 For a discussion on different forms of resilience, see: For Good Measure - Advancing Research on Well-being Metrics Beyond GDP - Marleen de SMEDT, Enrico Giovannini, Walter J. Radermacher
116 Manca, A. R., Benczur, P., & Giovannini, E. (2017). Building a Scientific Narrative Towards a More Resilient EU Society. JRC Science for Policy Report, JRC28548.
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a) Health systems
- explore the elements and conditions for capacity building to strengthen 
health system resilience, 
- address healthcare provision for vulnerable patient groups and how to 
sustain such provision in a system under stress, 
- set out a common approach to develop and implement “resilience tests” 
of Member State’s health systems.
- include a stronger focus on preventive health to increase resilience within 
the general population, tackle inequalities and reduce re-course to acute care
b) Health workers
- A comprehensive policy agenda for essential health workers: keeping 
frontline health workers safe on the job, increase training, information, and 
resources, fostering inter-professional and inter-sectoral collaboration with 
community health workers and informal care givers, raise pay to a 
permanent living wage 
c) Health policies
- Benchmark and support where needed research and development and 
procurement (especially for innovative medicines), 
- debate methods for Member States to collect and share aggregate health 
data and socioeconomic status, 
- integrate information and communication technologies across care levels 
and public health, 
- strengthen primary and mental health care, increasing public health focus 
on psychological distress,
- Integrate biodiversity considerations into the recovery from the COVID-19 
crisis. Biodiversity loss is a key driver of emerging infectious diseases and 
poses a variety of other growing risks to society. Investing in the 
conservation, sustainable use and restoration of biodiversity can help to 
address these risks.
- Protecting the ecosystems for the benefit of the current generation and of 
the generations to come should be at the centre of any long-term policy no 
matter which specific economic or social policies are concerned
- Economic recovery packages should be designed to “build back better”. 
This means doing more than getting economies and livelihoods quickly 
back on their feet. 
- Recovery policies also need to trigger investment and behavioural changes 
that will reduce the likelihood of future shocks and increase society’s 
resilience to them when they do occur. Central to this approach is a focus on 
well-being and inclusiveness.
Post-pandemic transformative resilience: 








The scenario of a collapse of the health services and 
its terrible consequences on our societies led to the 
adoption of measures that impacted very heavily 
on peoples’ daily lives and required great efforts of 
adaptation with a high toll on the economic, social 
and cultural spheres. New burdens were imposed 
on families, heavier still in overcrowded dwellings. 
Having children and teenagers permanently at 
home proved particularly challenging for couples 
and more so for single parents, most often women. 
Those with small children and working from home, 
even if in the liberal professions, had to rearrange 
their agendas, revise their priorities and, last but not 
least, try to compensate the lack of available school 
education. 
If full school closures were to be enforced again over 
a long period, a significant proportion of students 
from more vulnerable backgrounds would likely 
experience persistent disadvantage through a range 
of barriers: long-term educational disengagement, 
digital exclusion, poor technology management, and 
increased psychosocial challenges. We must learn 
from the impact of this initial phase of COVID-19 and 
have systems in place to operate effectively despite 
being in crisis. Failure to learn from this pandemic 
risks exacerbating existing educational inequities 
and subjecting students, particularly those in vul-
nerable settings, to an increased risk of adverse 
social outcomes.
Future directions must plan for schools, teachers, 
parents, and students to be prepared at multiple 
levels for a collaborative response, leading to a true 
resilience of the educational system. This must 
include an alternative to being physically present 
on the school campus, and policymakers and prac-
titioners must ensure equity in the provision of 
education for all students. This would concretely 
mean to underline inclusivity, appropriate use of 
technology with varying modalities, the provision of 
support for both teachers and families, as well as the 
importance of creating communities that facilitate 
learning. “Building back better” necessarily need 
proactive and multifaceted responses to address the 
educational needs and also avoid widening existing 
educational disparities. Resilience, in this specific 
sector, would then mean that as governments plan 
and prepare for future disaster responses, they must 
re-examine resource allocations to schools to ensure 
all students have equality of access to resources 
especially related to technology.
In the same line, since COVID-19 hit, people have 
also lost access to cultural and social events. A very 
common response to physical distancing due to the 
restrictions imposed to counter the pandemic was 
to re-create social closeness. People revisited the 
mechanisms of mutual help and solidarity by new 
means and through new communication channels, 
also exploiting the possibilities offered by digital 
technology. Since the first days of the lockdown, cre-
ativity exploded generating a myriad of spontaneous 
initiatives: arranging collective applauses from win-
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dows and balconies dedicated to those on the front 
line, rearranging spaces, inventing or converting 
devices to novel uses, sharing knowledge, skills, 
competences, and resources one could offer. In the 
same line, there flourished a number of individ-
ual and collective initiatives by artists, musicians, 
comedians, as well as institutional endeavours by 
museums, theatres, orchestras sending signals of 
endurance from the world of culture, art and leisure. 
Yet, the cultural and creative sectors have been 
among the most negatively affected sectors by the 
COVID 19 pandemic. The containment measures 
that have been put in place throughout the EU have 
led to a chain of effects, severely impacting the eco-
nomic and social situation in the cultural sector. 
Many concerts, art events and festivals have been 
taking place online. However almost one in two 
people globally cannot access them due to issues 
such as lack of internet connectivity, according to 
UNESCO estimates.117 With the lockdown, many 
public and private providers moved content on-line 
for free to keep audiences engaged and satisfy the 
sharply increased demand for cultural content. 
While the provision of free and digitally mediated 
cultural content is not sustainable over time, it has 
opened the door to many future innovations. To cap-
italise on them, there is a need to address the digital 
skills shortages within the sector and improve digi-
tal access beyond large metropolitan areas, with the 
additional consideration that digital access does not 
replace a live social and cultural experience or all 
the employment opportunities that go with it.
Building on the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on 
both the education and the cultural and creative sec-
tors, strategic complementarities can be developed. 
Both sectors experienced accelerated digitalisa-
tion, which brings new opportunities for local and 
regional development but also risks of exacerbating 
inequalities without accompanying measures. Such 
accompanying measures include, for example, the 
development of methodologies and technological 
solutions for distance and distributed learning with 
digitally mediated access to cultural resources and 
experiences. The lockdown and social distancing 
measures have also made evident the importance 
of culture for people’s mental well-being – and 
possibly, through the increasingly documented psy-
chosomatic effects of cultural access, also health. 
This recognition provides a new opportunity to 
capitalise on the role of arts and culture as ways to 
achieve resilience with transformation and invite 
to provide the right framework for possible inter-
ventions at policy and sectoral levels to support this 
transformation. 
This kind of transformative approach to resilience 
leads to a major question: who decides when and why 
a particular system should be considered “resilient” 
and what would be the political objective we want to 
achieve via the transformation phase. Hence, in a 
democracy, transformative resilience must become 
a central topic of an open and inclusive democratic 
process. This will inform and determine the collec-
tive choices that are made, and equally important, 
will provide the necessary public support to policies 
which by nature have far-reaching implications for 
citizens as a whole.
4.2.2.  Resilience to climate change: 
above and beyond climate resil-
ience
Climate change could cause social and economic 
damages far larger than those caused by COVID-19. 
Hence, it will be impossible to achieve a just tran-
sition without embedding resilience into climate 
change policy. This will require a comprehen-
sive approach, building on the 2030 Agenda of the 
UNSDGs. The interlinkages across the economic, 
social and environmental dimensions of devel-
opment and the opportunities to build positive 
synergies among them must be exploited here, 
because several of these interlinkages and synergies 
are fundamental to facets of building climate change 
resilience in a social-ecological way.
Just as vulnerability to climate change must be used 
as a particularly effective key to understand the state 
of our societies and territories, so resilience can be 
a powerful tool, to review the concepts that under 
today’s governance in a time of risks and disasters. 
Therefore, to anticipate the consequences of these 
events on sustainable well-being, we must develop 
preventive tools. Resilience should establish what 
is the desirable future for our societies, instead of 
being a simple shock absorption tool.
117 Culture in crisis: policy guide for a resilient creative sector - UNESCO - 2020
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Develop broad vulnerability indicators for the EU
Member States and regions (NUTS 2 level): vulnerability is best understood as a multidimensional concept.118 
A wide range of factors should be considered: it should encompass physical, social, economic, environmental 
and institutional features that could be hit by the overall impact of a given shock. These factors could include 
a wide range of data, from the asset stock of a household, its access to public services, to the geographical 
characteristics of a particular place. For instance, indicators on social vulnerabilities should take into account 
pre-existing precarious situation or due to measures introduced to tackle the emergency (lockdown, social 
distancing, ...) and focus on all groups which have likely experienced difficulties to satisfy their basic needs 
during the lockdown period and will have less resources for recovering.
118 Birkmann, 2006; Bohle, 2002; Cutter et al., 2000
119 Building a Scientific Narrative Towards a More Resilient EU Society Part 1: a Conceptual Framework - 2017 - MANCA Anna Rita, BENCZUR Peter, GIOVANNINI Enrico
Create a comprehensive dashboard of resilience 
indicators for the EU and its Member States119
Such a dashboard would allow (1) a continuous monitoring of the resilience of the society of the EU and its 
Member States, (2) an assessment of the impacts of policies on resilience, and (3) based on such information, 
the forming of guidance for new policies improving resilience.
• The proposed dashboard would aim to capture social, economic, and health aspects, using a selection 
of available and ready-made indicators to estimate the resilience capacity to cope with a shock (like the 
COVID-19 crisis) by absorbing, adapting, and transforming in response to it. 
• Such resilience characteristics should then be monitored continuously. Building on the Sustainable 
Development Goals index, the data could help to lay the groundwork to measure the progress of 
countries, by going beyond GDP and including measures of well-being, environmental sustainability  
and good governance. 
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Analyse vulnerability and resilience through  
a Human well-being lens
Resilience and vulnerability do not represent opposite ends of the spectrum, but rather form part of the 
same equation: resilience determines in large part how people or systems respond to shocks, and hence 
determines how people or systems are affected by those shocks and how vulnerable they are to experiencing 
a particular outcome. 
• The sustainability of the socio-economic and natural systems where people live and work is critical 
for well-being to last over time. Sustainability depends on how current human activities impact on 
the stocks of different types of capital (natural, economic, human and social). Suitable indicators for 
describing the evolution of these stocks must be developed. 
• Build “integrated” climate resilience impact assessments, which would combine different types of 
modelling tools to uncover the interlinkages across the environmental, economic and social dimensions of 
development, targeting the importance of bringing inequalities to the fore. Vulnerability to climate change, 
poverty alleviation and disaster risk reduction while reducing structural inequalities. The forthcoming Fit 
for 55 package must be based on transparent and comprehensive impact assessments that reflect fully 
the overall social benefits of increased EU climate ambitions, notably in respect of health, reduction of 
inequalities, territorial and social cohesion and the trade-offs between different policy choices. 
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4.3.  Inclusive gover-
nance and open 
democracy for  
a just transition
Openness, transparency and participation in policy 
design, decision-making and implementation are 
key ingredients to build accountability and trust, 
which are necessary for a just transition in a vibrant 
democracy. In fact, such an approach to a just tran-
sition can even be used to (re-)vivify democracy 
itself. There is a need for the EU to create a feeling 
of belonging and involvement, at the same time 
as it seeks a more active participation of citizens, 
through the establishment of relevant participa-
tory tools, especially at a time of moving towards a 
climate neutral society. This transition requires a 
common and strong political will, a bold vision of 
long-term objectives. Changes that will be addressed 
are systemic and public authorities at all levels need 
to develop coordinated, complementary and innova-
tive strategies. This transformative process requires 
building trust throughout society. Above all, it 
requires meaningful dialogue with all parts of soci-
ety, at every stage of the process and at every level. 
The Just Transition Mechanism partially addresses 
this issue by providing for Member States to pre-
pare their “Just Transition Territorial Plans” in 
consultation with local stakeholders (trade unions, 
enterprises, NGOs, local authorities). 
Strong social consensus on the goal and pathways 
to sustainability is fundamental. Social dialogue 
has to be an integral part of the institutional 
framework for policymaking and implementa-
tion at all levels. Adequate, informed and ongoing 
consultation should take place with all relevant 
stakeholders. In the tumultuous times European 
societies are facing, solidarity and a new mode of 
cooperation is more needed than ever. It is not only 
an issue of intergovernmental solidarity among the 
member states—it is also about transnational soli-
darity among EU citizens. 
Inclusive governance and participatory democracy 
are not about gaining consensus on already taken 
decisions, in order to ensure that they will be sup-
ported. It is about building those decisions in a truly 
inclusive manner. 
For many years now, countries across the world 
have witnessed people’s growing and persisting 
discontent, materialised through protests and the 
rise of populist movements, which have been fur-
ther amplified online. Discontent can be seen as the 
by-product of various related factors such as struc-
tural and widespread social inequalities, which in 
turn have eroded the legitimacy of liberal democ-
racy and political representation, and provoked the 
widespread loss of trust in institutions.120
The EU is no stranger to this widespread phenom-
enon. Pervasive levels of distrust threaten indeed 
the EU’s democratic legitimisation. Complexity of 
EU decision-making should not be perceived as 
tackled “by entrusting decision-making to ‘experts’ 
and technocrats and where policy choices would be 
presented as technical, as if they were the result of 
an objective maximisation of ‘efficiency’, univocally 
defined, hiding the clear-cut political choices that 
they embody”.121
»Strong social consensus on 
the goal and pathways to 
sustainability are fundamental.«
120 DevTalks - Democracy, deliberation and the digital age - OECD - Monday, 21st June 2021
121 The time for a U-turn towards social and environmental justice is now - Fabrizio Barca - The Progressive Post - September 4, 2020 - FEPS
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Philosopher Marcel Gauchet notes that in today’s 
world, politics have become “the true functional and 
symbolic infrastructure of our societies”.122 Disinforma-
tion and manipulation campaigns, in this respect, 
aim to undermine this infrastructure by weaken-
ing the authority, legitimacy and effectiveness of 
politics in democratic societies. From this point of 
view, the European democratic system can be seen 
as a critical infrastructure that needs to be protected 
jointly, in the same way as the traditional mate-
rial and technical infrastructures.123 But, as other 
infrastructures in a transition process, it should 
undergo a substantial reform. 
This chapter intends to discuss the opportunities 
and challenges of a true deliberative democracy, a 
starting point to begin to rebuild the social contract 
between civil society and institutions. The possibili-
ties of building new hybrid democratic systems that 
combine direct and representative, and digital and 
territorial forms of democracy are crucial to better 
involve people in the political decision-making pro-
cess and, thus, to achieve sustainable well-being 
objectives. Space for a heated, open and informed 
public debate should be promoted in order to allow 
citizens’ participation.124 
4.3.1.  Placing social dialogue at the heart 
of transition policy
Policies for mitigating and adapting to climate 
change are inherently political because they oblige 
society to choose a new path. Enhancing social dia-
logue on transition policies is imperative since their 
development, diffusion and deployment could have 
uneven impacts within and across national borders.
4.3.1.1.  Inclusive governance for the just tran-
sition mechanisms 
The “Just Transition Mechanism” will require 
national authorities to submit their “Territorial Just 
Transition Plans” to the Commission within the 
framework of the European Semester, so that the 
Commission can approve their overall ambition and 
specific content as well as certify their conformity 
with the “National Energy-Climate Plans” for 2030. 
This exercise must be more open: it should ensure 
the necessary involvement of the social partners 
and other directly concerned stakeholders. The 
climate pact fails also to provide a concrete gov-
ernance framework that would allow civil society 
and workers to truly participate in the design and 
implementation of the European green Deal. And 
although the trade unions are partners in the struc-
tured dialogue established within the governance of 
the cohesion funds, this fails to grasp the way they 
will be involved in the processes of drafting climate 
policies at national and local levels. For social dia-
logue to work effectively, it requires to strengthen 
workers’ participation and empower trade unions to 
ensure their effective involvement.
122 https://www.cairn.info/revue-la-revue-lacanienne-2008-2-page-59.htm
123 European Democracy, a fundamental system to be protected - https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0578-european-democracy-a-fundamental-system-to-be-protected
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• A European Climate Justice Governance Regulation 
Despite a range of important EU initiatives to address this (such as the Just Transition Fund or the 
forthcoming Climate Social Fund), a lot will depend on how national and regional governments will 
address the social risks and opportunities of the ecological transformation. Hence, alongside the Fit for 
55 initiatives, the European Commission should bring forward a Climate Justice Governance Regulation, 
notably inspired by the existing Energy Governance Union approach, to develop and monitor national 
climate justice plans. (NECPs).
The concept of a Just Transition process as well as the role of social partners in its governance must be 
enshrined in the legislation. Social dialogue and the role of trade unions should be explicitly mentioned 
in the Climate Law and the European Green Deal.
4.3.1.2.  Advance social dialogue at sectoral 
and company level 
More attention is to be given to the role of social 
dialogue to tackle climate change, especially at the 
company level. Trade unions are structured, have 
on the ground perspective, and democratically rep-
resent workers in all sectors of the economy. They 
are key in shaping the different measures so as to 
accommodate the needs of the workers and in iden-
tifying the key challenges of the transition, making 
sure that workers and most vulnerable sectors of 
society do not bear alone the burden of financing the 
transition. Workers on the ground are in a good posi-
tion to foresee the problems arising from climate 
change and to put forward fair solutions. This calls 
for a bottom-up approach, with inclusive governance 
at all levels, so that communities, trade unions and 
employers can be part of implementing the strategy.
4.3.1.3.  The need and role of civil society 
organisations in the just transition
In the field of ecological transition, the EU should 
promote policies empowering civil society unique 
and expanded role in generating democratic legiti-
macy by fostering public deliberation, translating 
and transmitting concepts, ideas and messages. 
It should lead to stimulate cooperation with NGOs 
and to create networks and structured dialogue 
between them to engage with the transition to a 
society achieving sustainable well-being for all. 
Countries’ adaptation plans are largely state driven 
and top-down in approach, while climate change 
is locally experienced and can only be effectively 
addressed by engaging local groups and institutions. 
Civil society organisations (CSO’s), being closest to 
the problem, are best suited to creating transforma-
tive capacities within communities.
Technology interventions and policies designed 
to address specific aspects of climate change can 
only be effective and sustainable if they are suited 
to the local context, meet the perceived needs of the 
community, and are within its management capac-
ity. Unless a community has been involved in the 
choice, design and deployment of the technology, 
they will not feel a sense of ownership and the very 
purpose of the intervention will be defeated. CSO’s 
and NGO’s occupy the spaces between national gov-
ernment, specialised institutions, private actors and 
the public, by virtue of which they can play effective 
roles in.
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• In order to provide a concrete governance framework that would allow civil society and workers to truly 
participate in the implementation of the European green Deal, the Commission should create a European 
Green Deal advisory board with trade union representations. 
• It is crucial for the adaptation strategy to fully involve workers and trade unions as decisions about 
adaptation to climate change are made. The new adaptation strategy should promote social dialogue 
and collective bargaining to address the social impacts of climate change and develop adaptation 
measures for the world of work. 
• Extend the scope of collective bargaining. At sectoral and workplace levels, extend the scope of 
collective bargaining to green transition issues to discuss the impact on employment and wages of the 
decarbonisation process and the impacts on skills needs and health and safety at work
•  At sectoral level, foster effective social dialogue through the creation of sectoral technical expert groups 
as well as through other various trade union or bipartite initiatives: publication of positions, employment 
impact studies, skills mapping, roundtables. 
• Negotiate agreements at sectoral and company level to map the future evolution of skills needs and 
the creation of sectoral skills councils. Establish dialogue with all relevant stakeholders and regional 
authorities to identify and manage the social impacts within a global commitment to retention, 
retraining and redeployment of workers, and ensure and support skills development, particularly for 
vulnerable workers.
• Develop and strengthen a network of Trade Union representatives at the workplace level and involve 
workers in concrete actions aiming to assess the environmental footprint of their company. 
• Boost the role of civil society for a just transition towards sustainability and to translate knowledge  
into action.
• Foster the engagement and active participation of all stakeholders, including youth, in accelerating  
the shift towards a more sustainable Europe.
• Developing Inclusive and local frameworks on a just and inclusive Transition. Engaging stakeholders, 
especially the one representing the most vulnerable, would help uncover the complex social and 
economic dynamics that engender poverty and vulnerability, and help design interventions that lead  
to fair and acceptable outcomes for all stakeholders.
• Involve local communities, representative groups of the most vulnerable, CSOs including NGOs and 
various stakeholders - governance, resource and knowledge providers in institutional frameworks for 
transition in a consultative and participatory manner.
• Introduce a European association statute to strengthen freedom of association, assembly and expression. 
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4.3.2.  The transition to a truly participa-
tory democracy 
Citizens are taking over the streets in different cities 
across the world. Concerned youth and citizens are 
expressing their concerns, like activists against 
climate change worldwide gathering, spontaneous 
movements everywhere. Taking the streets is an 
important move. But a bridge needs to be built to 
ensure that requests and innovative ideas to improve 
the quality of life of people should be rooted in the 
democratic infrastructure and processes. And dem-
ocratic processes should be constantly updated to 
reflect the need for citizens to be an active part of 
the evolution of the institutions and polices. 
Participatory democracy must consolidate the 
ambitious reform the EU should undergo to achieve 
human well-being goals. Democracy is not only a 
dimension of the transition to well-being, but also 
the method that must govern its definition and gov-
ernance: it is both an input and an output of human 
well-being.125
It is indeed of crucial importance to build tangible 
transitions in the European Union at every levels 
of governance, since well-being is best measured 
where it is actually experienced. 
The well-being transition is, in Elinor Ostrom’s 
(2010) words, a “polycentric transition”: each level 
can seize this opportunity to reform its policies. 
A transition policy thus presupposes new forms 
of citizen participation and deliberation. In other 
words, a wider and thicker democracy. Qualita-
tively different forms of democratic engagement are 
required to advance democracy and climate action at 
the same time. Climate assemblies have drawn much 
attention as a vehicle for democratic participation 
on energy transition issues. While these assemblies 
offer valuable deliberative spaces, so far they have 
had a limited political impact, limit the numbers 
of people able to be involved, and have insufficient 
connections with actual policymaking processes.126 
It is therefore important to find ways to link these 
approaches more strongly with existing policy pro-
cesses, as well as to explore other innovative and 
complementary forms of public engagement on the 
climate agenda, as well as other societal challenges 
such as technology change, inequality, ecological 
degradation, or resource use. In particular, alter-
native territorial governance arrangements can 
provide useful lessons on long-term citizen engage-
ment and more seamless connections between 
citizens and government officials, thereby comple-
menting other forms of public deliberation.
The climate system itself poses unique challenges to 
democratic governance. Accelerating rates of envi-
ronmental change associated with climate change 
make past experience less applicable to current sit-
uations and complicate predicting the future even 
further. As such, participatory and deliberative 
approaches may need to be reconfigured to respond 
adequately to the challenges of climate change.
125 Pour une politique du bien-être. Eloi Laurent 2018. Revue de l’OFCE 2018/4 (N° 158), https://www.cairn.info/revue-de-l-ofce-2018-4-page-403.htm
126 In France, the Citizen’s Climate Convention, with its 150 citizens selected to reflect on reducing France’s CO2 emissions from 2019 to 2020, has attracted considerable attention as an experiment in the 
participatory democracy field. However, more than half of the proposals from the Convention were dropped from the French climate law so far.
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Build several ‘Citizen conferences’ on a Pan-european scale
including a panel of citizens, experts and decision-makers discussing the respective importance of the 
different dimensions of well-being and agreeing on a scoreboard common to be implemented (e.g., 
building on the UN model of conferences on ‘The Future We Want’ and linking this to initiatives such as the 
Conference on the Future of Europe). 
developing the concepts of community placemaking conversations, hyperlocal governance for co- 
production and co-ownership, and allowing different models of collaboration between city governments 
and citizens.
Involve citizens in deliberative and participatory settings to discuss 
desired and concrete pathways to sustainable well-being for all,
Ensure that the information on investments and reforms financed by 
the EU – expenditures, physical implementation and procedures –are 
properly accessible to all citizens
The very bases of our models for political participation, governance 
and even democracy already undergo profound changes as new tech-
nologies are rolled out and taken up in Europe. 
Build a European Model for local and regional practices  
on climate-sensitive participatory budgets
in an open and verifiable way, and that participative monitoring is facilitated at local level. 
Citizens are increasingly using alternative methods to engage in through social media and Information 
and Communication Technology. New and formalised participatory governance mechanisms are therefore 
necessary to enhance inclusiveness in the decision-making process on just transition policies. The European 
Commission should explore innovative ways to effectively engage with citizens to source ideas, co-create 
solutions, and seize opportunities provided by digital government tools.
 in which citizens deliberate among themselves and with officials how to allocate part of a municipal or public 
budget for new public goods in the transition process.
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4.4.  Education and 
lifelong learning
Education needs to be seen as the foreground to social 
justice in our thinking. Next to being positively cor-
related with individuals’ economic success and life 
satisfaction, education also fosters the well-being of 
a Society. Regardless of this, EU Member States, in 
whose hands related political competencies remain, 
are on average investing less in education than ever 
before since the beginning of the continent-wide 
collection of related data. To achieve the transition 
to a model of sustainable well-being for all, this 
trend must be reversed. It is crucial to acknowledge 
that Education is a fundamental human right and a 
common public good. This has to be respected and 
strengthened as a future EU objective in line with 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the 
United Nation (UN) and full implementation of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights. 
In November 2017, the European Commission pub-
lished its Communication to the EU Leaders’ meeting 
in Gothenburg which endorsed the European Pillar 
of Social Rights. The text focused on setting up new 
policy goals on education for the 2018-20 period and 
beyond and announced the creation of the European 
Education Area (EEA). It also proposed new initia-
tives, more investment and stronger cooperation 
of Member States to help all Europeans, of all ages, 
benefit from the EU’s rich education and training 
offer. 
We must however remind here that the objective 
of inclusive education is a necessary and adequate 
response to increasingly complex and diverse soci-
eties of today which considers diversity as an added 
value and not simply as a challenge to address. 
The contemporary world appears to be in a perpet-
ual state of flux, changing continuously. How can 
schools prepare students to tackle societal chal-
lenges that we cannot yet imagine, for jobs that have 
not yet been created, and to use technologies that 
have not yet been invented? How can we equip them 
to thrive in an interconnected world where are con-
fronted to different perspectives and world views, 
interact respectfully with others, and take respon-
sible action toward sustainability and collective 
well-being? The COVID pandemic showed that the 
future is difficult to predict; but by drawing up our 
definition of just transition, we can learn –and help 
our children learn –to adapt to, thrive in and , above 
all, shape whatever the future holds.
The EU should propose a comprehensive policy 
agenda in which it educates caring and respon-
sible citizens in a participatory democracy that 
take into account political, demographic and eco-
nomic changes. Education is crucial to ensure the 
smoothness and inclusiveness of the sustainable 
transformation of society. Education in a model of 
sustainable well-being must be available to all at 
every stage of their lives, commencing as early as 
possible and continuing throughout.127 
Therefore, this section seeks to reaffirm the crucial 
role of education, training and lifelong learning 
in paving the way towards a sustainable future for 
Europe and beyond. The social role of schools and 
education should be protected by policy coherence 
to mainstream sustainability as a priority across 
Europe and the world. 
»Education is a fundamental 
human right and a common 
public good.«
127 This is at the core of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all)
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This alignment aims at considering thoroughly 
the need for a consistent approach that should be 
reflected in the implementation of the European 
Green Deal, European Skills Agenda, European 
Education Area, Digital Education Action Plan, Euro-
pean Research Area, EU Recovery Plan and other 
EU strategies. 
4.4.1.  Education and learning as social rights: policy proposals and governance
»While following any crisis there 
is a tendency to shift education 
towards labour market needed 
skills, it is essential to fight for 
social cohesion, democratic 
values and citizenship, with 
enforcing social and citizenship 
competences.«
• Protect holistic education as a public good and protect the social role of schools and education.  
The COVID-19 crisis clearly showed that schools are essential for children and students to develop their 
social competences. Education is also key to providing a sense of belonging and opportunities for active 
participation for all learners, especially for those who are disadvantaged. Teaching key competences, 
especially the transversal skills, are important and the role of teachers is essential in developing how 
the key competences can be applied to teaching. While following any crisis there is a tendency to 
shift education towards labour market needed skills, it is essential to fight for social cohesion, 
democratic values and citizenship, with enforcing social and citizenship competences. Access must 
be universall including for newcomers such as migrants and refugees. 
• The European Union should launch a broad consultation on the Future of education and skills  
in a in an ever-changing and interconnected world. The aim of the project would be to initiate a 
discussion about the knowledge, skills, and values that today’s students will need to thrive and shape 
their world. This consultation would lead to recommendations helping instructional systems to develop 
these knowledge, skills, and values effectively. 
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• The EEA should implement the European Pillar of Social Rights.128 The related Action Plan must offer 
the opportunity for the EU to commit to concrete actions in this respect. It should require the member 
states to present their national strategies and adopt a clear monitoring on national actions and reforms  
in line with the following goals: 
- Right to high quality and inclusive education for all 
- Quality and inclusiveness of education achieved by clear national strategies 
- Education as a human right and public good to prepare the students to be responsible citizens with solid democratic 
values and ready for necessary upskilling within the labour market; 
- Improved governance: Social dialogue need to be strengthened and national strategies need to be set up with the 
education trade unions and based on research on students’ and teachers’ needs.
• Democratic governance of education and collaborative leadership in schools are fundamental 
requirements for high quality and inclusive education systems. Shared school governance with clearly 
defined responsibilities and taking into consideration the needs of all key stakeholders in education 
(including teachers, school leaders, and other education personnel, students, parents, and the wider 
community), is important for inclusive education creating democratic school culture. 
• In order to develop relevant indicators for the future for education and training, the European 
Commission should carry out thorough research and impact assessment, and adjust the targets based 
on trustworthy data on the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on education, students and teachers. The 
target should lead to set up actions to support the socio-economically disadvantaged students with joint 
social and education policies. 
• Well trained and highly valued teachers. Teachers and educators are essential in helping to develop 
a well-functioning society of well-being. All too often, however, their role and the teaching profession as 
a whole are undervalued. In these challenging times, when everyone understood the multifaceted role 
of teachers under Covid conditions, we have a timely opportunity to revalorise the teaching profession 
and to emphasise the significant role of teachers in Society. This would include to safeguard appropriate 
funding to Education and teachers (funding education should be regarded as an investment rather than 
a cost for society and national budgets) and to provide teachers and other education personnel in every 
European country with the space, tools and support to exercise their profession, especially in the context 
of increased level of digitalisation in the teaching profession. 
• Sustainable investment to education. The EU strategy should put particular emphasis on the need 
for further public investment in education, improving equality and social inclusion in schools, and 
cooperative school leadership and teaching. The use of digital technology needs appropriate and 
continuous high investment in schools regarding the equipment and software updates. The EU should 
be more ambitious in order to ensure sustainable investment to high quality and inclusive education and 
to invest more in order to facilitate innovation with the best learning and teaching equipment in schools. 
128 The first pillars states: “Everyone has the right to quality and inclusive education, training and life-long learning in order to maintain and acquire skills that enable them to participate fully in society and manage 
successfully transitions in the labour market”
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• Ensure adequate, long-term funding at both European, national, regional and local level, including 
through the next EU Multi-annual Financial Framework (2021-2027) and Next Generation EU, in order to 
unlock the full potential of sustainable development skills across all learning sectors. Attention should be 
given to building closer and more operational synergies between funding programmes and instruments 
so that innovation in learning is not lost to siloed-thinking.
• Establish that the "European skills strategy for sustainable competitiveness, social equity and resilience" 
must guarantee the right to lifelong learning for all and in all areas. 
• Introduce a skills-based compensation systems in companies accessing public funds for  
upskilling workers and in agreement with workers’ representatives, as this system would ensure  
that there is a return on that public investment
• Fair digitalisation in education. In relation to the planned Digital Education Action Plan for Europe 
and on the Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence, The ICSE acknowledges, in view of the fast 
evolution of technological progress, and its impact on the labour market and society as a whole, the 
need for a meaningful reflection on the potential benefits - and inherent limits - of the digital era for 
the education sector. We believe that these reflections and decisions will durably impact the education 
sector, for teachers and students alike. Online learning has extraordinarily developed as an effect of 
social distancing caused by the pandemic. While online education will and should never replace physical 
presence, it opens promising avenues to complement and enhance it. The Digital Education Action 
Plan should help advance the digital transition in education with a view to help training according to 
the learner’s needs and reach out to people from remote areas. In this respect, access to IT tools and 
internet for all students and teachers need to be ensured by sustainable public investment.
4.4.2.  True skills and competences for a just transition
»The EU strategy 
should put particular 
emphasis on the 




• Fair green transition of education and schools. The latter would not only be envisaged as a way of 
enhancing skillsets and boosting the economy, but also of furthering the aims of global citizenship. 
In order to achieve these goals,129 EU member states should better connect environmental policies 
to education policies and the European Commission should support to set up national green skills 
and competence strategies. Indicators and benchmarks on green skills and competencies could be 
developed based on EU-level research on mapping national policies on integrating climate change 
awareness, environmental responsibility, sustainable development, and green skills and competences 
within education curricula of early childhood education, general education, VET and higher education. 
• Tackling vulnerabilities with Lifelong Learning. European countries are indeed now entering a period 
of significant demographic change Demographic change and the green and digital transitions often 
affect, support or accelerate each other. This will result, potentially, in severe skills shortages in Europe’s 
technologically advanced industries and raises questions about the abilities of older workers to acquire 
significant new knowledge, particularly in the field of new technologies.130 Strategic foresight will 
therefore be an essential tool to predict and prepare policies to address these issues and leave no one 
behind. Moreover, and to ensure For a lifelong learning to become a reality in a European Education Area, 
we have to ensure the fluidity between education and training systems, which can only flow from the 
automatic mutual recognition of qualifications and diplomas across Europe, including professional 
qualifications, vocational trainings and informal and non-formal experiences.
129 See the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on inclusive and equitable quality education (SDG 4) and on climate change (SDG 13). In particular, target 13.3 aims to: “[i]mprove education, 
awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning” and target 4.7 aims to “ensure that all learners acquire the 
knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development”
130 OECD (2016), Skills Matter: Further Results from the Survey of Adult Skills, OECD Skills Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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• Citizens active participation is unquestionably linked to sustainable development. Promoting 
equitable, inclusive, and fair societies involves generating processes for citizen participation that 
 imply shared decision- making and an assumption of responsibilities in favour of global sustainability. 
Civic education needs, therefore, to be mainstreamed through all education from early ages to later  
on in adult life. 
• Promote a green mind-set in skills, education and training programmes, beyond the labour market, 
as an important area of citizenship competence. Further support for learning aimed at promoting 
climate and environmental literacy, sustainable lifestyles and understanding of human-nature 
interdependencies. The EU should upscale and broaden the scope of initiatives addressing these issues 
and provide further support for learning providers active in this field.
• Incorporate Sustainable Development in education and training policies and programmes such as 
the European Education Area, Digital Education Action Plan, aligning with Sustainable Development 
Goal target 4.7 among others. This would imply to mainstream sustainable development education and 
training in Erasmus+, ESF+, Horizon Europe and creating synergies between these programmes.
4.4.3.  Education on well-being goals  
and sustainable aspects 
As the principal instrument to integrate individ-
uals into society, education is essential to create 
ownership of sustainable well-being as a new social 
paradigm among citizens by providing them with the 
means to be active agents for social and technologi-
cal progress. Education and training systems must be 
comprehensive enough to help foster competences 
which will drive this transformation, from European 
citizenship education, critical thinking, media train-
ing to Artificial Intelligence, ICT and coding.




Regions in the EU have consistently shown dif-
ferences in their economic structure and level of 
socioeconomic development. For decades, one of 
the EU’s goals has been to reduce these disparities. 
In recent years, large variations in regional develop-
ment have shown that some regions have struggled 
significantly to improve their development trajecto-
ries. Despite considerable investment many of these 
regions are still underperforming and not able to 
keep up with the transition, with potential negative 
consequences on regional income, well-being and 
political stability.131 Moreover, convergence has, to 
some extent, been driven by many former well-off 
regions experiencing long-term economic decline. 
Many formal industrial regions have struggled to 
cope with greater economic integration, increases 
in trade, outsourcing and offshoring processes, and 
face considerable challenges from the economic 
transition towards digitalisation. Both types of 
regions have fallen into what is known as a develop-
ment trap132 and have special development needs, 
which could be better supported by targeted inter-
ventions and investments. 
Many of these regions already found it difficult to 
recover from the great recession and are bound to 
labour in re-emerging from the pandemic crisis. 
Other ongoing economic transformation – driven by 
trends including technological and climate change, 
as well as the long-term impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic – will continue to demand massive trans-
formative efforts. 
These developments have the potential of creating 
particular challenges for all types of vulnerable 
regions, especially as they may already lack the 
capacity and endowments to benefit from changing 
economic opportunities. Ensuring a just transition 
for the territories requires anticipation and carefully 
calibrated policy interventions to mitigate potential 
conflicts and transitional changes. A more rapid 
transition in the most developed regions — fun-
damentally the largest cities in Europe, often the 
capital cities — could deepen pre-existing vulner-
abilities and inequalities and ignite social conflict. 
Anticipative and inclusive policymaking are crucial: 
building capacity to anticipate structural changes 
in order to allow policy to intervene before harm 
is caused is key to achieve fairness and sustainable 
well-being for all people regardless of where they 
live. A forward-looking approach should identify 
and anticipate the policy areas that offer crucial sup-
port for keeping up with ongoing transitions.
Broad structural and multi-faceted policies are 
needed (public investments, social dialogue, social 
protection, social justice, industrial policy, state aids 
and competition policy, skills and education, etc.) to 
create support in society for the structural reforms 
of our economies needed to protect the people and 
the climate. 
131 EU lagging regions: state of play and future challenges - Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies Authors: Marta PILATI, Alison HUNTER 
(EPC)PE 652.215-October 2020
132 Iammarino, S., Rodríguez-Pose, A., Storper, M., & Diemer, A. (2020). Falling into the Middle-Income Trap? A Study on the Risks for EU Regions to be Caught in a Middle-Income Trap. Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union.
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There is a critical need to publicly organise this shift in 
a way that it benefits the society as a whole to guaran-
tee a “just transition” where the people themselves 
are the actors and designers of the transformation, 
rather than victims of the transition. 
The place-sensitive approach — an approach that 
posits that economic development should be sensitive 
to the need for economic development to occur in as 
many places as possible, tapping into the considerable 
development potential of most areas133 — proposed 
here requires addressing the territorial distress felt 
by those places that are struggling to cope with eco-
nomic, social and environment of transitions and 
promoting policies that go beyond fundamentally tar-
geting – as has often been the case until now – either 
the more developed and often dynamic large cities or 
simply the least developed regions. 
There is an urgent need at all geographical scale to 
move beyond and complement policies focusing on 
the current situation – e.g. core cities or lagging-be-
hind regions – to consider the dynamics of economic 
development. This entails thinking about viable 
development intervention to deal with long-term tra-
jectories of low, no, or negative growth and provide 
solutions for those places suffering from industrial 
decline and brain drain, as well as those stuck in a 
development trap. Moreover, the policies must go 
beyond simple compensatory and/or appeasement 
measures. This implies tapping into the often over-
looked economic potential most of these places have 
and providing real opportunities to tackle neglect and 
decline. By confronting the economic decline, weak 
human resources, and low employment opportuni-
ties the conditions can be laid out for improving the 
playing field and, more importantly, enhancing the 
well-being of citizens wherever they live.134
While EU cohesion policy seems to be successful in 
driving improvements in key indicators and support-
ing a better quality of life in recipient regions, it has 
not always been effective in helping regions in their 
economic transformation. Indicators used to measure 
the efficiency of EU cohesion policy remain relatively 
constrained and too much linked to GDP or macroeco-
nomic indicators. They fail to grasp the reality of the 
situation of the various places in Europe, both in its 
diversity and its granularity. More data (such as that 
describing the situation in terms of access to some 
basic public services) are becoming increasingly 
available. However, they are hardly used by public 
authorities, be they European, national, regional or 
local, to inform public intervention at a territorial 
level and development strategies. Restructuring pro-
cesses are often incomplete, infrastructure provision 
is sometimes hampered by a lack of resources for 
running and maintenance costs, and job creation is 
sometimes transient.135 The most recent literature 
is now turning its attention to structural transfor-
mations, productivity and ecosystems, to the need 
for cohesion policy to be place-sensitive, and to the 
context conditions that can support regional develop-
ment policies in achieving their goals. 
There is a critical need to 
guarantee a “just transition” 
where the people themselves are 
the actors and designers of the 
transformation, rather than 
victims of the transition.«
»
133 Iammarino, S., Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Storper, M. (2019). Regional inequality in Europe: evidence, theory and policy implications. Journal of economic geography, 19(2), 273-298.
134 The Geography of EU discontent - Lewis Dijkstra, Hugo Poelman and Andres Rodriguez-Pose - Urban and regional policies Working Paper © European Union, 2018
135 Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés - The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it). Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2017
140 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Policies and 
programmes need to be informed by theory and 
sound empirical evidence, but also designed in line 
with the specific conditions of countries and regions. 
Policies need to be adapted to the context where they 
are providing largely local services (water, waste 
disposal, local transport) or higher level services 
(such as education, research and innovation, law and 
order) the effectiveness of which, it is now under-
stood, strongly depends on them being adapted 
to places.136 This applies still more to those formal 
and informal institutions that are a prerequisite for 
development: there is no general recommendation 
for building trust or social capital, which needs to 
be designed place by place. Cohesion policy should 
be presented for what it is: “for tackling the new 
divides and for delivering inclusion and innovation 
for persons in places”,137 in line with the principles 
of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the social 
aspects of EU climate policies.
This section shows how territories can become 
the heart of the necessary transition to well-being, 
resilience and sustainability. We will propose recom-
mendations addressing the “territorial momentum” 
we are living, which results as much from globali-
sation as from urbanisation, and then explains how 
the territory, understood as a social-ecological insti-
tution, can become the ecosystem par excellence 
of the transition. However, this territorial moment 
is fraught with a threat: the worsening of social 
inequalities. The serious warning of recent waves 
of elections taking place across Europe clearly 
indicates that pervasive and growing social and 
territorial inequalities and the different capacities 
of territories to confront and adapt to the different 
transitions can create the political climate that may 
derail our capacity as a society to get together to face 
the important challenges we are confronting. The 
rise of anti-system voting is polarising our societ-
ies to levels not seen in a long time and represents 
a serious threat to garnering the society-wide con-
sensus needed to achieve just economic, social and 
environmental transitions. The rise of anti-estab-
lishment voting is threatening not only European 
integration but also the very economic, social and 
political stability of our societies. This explains why 
the question of territorial justice is inseparable from 
that of social-ecological transition. 
The social-ecological transition must be measured 
in the light of each territory, with the objectives of 
the equality between territories. 
The application of a place-sensitive approach 
requires to a greater variety of regional development 
strategies, opening the door for more complex but 
fairer solutions that cannot be achieved through 
a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Decentralisation and 
the empowerment of sub-national governments can 
play important roles in this respect. This requires 
a more efficient vertical and horizontal integra-
tion of institutions and social partners. In other 
words, place-sensitive policies should be built on 
cooperation among national, regional, and local gov-
ernments, and with socioeconomic partners.
The intensity and pace of change in the economy and 
society under the triple transition—green, digital 
and demographic—all accelerated by the pandemic, 
are of an unprecedented scale. An approach to ‘jus-
tice’ and ‘fairness’ which narrowly targeted groups 
or regions expected to be severely hit by the com-
bined effect of the technological advances and the 
decarbonising of the economy could hardly square 
the circle of meeting the environmental challenges 
while ensuring social equity and well-being.
136 An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy - A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations - Independent Report prepared at the request of Danuta Hübner,  
Commissioner for Regional Policy by Fabrizio Barca - 2009










A constrained just-transition approach, relying 
on a combination of social safety-nets and voca-
tional education and (re)training policies for 
specific groups of workers most affected, would 
risk being another failed blueprint.138 A crucial step 
in addressing the just-transition challenge would be 
to set at the core of the EPSR a broadly defined right 
to protection. As important as it to engage with the 
implications in terms of employment and vocational 
education and training for the social groups most 
severely hit by the green and digital transitions, if 
this transformation is not set within a comprehen-
sive approach to the wide-ranging distributional 
impacts on social groups, regions and localities, it 
cannot suffice to meet the EU’s pledge of ‘leaving no 
one behind’.
Data need to be systematically collected and used 
at place level 
on exposure to environmental hazards by socio-professional or income group and on cumulative vulnerability 
and health risks across social groups due to the distribution of the burden of environmental inequality. Also 
required are greenhouse-gas emissions by income group (on the basis of consumption) and the distributional 
impacts of various environmental policies. Such data would provide a valuable compass to a genuinely just 
transition. Data need to be systematically collected as well on issues such as opportunities, institutional quality, 
well-being and welfare at local level, as well as on the impact of trade, globalisation and automation, among 
other processes, at a fine subnational level.
Mapping the upheavals in labour markets caused 
by the economic transition to a new production 
system 
and of the multiple futures transitions is also a pre-requisite: , Either towards a low carbon economy, which 
has a more circular use of resources, or from technological change, opportunities should be identified 
to allow effective policies to be designed and implemented, ensuring worker protection. In this respect, 
a greater role should be given to the territorial plans established and designed at territorial level and 
involving a range of local public and private actors.
138 A greener and more social pillar by Maria Petmesidou and Ana Guillén  - Social Europe -  1st April 2021 - https://socialeurope.eu/a-greener-and-more-social-pillar
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Mainstream attention to the needs of the most 
vulnerable regions across all EU policies
EU policies show a lack of sensitivity to the intensity of the specific challenges EU regions experience. Without 
careful consideration of their constraints, there is a risk that policies have a more limited (or even negligible) 
impact in the regions that need the most support. A stronger commitment to address these challenges could 
lead to better prioritisation and targeting of actions based on needs and potential. This also applies to policies 
intended to support the energy, digital and industrial transitions, which tend to adopt a top-down approach 
and are not well aligned with the needs of most vulnerable regions.
Ensure that structural reforms entail  
a place-based sensitivity
Most vulnerable places often lack the capacity and resources to engage with a complex reform agenda 
successfully. Structural reforms should be supported by clear, place-sensitive impact analyses, to be able 
to plan targeted support when implementing reforms. A reformed European Semester should strengthen 
the territorial dimension. This could incentivise and support targeted reforms for EU regions that face the 
most acute challenges. 
Promote public and open scrutiny at place level 
to strengthen the role of organisations representing economic and social interests and civil society, 
including any group significantly affected by the transition in integrated territorial strategies and in the field 
of research and innovation.
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Support and encourage investments in  
sectors with high employment creation and  
environmental protection potential
Encourage Smart Specialisation 
such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, with particular attention being paid to energy poverty, sustain-
able mobility, and the upgrade of transport infrastructures among other investments. Given the key role of 
regional and local authorities in the recovery, the green transition and the implementation of the SDGs, it is 
essential that regional and local authorities are strongly involved in all stages of the national resilience recov-
ery plans (NRRPs), from design to implementation.
as a EU policy approach offering a methodology along which regions and countries could develop and imple-
ment their research and innovation strategies. Priorities should be given to the search for solutions through 
the mobilisation of science, technology and innovation to environmental and social needs and must comply 
with well-being objectives. 
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4.6.  Climate justice: the 




The concept of climate justice frames global climate 
change as a political and ethical issue and not just 
a strictly environmental one. Climate justice should 






Large increase in heat extremes
Decrease in precipitation
Increasing risk of droughts
Increasing risk of biodiversity loss
Increasing water demand for agriculture
Decrease in crop yields
Increasing risks for livestock production
Agriculture negatively affected
by spillover effects of climate change 
from outside Europe
Boreal region
Increase in heavy precipitation events
Increase in precipitation
Increasing damage risk from winter storms
Increase in crop yields
Mountain regions
Temperature rise larger than European average
Updward shift of plant and animal species
Risk of hail
Risk of frost
Increasing risk from rock falls and landslides
Atlantic region
Increase in heavy precipitation events
Increasing risk of river and coastal flooding
Increasing damage risk from winter storms
Continental region
Increase in heat extremes
Decrease in summer precipitation
Increasing risk of river floods
Source: Adapted from EEA (2017b)
Climate Injustice is already striking: social groups and territories are unequal in their exposure to environmental risk and hazard 
and in their ability to adapt to climate change. 
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The uneven distribution of the impacts of climate 
change, pollution and extreme temperatures on the 
health of Europeans closely reflects the socio-demo-
graphic differences within our society. The elderly, 
children and those in poor health tend to be more 
adversely affected by such environmental health 
hazards than the general population. Groups of lower 
socio-economic status (the unemployed, those on 
low incomes or with lower levels of education) also 
tend to be more negatively affected by environmental 
health hazards, as a result of their both greater expo-
sure and higher vulnerability. In many European 
countries, the disproportionate exposure of lower 
socio-economic groups to pollution, noise and high 
temperatures occurs in urban areas. Moreover, and 
as previously stated, there are pronounced regional 
differences in social vulnerability and exposure 
to environmental health hazards across Europe. 
Regions with lower average socio-economic status 
and higher proportions of elderly people in southern 
and south-eastern Europe experience greater expo-
sure to ground-level ozone and high air temperatures. 
Finally, even in wealthier sub-national regions, it is 
still the poorer communities that tend to be exposed 
to higher local levels of pollutants and extreme tem-
perature, as shown by studies at finer spatial scales. 
Climate change and other forms of environmental 
degradation have already caused net negative impacts 
on jobs and working conditions, and these impacts are 
expected to become more pronounced in the coming 
decades.139 Although the whole European economy 
is concerned, some economic sectors are considered 
to be particularly at risk. This is especially an issue 
in sectors, which are heavily de-pendent on natural 
resources, such as agriculture and forestry, but not 
limited to them. Rising sea levels, ocean acidification 
and changing ocean temperatures will limit biodi-
versity and alter the distribution and productivity of 
fisheries. Natural disasters will likely disrupt sectors 
such as energy and water providers, construction, 
transport and tourism, destroy critical infrastruc-
ture and take lives, putting additional pressure on 
emergency and rescue services, the health care 
sector and other public services. The probability of 
most types of extreme events is expected to increase 
significantly, which can in turn affect banking and 
insurance companies. The manufacturing sector and 
the industry are also exposed, mainly through spill-
over effects coming from the most affected sectors. 
Last but not least, the higher temperatures pro-
jected with climate change pose serious risk to 
workers’ health and safety, especially in Southern 
Europe where the highest rise in temperatures are 
expected. Many of them work outside and therefore 
may suffer from heat stress, dryness, dizziness or 
even heat stroke or collapse if the body temperature 
rises above 39°C. Even at less extreme temperatures, 
heat leads to a loss of concentration and increased 
tiredness, which means that workers are more likely 
to put themselves and others at risk.
Climate injustice could be worsen by inappropriate 
policy decisions. The impacts of both the technolog-
ical and sustainability transition on production and 
consumption systems might not be fairly distributed 
across gender, geographical location and age and 
might exacerbate already existing inequalities in 
Europe. 
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»Climate change and other forms 
of environmental degradation 
have already caused net negative 
impacts on jobs and working 
conditions.«
Environmental injustice occurs when those with 
political or economic power exploit the planet’s 
resources to the detriment of poorer communities 
or the average citizen, despite these people being the 
least responsible for the emissions that have driven 
the climate crisis.140 This situation could lead to a 
strong resistance to climate change policies, and the 
perception that they penalise the average citizen, 
specific sectors, or communities and individuals 
dependant on fossil fuels despite the benefits of such 
policies. Different policy initiatives focus on sectors 
and areas that are greatly influenced by climate chal-
lenges, for example health, transport, agriculture, 
energy. In this respect, it is important to state that Cli-
mate Justice is not just about those affected directly 
by the impacts of climate change but also those 
affected by the drivers of climate change through 
dependency on goods, services and lifestyles that are 
associated with high emissions and low resource effi-
ciency. Climate Justice can provide an overarching 
integrated approach to ensure that the transition to 
a low carbon economy is achieved when pursuing the 
interests of the sustainable well-being.
People should be at the centre of structural change, 
so that affected people can become active partici-
pants. This means not only that a supportive, reliable 
political framework and adequate resources must 
be provided, but also that all those affected must be 
effectively empowered to participate critically and 
constructively.141
In order to ensure a just transition, we need to 
address the two dimensions of the challenges faced 
when pursuing climate justice objectives, namely: 
tackling the unequal vulnerability and exposure to 
environmental risk in society and at work, on the 
one hand, and the need for social fairness in envi-
ronmental policies, on the other hand. 
4.6.1.  A comprehensive strategy for a fair 
adaptation to climate change 
The Paris Agreement committed to strengthening 
adaptation capabilities to cope with the inevitable 
impacts of climate change, re-orienting all financial 
flows and technology deployment and development 
consistently with new temperature goals. The Euro-
pean Commission also adopted on the 24th February 
its communication on a new EU Strategy on Adap-
tation to Climate Change, setting out the pathway 
to prepare for the unavoidable impacts of climate 
change. The new strategy intends to show the way 
to boost adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and 
reduce vulnerability to climate change. It focuses 
mainly on technical requirements: early warning, 
infrastructure, water resources, coastal erosion, crop 
management... All vital questions, but the communi-
cation says little about the harmful social impact of 
climate change. Our main concern here would be to 
assess how social justice and sustainable well-being 
140 The richest 1% on the planet is responsible for twice as many CO2 emissions as the poorest half of humanity. Confronting carbon inequality - Putting climate justice at the heart of the COVID-19 recovery - 
OXFAM 21 September 2020
141 In this sense, the WBGU (German Advisory Council on Global Change) proposes the launch of an overarching ‘Zero Carbon Mission’ on multiple political levels. Its aim should be to strengthen and 
inter-connect transformative potential in the affected regions on the basis of reliable local, national and international frameworks. The Zero Carbon Mission should enable future-oriented modern-
ization strategies for ‘pioneer sustainability regions’ and not be limited to immediate crisis management https://www.wbgu.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wbgu/publikationen/politikpapiere/pp9_2018/
pdf/wbgu_policypaper_9.pdf
»Our main concern here would be 
to assess how social justice and 
sustainable well-being for all are 
taken on board in adaptations to 









































Overall capacity to adapt to climate change







(source: ESPON, European Commission - Overall impacts derived from 26 impact indicators, overall adaptive capacity from 15 
individual indicators, and overall vulnerability from a combination of overall impacts and adaptive capacity - 21 Dec 2016) 
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for all are taken on board in adaptations to climate 
change impacts across the EU. The impacts of climate 
change are not neutral. Men and women, low-income 
households, older people, persons with disabilities, 
displaced persons have different adaptive capabilities. 
Adaptation measures need to address their situation. 
So far, most adaptation measures promoted by the EU 
adaptation strategy and developed by Member States 
were focused on technical solutions. This section 
intends to address how resources provided by broad 
climate objectives are creating a moment for Europe 
to take transformational action.
4.6.1.1.  Adaptation policies must address  
environmental inequalities 
Mitigation policies intend to make the impacts of cli-
mate change less severe by preventing or reducing the 
emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmo-
sphere. Whereas the IPCC defines adaptation as “the 
process of adjustment to actual or expected climate 
and its effects”. As climate change is currently wors-
ening, Europe will face exceptional weather events of 
all sorts. The evidence is incontrovertible. The past 
decade was the warmest on record142 and the impact 
on human health and society is clear. A ten-year 
World Health Organization study143 found heatwaves 
in nine European cities increased the death rate by up 
to 33 per cent and, according to the European Envi-
ronment Agency,144 extreme weather events across 
Europe between 1980 and 2019 (see chart145) inflicted 
economic losses amounting to almost €446 billion. 
Even if all greenhouse-gas emissions ceased tomor-
row, this would not halt the impact on the climate, 
likely to continue for decades. Mitigation is vital but, 
in the meantime, ensuring that society can anticipate 
change and adapt to it is just as important.
Heatwaves in nine European cities 
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»Climate justice has two main 
dimensions:  tackling the 
unequal vulnerability and 
exposure to environmental risk 
in society and at work, on the 
one hand, and the need for 
social fairness in environmental 
policies, on the other hand.«
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Climate change adaptation, according to the definition 
of the European Commission, means “anticipating the 
adverse effects of climate change and taking appropriate 
action to prevent or minimise the damage they can cause 
or taking advantage of opportunities that may arise”.146 
According to our specific goal of ensuring 
a just transition, the primary objective of adaptation 
is to address climate vulnerability of specific regions, 
economic sectors or populations. An early adaptation 
action will save lives and jobs. Adaptation measures 
should consist of bold investments in infrastructure 
to protect against natural disasters, the development 
of resource efficiency management systems, the 
strengthening of social protection systems and the 
adoption of adequate prevention measures.
Extreme weather events across Europe 
between 1980 and 2019 inflicted 








anticipating the adverse effects 
of climate change and taking 
appropriate action to prevent or 
minimise the damage they can 
cause or taking advantage of 
opportunities that may arise
146 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation_en
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The EU adaptation strategy must be legally 
binding
Health hazards related to climate change will affect people, particularly some vulnerable groups. These haz-
ards are already increasing morbidity and mortality due to extreme weather events (heatwaves, storms, floods, 
wildfires) and emerging infectious diseases (whose spread, timing and intensity are affected by changes in 
temperature, humidity and rainfall). There is a strong correlation between mandatory policy targets and the 
efficiency of their implementation. Ensuring the EU’s preparedness against hazardous climate change should 
at least require the development of mandatory adaptation plans, climate vulnerability assessments and cli-
mate stress tests at local, regional, and national levels.
- We therefore ask to address the need to mainstream climate adaptation in, and maximise the co-benefits 
with, all relevant EU policies towards a more sustainable future, such as agriculture and food production, 
forestry, transport, trade, energy, environment, water management, buildings, infrastructure, industrial, 
maritime and fisheries policies, as well as cohesion policy and local development, and social policies, and 
the need to ensure that other European Green Deal initiatives are consistent with climate adaptation and 
mitigation measures.
-  We call for a strengthened governance of the new strategy:
1) t́he identification of priority areas and investment needs, including an assessment of the extent to 
which EU investments contribute to reducing the overall climate vulnerability of the Union, 
2) a more frequent review process, with clear goals, a proper assessment, and indicators informed by the 
latest science to measure progress in its implementation.
3) we call the European Commission to integrate mandatory climate risk assessments into the EU strat-
egy on adaptation to climate change, including of national adaptation plans.
Particular attention also has to be paid to the impacts of climate change and the costs of adaptation for each 
region, particularly those regions that are facing the double challenge of contributing to the global mitiga-
tion effort while bearing the increasing costs of dealing with climate-related impacts. It is therefore equally 
important to further promote climate adaptation in regions and cities in the new Strategy, such as through 
promoting legislative frameworks requiring adequate adaptation strategies also at these levels;
Develop a strong social dimension, which would 
put people first 
The strategies developed so far lack concrete socio-economic impact assessments of climate change conse-
quences on the society and on the working world, both in terms of employment and working conditions. These 
strategies should include meaningful indicators to monitor the socio-economic impacts of adaptation strate-
gies and to assess the value of the prevention and management of risks linked to climate change. The adoption 
of adaptation strategies and policies is crucial as these strategies and policies play a key role in avoiding or 
diminishing the negative effects climate change may have on human health, safety and on the economic envi-
ronment and employment. If not addressed at the proper level, these effects will aggravate environmental 
inequalities in Europe.
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Climate change will affect men and women  
in different ways
Urban-planning, investment in resilient  
infrastructure and housing
Adaptation measures must promote and not undermine gender equality. This means Women need to par-
ticipate in political decision-making and design of the policies in order to incorporate a gender perspective. 
Climate policies should be gender mainstreamed. This should lead as well to women participating in the ‘gen-
der-screening’ of all proposals, to assess their specific impact.
will play a crucial role regarding disaster prevention. The EU should pilot more closely policy to assist local com-
munities develop and implement adaptation plans, and support the most vulnerable ones, so that they can 
find the expertise to plan and the resources to take action.
Social protection policies are necessary to protect 
lower-income groups against the threats of  
climate hazards 
Adaptation policies are critical to preventing a deterioration of livelihoods as a result of climate hazards. In the 
same way, the strategy must protect vulnerable communities, such as migrants and seasonal workers, and 
avoid perpetuating any form of ethnic, religious or other discrimination.
147 Public services and adaptation to climate change - European Public Services Union - 2017 -  
https://www.epsu.org/sites/default/files/article/files/2_EPSU%20Public%20services%20and%20adaptation%20to%20climate%20change%20for%20reading.pdf
Public services are likely to be affected  
by climate change
as demand for caring, health services and emergency support will increase. The EU needs to plan for the con-
sequences and to invest in public services, infrastructure, social protection and insurance schemes, so that our 
societies are ready to handle the challenges. As underlined by the EPSU study,147 the different strategies are 
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Public policy will have to play a critical role in 
providing public goods for adaptation 
and ensuring that social processes and institutions are flexible enough to learn and assess policy options. Cli-
mate change presents a public goods-related problem, one that could produces socially undesirable results if 
not addressed properly. Information and accurate climate forecasts, public infrastructure, flood control systems, 
early warning systems, knowledge and technology are public goods, all of which are essential for adaptation. 
Design a Climate risk insurance for low-income 
households as one fundamental element of the 
social-ecological welfare state148
Ecological crises are social risk threatening the lives and livelihoods of Europeans, especially the most vulnera-
ble ones: close to 100,000 Europeans have died because of these increasingly violent ecological shocks in the 
last four decades, many more have been driven to poverty or precariousness by losing their homes, equipment 
and social networks. We know for sure that these human losses are going to skyrocket if we don’t build ade-
quate collective social-ecological protections. Those social-ecological risks should be pooled in order to reduce 
their economic cost and social injustice using the same institution that has proven so successful in fostering 
human development for a century in Europe and so strategic in the face of the Covid crisis: the welfare state. 
A new public insurance scheme, akin to national health insurance schemes, aimed at covering natural 
catastrophes or extreme weather events such as heat waves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and storms 
that will increase in many European regions. Because of this increase in natural hazards, the price of insurance 
policies is expected to become unaffordable for lower income households. This unprecedented situation will 
require the establishment of a social-ecological safety net which would extend risk coverage and public solidar-
ity to new risks linked to the deterioration of climatic conditions. To do so, Members States should collectivise 
part of the risk to make up for the private sector’s failure to offer viable insurance options. In this scheme, the 
EU would act as a reinsurance capacity to support national public funding. 
148 While between 1980 and 1999, the overall cost of storms, floods, heatwaves, cold waves, droughts and forest fires totalled 175 billion euros in the EU, they amounted to 245 billion euros between 
2000 and 2019, close to 1,5 more. We know for sure that these costs are going to increase much further in coming years. Of these losses today, at best, private insurance covers 25% on average in EU 
countries (60% at best), largely for wealthy households.
characterised by an “absence of stable and systematic public financing, at both national and municipal levels”. 
There is also a lack, at EU level, of any legal instrument that would protect citizen’s health in relation to the risks 
raised by climate change.
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4.6.1.2.  Adaptation policies must ensure fair 
working conditions
Climate change is already impacting workers and 
working conditions in a wide variety of sectors. 
It will have even more serious implications for 
vulnerable workers. For example, the health and 
safety of outdoor workers in construction or agri-
culture could be severely affected by the rise in 
temperature. Heat stroke, skin cancer, fatigue and 
dehydration, as well as the spread of diseases are 
among the increased risks. 
Heat stress or extreme weather events will pri-
marily affect outdoor workers and especially those 
whose activity is physically demanding.149 Agri-
culture and construction are sectors considered 
particularly at risk. Several categories of workers 
who work indoors may also be impacted, especially 
those who work in warm spaces that are not air-con-
ditioned. Experience shows that even office workers 
can be impacted if the building is lacking in proper 
isolation or a cooling/ventilation system. Possible 
preventive measures include changing working 
hours, in-work organisation, in-vestment in proper 
equipment and access to water. It’s important to 
note, moreover, that some of these measures may 
introduce new hazards. 
Civil-protection workers, such as firefighters and 
nurses, will see their workloads and stress increase 
significantly, as wildfires and other extreme 
weather events become more severe and frequent. 
The adaptation strategy should address work-
ers protection from high temperatures, natural 
ultra-violet radiation and other health-and-safety 
hazards. Protection currently varies across Europe 
and in some countries fails to address rising tem-
peratures. The EU should encourage member states 
to carry out studies on the impact of climate change 
on the world of work, examining different regions 
and sectors in detail.
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We will try to 
explore how 
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Establish social protection mechanisms  
at European level
Strictly monitor the development and 
implementation of national adaptation strategies, 
Provide sufficient funding for adaptation
European trade unions and European employer’s 
organisations should establish a strong and stable 
social dialogue on the implications climate change 
may have on the health and safety of workers
that recognise the increased safety and health risk faced by workers due to climate change and create 
obligations to protect them. 
to support Member States in case of emergencies.
with regards, in particular, to the assessment of climate change’s socio-economic impact and make sure 
trade unions are involved.
through a rise of the amounts dedicated to adaptation by the different European Structural and Investment 
funds and harmonise taxation regimes across Member States in order to prevent tax fraud, tax avoidance and 
ensure a fair redistribution of resources in order to allow public authorities to finance adaptation measures.
 in order to issue guidance for companies on how they should act to protect their workers.
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4.6.2.  How justice needs to guide envi-
ronmental policies 
The aim of this section is to explore how to 
promote policies achieving a fair share of 
resource- and energy use both to tackle the 
climate and environmental problems we are 
facing while addressing inequalities (because 
they intersect with the effects of climate change). 
Together with the following chapter (Chapter 
5 : Living an healthy life in a decarbonised planet 
which will address more in depth the necessary 
ambition to reduce GHG emissions), we will try 
to explore how aiming to reduce environmental 
destruction is reinforced by combatting inequal-
ity here and now and by taking inequality into 
account when designing environmental policy. 
We should avoid at any cost that policy measures 
making sense from a climate point of view could 
impact low income households unequally and, in 
general, fight the regressive effect they can have 
on the most vulnerable segments of the popula-
tion. 
As previously stated, we need to include a clear 
definition of the just transition concepts in 
the European legislation as well as some mon-
itoring indicator. This should be done using the 
framework set out by the International Labour 
Organization in its Guidelines for a just transi-
tion.
In parallel, the EU Pillar of Social Rights is to 
serve as a compass for a renewed process of 
convergence towards better living and working 
conditions amongst Member States. The EPSR 
is based on 20 principles,150 many of which will 
be impacted either directly by climate change 
or indirectly by the need to transition to new 
economic models. We consider its implementa-
tion by 2030 to be an integral part of our climate 
ambitions. Indeed, we need to ensure that the 
transformative process of a carbon neutral 
economy fully addresses the issue of inequality 
between and within EU member states, between 
people and places. The climate challenges we are 
facing today stems also directly from the very 
unequal and unsustainable economic system that 
has developed over the years. 
4.6.2.1.  Just transition for labour
The ambitious goals set by the Paris Agreement will 
entail an unprecedented social and economic transi-
tion in a relatively short period of time, as countries 
seek to adapt and restructure towards more sustain-
able systems of production and consumption. The 
transformation of production can be an import-
ant vehicle for technological progress, sustainable 
development and new jobs and job creation but also 
for social innovation. However, the transition to a 
low-carbon model will carry serious implications for 
employment, with at best the potential displacement 
of jobs in many sectors and regions. Anticipating 
these trends and their impact on workers in terms of 
organisation of work, skills need, investment capac-
ity and employment should be at the heart of our 
recommendations.
The transition is expected to benefit companies 
operating in the environmental sectors in particu-
lar. Investments in renewable energy and in energy 
efficiency will create jobs in basic manufacturing, 
engineering, transport equipment, utilities, con-
struction, and their supply chains. In the EU, the 
overall employment in the so-called “eco-indus-
»We need to 
ensure that the 
transformative 








tries” is already estimated at 1-2% of total European 
employment (4.2 million jobs).151 In some countries 
(such as the United States), the size of the environ-
mental sector is already larger than the aerospace 
and defence industries. Some sectors are experienc-
ing very strong employment dynamics (renewable 
energies, heat and energy saving equipment, waste 
management). This development should continue 
in the coming years. According to a study from the 
European Commission released in 2012, the renew-
able energy sector would have had the potential to 
create 3 million jobs by 2020. Despite the ever-grow-
ing share of renewable energy, a downward trend in 
related jobs occurred from 2011 onwards, turning 
to stagnation in the following years. Nowadays, In 
the EU, the green transition was expected to create 
1.2 million additional jobs before the outbreak of 
COVID-19.152
The transition is also expected to create some new 
constraints, for example in carbon intensive indus-
tries. These risks could consist of lower demand for 
certain products, higher investment needs to cope 
with tighter environmental standards as well as with 
a higher carbon price. In some sectors, the devel-
opment of new technologies may lead to a higher 
degree of automatisation of production processes, 
which in turn reduces the need for workers. If these 
risks are not properly managed, they can result in 
restructuring processes, collective redundancies or 
even plant closures.153 Last but not least, the tran-
sition may also impact the quality of jobs. The shift 
will stimulate demand for high skilled jobs but also 
for medium and low skilled ones, which may mean 
poorer working conditions and more occupational 
health and safety risks.
To be successful, it will require strong, stable and 
coherent policies aiming at supporting develop-
ing sectors, as well as more traditional industries, 
which can be an important driver for the implemen-
tation of more effective and sustainable production 
processes. It is our priority to protect and preserve 
communities and to facilitate the transition while 
creating enhanced levels of well-being, both socially 
and economically, of those affected. 
The renewable energy sector would have 
had the potential to create 3 million jobs 
by 2020
»It is our priority to protect and 
preserve communities and to 
facilitate the transition while 
creating enhanced levels of 
well-being, both socially and 
economically, of those affected.«
151 Source : Eurostats
152 Commission Staff Working document - Exploiting the employment potential of green growth SWD/2012/0092 final
153 https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/publication/file/2018-09/Final%20FUPA%20Guide_EN.pdf
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Beyond skills: promote competence building and 
enhance employability 
The transition towards a low-carbon economy is expected to have very strong implications in terms of com-
petences and skills. Potentially, it may affect a great number of workers, raising the need for new skill profiles, 
lowering the demand for others. Workers whose jobs may disappear as a result of climate change or as a result 
of the need to end dependency on the drivers of climate change should not be the ones to pay the price for 
this change. Ensuring a just transition will require an adaptation of vocational and educational systems but also 
active labour market policies targeting employment creation, training and life-long learning.
• In regions dependent on carbon-intensive activities, the transition process should lead to support 
workers with measures aiming at creating re-qualification and redeployment of workers, from declin-
ing sectors to growing sectors.
• Identify both challenges and opportunities: In sectors and regions that are the most affected by the 
change, identify both challenges and opportunities linked to the decarbonisation process and promote 
initiatives aiming at retraining workers in developing sectors. 
Boosting European industries’ transformation 
and creating decent jobs in a sustainable and 
low-carbon economy
• Promote the adoption of integrated industrial policies that would be consistent with sustainable develop-
ment goals, providing industry with clear strategic objectives, a stable regulatory, financial, fiscal and legal 
framework and allowing for the creation of green and decent jobs
• Promote investment in sustainable technologies. Promote European and national public and private invest-
ment in green technologies through European R&D, as well as the creation of European technological 
platforms dedicated to low & zero carbon technologies.
• In regions and industries most affected by the transition, promote economic diversification as well as the 
adoption of policies and measures that will allow a just transition for workers, favour investment in sustainable 
sectors, promote technological innovation and provide the means (financial, social) to ensure this transition. 
Adequate social protection 
As underlined in the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda,154 social protection is a fundamental human right and ensur-
ing a just transition raises the need for adequate and efficient protection measures (unemployment benefits, 
health insurance, social benefits, retirement, etc.), that will protect affected workers and target social inclusion 
and the eradication of poverty.
• Promote the integration of adequate social protection measures into national climate change pol-
icies including measures specifically targeting those who are going to be negatively affected, and in 
particular workers largely dependent on natural resources or facing major structural changes.
154 http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm
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4.6.2.2.  Just transition for consumers
There is a perception that a sustainable life style, and 
sustainable consumption choices are only compati-
ble with a high disposable income and that ethical, 
climate friendly, sustainable choices are not acces-
sible to all equally.155  Pricing that incorporates the 
climate costs (such as resource intensity) of goods 
and services should be supported by a policy frame-
work that challenges this perception and increases 
accessibility for all consumers. Without the alter-
native choice the consumer is left with no option, 
but forced into poverty/poor decision making/
unhealthy choices/unsustainable choices and devel-
ops a dislike for “environmental” policies that are 
seen to be penalising the end user. Meanwhile, 
those who profit from this system are not paying, 
but are making more money, and so the inequality 
increases – under the guise of environmental policy 
contradicting the principles of sustainability. The 
power of consumers in achieving the transition can 
only be harnessed when consumers have the option 
of sustainable ethical alternatives that do not lead 
to a significant reduction in terms of accessibility. 
Viable alternatives for consumers can be devel-
oped through the new economic models such as the 
Digital, Collaborative, and Circular Economy and 
through the international cooperation on the global, 
sectorial transition to these models.
• Support mechanisms, including public money, economic instruments and incentives should be used to 
ensure that infrastructure and appropriate supports exist for consumers wishing to choose a low carbon 
lifestyle, including assistance for meeting the higher costs of ethical/long life/sustainable goods and 
services.
• Citizens should not feel that climate change policies are associated with unfairly penalising of those who 
have no alternative but to operate within the fossil fuel economy.
• Too often the polluter pays principle is misapplied and levies are forced on consumers, when they 
have no viable alternative available. In order to drive behaviour change in the required direction, the 
sustainability policies are dependent on ensuring that supports for transition are clearly identified, 
prioritised, and adequately financed.
There is a 
perception that a 
sustainable life style, 
and sustainable 
consumption 
choices are only 
compatible with a 
high disposable 
income and that 
ethical, climate 
friendly, sustainable 
choices are not 
accessible to all 
equally.«
»
155 European Economic and Social Committee - Climate Justice (own-initiative opinion) - Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment - 2017 
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Focus on automative mobility 
Cars contribute over sixty per cent of CO2 emissions in the transport sector and thus constitute a source of 
very considerable leverage for emission reduction strategies. The stakes in the automobile industry are par-
ticularly high and the transformation is also more complex than in other sectors. Besides decarbonisation, 
the digitalisation of both the production and the product and a reconfiguration of the global supply chains of 
the industry are proceeding simultaneously. And all this is happening at an accelerating pace.156 
The Commission will present a binding roadmap for the full phasing out of internal combustion engine cars 
by 2035. To ensure that all actors are involved - and notably workers and communities that will be affected 
by such changes - the EC should launch without any delay a “Just transition strategy for the automotive sector 
“so as to anticipate and manage the changes. 
• This roadmap should follow the principles of the place-sensitive policies as discussed above to ensure 
the phasing out of combustion engine process is fair, both for people and workers. 
• Binding targets for charging infrastructures in each member states and a sustained support for the 
European batteries cell industry are equally necessary.
• Increased EU funding should be available to support national, regional and local authorities to imple-
ment sustainable mobility plans based on their citizens’ needs, in particular the most vulnerable ones. 
• Extensive digitalisation and vehicle electrification should make possible a drastic change in mobility 
and entail the development of services and service provision functions alongside new connectivity 
and public transport features. Such change is critical since it has the potential for overhauling vehicle 
usage and ownership. The Commission should assess the changes in mobility patterns and the role of 
individual vehicle use will have in the future.
• The EU must support the development and promotion of public transport as a solution that attains a 
more efficient use of road networks and provides a more socially equitable and clean mobility than 
private vehicles. The multifaceted aspects of mobility should lead to the integration of various means 
and modes of transport, ensuring a rational division of transport tasks between individual modes of 
transport, the development of new, environmentally friendly, techniques and technologies of trans-
port and delivery, promotion of alternative forms of movement in urban areas, as well as changes in 
users’ behaviours and habits. 
156 Béla Galgóczi - Towards a just transition: coal, cars and the world of work - 2019
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4.6.2.3.  The just transition must tackle energy 
poverty 
Energy poverty is a major issue across Europe and 
although its meaning and context can vary from 
country to country, it is another striking example 
of the need to ensure climate change policies are 
focussed on protecting the most vulnerable. Energy 
poverty is already a reality for 10 % of EU citizens. 
From 2007 to 2018, electricity prices for households 
rose by around 25%according to Eurostat and ACER. 
It will be crucial that future EU policies address this 
problem and counterbalance any regressive distri-
butional effects that climate measures may have on 
citizens. Fighting energy poverty, in the broader 
context of an EU overall strategy against poverty, 
must be a top priority of the European Commission 
and the Member States. 
Energy poverty 
is already a 
reality for 10 % 
of EU citizens.«
»
• Adding a provision to ensure that access to energy services is a basic social right. Along these lines, a 
broad European definition of energy poverty, refined by Member States according to their own national 
circumstances should be established to implement this right in the most efficient way. Access to energy 
must be secure, sustainable and affordable for all in Europe, including via the promotion of social tariffs. 
• To fight the root causes of energy poverty, tripling the renovation rate of dwellings thanks to increased 
and renewed ambitions in respect of energy efficiency and the Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive will be key steps. Setting criteria for a significant minimum percentage of energy efficiency 
obligation schemes to target energy-poor citizens. A “European Energy Poverty Observatory” that would 
bring together all stakeholders would help define European energy poverty indicators. JUST transition 
means ensuring that clean and affordable accessible energy is supplied to everyone.
• The European Commission must push Member States to act: increased EU funding should help local, 
regional, national authorities to overcome current administrative, financial and economic obstacles to 
make renovation accessible to all so that high upfront costs are not borne by vulnerable people. Local 
communities are key actors in the fight and community led renovations should receive more support. 
• Renewable energy production in terms of a % of electricity consumption has more than doubled 
between 2004 and 2015 in the EU (14% to 29%). However, in heating, buildings and industry, and in trans-
port the energy requirements are still enormous. Progress is occurring, but from a very low base, for 
example the share of renewable energy in fuel consumption in transport has increased from 1% to 6% in 
the same period. 
• Policies that support addressing the energy poverty problem in EU can also be solutions for establishing 
a clean energy infrastructure and supply, by shifting subsidies and coordinating political will.
• Public subsidies in favour of fossil fuels must be phased out as soon as possible otherwise we will use tax-
payer’s money to support stranded assets at the expense of other urgent and long term public priorities 
to ensure a just transition for all, be it the need to increase public investments in social infrastructures 
and policies or the need to increase investments in climate neutral technologies and infrastructures 
across all economic sectors. 
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Climate Justice in the Courtroom: global increase in the number of lawsuits 
relating to climate change
The number of lawsuits relating to climate change is increasing worldwide. A wide variety of law-
suits were registered, and, of these, pioneer lawsuits for compensation due to climate-related loss and 
damage were the exception. But the rights attached to Human linked to climate change are now being 
recognised in various countries around the world, through the judiciary process. This trend illustrates 
that Courts consistently uphold the principle that governments can be held legally accountable for not 
taking sufficient action to prevent the foreseeable harm resulting from climate change. 
On 20 December 2019, the Dutch Supreme Court, the highest court in the Netherlands, upheld the pre-
vious decisions in the Urgenda Climate Case, finding that the Dutch government has obligations to 
urgently and significantly reduce emissions in line with its human rights obligations. 
A Paris court has convicted the French state of failing to address the climate crisis and not keeping its 
promises to tackle greenhouse gas emissions. The court found the state guilty of “non-respect of its 
engagements” aimed at combating global warming. Billed by the “affair of the century”, the legal case 
was brought by four French environmental groups after a petition signed by 2.3 million people.
In April 2021, Germany’s Constitutional Court has found in a landmark ruling that key parts of the 
country’s climate legislation are insufficient. The court said Germany’s Climate Action Law is partly 
unconstitutional because it shifts the climate burden of making painful reductions to future generation 
and obliged the government to introduce details on greenhouse gas reduction targets for the period after 
2030 by the end of 2022. 
On June 17 2021 the Court of First Instance of Brussels has collectively condemned the Belgian author-
ities for their negligent climate policy. The judges ruled that the Belgian climate policy is substandard 
and not only violates the legal duty of care but also Human rights. 
The fact that some of these decisions are based exclusively on the rights of future generations – all of 
them taken together and functioning intertemporally, nonetheless – constitutes an innovative depar-
ture. Indeed, these decisions should serve as a blueprint for lawsuits in other countries, adopting the 
logic of intergenerational climate justice. Lawsuits filed against companies by people who have been 
harmed by climate change can contribute towards realising a just transformation. Furthermore, law-
suits can also be a trigger and driver for the long-term establishment of mechanisms to ensure just 
compensation for every citizen affected by climate change.157
157 https://www.wbgu.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wbgu/publikationen/politikpapiere/pp9_2018/pdf/wbgu_policypaper_9.pdf
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All the evidence indeed suggests that Humans have 
gone too far in the destruction of the only planetary 
ecosystem they have, leading to them now being 
endangered. The world’s leading climate scientists are 
increasingly concerned that global heating will trigger 
tipping points in Earth’s natural systems, which will 
lead to widespread and possibly irrevocable disaster, 
unless action is taken urgently. Reducing greenhouse 
gas is therefore a matter of absolute necessity. The EU 
cannot afford to fail, because the target is still close, 
and because our chances of a second try constrained. 
These shocks would indeed not only damage the envi-
ronment on which we depend, they also weaken our 
political, economic and social systems. 
Climate change is a “crisis multiplier” that has pro-
found implications for international peace and 
stability. It is indeed common knowledge that the 
environmental degradation and anthropogenic cli-
mate change caused by an exploitative world economy 
is the prime example illustrating the unsustainable 
nature of today’s model of development. Less noticed 
are its unequal fundamental components: the richest 
1% on the planet is responsible for twice as many CO2 
emissions as the poorest half of humanity, as the dev-
astating effects of climate change are felt more than 
ever. 
The same goes for global pollution and its detrimen-
tal effects to Nature and Human, which generate 
unacceptable injustices. Ecological crises reinforce 
inequalities, just as inequalities increase environ-
mental damage. 
It is indisputable that the European Union displays 
unprecedented environmental policy ambitions to 
deal with the threats that are now facing us. The goal 
of climate neutrality by 2050 has become a legally 
binding target, paving the way for a much-needed 
ambitious environmental agenda.
In the view of the ICSE, the opportunity of the ongo-
ing EU climate action should be seized to propose 
a sustainable transformation of Europe. A true 
environmental agenda not only aims to protect our 
livelihood and that of planet Earth, but to actively 
improve our future sustainable well-being through 
»Climate change is a “crisis 
multiplier” that has profound 










a fully-fledged social-ecological response to climate 
change.
This section proposes a comprehensive approach on 
carbon emissions reduction with the aim of aligning 
carbon pricing, effort sharing and climate policies in 
order to carry out a fair distribution of the emissions 
space among countries and among people. If carbon 
pricing and environmental taxation are important 
instruments to implement the green transition, it 
is equally crucial to take into account the distribu-
tional effects of these instruments and to put in place 
accompanying policies to mitigate their potentially 
socially unfair effects. In particular, carbon pricing 
revenues should be used to counter potential nega-
tive social and economic consequences resulting 
from the decarbonisation process. 
It is equally important that the 2030 climate target 
is translated into a concrete and adequate policy 
framework to achieve ambitious environmental 
goal. To do so, the EU should act as the leading pro-
moter of transformational measure by: designing 
an integrated industrial policy focused on strategic 
missions linked to decarbonisation; aligning infra-
structure policies and mobility policies to this 
long-term vision; boosting sustainable production 
and consumption; and proposing a comprehensive 
framework for improving natural carbon sinks.
Besides, we must make it clear that applying a 
well-being lens when designing climate mitigation 
policies has the potential to deliver wider benefits 
both in the short and the long term. A co-beneficial 
approach should recognise the intrinsic intercon-
nections between our social and ecological systems 
as the basis for a just and sustainable economy, with 
health as the great connector. Along these lines, the 
revalorisation of Biodiversity into the political agenda 
of the European Union is necessary to emphasise the 
interactions between human activities, ecosystems 
and climate. With the same view of aligning policies 
with the objectives of sustainable well-being, this sec-
tion will seek to re-affirm that health, in a wide sense, 
is “one”, which implies that policy responses must be 
guided by a coherent approach towards human and 
environmental health. 
Furthermore, a shift in perspective is needed to 
better integrate growing challenges to the sus-
tainability of the food system, and the CAP should 
ensure full policy coherence covering agricultural, 
food, environment, and climate policies. Finally, 
and as air, water and soil pollution, as well as the use 
of hazardous chemicals, can undermine the health 
of all citizens, the ICSE is calling for an overarching 
framework at EU level that can address the complex 
interlinkages across policy domains relevant to envi-
ronment and health.
»We must make it clear that 
applying a well-being lens when 
designing climate mitigation 
policies has the potential to 
deliver wider benefits both in the 
short and the long term.«
5.1.  Introduction 
The COVID crisis has triggered a global chain reac-
tion leading to the lockdown of virtually the entire 
world’s population and an almost complete stop of 
the global economy. It is now acknowledged that this 
pandemic is a striking example of the extent of the 
consequences on Human life of the ongoing deteri-
oration of nature. This worldwide health crisis is, at 
its origin, ecological: the virus — like SARS, MERS, 
Ebola— stems from the human-animal frontier. The 
loss of biodiversity in the ecosystems has created the 
general conditions that have favoured and, actually, 
made possible, the insurgence of the COVID-19 pan-
demic (a so-called ‘zoonosis’).
While attention and political response have properly 
been focused on the virus, the world has witnessed 
at the same time recurring and extreme weather 
phenomena. To name a few: heat waves in Siberia, 
unprecedented summer droughts in Europe in the 
last 250 years, wildfires in Australia and California 
and storms in Bengal which forced two million people 
to evacuate their homes... 
All the evidence suggests that158 Humans have gone 
too far in the destruction of the only planetary ecosys-
tem they have, leading to them now being endangered. 
Climatologists are unanimous that, if not properly 
addressed, global warming and the destruction of 
biodiversity are pushing our planet and human civil-
isation into unknown territory. These shocks not 
only damage the environment on which we depend, 
they also weaken our political, economic and social 
systems. As a result of the recent COVID experience, 
human beings are all becoming increasingly and 
intimately aware of the impact of nature on their 
existence and the extent to which, across borders 
and generations, their fates are interconnected. This 
wake-up call will however not be sufficient, far from it. 
Climate change is a “crisis multiplier” that has pro-
found implications for international peace and 
stability. It is indeed common knowledge that the 
environmental degradation and anthropogenic cli-
mate change caused by an exploitative world economy 
is the prime example illustrating the unsustainable 
nature of today’s model of development. Less noticed 
are its unequal fundamental components: the richest 
1% on the planet is responsible for twice as many CO2 
emissions as the poorest half of humanity,159 as the 
devastating effects of climate change are felt more 
than ever. The same goes for global pollution and 
its detrimental effects to Nature and Human, which 
generate unacceptable injustices (see Chapter 4 “The 
imperative of a just transition in a changing world”160). 
»Climatologists are unanimous 
that, if not properly addressed, 
global warming and the destruc-
tion of biodiversity are pushing 
our planet and human civilisa-
tion into unknown territory.«
158 In the past 2 decades, Europe already experienced an increased frequency of droughts with estimated loss of about EUR 100 billion. Ionita, M. et al. The European droughts from a climatological perspec-
tive. Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. 21, 1397–1419 (2017).
159 The richest 10% of the global population, comprising about 630 million people, were responsible for about 52% of global emissions over the 25-year period, the study showed:  
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621052/mb-confronting-carbon-inequality-210920-en.pdf
160 The effects of climate change and pollution levels tend to be more serious for specific subgroups based upon territorial disparities and wealth. In other words, the low-income households are least to 
blame for CO2 emissions but suffer the most—forced to live with pollutants and / or climate change direct effects that the polluters themselves pay to avoid. 
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If nothing or too few is done, these “extreme inequal-
ities”, at work for several decades, could precipitate 
the world towards both climate and social chaos.
Ecological crises reinforce inequalities, just as 
inequalities increase environmental damage. 
Hence, policies to reduce Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions must restore Justice within our societies. 
To avoid the distributional effects of climate pol-
icies, the latter, for example carbon taxes, must 
be designed to avoid or compensate any negative 
effects that would increase inequality. Otherwise, 
the effort will be perceived as unfair and the transi-
tion is not likely to happen. One striking example is 
the yellow vests movement that emerged in France 
in 2018, whose fierce protests forced the French gov-
ernment to step back on its plans for taxing carbon 
emissions. As noted by the High Council on Climate 
(HCC),161 an increase of the climate-energy contri-
bution at the level initially planned for 2022 coupled 
with the modification on the taxation of diesel fuel 
would have represented an effort of almost 1% of dis-
posable income for the poorest 10% of households 
against 0.3% for the top 10% richest.162
Such a prospect is obviously not compatible with 
the vision of a social model built on the notion of 
sustainable well-being for all and must therefore 
be addressed by our work on a new policy agenda 
for a sustainable and socially fair transformation of 
society. 
The last Special Report of the International Panel 
on Climate Change warned that the world is already 
1°C warmer than pre-industrial levels. Between 
2030 and 2052, global warming is likely to hit a 1.5°C 
increase.163 By signing the Paris Agreement,164 the 
EU committed itself to the goal of global net climate 
neutrality by 2050. With the aim of achieving at least 
55% greenhouse gas emissions reductions by 2030, 
the European Green Deal is the European Union’s 
flagship strategy to tackle climate change and the 
roadmap towards a carbon neutral Europe by 2050.165 
In addition, the European Commission has started 
working on the so-called “Fit for 55 Package”, which 
includes initiatives and revisions of existing direc-
tives to be aligned with both the new 2030 targets 
and with the long-term goal of 2050. 
It is indisputable that the European Commission 
displays unprecedented environmental policy ambi-
tions to deal with the threats that are now facing us. 
The goal of climate neutrality by 2050 will become 
a legally binding target, paving the way for a much-
needed ambitious environmental agenda. However, 
the path to achieve such a high-level commitment 
has for long been - and still is - a divisive issue inside 
both the academic and political communities.166 
Reducing greenhouse gas is indeed a matter of abso-
lute necessity. Using a worst-case scenario existential 
risk analysis in a much-discussed report, Australian 
climate experts167 recently stated that an additional 
2°C of warming would have disastrous consequences 
on our societies. 
»The richest 1% 
on the planet is 
responsible for 
twice as many 
CO2 emissions 
as the poorest 
half of 
humanity«
161 The French “Haut Conseil pour le Climat” is an an independent body tasked with issuing advice and recommendations to the Government on the implementation of public measures and policies to 
reduce France’s greenhouse gas emissions. Agir en cohérence avec les ambitions - Haut Conseil pour le Climat - 2019 -  
https://www.hautconseilclimat.fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/hcc_rapport_annuel_grand_public_2019.pdf 
162 The tax increase was perceived as unfair in the sense that, in a relative way, it affected more, and was rejected by, the low-income population, in particular by people who needed their cars to commute 
every day.
163 IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report: Between 2030 and 2052, global warming is likely to hit a 1.5°C increase. This increase of 1.5°C could already endanger between 20% and 30% of biodiversity. While an increase 
to 2°C would significantly worsen the risks of drought, floods, extreme heat 
164 Its goal is to limit global warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels
165 On the 21st of April Negotiators from the European Parliament and EU member states reached an agreement on the European Climate Law that will enshrine the EU’s commitment to reaching climate 
neutrality by 2050. As expected, the 2030 target was the most fierce political fight, but parties reached an agreement to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by “at least 55%” by 2030, compared to 1990 
levels. That objective will therefore become a legal obligation for the EU and its member states.
166 In order to ensure that sufficient efforts to reduce and prevent emissions are deployed until 2030, the climate law introduce a limit of 225 Mt of CO2 equivalent to the contribution of removals to the net 
target. It also states that the European Union shall aim to achieve a higher volume of carbon net sink by 2030. With the inclusion of “carbon sinks” (from Forestry and Agriculture) into the legislation, 
the EU’s 2030 target would translate into a “gross” reduction of 52.8%.
167 Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach - David Spratt & Ian Dunlop - May 2019
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In their scenario, “tipping points” will occur if 
humanity fails to institute bold carbon emission 
reductions in the 2020s and 2030s.168 The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
introduced the idea of tipping points two decades 
ago. They are events that could potentially commit 
the world to long-term irreversible changes. At that 
time, these ‘large-scale discontinuities’ in the cli-
mate system were considered likely only if global 
warming exceeded 5 °C above pre-industrial levels.
However, in June 2021, a recent leaked, 4,000 
pages report from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) brought more cause for con-
cern and alarm. Now the world’s leading climate 
scientists are increasingly concerned that global 
heating will trigger tipping points in Earth’s nat-
ural systems, even between 1 and 2 °C of warming. 
The draft reportedly describes how climate change 
will “fundamentally reshape life on Earth in coming 
decades, even if humans can tame planet-warming 
greenhouse gas emissions” with projections on food 
supplies, water scarcity, extinction rates, migration, 
infectious diseases and extreme weather events.
At a global level, the recent wave of net zero targets 
commitments has put the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C 
within relatively striking distance. Actually, the 
Climate Action Tracker (CAT) has calculated that 
global warming by 2100 could be as low as 2.1°C as 
a result of all the net zero pledges announced as of 
November 2020,169 while if everything continues as it 
is today, we are heading for a warming of 2.9°C. 
The EU cannot afford to fail, because the target is 
still close, and because our chances of a second try 
constrained.
In the view of the ICSE, the opportunity of the ongo-
ing EU climate action should be seized to propose a 
sustainable transformation of Europe. A true environ-
mental agenda not only aims to protect our livelihood 
and that of planet Earth, but to actively improve our 
future sustainable well-being through a fully-fledged 
social-ecological response to climate change. 
To this end, the ICSE is proposing a comprehensive 
policy package to address the multifaceted dimen-
sion of political responses at stake. Our mainstream 
approach would be to design recommendations that 
would will result in progress for all, individually and 
collectively. We aim at addressing both risks and 
opportunities for people and society, in respect of jobs 
and quality of employment, social cohesion and social 
equality, territorial equity, quality of life and increased 
well-being for all and society in general. The green (and 
digital) transformation can and should be - if properly 
framed from the onset - powerful engines of progress.
This section will first propose a comprehensive 
approach on carbon emissions reduction with the aim 
of aligning carbon pricing, effort sharing and climate 
policies. If carbon pricing and environmental taxation 
are important instruments to implement the green 
transition, it is equally crucial to take into account 
the distributional effects of these instruments and to 
put in place accompanying policies to mitigate their 
potentially socially unfair effects, and ensure a just 
transition. The Emissions Trading System (ETS) should 
be significantly reformed and tightened through a 
lower emission cap, with deeper annual linear reduc-
tions and an end to the handing out of free pollution 
permits. 
168 According to the authors, this would create a hothouse effect on Earth, leading to rapidly rising sea levels set off by melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet and “widespread permafrost loss and large-scale 
Amazon drought and dieback”. The “hothouse Earth” effect would cause “35 percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, (to be) subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat con-
ditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability.” For instance, as rising temperatures lead to the melting of Arctic permafrost, the unfreezing soil releases methane, a powerful greenhouse gas that 
in turn causes more heating. Other tipping points include the melting of polar ice sheets, which once under way may be almost impossible to reverse even if carbon emissions are rapidly reduced, 
and which would raise sea levels catastrophically over many decades, and the possibility of the Amazon rainforest switching suddenly to savannah
169 https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/global-update-paris-agreement-turning-point/
»  The EU cannot 
afford to fail, 
because the 
target is still 
close, and 
because our 





In full complementarity with this objective, the 
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), 
which has long been advocated by the progressive 
and is now proposed by the European Commission, 
would ensure that the price of imports reflects more 
accurately their carbon content. Future carbon pric-
ing revenues would finance climate mitigation and 
climate justice policies. 
Ultimately, the establishment of a European carbon 
budget170 would offer effort differentiation rules in 
order to carry out a fair distribution of the emis-
sions space among countries (taking into account 
the historical responsibility of each country in cli-
mate change, differences in living standards or even 
demography). The chapter will then address how 
the direction to a low-carbon future necessarily 
needs concerted action to align policies, regulatory 
frameworks and climate goals with the objective 
of achieving sustainable well-being objectives. The 
contribution of extensively sustainable production 
and consumption policies to both GHG emissions 
reduction and well-being progress will be critical 
in this respect. Parallel, a general rethinking of 
land use (to unequivocally increase natural carbon 
sequestration) will be an absolute necessity. 
Second, next to GHG emissions, other ecological 
consequences of human activity are increasingly 
undermining the planet’s biodiversity and lead to 
worrying negative chain reactions between different 
forms of life in ecosystems. 
The essential link between the biodiversity and the 
human, ecological, domestic animal and wildlife 
health and the threat disease poses to people, their 
food supplies and economies has been clearly estab-
lished by the COVID outbreak. 
A co-beneficial approach should recognise the 
intrinsic interconnections between our social and 
ecological systems as the basis for a just and sustain-
able economy, with health as the great connector. 
This chapter will put forward new synergies and 
trade-offs between climate change mitigation and 
broader goals such as health and wider environmen-
tal quality. With the same view of aligning policies 
with the objectives of sustainable well-being, this 
section will seek to re-affirm that health, in a wide 
sense, is “one”, which implies that policy responses 
must be guided by a coherent approach towards 
human, and environmental health. 
This approach, which the European Green Deal 
already, but only partly, acknowledges, would lead 
the ICSE to lay out policy recommendations within 
this coherent framework. While political debate has 
recently moved on to increase EU competence in 
Health, the approach followed in the report allows 
proposing recommendations in a series of domains 
like the challenges to the sustainability of the food 
system, the reduction of exposure of humans and 
the environment to pollutants and the access to qual-
ity health for all.
»  The green (and digital) 
transformation can and 
should be - if properly framed 
from the onset - powerful 
engines of progress.«
170 This concept has been put forward by the IPCC. It establishes the quantity of GHGs that our humanity can emit over the next decades. 
170 
5.2.  A fair path to 
decarbonisation: 
beyond carbon 
pricing, the need 
for carbon value 
and a consistent 
political agenda
Through the Paris Agreement, countries agreed to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the amount 
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere keeps rising, 
heating the Earth at an alarming rate. The latest EU 
carbon market emissions data released by European 
Commission on April 1 2021 was striking, though. 
It showed the impact of the COVID pandemic and 
a total year-on-year emission reduction estimated 
at 13% for all installations and airlines covered by 
the EU carbon market. However, data breakdown171 
shows that pollution from industrial sectors, such as 
cement, chemicals, and steel fell by only around 7%, 
and this mostly due to the reduced output caused by 
the COVID pandemic. The power sector registered a 
drop of 15.6% while emissions from aviation plum-
meted by 63.8% (due to the grounding of flights). 
Unlike in the power sector, carbon pollution from 
heavy industry has hardly decreased since 2012. 
Without additional policies and measures, it is also 
not expected to go down until 2030. 
In concrete terms, this means that not only are indus-
trial emission reductions lagging behind, emissions 
also likely to rebound in the next few years.
The EU committed itself to the goal of global net cli-
mate neutrality by 2050: the European Green Deal, 
with its climate law, is therefore the main strategy to 
achieve at least 55% greenhouse gas emissions reduc-
tions by 2030 (together with the “Fit for 55 Package”, 
which includes initiatives and revisions of existing 
directives to be aligned with these new environmen-
tal objectives). The opportunity should be seized to 
propose a sustainable transformation of Europe with 
two main objectives: fairer effort sharing in the GHG 
reduction objective and bringing an added-value to 
people via a progressive environmental agenda. An 
approach with multiple instruments, including tar-
geted support for policies aiming at GHG reduction, is 
indispensable to avoid path dependencies and lock-in 
of long-lived, high-carbon assets. The following rec-
ommendations intends to improve the relevance and 
consistency of the “Green Deal” policy package with 
the achievement of sustainable well-being for all. 
»The opportunity should be seized to 
propose a sustainable transformation 
of Europe with two main objectives: 
fairer effort sharing in the GHG 
reduction objective and bringing an 
added-value to people via a 
progressive environmental agenda.«
171 EU ETS emissions plummet due to pandemic as EUA surplus skyrockets - Sandbag - Apr 8, 2021.  
https://sandbag.be/index.php/2021/04/08/eu-ets-emissions-plummet-due-to-pandemic-as-eua-surplus-skyrockets/
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5.2.1.  Carbon pricing: linking the social 
and environmental goals and 
making them mutually supportive
Carbon pricing is supposed to have many virtues. It 
allows fighting against climate change while boost-
ing economy and creating new job”. It contributes 
to decoupling economic growth from the growth of 
emissions. It is based on the “polluter pays” princi-
ple (through market mechanisms, the fundamental 
objective is to pass the cost of emitting to emitters, 
which is a way to hold them responsible for the seri-
ous environmental - and thus social - costs of adding 
GHG emissions to the atmosphere). 
It is held as an instrument to spur investments in 
clean technologies by creating financial incentives 
for polluters to reduce emissions. It is supposed to 
create a positive change in producers and consum-
ers behaviour.
To date, alas, it has not borne much relation to real-
ity. Emission prices constrain emissions but have 
not to date led to deep reductions. In practice, and 
if not reformed properly, carbon pricing strategies 
could tend to promote the optimisation of estab-
lished business models and technologies but neglect 
more fundamental system change necessary for 
deep decarbonisation. 
Moreover, and as it has often been stated,172 if carbon 
pricing and environmental taxation are important 
environmental and fiscal instruments to implement 
the green transition, it is equally crucial to take into 
account the distributional effects of these instru-
ments and to put in place accompanying policies to 
mitigate their potentially socially unfair effects, and 
ensure a just transition.
The EU Emission Trading System, in its original 
form, is a telling example of such an underachieve-
ment. According to a recent study,173 EU ETS has not 
only proved to be regressive on the house-hold-ex-
penditure side (carbon cost being passed through 
to products that make up a greater share in the 
consumption basket of low-income households) but 
also on the government side – with a compensation 
mechanism that benefits capital owning households. 
Moreover, the pass-through of the value of free 
allowances within ETS system has distributional 
consequences. Firms acquire free allowances at zero 
cost, yet incorporate some of their value in product 
prices. This means that consumers pay more while 
firms generate higher profits.
As countries prepare their updated national climate 
action plans, known as NDCs, which are essential to 
meet the temperature targets agreed under the Paris 
Climate Change Agreement, momentum is growing 
to rethink the price on carbon pollution as a means 
of bringing down emissions and driving investment 
into cleaner options. A wide range of Economists, 
businesses, governments, NGOs and international 
bodies are advocating strong carbon pricing as a key 
instrument in transitioning to a low-carbon econ-
omy. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has 
»Firms acquire free allowances at 
zero cost, yet incorporate some 
of their value in product prices. 
This means that consumers pay 
more while firms generate 
higher profits.«
172 Report on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021 (2021/2004(INI)
173 The distributional effect of climate policies - Georg Zachmann, Gustav Fredriksson and Grégory Claeys - Bruegel 2018
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also added his voice, saying “we need to see much more 
progress on carbon pricing.”
Although the ICSE fully recognises the need for 
carbon pricing tools to support EU’s increased cli-
mate ambitions, it is very concerned about their 
potential distributional effects and calls for the 
respect of at least three principles when designing 
implementation policies: 
• solidarity and fairness between EU Member 
States when implementing, carbon pricing 
should address the differences between them 
when it comes to the magnitude of the challenge 
for the local economies
• solidarity and fairness within Member States: 
the impact of carbon pricing tools on vulnerable 
groups in society and lower income households 
should be tackled, not only in terms of afford-
ability but equally in terms of access to certain 
goods/services to fulfil their needs (energy, cool-
ing and heating, transport and mobility..) 
• addressing the territorial impact of such poli-
cies, not only for remote or peripheral areas, but 
more generally for those areas within Europe 
which are already undergoing a profound 
transformation in respect of their social and eco-
nomic development ( “left behind areas”) as well 
as for rural areas 
It is therefore necessary to reform carbon pricing 
to make it fairer and more efficient and to acknowl-
edge the role of broader policy portfolios. The case 
for integrating revenue use decisions with broad 
tax policy design, rather than separating it (as is the 
case with labelling transfers as carbon dividends), 
becomes stronger as carbon pricing revenue raises. 
The EU should choose how (e.g. targeted to low 
income households via the social benefits system, 
or to all households via tax reform or a lump-sum 
transfer) and how much of the additional revenue 
is recycled back to households in order to achieve 
a desired distributional outcome as well as other 
policy goals. 
The socioeconomic effects of a carbon pricing policy 
vary substantially depending on how the revenue 
from the policy is used. As such, revenue use is a sig-
nificant aspect of policy design. The questions raised 
by the use of carbon pricing revenues are equally 
important: how can policy design safeguard an 
equal and fair distribution of these revenues? How 
to ensure that theses revenues will serve the fight 
against climate change and support investments 
geared by the principle of “just transition”? How can 
we design from the onset flanking or compensatory 
measures in various forms to redress the negative 
distributional impact of carbon pricing tools?
The EU’s 2030 overall climate target is implemented 
through the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework. 
Most notably, in its strategy towards climate-neu-
trality, the European Commission has outlined the 
importance of carbon pricing to complement the 
existing climate policy framework. In addition, the 
European Commission is expected to present a leg-
islative proposal on a Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism in the second quarter of 2021 as part 
of the European Green Deal as well as a proposal 
on how to include the revenue generated to finance 
part of the EU budget. The purpose of this proposal 
is to ensure that the price of imports reflects more 
accurately their carbon content. This mechanism 
would create a global level playing field as well as 
an incentive for both EU and non-EU industries to 
decarbonise. While the EU’s ambition to step up 
Europe’s 2030 climate ambition is clear, it needs to 
give a new impetus to carbon pricing and green tax 
reforms and ensure the consistency of its Union’s 
environmental and climate strategy. Then it could 
drive a deep decarbonisation of our systems and 
foster the needed system change.174
»The socioeconomic 
effects of a carbon 
pricing policy vary 
substantially 
depending on how 
the revenue from 
the policy is used.«
174 European environmental Bureau - A Carbon Pricing Blueprint for the EU - 11 March 2021 - https://eeb.org/library/a-carbon-pricing-blueprint-for-the-eu/
Set broader political objectives for carbon pricing
It is very often argued that carbon prices mechanisms will overall provide new job opportunities and growth. 
It might be true at the aggregate level (EU 27). However, the outcome might be patchier if one takes a more 
granular approach space wise. This has to be taken into account when designing carbon-pricing measures. 
The European Commission must provide more comprehensive, complete and detailed assessments on quality 
jobs and employment (e.g. in the form of desegregated data). The aim would be to integrate the overall social 
benefits of increased climate ambitions policies, notably in terms of well-being and quality of life. Up-skill work-
ers for the low-carbon transition through a new Just Transition Fund to be financed from auctioning revenues 
would simply not be enough and would narrow the transformative potential of carbon pricing. A review of the 
complementarity and the adequacy to current objectives of EU’s climate mitigation instruments and carbon 
pricing measures should be undertaken. A clear assessment into the Commission modelling process and in its 
political narrative allowing to establish clear-cut data and figures would consent to addressing them with at 
least the same level of attention that it puts on EU competitiveness and growth. In the same line of thought, we 
need a coherent approach between carbon pricing regulation and EU state aid rules (and more generally EU 
competition policy currently under review for adapting it to the green and digital agenda). 
175 The EU Emission Trading System – carbon pricing as an important tool to achieve the objectives of the Green Deal - Sabine Frank - Carbon Market Watch - 2020  
https://carbonmarketwatch.org/2020/06/23/the-eu-emission-trading-system-carbon-pricing-as-an-important-tool-to-achieve-the-objectives-of-the-green-deal/
176 Special Report 18/2020: The EU’s Emissions Trading System: free allocation of allowances needed better targeting - European court of Auditors
177 Under the EU Emissions Trading System, companies need to obtain emission allowances covering their carbon emissions. Free allocation is set as a transitional method of allocating allowances in 
contrast to the default method (auctioning). However, allowances allocated for free continue to represent more than 40 % of the total number of available allowances.
Make the ETS more efficient
to reduce GHG emissions through a significant reform (a lower emission cap with deeper annual linear reduc-
tions). First and foremost, the fundamental question is: is the EU ETS reducing emissions? Emissions rose in 
Phase I (2005–2007). In Phase II (2008–2012) decreases in emissions were not linked to EU ETS but rather to the 
economic crisis. In phase III, The carbon emissions from sectors covered by the EU ETS (excluding aviation) have 
decreased by 21% from 2008 onwards. However, the drop in total emissions hides the immense differences 
between industrial sectors and the power sector and this reduction should not be fully attributed to the EU ETS 
– other decarbonisation policies, such as coal phase-outs, renewable energy deployment or energy efficiency 
investments, played a major role. At the same time, industrial pollution from the production of steel, cement 
and chemicals has stagnated.175 The ICSE would recommend to lower the actual cap of the EU ETS which 
derived in the context of the previous EU climate protection targets (−40% for the 1990–2030 period). For the 
commitments made with the new NDC of the EU-27, the cap of the EU ETS will have to be significantly adjusted 
in view of the prominent role of emissions from installations regulated by the EU ETS. 
Make the ETS fairer. 
Every sector of the economy will need to make deep and sustained cuts in its emissions – and the EU ETS could 
contribute significantly if the polluter pays principle was extended to all the sectors it covers. Yet, there are 
recurrent concerns on the use of ETS allowances under the current ETS regime, including the issue of “windfall 
profits”.176 Free allocation177 should, therefore, be abolished and replaced by auctioning of all emission allow-
ances. This measure would make the EU ETS fairer to citizens, since it would divide the costs of the low-carbon 
transition more equally between citizens and industry. It would then be opportune to ensure the current pro-
visions on ETS/ Modernisation Fund and ETS Innovation Fund are fit for purpose. There is a clear need for 
stronger social and environmental conditionality in the use of these funds and ensure that there are geared by 
the principles of just transition.
Make the ETS more efficient and fairer:
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The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism:  
a powerful tool if properly designed
When establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism to stimulate global climate action, we need to 
ensure it is part of a broader EU industrial strategy and goes hand in hand with a full phase out of all current 
measures aimed at mitigating carbon leakage, including free ETS allowances. It should cover the power sector 
and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement, steel, aluminium, oil refinery, paper, glass, chemicals and 
fertilisers, which continue to receive substantial free allocations, and still represent 94 % of EU industrial emis-
sions. The introduction of a CBAM must not water down the overall cap on emission allowance or the need to 
further strengthen the annual reduction of total permits, in line with the EU’s climate neutrality objective and an 
updated EU 2030 climate target. In the same line, export rebates should be excluded from the mechanisms  as 
this could otherwise encourage differentiated production for domestic and export markets, leading to export-
ing of higher carbon products. Export rebates would not be coherent with higher EU climate ambition and the 
drive to encourage higher climate ambition globally. The CBAM remains a “peripheral (but ground-changing) 
tool”178 in a policy mix needed to ensure increased EU domestic efforts to avoid further climate disruption, and 
to address the environmental impacts of products imported into the EU. A consistent policy mix would there-
fore also need to address EU consumption impacts regardless of where these impacts occur. Finally, as the 
CBAM would focus on a few strategic sectors, it should be designed in a way that limits the risk of offshoring of 
manufacturing activities downstream the value chain. The future CBAM should therefore also apply to interme-
diate and finished products, focusing on components with a high carbon footprint. To cope with technological, 
regulatory and market change, the CBAM should be dynamic and its scope should be regularly reviewed.
Tax revenues: climate dividends for social justice 
The gap between actual carbon prices and those required to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation 
could be closed by using revenues in a fair way that ensures benefits are relevant to all. As such, we should not 
dismiss carbon taxation on the basis that it could be, in essence, regressive. Rather, we need to explore the ways 
to offset these impacts to make carbon taxation good both for the people and the planet.
Carbon pricing can raise significant revenues, and the way they are used is essentially a political choice. There 
are three main ways of using revenues: 1) general budget allocation, where they are directed to the government 
public funds with no specific indication of their use; 2) green subsidies, where they are reinvested in climate 
purposes such as promoting low-carbon technologies; 3) revenue recycling, where they return to consumers in 
the form of dividends/lump-sum rebates.
Allocate revenues of carbon pricing (reformed ETS and CBAM) to just transition and mitigation policies. 
A fair approach, when it comes to revenues generated by the EU ETS or the future Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism, would consist in dedicating them to manage the just transition, especially in those regions and 
countries most affected by decarbonisation. In this case, such revenues should not be used to feed the general 
EU budget, but they rather should be earmarked to finance climate action (e.g. : to increase the financing of 
the Innovation Fund, the Modernisation Fund and the Just Transition Fund). In the same lines, options should 
178 Climate Action Network - Supporting document to response to the European Commission’s public consultation on the carbon border adjustment mechanism-(CBAM) - 28/10/2020 -  
https://caneurope.org/supporting-document-consultation-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism/
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be explored for pricing carbon through a contribution payable in non-ETS sectors, with part of the resulting 
revenue to fund assistance for workers, communities and regions. 
Carbon dividends: an equitable use of the revenues. The ICSE is of the opinion that carbon pricing revenues 
should be used to counter potential negative social and economic consequences resulting from the decar-
bonisation process, and that these revenues collected due to increased pricing of C02 should redistributed to 
citizens. One use of revenues that is likely to be fair everywhere is to use transfer payments to lessen the impact 
on the households whose cost of living is disproportionately affected by carbon pricing. Carbon pricing can 
only be made just and politically durable if linked to returning the revenue to the public as carbon dividends.
A carbon dividend distributes the revenue from a carbon price back to households. In its simplest form, a 
carbon dividend would divide the amount of revenue generated by a carbon price over the course of a year 
evenly among all households. However, it does not need to be divided in equal amounts (it can be divided 
based on one’s income, tax returns, or other factors). Hence governments need to assess which groups in 
society are going to be hit hardest. That depends on factors such as whether the low-income households 
predominantly use electricity, fossil fuels or traditional biofuels, and what their transport, heating and cooling 
requirements are. 
175 
5.2.2.  Carbon value: a long-sighted 
approach for equity
A recent IPCC report179 - dealing with impacts of 
global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels 
- recently provided with an estimate for a global 
remaining carbon budget (excluding permafrost 
feedbacks) of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees during 
and beyond this century. The equation is simple: to 
stay within 1.5 degrees warming, the carbon budget 
left is around 416GtCO2, or 10 more years of emissions 
at our current rate. 
The notion of “remaining carbon budget” is useful 
as it squarely addresses the most important anthro-
pogenic greenhouse gas emission, namely CO2, and 
provides with an accurate panorama over the avail-
able alternatives. In concrete terms, limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C depends on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions over the next decades, where lower GHG 
emissions in 2030 lead to a higher chance of keep-
ing peak warming to 1.5°C. Available pathways 
that aim for no or limited temperature overshoot 
of 1.5°C keep GHG emissions in 2030 to 25–30 GtCO2 
emissions / year in 2030. To date, this contrasts with 
median estimates for current unconditional nation-
ally determined contributions (NDCs) of 52–58 GtCO2 
emissions /year in 2030. 
It would be misleading to consider these data as 
purely quantitative. Over and above these figures, 
the choice of the pathways to decarbonisation will 
bear consequences for the future of the Planet and 
human beings. Sea level rise will continue beyond 
2100 even if global warming is limited to 1.5°C in the 
21st century, but with moderate amplitude. 
However, marine ice sheet instability in Antarctica 
and/or irreversible loss of the Greenland ice sheet 
could result in multi-metre rise in sea level over hun-
dreds to thousands of years. These instabilities could 
be triggered at around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming. 
Climate change impacts and responses are closely 
linked to sustainable development which balances 
social well-being, sustainable economy and environ-
mental protection. The United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, already 
provided an established framework for assessing the 
links between global warming of 1.5°C or 2°C and 
development goals that include poverty eradication, 
reducing inequalities, and climate action.
Thus, and in line with the policy recommendations 
we proposed in the previous chapter on “Just transi-
tion”, it has become evident that the avoided climate 
change impacts on sustainable development, eradi-
cation of poverty and reducing inequalities would be 
greater if global warming were limited to 1.5°C rather 
than 2°C.180 
As stated before, enhanced carbon pricing will not be 
enough to tackle these crucial issues. 
To stay within 1.5 degrees warming, the 
carbon budget left is around 416GtCO2, 
or 10 more years of emissions at our 
current rate. 
1.5°C
»It has become evi-
dent that the avoided 
climate change im-
pacts on sustainable 
development, eradi-
cation of poverty and 
reducing inequalities 
would be greater if 
global warming were 
limited to 1.5°C 
rather than 2°C.«
179 IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. 
Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]
180 “If further action is not taken to strengthen the Nationally Determined Contributions and develop a pathway to meet the global warming targets of the Paris Agreement (Rogelj et al., 2016), then the greatest shifts 
in climate will be experienced by the poorest” - In “The Inequality of Climate Change From 1.5 to 2°C of Global Warming” - Andrew D. King and Luke J. Harrington - ARC Centre of Excellence for Climate 
System Science, School of Earth Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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Carbon pricing aims to reduce GHG by making 
them more expensive. Doing so, and if not properly 
reformed, it could link the ability to continue with 
one’s current emission-intensive lifestyle to the abil-
ity to pay for it. Under politically relevant forms of 
carbon pricing this would lead to an unfair distribu-
tion of burdens. It does so by needlessly burdening 
those individuals who have contributed the most to 
climate change during the last couple of decades. 
Carbon value, however, is addressing more deeply 
the fair distribution of burdens.
We already identified three main channels through 
which the inequality-aggravating effect of climate 
change materialises, namely (a) increase in the 
exposure of the disadvantaged groups to the adverse 
effects of climate change; (b) increase in their sus-
ceptibility to damage caused by climate change; and 
(c) decrease in their ability to cope and recover from 
the damage suffered. It should be clearly noted and 
understood that the same analytical framework can 
be used to discuss the relationship between climate 
change and inequality across countries.
We must get this right when dealing with the level 
of ambition we consider necessary to achieve global 
decarbonisation in a fair and sustainable way. To 
date, though, important issues remain unaddressed 
at the European level. 
The Green Deal greenhouse gas accounting, in line 
with the norms in force at the United Nations since 
the Kyoto Protocol, is based on production or territo-
rial emissions (those that take place within European 
borders) but fails to point out that the region con-
tributes indirectly to climate change through its 
consumption emissions. 
Although easily overlooked, the embodied carbon 
emissions associated with the consumption of 
imported goods has been on a significantly upward 
trend in Europe in the past two decades, often under-
stating part or all of the domestic carbon reduction 
gains achieved by individual countries. Although 
nearly any imported product is responsible for a 
certain amount of carbon emissions generated in its 
value chain up to the point of import, imports from 
key trade partners in emerging economies are often 
more carbon intensive in their manufacturing pro-
cesses than similar products imported from other 
European countries. Considering many European 
countries have outsourced an increasing number of 
products to overseas developing and emerging econ-
omies such as China and India since the 1990s, we 
can witness the emergence of so-called ‘carbon leak-
age’ whereby the production of domestic products is 
moved to more carbon-intensive economies and with 
the resulting products subsequently imported.
To put it differently, taking into account imported 
emissions would take out a lot of the albeit ambitious 
EU climate performance and efforts. 
Consumption-based emissions accounting must be 
assessed alongside the territorial, production-based 
emissions typically required to be reported by gov-
ernments, since they highlight the links between 
local consumption and its global environmental con-
sequences. When the EU is considered as a whole, 
and taking into account the consumption-based 
calculation, the top 10% of people with highest 
household emissions are responsible for around 15% 
of EU’s household emissions, while the bottom 10% 
emit only 5%.181
This situation confirms that, in order to tackle fron-
tally global warming, the EU needs to address the full 
picture of the CO2 emissions, including the inherent 
inequalities they bear within our societies. 
A recent Oxfam report182 indeed revealed a stark 
“carbon inequality” between and within European 
countries. While Europe is responsible for 15% of 
global consumption emissions, despite being home 
to just 7% of the world’s population, the richest 10% of 
»Taking into account 
imported emissions 
would take out a lot of 
the albeit ambitious 
EU climate perfor-
mance and efforts.«
181 Simon Evans - Carbon Brief - Are the UK’s emissions really falling or has it outsourced them to China? - March 19. 2015 -  
https://www.carbonbrief.org/are-the-uks-emissions-really-falling-or-has-it-outsourced-them-to-china




Europeans are responsible for over a quarter of emis-
sions – the same as the poorest half combined – with 
the wealthiest 1% producing 7% of emissions. More 
seriously still, these inequalities are also seen in the 
effort required to reduce emissions. According to the 
report, the poorest half of Europeans have cut emis-
sions by almost a quarter, while emissions from the 
wealthiest 10% continue to rise. In contrast, both the 
richest 10% and 1% have increased emissions, by 3% 
and 5% respectively, while middle-income Europe-
ans were responsible for just under half of emissions, 
making cuts of 13%. 
The conclusion is rather significant: while the poorest 
half of Europeans have cut emissions significantly, 
they will be the hardest hit by climate change. Next, 
the richest 10% of EU citizens have a per capita foot-
print over 10 times higher than the level needed by 
2030 for a 1.5C-consistent emissions pathway, while 
the footprint of the richest 1% is 30 times higher. By 
contrast, the footprints of the poorest 50% of Europe-
ans will need on average to be halved by 2030.
As is reasonably logical to expect, disparities are also 
apparent between member states with the richest 
10% of citizens in Germany, Italy, France and Spain 
– approximately 25.8 million people – collectively 
responsible for the same emissions as the entire 
population of 16 member states – approximately 84.8 
million people. 
Absolute emissions are also high among the richest 
10% in far smaller Member States such as Belgium 
and the Netherlands, as a result, in particular, of 
these countries’ high dependency on imports of oil 
and gas, and use of gas for residential heating.183 
The EU should set emissions reductions targets that 
are in line with the latest international commitments 
and that reflect the EU’s high historic responsibility 
for emissions and its capacity to ensure a low carbon 
transition. Now everyone must pull their weight to 
achieve the deeper emission cuts needed over the 
next decade. To date, EU emissions reductions have 
coincided with rising economic inequality, leaving 
emissions among the richest Europeans unaccept-
ably high even as they fall among lower income 
groups. To achieve the deeper reductions that are 
now needed, all sections of European society must do 
their fair share. 
We strongly believe that EU should use the European 
Green Deal to fight inequality while cutting carbon 
emissions, as an essential part for achieving ambi-
tious - and much needed - EU climate targets.
The richest 10% of Europeans 
are responsible for over a 
quarter of emissions 
»While the poorest half of Europeans have cut 
emissions significantly, they will be the hardest 
hit by climate change. Next, the richest 10% of 
EU citizens have a per capita footprint over 10 
times higher than the level needed by 2030 for 
a 1.5C-consistent emissions pathway.«
Europe is responsible for 15% of global 
consumption emissions, despite being 
home to just 7% of the world’s population
15%
183 The richest 10% in Belgium and the Netherlands (c. 3.7m people) are responsible for higher emissions in absolute termsthan the total population of many other Member States, including Hungary  
(c. 9.9m people), Bulgaria (c. 7.3m people), Greece (c. 10.9m people), Denmark (c. 5.7m people), Sweden (c. 9.9m people) and Finland (c. 5.5m people). Op. Cit.
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taking greenhouse gas consumption emissions, not only production emissions, as a reference and promote 
on this basis and other equity criteria - as the carbon budget (see below) - a comprehensive global collec-
tive climate justice strategy – understood as the fair distribution of mitigation efforts. Goals to achieve carbon 
neutrality by 2050 are pointless if this is done through pollution displacement – by increasingly importing 
CO2-intensive products from the rest of the world.
184 For the EU to reduce its global CO2 emissions, systemic 
changes to the European economy are needed. As the world’s largest economic and trading block, the EU and 
its Member States’ policies on trade and investment flows are important, but often overlooked, parts of the 
policy toolbox to achieve change. European trade and investment flows are too important to disregard their 
impacts – both positive and negative – on climate change.
Establish a European carbon budget
Aim for a net decoupling
The European Commission should table a carbon budget for the EU by December 2021, detailing the remaining 
carbon emissions that would be possible to keep within the Paris Agreement’s temperature threshold on time. 
A carbon budget shall be developed to quantify the amount of GHG emissions that can be emitted in total over 
each 5 year period through 2050. This is would be achieved by developing trajectories that give estimations 
of the yearly rate of emissions reduction to achieve the target set by the Paris COP 21 agreements taking into 
account the constraints given by final objectives of EU policies. 
The carbon budget would allow to propose differentiation rules in order to carry out a fair distribution of the 
emissions space among countries. Carbon budgets could be assigned to countries by equity principles (based 
for example on cumulative emissions, per capita emissions, GDP, taking into account the historical responsibil-
ity of each country in climate change, differences in living standards or even demography). Doing so, it would 
provide the EU with a corridor of carbon social values, which could be systematically used in socio-economic 
assessments of public policy instruments and public investments. Such an approach would allow to redistrib-
ute more financial support could be provided to low-income countries through EU funding to accelerate the 
deployment of new infrastructures and low carbon technologies as well as to mitigate the negative socio-eco-
nomic impacts of the transition. 
A European carbon budget, would clarify the long-term target and would create a natural foundation for the 
right amount of emission allowances within the - hopefully - expanding ETS. A carbon budget would as well 
improve predictability and the robustness of the CO2 price. Finally, the trajectories proposed within Carbon 
Budget would, for the first time, link a regional policy to a global policy by means of the estimation of a regional 
carbon budget. It would then allow to invite policymakers to revisit the present EU policy mitigation agenda 
linking it more actively and quantitatively to the ‘big-picture’ commitments signed within the Paris treaty. 
184 “In 2001, EU consumption caused global CO2 emissions that were 12% higher than the total emissions that occurred within the EU. This excess was about 500 million tons – more than Italy’s CO2 production that 
year. The difference is mainly due to the level of emissions in developing countries – particularly China – associated with the manufacture of goods consumed in the EU. Evidence suggests that the global emissions 
from EU consumption have further increased. Most emissions, whether in the EU or China, are not related to imports or exports, but take place domestically to satisfy domestic consumption”. WWF’s Trade and 
Investment Programme and the Industrial Ecology Programme at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology John Kornerup Bang, Eivind Hoff and Glen Peters - Published January 2008
5.2.3.  Align policies and regulatory 
frameworks with the objective of 
achieving climate and sustainable 
well-being goals
As stated above, carbon pricing and value should be 
used as part of a policy mix that promotes innovation 
and sustainability, accounts for political dynamics, 
varies between sectors and over time, and aims at 
profound system change. Climate policy responses 
need to move beyond market failure reasoning and 
focus on fundamental changes in existing socio-tech-
nical systems such as energy, mobility and industrial 
production. We argue that climate change can be 
more appropriately understood as a system problem. 
Core societal functions will be met through large and 
deeply entrenched socioeconomic systems made up 
of interconnected technologies, infrastructures, reg-
ulations, business models, and lifestyles. 
Along with a proper framework for a Just transition, 
it is equally important that the 2030 climate target is 
translated into a concrete and adequate policy frame-
work to achieve ambitious environmental goals. In 
that regard, the “Fit for 55 Package”185 will be decisive 
for EU’s climate action in the coming decade.
While the EU has decided to raise its 2030 climate 
target to 55 percent, it is far from being on track to 
reach this objective. The European Commission proj-
ects at least a 10 percentage points gap for emissions 
reductions in 2030 based on current scenarios. Quick 
and decisive action is thus needed across all sectors 
of the economy to meet the new 2030 target and to 
prepare for climate neutrality by 2050. The new EU 
budget will make some contribution to reducing 
emissions, however, to transform the EU economy 
to climate neutrality in less than three decades, addi-
tional policies are needed.
Several areas offer the possibility of significant reduc-
tions, but some bottlenecks need to be overcome. 
Recycling and the circular economy offers the pros-
pect of less resource use but are until now too limited. 
Carbon-capture and storage is of limited scale to date, 
and their outcome is controversial. Natural solutions 
and effective reforestation could absorb up to 30 % of 
global emissions, but this estimate is very uncertain 
and its improvement still needs ambitious policies 
to support it. Increased use of nuclear energy opens 
a difficult debate on radioactive waste storage, deple-
tion of reserves, and high costs in times of climate 
hazards. On the other hand, improvements in energy 
efficiency – assuming radical steps – could save up to 
40 % of global emissions while behavioural changes 
could save 10-15 % or more.186
This target has not yet been reached, far from it. 
The reduction in energy consumption that needed to 
reach a 20 % decrease by 2020 have not been demon-
strated so far.187 Recent analysis shows that between 
2000 and 2018, the sectors of transport and services 
increased their final energy consumption by 10.8% 
and 20.2% respectively.188 
Natural solutions and effective 
reforestation could absorb up to 
30 % of global emissions, but this 
estimate is very uncertain and its 
improvement still needs 
ambitious policies to support it. 
»While the EU has decided to 
raise its 2030 climate target to 
55 percent, it is far from being 
on track to reach this objective.«
185 To achieve the 55% GHG reduction objective, the European Commission identified a set of actions needed to decarbonise the different sectors of the economy. It also indicated that several key legislative 
instruments will be revised. Among these legislative instruments subject to revision are: the Emission Trading System Directive, the Effort Sharing Regulation, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy 
Efficiency Directive, the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, the CO2 Emissions Performance Standards for Cars and Vans and the LULUCF Regulation.
186 Decoupling economic growth from environmental harm - EPRS | European Parliamentary Research: Eamonn Noonan with Stefano Vrizzi, Global Trends UnitPE 651.916 – July 2020  
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/651916/EPRS_ATA(2020)651916_EN.pdf
187 European Environment Agency Trends and projections in Europe - 2020
188 Joint Research Center, 2020, Energy Consumption and Energy Efficiency trends in the EU-28, 2000-2018
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The energy consumption in the tertiary sector is 
expected to continue to increase, notably due to the 
increased use of electricity in the IT sector and data 
centres. By contrast, in the same period, residen-
tial energy consumption declined by 4.5% and the 
industrial consumption decreased more significantly 
by 14.6% but this is likely due to the financial and 
economic crisis of 2008 and by the resulting deindus-
trialisation process. Since the “cheapest and cleanest 
energy is the one we do not use”;189 the energy efficiency 
principle should therefore be a priority for the Euro-
pean Union to reach its climate targets.
In other words, the EU should act as the leading pro-
moter of transformational measures. It should then 
1) design an integrated industrial policy focused on 
strategic missions linked to decarbonisation 2) align 
infrastructure policies and mobility policies to this 
long-term vision 3) boost sustainable production and 
consumption and 4) design a comprehensive frame-
work for improving natural carbon sinks.
5.2.3.1.  A sustainable European industrial 
policy: set a dedicated agenda for 
decarbonisation of Energy Intensive 
Industry (EII)
Industrial transformation priorities should be to 
reduce resource and energy use, greenhouse gas 
emissions and air pollution as well as solid waste. 
A robust industrial strategy ensuring that Europe’s 
carbon neutrality should serve as a springboard for 
European industrial leadership in renewables-based, 
decarbonised and digital solutions. 
The ICSE is proposing here to further strengthen 
the link between the new Industrial Strategy as pro-
posed by the European Commission and the “Fit for 
55” Package. As stated above, the EU should not solely 
rely on carbon pricing mechanisms to decarbonise 
its energy intensive industries. A climate-neutral 
industrial strategy and concrete sectoral decar-
bonisation strategies is needed to complement this 
cap-and-trade approach.
To achieve the transition towards climate neutrality, 
we need to develop sectorial decarbonisation road-
maps to ensure a just transition of the workforce 
while accelerating the development of low carbon 
infrastructures and technologies. This interdepen-
dence of policy goals must be reflected in a global 
approach: a true climate neutral Industrial Strategy 
must foster investments and strengthen employ-
ment and strategic value chains in the EU in a way 
that helps achieve the objectives of the European 
Green Deal. A new EU Industrial Strategy, together 
with the Circular Economy Action Plan and a com-
prehensive approach of Just Transition, should be 
the “cornerstone of EU climate action and provide the 
necessary policy and financial tools for European indus-
try to go green”.190
»A robust industrial strategy 
ensuring that Europe s̓ carbon 
neutrality should serve as a 
springboard for European 
industrial leadership in 
renewables-based, decarbonised 
and digital solutions.«
189 ETUC resolution on “Fit for 55” package - Adopted 22.03.2021 - https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-resolution-fit-55-package
190 ETUC resolution on European Green Deal initiatives: Climate Law, EU Sustainable Investment Plan, Just Transition Fund Regulation and new EU Industrial Strategy - Adopted 09.06.2020
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Provide a comprehensive framework to put the 
EU industry on track to reach climate neutrality 
by 2050
Support cross-sectoral technologies as pathways 
to decarbonise Energy Intensive Industry (Ells) 
Massive investment in the development and deployment of low carbon breakthrough technologies are needed 
(e.g. through the development of renewable hydrogen, , batteries or other clean technologies that allow low 
carbon industrial production processes). It would equally essential to create lead markets for low-carbon prod-
ucts through appropriate measures (e.g. public procurements, carbon contracts for differences to promote the 
uptake of low-carbon steel, cement, chemicals). Such framework, accompanied by adequate reforms of State 
Aid guidelines, will be crucial to keep a strong industrial value chain in Europe and to maintain employment in 
the long term.
The use of sustainable renewable hydrogen to produce steel, ammonia or synthetic fuels is a prime example. 
Hydrogen can be produced in a sustainable manner via the electrolysis of water powered by green electricity. 
Renewable hydrogen is likely to play a significant role in the global energy transition since it could provide a 
clean source of energy for sectors that are difficult to electrify directly, such as transport and industry. Using 
renewable hydrogen as an energy carrier effectively widens the applications of renewable power. Its higher 
energy density makes it more suitable than the use of batteries in some applications. In cases where it can 
be more readily transported over large distance, in pipelines, it provides a relatively low-cost distribution and 
energy storage option. Lastly, renewable hydrogen production via electrolysis is a controllable source of elec-
tricity demand that can help provide flexibility in power systems.
Increasing the renewable energy target could help secure and develop an industrial value chain in the EU for 
renewable technologies and therefore create new quality jobs. Any increase in targets should be supported 
by a sound industrial policy as well as by substantial public investments to compensate the shortcomings of 
private actors to deploy new technologies. In the same line, it is critical to encourage the better valorisation of 
waste streams and materials efficiency as production on basis of secondary materials is less energy-intensive 
than transformation of primary resources. 
Set a comprehensive renewable strategy
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such as shared infrastructure for sustainable process technologies and organisation of industrial symbiosis. 
This cooperation could help to promote industrial collaboration, strategic alliances as a means to support com-
panies to move up to the value chains of the future and to share costs of R&D and investment. 
Support re-adjustment programmes for SMEs 
Set European platforms for cooperation 
in the EIIs value chains that are specialised in conventional technologies, in order to help them to redefine their 
value chain positioning and to redirect their core competencies while preserving jobs.
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5.2.3.2.  Transforming infrastructures to meet 
the Paris Agreement targets and to 
incorporate sustainable and low- 
carbon technologies
EU policy should in the first place stimulate 
Member States to prioritise the further elaboration 
and improvement of national policies that enable 
increased local renewables deployment, amongst 
others through a timely transposition of the Clean 
Energy Package and a robust implementation 
of ambitious National energy and climate plans 
(NECPs). Actually, in order to find viable pathways 
to avoid dangerous climate change, current models, 
including the European one, begin to include more 
and more examples of carbon capture and storage, 
a technology that could presumably remove the 
carbon dioxide from coal-fired power stations and 
then store the captured carbon deep underground 
indefinitely. But crucially, we cannot completely rely 
on the promise that temperatures will be brought 
down with a range of carbon dioxide removal by the 
end of the century, and thus producing carbon-neg-
ative technologies. How could technology possibly 
allow us to “transform our civilisation from one that 
currently pumps out 40 billion tons of carbon dioxide 
into the atmosphere each year, to one that produces a net 
removal of tens of billions”191 in such a short period of 
time?
191 Climate scientists: concept of net zero is a dangerous trap - James Dyke, Robert Watson and Wolfgang Knorr - 27th April 2021.  
https://www.socialeurope.eu/climate-scientists-concept-of-net-zero-is-a-dangerous-trap
192 IRENA (2019), Climate Change and Renewable Energy: National policies and the role of communities, cities and regions (Report to the G20 Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG)), Interna-
tional Renewable Energy Agency
The energy sector needs a total overhaul, with a transformation from fossil-based to zero-carbon energy pro-
duction by the second half of this century. Today, 84% of energy use comes from fossil fuels, with 16% derived 
from renewables. A recent analysis192 show how, through accelerated uptake, 65% of energy use could come 
from renewables by 2050. This would be a step forward for some countries to meet the Paris Agreement climate 
goals. Renewable energy currently represents about 25% of global electricity generation, the remaining part 
being produced by fossil fuels. Around 80% of all electricity in 2050 could be generated by renewable energy. 
The transformation to a sustainable energy system with high shares of renewables would meet climate goals 
and pay for itself. It would lead to massive job creations between now and 2050, and the health, environmental 
and climate benefits would save up to six times more than the additional costs associated with reconfiguring 
the energy sector. Furthermore, to curb current trends and reduce further energy consumption in Europe, we 
need to revise the targets of the energy efficiency directive and to make them legally binding. Consequently, 
the EU should adopt more stringent Ecodesign requirements on energy related products and extend the range 
of products covered by the Ecodesign Directive to ICT products, data centres and other relevant non-energy 
related products. Accordingly, the future trans-European energy infrastructure (TEN-E) regulation must fully 
cater for a future- and climate-proof energy system based on the energy efficiency first principle and 100% 
renewable energy. It must exclude any infrastructure projects directly or indirectly supporting or depending on 
fossil fuels and projects that are not in line with nature protection.
Improve synergies between renewable energy 
and energy efficiency 
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Build new infrastructures to support new  
technologies and processes 
For example, the use of renewable hydrogen and e-fuels at scale will require large amounts of renewable power, a 
large number of electrolysers, hydrogen storage, conversion technologies, distribution systems such as pipelines 
or shipping, and changes and new designs among the end-use technologies. The difficulty is that investment in 
this infrastructure needs to come ahead of the demand if early progress is not to be stifled. Carefully co-ordinated 
planning coupled with targeted incentives will be needed to ensure that the right infrastructure is built at the 
right time. Renewable hydrogen will require a strategic and quick upgrade of both production and distribution of 
renewable electricity and will have to be dealt with in the framework of the Energy Union governance. This shall 
include a clear roadmap on the deployment of renewable hydrogen facilities and variable renewables energy 
capacities, and the adaptation of targeted demand sectors. Exploit cross-sectoral synergies should be considered 
as a priority to make substantial investments available in this respect. 
Instead of physical movement, is key to invert the current growth in car ownership and use, and related GHG 
emissions from transport (now accounting for approximately 23% of global CO2 emissions). Accessibility is a com-
bination of mobility and proximity, i.e. ensuring that people are able to easily reach jobs, opportunities, goods, 
services and amenities. Enhancing accessibility by giving priority to sustainable modes and creating proximity 
between people and places can importantly contribute (along with the improvement of vehicle technologies and 
fuels) to enlarging mitigation potential, while also improving life quality through delivering better equity, health, 
economic, road safety, and wider environmental outcomes.
Re-design mobility systems around accessibility
Address with a serious focus the limitations of 
Carbon Capture and Storage technologies 
To date, it is widely believed that direct air capture, because of its exorbitant costs and energy demand,193 if it 
ever becomes feasible to be deployed at scale, will not be the magic bullet that would somehow rid us of the 
GHG emissions in a short period of time.194 Yet, current European pathways that aim for limiting warming to 1.5°C 
rely on large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) measures,195 which are to date uncertain and entail 
clear risks. It should be made clear here that the first-order priority should always be to reduce emissions as quickly as 
possible, instead placing undue reliance on the possibility to remove them afterwards. Every effort must be made to 
decarbonise our economy and societies, and carbon removal must eventually complement, not substitute for, emis-
sion reductions. 
The ICSE is therefore recommending that the EU adopt a 2030 emission reduction target supplemented by a 
separate target for removals to ensure both advance at the necessary scale independent of each other, while 
avoiding confusion and counter-productive incentives. Mixing emissions and removals in a single target would 
allow other countries to do the same and undermine the transparency and trust that is needed to accelerate the 
transition towards climate neutrality.196
193 Fundamentally, Direct Air Capture (DAC) is expensive because even though the concentration of carbon dioxide in the air is increasing, it is still very dilute and requires lots of energy to 
separate out. DAC is also expensive because there are not many companies involved or available projects yet. Another reason is that markets for CO2 are limited and cannot provide enough 
revenue to offset the cost of capture. In Direct Air Capture: Resource Considerations and Costs for Carbon Removal - Katie Lebling, Noah McQueen, Max Pisciotta and Jennifer Wilcox - World 
Resources Institute - January 6, 2021. Direct Air Capture: Definition, Cost, & Considerations | World Resources Institute (wri.org)
194 Recent publications in the US pretend that direct air capture could plausibly remove nearly one and a half billion tons of carbon dioxide per year by 2050---equivalent to taking around 
300 million cars off the road for a year---if the technology can deploy as quickly as solar photovoltaics has and if we start in the next few years. CarbonShot: Federal Policy Options for Carbon 
Removal in the United States - Jamey Mulligan, Alex Rudee, Katie Lebling, Kelly Levin, James Anderson and Ben Christensen - World resources Institute - January 31, 2020
195 When the European Commission announced it would raise the EU 2030 target to at least -55%, it also introduced the idea of a Net target (instead of an absolute one) for 2030 in the Impact 
Assessment accompanying the Commission’s proposal. This amounts to state that the 2030 target now combines both emission cuts and carbon removals.
196 Now is the time for an honest conversation about carbon dioxide removal- Mark Preston - Bellona Europa (NGO) - 6 oct. 2020
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5.2.3.3.  Sustainable consumption and produc-
tion: boost circular economy
The reduction in the consumption of natural 
resources taking into account the global material 
footprint of the European Union would contrib-
ute to the overall objective of GHG reduction.197 
Recycling should be the last resort in a circular 
economy: funds would be better used investigating 
material-free options. The setting of an EU-wide 
material and consumption footprint reduction 
target should be considered as part of a more com-
pelling circular economy monitoring framework 
to be deployed from EU and national levels to busi-
ness and products level. 
»Recycling 
should be the 








195 Current consumption levels are straining planetary boundaries: according to the WWF, the resources of 2.8 planets would be absorbed if EU levels applied globally.
Promote and extend the Ecodesign framework
In order to make sustainable products the norm, support an extension of the scope of products covered by 
ecodesign-type minimum performance requirements, including material and chemical contents, durability, 
reparability and recyclability, carbon and environmental footprinting and sustainable sourcing (recycled con-
tents notably). Establishing the standardisation of certain components to reduce the diversity of spare parts 
and simplify repair (e.g. chargers and connectors) by setting minimum requirements on design for disassembly 
and public access to spare parts and repair manuals, for all electrical and electronic products. An extension 
to legal guarantees could be given to product groups with significantly longer lifetime than 2 years (e.g. for 
a washing machine). If so, an extended period of burden of proof should also be placed on the manufacturer. 
197 Current consu ption levels are straining planetary boundaries: according to the F, the resources of 2.8 planets ould be absorbed if EU levels applied globa ly.
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Establish effective economic incentives for 
resource-saving strategies 
Establishing incentives to create a vibrant market for repair would reduce costs and encourage users to repair 
(e.g. a reduced VAT on repair services, tax reduction for people have repaired products). National tax systems 
and financial incentives should promote reuse activities, e.g. by reduced VAT on repair activities and sec-
ond-hand products and levies on single-use packaging, to stimulates households to produce less waste. Make 
circular sustainable public procurement the default option and consider making it also the default choice for 
private companies with a reporting obligation as part of their non-financial reporting activities. Introducing 
legislation to create a European ‘buy sustainable act' to use the lever of public procurement would allow to 
promote socially and environmentally sustainable forms of production, e.g., as regards the use of collectively 
organised and fairly remunerated labour, sustainable forms of agriculture and land use, and the use of recycled 
materials. Accelerate the setting up of digital product passports that will encompass all the aforementioned 
information and enhance consumer empowerment, market surveillance and policy definition.
Develop new eco-design requirements for digital 
and electronic products 
(e.g. so that electric car batteries are affordable durable, repairable and recyclable). Implementation of an EU 
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), whereby the manufacturer would be responsible for the entire life-cy-
cle of products. In the technological field, it could be extended to the setting of a minimum compatibility 
period of new software with existing hardware. In the same line, extending the lifespan of smartphones and 
other electronics by just one year would save the EU as much carbon emissions as taking 2 million cars off the 
roads annually.198
198 The climate cost of ‘disposable smartphones- European environmental Bureau - 2019. https://eeb.org/library/coolproducts-briefing/ 
All packaging must be designed for reuse and recycling, provide transparency on the chemical composition, 
be separately collected and materials must be sustainably sourced. Reusable packaging should have a share of 
at least 30% of the market by 2030 for all primary packaging, and of at least 70% for beverage packaging). Con-
trol and limit global shipment of waste: waste should not be shipped to non-EU countries with less stringent 
regulations and inadequate recycling infrastructure. Instead, Europe should reuse and recycle its own waste as 
close to the source as possible, creating local employment. Strict enforcement of the new amendments to the 
Basel Convention is crucial.
Address growing waste management issues
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5.2.3.4.  The crucial contribution of natural 
carbon sinks to GHG emission reduc-
tion
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 
(IPCC) climate scenarios bank on carbon removal 
outcomes to secure the globally agreed 1.5°C climate 
target, and Article 4 of the Paris Agreement explicitly 
recognises “removals by sinks of greenhouse gases” 
as a means to balance out continued emissions.
The European Commission is currently reviewing 
the rules set in the regulation on the accounting of 
greenhouse gas emissions and removals from Land 
Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) to 
ensure the achievement of the new ambitious EU 
climate targets. LULUCF plays a key role in reaching 
the 2050 climate neutrality target, since the goals of 
the Paris Agreement cannot be met without signif-
icant contributions from the land sector, including 
supply-side measures in forestry and agriculture, 
and demand-side measures related to healthier diets 
and reduced food waste. 
Nature-based solutions are methods that rely on 
enhancing the carbon uptake capacity of forests 
and soils. Reforestation and afforestation are the 
most commonly known practices. Other strategies 
include regenerative agricultural practices or land 
and crop management techniques that retain or 
increase carbon uptake by soil, the restoration of 
coastal wetlands such as mangroves, and ocean-
based practices to restore seagrass or grow kelp. 
Such strategies essentially seek to enhance our plan-
et’s natural capacity to capture carbon. They should 
solve multiple challenges simultaneously, due to the 
benefits in terms of biodiversity and recreating pro-
ductive ecosystems.199
Oceans are one of the main natural carbon sinks. 
According to the World Economic Forum, they are 
able to absorb around one-third of global CO2 emis-
sions. The main mechanism of absorbing CO2 is 
called the “physical carbon pump”. 90% of atmo-
spheric CO2 is transferred to the surface seawater 
by diffusion. The dissolved CO2 will then be trans-
ported by ocean currents to the deep layers of the 
ocean. Seagrass plays a key role, as it accounts for 
10% of the ocean’s capacity to store CO2, capturing 
it up to 35 times faster than forests. However, sea-
grass meadow area has been decreasing by 7% per 
year since 1990, due to coastal development and 
dredging, and reduced water quality. Besides, the 
threats of marine microplastics to ocean carbon 
sequestration are increasingly known: the impact of 
marine plastics on ecosystem responsible for the gas 
exchange and circulation of marine CO2 may cause 
more greenhouse gas emissions.200
In forests, carbon sequestration is done through 
photosynthesis. Under normal conditions, there is 
a net absorption of CO2 and a net release of oxygen 
in plants. According to the Global Forest Resources 
Assessment 2020, 99% of the forest carbon is found 
in living biomass and soil organic matter, with the 





methods that rely on 
enhancing the carbon 
uptake capacity of forests 
and soils. Reforestation and 
afforestation are the most 
commonly known practices. 
199 Carbon removal: Complementing or clouding climate action? - European Environmental Bureau - Coralie Boulard - February 2021
200 Marine microplastics 1) affect phytoplankton photosynthesis and growth; 2) have toxic effects on zooplankton and affect their development and reproduction; 3) affect marine biological pump; and 4) 
affect ocean carbon stock. Phytoplankton and zooplankton are the most important producer and consumer of the ocean.
Seagrass plays a key role, as it accounts 
for 10% of the ocean’s capacity to store 
CO2, capturing it up to 35 times faster 
than forests.
Despite their theoretical potential, CO2 removal 
strategies hold some uncertainties. For instance, 
natural sinks are neither stable nor permanent. 
Forests are not protected against natural and 
human disturbances and the carbon captured by 
sinks may be vulnerable to future leakage. The 
case of the 2019 Australian wildfires is a striking 
example of the vulnerability of forests’ carbon 
sink functions, and “the augmented effects of cli-
mate change will only exacerbate this fragility”.201 
Indeed, natural carbon sinks are precluded from 
performing at their best. Deforestation’s rise 
in recent decades has decreased the total forest 
carbon stock from 668 billion tonnes in 1990 to 662 
billion tonnes in 2020.202 These projections have 
further worsened in the meantime for the Euro-
pean stock: by 2025, European forests are likely 
to hold 18% less carbon than in the early 2000s, 
according to the information published in 2020 
by the European Commission.203 To date, Europe's 
terrestrial biosphere absorbs 7 to 12% of Euro-
pean anthropogenic CO2 emissions.
Furthermore, there might not be enough avail-
able land across the EU to engage in large-scale 
tree planting without seriously compromising 
biodiversity204 and food security.205 Promoting 
nature-based removal solutions is therefore hin-
dered by the reality that the EU’s sinks have come 
under pressure from increased economic exploita-
tion and the adverse effects of climate change.
This is where a proactive and well-calibrated 
policy is needed. While the limitations and uncer-
tainties associated with carbon removal must be 
fully factored into and accounted for in our climate 
policies, their contribution remains absolutely 
essential to ambitious climate objectives. 
Land plays an important role in the climate system 
and provides the principal basis for human liveli-
hoods and well-being including the supply of food, 
freshwater and multiple other ecosystem services, 
as well as biodiversity. What is at stake is that the 
“deferral of GHG emissions reductions from all sectors 
implies trade-offs including irreversible loss in land 
ecosystem functions and services required for food, 
health, habitable settlements and production, leading 
to increasingly significant economic impacts on many 
countries in many regions of the world,” concluded 
the IPCC special report on climate change and 
land.206
Human use directly affects more than 70% of the 
global, ice-free land surface. This trend can and 
must be reversed to restore the positive effect of 
natural carbon sink. Given the inter-connected 
nature of these biodiversity, climate, land and 
food-related challenges, co-ordination and coher-
ence between different policies affecting the 
land-use nexus is crucial. Since wide deployment 
of bioenergy is constrained by cost and availability 
of biomass, a particular attention should be paid 
to those techniques that combine natural carbon 
capture and agricultural use and, therefore, do not 
compete with food production or ecosystems.
Europe's terrestrial biosphere 
absorbs 7 to 12% of European 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions. 
7-12%
99% of the forest carbon is found 
in living biomass and soil 
organic matter, with the 




202 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2020: http://www.fao.org/3/CA8753EN/CA8753EN.pdf
203 Commission delegated regulation amending Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the forest reference levels to be applied by the Member 
States for the period 2021-2025
204 Can tree planting solve climate change? - FERN - 1 July 2020 - https://www.fern.org/publications-insight/can-tree-planting-solve-climate-change-2172/
205 It has been estimated that Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage would demand between 0.4 and 1.2 billion hectares of land. In BECCS deployment: a reality check - Grantham Institute - impe-
rial College - London - Briefing paper No 28January 2019
206 iPCC, 2019: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas 
fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/chapter/summary-for-policymakers/
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Only biomass that adheres to sustainability 
criteria should be considered carbon neutral in 
the EU’s climate legislation 
The greenhouse gas emissions from burning biomass that do not meet these criteria must be accounted for 
in the carbon pricing mechanisms. Considering these uncertainties and the potential impact on resources, 
biodiversity and soil health, the scale of BECCS deployment should be limited only to circumstances where 
it is proven to be beneficial. Good governance and financial incentives are required to stimulate high-quality 
BECCS at this limited scale. 
The CAP must set concrete targets against  
conversion to cropland and fund restoration  
of damaged carbon sinks 
Stepping up EU Action against deforestation and 
forest degradation 
Paludiculture (rewetting techniques to remedy past degradation of drained peatlands) or other agricultural 
practices resulting in carbon sequestration, should be financially supported with additional CAP payments via 
eco-schemes and rural development interventions.
Forestry should be managed in a sustainable manner under control of certification schemes. Set up the 
inclusion of a safeguard to ensure that the EU’s carbon sink cannot decline (“net-net” accounting).
190 
207 Human contamination and accumulation of microplastics can occur via food (due to packaging, and consumption of sea food), air (inhaling contaminated air) and drinking water
208 Plastic & Climate: The Hidden Costs of a Plastic Planet - Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) - 2019 - https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Plastic-and-Climate-FINAL-2019.pdf
209 Op. cit.
Propose a wide-ranging restriction on microplas-
tics in products placed on the EU/EEA market to 
avoid their release in the marine environment 
after a highly polluting life-cycle 
A win-win-win policy for the climate, the environment and human health 
Microplastic, once in the environment, do not biodegrade. They have been detected not just in marine but 
also in freshwater systems including marshes, streams, ponds, lakes, and rivers in Europe. They accumulate in 
animals as well as in drinking water, and are consequently consumed by humans, with variable exposures.207 
Even more, amidst growing concern about the impacts of plastic on the oceans, ecosystems, and human 
health, there’s another largely hidden dimension of the plastic crisis: plastic’s contribution to global green-
house gas emissions and climate change. 
Plastics actually originate as fossil fuels and emit greenhouse gases from cradle to grave. Greenhouse gases are 
indeed emitted at each stage of its lifecycle: 1) fossil fuel extraction and transport, 2) plastic refining and manu-
facture, 3) managing plastic waste, and 4) plastic’s ongoing impact once it reaches our oceans, waterways, and 
landscape. Greenhouse gas emissions from the plastic lifecycle would even threaten the ability of the global 
community to keep global temperature rise below 1.5°C. In 2019, the production and incineration of plastic has 
added more than 850 million metric tons of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere—equal to the emissions 
from 189 five- hundred-megawatt coal power plants.208 By 2050, the greenhouse gas emissions from plastic 
could reach over 56 gigatons—10-13 percent of the entire remaining carbon budget.209 
Ultimately, plastic that is unmanaged ends up in the environment, where it continues to have climate impacts as 
it degrades. Microplastic in the oceans may actually interfere with the ocean’s capacity to absorb and sequester 
carbon dioxide, since they can reduce the ability of phytoplankton to fix carbon through photosynthesis. This 
would mean that plastic pollution may interfere with the largest natural carbon sink on the planet and should 
be cause for immediate political response. This includes:
• ending the production and use of single-use, disposable plastic
• implementing extended producer responsibility as a critical component of circular economies 
• adopting and enforcing ambitious targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors,  
including plastic production
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5.3.  “One” Planetary 
and Human Health
In the light of the recent COVID outbreak, the chap-
ter will put forward new synergies and trade-offs 
between climate change mitigation and broader goals 
such as health and wider environmental quality. We 
are called on to participate in a twofold change of 
paradigm: to place health at the heart of our public 
policies, and to place the environment at the heart of 
our health policies. This is the fundamental mission 
of the social-ecological state (establishing the link 
between inequalities and ecological crises and the 
link between ecosystem health and human health). 
It’s time to move beyond the cost-benefit approach, 
which continues to dominate our collective actions 
and decision-making. This approach assigns every 
aspect of life a monetary value and evaluates our 
actions and investments in terms of their relative 
monetary cost vs their relative monetary benefit. A 
cost-benefit analysis would see the ‘costs’ of invest-
ing in climate change mitigation as outweighing the 
monetary ‘benefits’ of continuing business as usual. 
However, a co-beneficial approach recognises the 
“intrinsic value of the health of our people and planet 
and their role as the foundation for any economic 
activity”.210 If we take on this perspective, we realise 
that mitigating climate change is not only vital for our 
collective health and well-being, but it also brings 
about considerable social savings resulting from 
improved health, as well as economic gains associ-
ated with the creation of an estimated 24 million new 
jobs by 2030. A co-beneficial approach therefore rec-
ognises the intrinsic interconnections between our 
social and ecological systems as the basis for a just 
and sustainable economy, with health as the great 
connector.211
To do so, we must make it clear that applying a 
well-being lens when designing climate mitigation 
policies has the potential to deliver wider well-be-
ing benefits both in the short and the long term. One 
example relates to the synergies between simulta-
neously reducing air pollution and GHG emissions. 
Reducing the combustion of fossil fuels would cut 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, but also the related 
particulate matter and other chemical compounds 
yielding climate air quality and health benefits.212 Air 
pollution is therefore closely linked to climate change 
- the main driver of climate change is fossil fuel 
combustion which is also a major contributor to air 
pollution, which, along with the introduction of waste 
materials in our environment, has negative effects to 
the ecosystem we rely on. Efforts to mitigate one can 
improve the other. 
Our approach intends to integrate health into 
carbon-cutting policies from inception through inter-
sectoral action. Most measures and policies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions can benefit human health, 
if adequately designed and implemented. Carbon-cut-
ting policies that are known to provide health benefits 
include those that reduce emissions of health-damag-
ing pollutants through changes in energy production, 
energy efficiency, sustainable transportation and 
210 Five Pathways toward Health-Environment Policy in a Well-being Economy - WEAll Working group: Éloi Laurent, Fabio Battaglia, Giorgia Dalla Libera Marchiori, Alessandro Galli, Amanda Janoo, 
Raluca Munteanu, Claire Sommer - May 2021
211 Watts, N., et al., 2019. The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: ensuring that the health of a child born today is not defined by a changing climate. The Lancet, 394(10211), pp. 1836-1878.
212 In addition to carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), the world is currently facing the issue of local pollutants such as sulfur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter and 
volatile organic compounds (VOC) that are harmful to breath in.
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control of landfills, among others.213 Ensuring that 
health systems are among the priority sectors is an 
opportunity to align action on climate change with 
goals for improving health and well-being.
The core effects of pollution are widely known. The 
immediate effects of breathing polluted air puts 
Human at a higher risk for asthma and other respira-
tory diseases. Air pollutants are mostly carcinogens 
and damages the immune, endocrine and reproduc-
tive systems while high levels of particle pollution 
have been associated with higher incidents of heart 
problems. Longer-term studies shows that the toxic 
chemicals released into the air settle into plants and 
water sources. When the animals eat the contam-
inated plants and drink the water, then pollutants 
molecules travels up the food chain – to Human. 
While pollution is a global problem, it affects more 
severely the most vulnerable groups. Many studies 
showed that some pollutants have detrimental effects 
on prenatal growth, while the ageing process makes 
older adults more vulnerable to the detrimental 
health effects of environmental contaminants. 
Even more so, they indicate that the effects of pol-
lution levels tend to be more serious for specific 
subgroups based upon territorial disparities and 
wealth,214 thereby causing some communities to expe-
rience more negative environmental consequences 
than others. Other studies suggest that, even in cases 
of relatively low levels of pollution, and in addition to 
the effects on physical health, exposure negatively 
affects individual assessments of well-being.
The combined objectives of fighting pollution and 
achieving sustainable well-being, including health, 
would require adaptation and protection measures to 
tackle these inequalities in pollution exposure. Build-
ing a new environmental model would then mean to 
mitigate drastically global pollution, to fight against 
its detrimental effects to Nature and Human and to 
offset injustices. 
In light of all the benefits of living or working in a 
natural environment discussed so far and pollution 
being the cause of almost half-a-million deaths every 
year in the European Union alone, the European 
Environment Agency recently called for ‘systemic 
change through visionary policies’ in order to protect 
the environment and improve the health and well-be-
ing of European citizens.215
In other words, the low-income 
households are least to blame for 
CO2 emissions but suffer the 
most—forced to live with 
pollutants and / or climate change 
direct effects that the polluters 
themselves pay to avoid.«
»
213 Protecting health in Europe from climate change: 2017 Update - WHO - 2017 https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/355792/ProtectingHealthEuropeFromClimateChange.pdf
214 Almost nine out of 10 individuals living in urban areas are affected by air pollution. Populations living in Africa, South-East Asia, and in low- and middle-income countries across all regions are the 
most exposed.  
Guillerm N, Cesari G. Fighting ambient air pollution and its impact on health: from human rights to the right to a clean environment. Int J Tuberc Lung Dis. 2015;
215 Laurent É. et al. (2021) Toward Health-Environment Policy in a Well-being Economy. In: Laurent É. (eds) The Well-being Transition. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.  
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67860-9_5
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The same applies for biodiversity. On May 20, 2020 
the European Commission adopted the Biodiversity 
Strategy and a Farm to Fork Strategy. As core parts 
of the European Green New Deal, the initiatives are 
intended to promote the reinforcement of Europe's 
resilience. These environmental strategies are an 
important step forward as they acknowledge that 
biodiversity protection and climate change mitiga-
tion are key to the future of Europeans and, above 
all, that they are mutually reinforcing.
This revalorisation of Biodiversity into the political 
agenda of the European Union emphasises the inter-
actions between human activities, ecosystems and 
climate. Protecting biodiversity would then not only 
aim at preserving ecosystems as such, it would also 
be a way to ensure that we maintain the provision of 
associated ecosystem services. A preserved biodiver-
sity, for instance, provides natural barriers between 
species to prevent pandemics and healthy ecosys-
tems that clean our water, purify our air, maintain 
our soil, regulate the climate, recycle nutrients and 
provide us with food. 
Yet, the continued growth of human populations and 
of per capita consumption have resulted in an unsus-
tainable exploitation of Earth’s biological diversity, 
exacerbated by climate change, ocean acidification, 
and other anthropogenic environmental impacts. 
As a consequence, biodiversity continues to decline, 
establishing a clear link between consumption and 
biodiversity loss. For a long time, human activities 
took only into account, at best, the market share of 
natural capital (agricultural and forestry resources), 
assuming nothing but the economic value of biodi-
versity.
This can explain why the depletion and degradation 
of many ecosystem services provided by biodi-
versity represents the loss of a capital asset that is 
however poorly reflected in conventional indicators 
of economic growth. Furthermore, there is a con-
sistent body of work that implicitly considers the 
justices and injustices arising from biodiversity con-
servation interventions. Some studies216 reported 
evidence for a causal connection between economic 
inequality and biodiversity loss. They found that, 
among countries the number of species or crops that 
are threatened or declining increases substantially 
with the Gini ratio of income inequality, suggesting 
that economic distribution has an important effect 
on how we interact with the broader ecosystems 
upon which our societies depend. 
»Policies that alter the 
environment have impacts on 
the people who live there as 
well. And when some people 
have access to resources that 
help them relieve those impacts 
while others donʼt, it becomes 
a social justice issue.«
216 Mikkelson GM, Gonzalez A, Peterson GD (2007) Economic Inequality Predicts Biodiversity Loss. PLoS ONE. Academic Editor: Jerome Chave, CNRS, France.  
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000444
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It has been now stated217 that Biodiversity loss 
has negative effects on several aspects of human 
well-being, such as health, food security and vul-
nerability to natural disasters. Policies that alter the 
environment have impacts on the people who live 
there as well. And when some people have access to 
resources that help them relieve those impacts while 
others don’t, it becomes a social justice issue.
 
Addressing these social and environmental injus-
tices218 is therefore a necessity and should be a 
central pillar in the visioning of socio-ecological 
solutions. Opportunities for enlarging the synergies 
between climate and well-being outcomes, including 
Health, can be found in all the sectors considered in 
the following chapter.219
5.3.1.  Provide quality health services for 
all through aligned policies
Just as rethinking societal goals and the definition of 
progress are increasingly recognised as crucial to put-
ting sustainability at the centre of policy decisions, 
health should be mainstreamed in well-being policies. 
Much healthcare around the world is primarily focused 
on acute care. World Health Organization studies have 
examined the aggregate disease burden attributed to 
key environmental risks globally and regionally, quan-
tifying the amount of deaths and diseases caused by 
factors such as unsafe drinking-water and sanitation, 
and indoor and outdoor air pollution. These reports 
confirms that approximately one-quarter of the global 
disease burden, and more than one-third of the burden 
among children, is due to modifiable environmen-
tal factors. This 'environmentally-mediated' disease 
burden is much higher in the developing world than in 
developed countries - although in the case of certain 
non-communicable diseases, such as cardiovascular 
diseases and cancers, the per capita disease burden is 
larger in developed countries.220
Building from that experience, it would be crucial 
to examine how specific diseases and injuries are 
impacted by environmental risks in Europe, and 
which regions and populations are most vulnerable 
to environmentally-mediated diseases and injuries. 
“Preventive care” means any measure that aims to 
avoid or reduce the number or the severity of inju-
ries and diseases, their sequelae and complications. 
It includes interventions for both individual and col-
lective consumption. 
When diseases are non-communicable and arise 
from a high impact of environmental factors along-
side other biological factors (such as stress, poor 
diet, lack of exercise) an increase in both personal 
well-being and resilience, as well as reduced costs 
to health services can arise from a more preventive 
approach to care, before symptoms become appar-
ent, or at their early onset.221
While the vast majority of chronic diseases are pre-
ventable,222 only 3% of health budgets are invested in 
prevention.223 
 
This development has significant consequences on 
overall society and is strongly related to inequalities 
between different groups in society based on level of 
wealth or education, or the type of region people live 
in. There is also now direct evidence that poverty and 
inequality are linked (through for example increased 
stress, and decreased ability to access nutritious or 
adequate food), which has negative impacts on peo-
ple’s health, contributing to the development of both 
mental and physical health problems such as depres-
sion, cardiovascular disease, cancer etc. It has also 
been clear that the experience and severity of COVID 
has been worse for people with low incomes, or from 
disadvantaged groups. These inequalities, which 
result in varying levels of life expectancy or burdens 
of chronic diseases between groups in society, are per-
sistent and mutually reinforcing.
217 Ecosystem Conditions and Human Well-being - Current State & Trends Assessment - Condition and Trends Working Group Volume 1. Approximately 60% (15 out of 24) of the ecosystem services it 
examined are being degraded or used unsustainably, including fresh water, capture fisheries, air and water purification, and the regulation of regional and local climate, natural hazards, and pests.
218 In high-income countries, 29 per cent of cities fall short of meeting the World Health Organization guidelines. But in those countries, poorer communities are often those most exposed—power 
plants, factories, incinerators and busy roads are often located in or near poor suburban communities. Source : WHO
219 Accelerating Climate Action : Refocusing Policies through a Well-being Lens - OECD - 2019
220 Preventing Disease Through Healthy Environments - Towards an estimate of the environmental burden of disease - A. Prüss-Üstün and C. Corvalán - WHO - 2006
221 Countries around the world are experimenting with adopting a more holistic approach to well-being, which focuses on these preventive aspects of health. For example, in Wales, and linked to the 
Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act, they are starting to set up well-being or community hubs to help people adopt healthier lifestyles, decrease loneliness etc;
222 At least 60% of all heart disease, stroke and diabetes could be prevented by applying the right prevention procedures. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20210118-1?redi-
rect=%2Feurostat%2Fnews%2Fwhats-new
223 According to the latest figures published by Eurostat, EU member states on average only spend 2,8 % of their healthcare budget on preventive care, which translates into an expenditure of 82 EUR per 
inhabitant on average. With 4,4 % of its healthcare budget spend on preventive care, Italy and Finland spend the most of any EU member state.
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In addition to the effect of economic policy on health 
and social policy and their direct health conse-
quences, economic policies mediate the impact of 
the social determinants of health inequalities—the 
conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work, 
and age. These determinants form a complex and 
interlocking web of upstream factors that affect pop-
ulation health and health inequalities. Furthermore, 
sizeable differences in health continue to exist within 
countries. Self-reported health, non-communicable 
diseases, and individual-level risk factors all follow a 
social gradient, with individuals of higher socioeco-
nomic background often faring better than those with 
lower social standing. Over the past decade, health at 
an aggregate European-level has improved, as mea-
sured by life expectancy at birth. 
However, such gains are unevenly distributed across 
countries, exacerbating between-country health 
inequalities.224
Thus, if health inequalities in the EU are to be 
reduced, concerted action that takes due care of the 
complex web of determinants of health inequalities 
as well as the individuals in vulnerable situations 
is required. Coordinated investments can promote 
more cost-effective development strategies with mul-
tiple social and economic co-benefits, in addition to 
global health gains, both immediate and long term. 
Repositioning the health sector to act more effectively 
on preventive health policies, while enhancing inter-
sectoral partnerships, is thus critical to addressing 
the environmental causes of disease and injury.
224 Health Inequalities in Europe: Setting the Stage for Progressive Policy Action. Timon Forster, Alexander Kentikelenis and Clare Bambra - FEPS - 2019 https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publica-
tions/1845-6%20health%20inequalities%20inner-hr.pdf
225 One Health' is an approach promoted by the United Nations to design and implement programmes, policies, legislation and research in which multiple sectors communicate and work together to 
achieve better public health outcomes.
to build pandemic preparedness, enhance pandemic prevention programs, and to investigate and control 
outbreaks across sectors. In addition, health inequalities should be addressed by adopting aggregate health 
indicators for the prevention and control of zoonotic diseases and to tackle wide challenges such as antimicro-
bial resistance, food security and nutrition, and community and health issues arising from relationships with 
land and the environment in the face of environmental degradation and climate change. 
Mainstream the ‘One Health’ approach225 in Europe 
Prevention can have a significant impact on the 
achievement of sustainable well-being goals 
and the sustainability of healthcare systems, particularly in relation to the growing burden of chronic diseases 
linked to environmental causes. Welfare systems need to better target populations in vulnerable situations. 
Providing universal healthcare coverage should be a key element in such efforts, levelling the playing field in 
terms of access and utilisation of health services.
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Include a strengthened chapter in the European 
Pillar of Social Rights
which would underline the right to a healthy environment as essential to ensure adequate living and working 
conditions and promote well-being. The human right to a healthy environment would bring together the envi-
ronmental dimensions of civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights, and protects the core elements 
of the natural environment that enable a healthy life. It would explicitly stipulates that diverse ecosystems and 
clean water, air, and soils are indispensable for human health. Moreover, in contrast to some national laws, there 
is no recognition at European and international level of the individual right to a healthy environment. Article 37 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights only reflects the general principle of environmental protection in EU 
legislation but does not declare it a substantive right. The Commission should strive to fill this gap at European 
level and also promote international recognition of this human right.
Stress-test the capacity of Member states Health 
Systems to manage in socially equitable ways 
existing diseases and forthcoming climate 
change-related shocks and stresses 
Measures for health protection would involve:
• enhancing disease surveillance, especially for climate-sensitive vector-borne diseases;
• monitoring and modelling changes in environmental exposures such as air pollution;
• ensuring essential medical supplies and health service provision during disasters;
• improving preparedness, planning and response for heat-waves and other extreme events;
• facilitating coordination between health and other sectors to deal with changes in the incidence and 
geographical range of diseases.
• collecting a European stockpile of strategic medical products and equipment to be deployed when 
and where needed
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Align policies that aim to reduce the effects of  
climate change on human health 
for example, by strengthening health services – with the objectives of reducing poverty and inequalities. 
Universal access to health services is needed to protect poor strata of populations. Expanding the right to 
health would mean to include appropriate environmental conditions for the realisation of most other essential 
rights (such as to food, housing isolation and work conditions). It would lead to systematically collect data on 
exposure to environmental hazards by socio-professional or income group and on cumulative vulnerability and 
health risks across social groups due to the distribution of the burden of environmental inequality.
5.3.2.  A protective biodiversity 
A policy agenda aimed at sustainable well-be-
ing for all requires the mainstream conception of 
natural capital to be reviewed. Far from the blind 
transformation of nature into natural resources, 
the preservation of natural capital according to the 
perspective of sustainable well-being would have a 
view to social justice,226 since biodiversity is provid-
ing associated ecosystem services for the many.
While European leaders have acknowledged the 
importance of a “green recovery”, the focus has 
been predominantly on climate change. Yet biodi-
versity loss and climate change are challenges of a 
similar magnitude and urgency, and are fundamen-
tally interlinked. They must be addressed together 
as part of a broader green and inclusive recovery. 
There is a compelling case for the integration of health 
perspectives in biodiversity policy and practice, and 
an equally strong case for ensuring that biodiversity 
considerations are fully integrated into health policy 
and practice. It is essential to integrate a health per-
spective into biodiversity policy and practice, and for 
health perspectives to be clearly articulated in a post-
2020 global biodiversity framework.
Instead of incentivising activities that harm biodi-
versity, governments and the EU should redirect 
subsidies to activities that deliver socio-economic 
outcomes and have a positive impact on biodiversity 
(e.g.: governments could provide targeted fundings to 
promote biodiversity and other environmental public 
goods in agricultural systems). Agri-environmental 
payments, for instance, have the potential to deliver 
“win-win” outcomes for both environmental and 
health performance.
226 Éloi Laurent et Jacques Le Cacheux, 2012, Économie de l’Environnement et Économie Écologique, Paris, Armand Colin. One could "assess" the social value of the environment, by applying economic 
values (a price, for the most part) to the non-economic, for exam-ple, to the value of existence. The author then proposes that consumption be replaced by the more heritage concept of "natural 
capital" whose future growth rate is not guaranteed, unlike consumption
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Secure the recognition of biodiversity as a global 
public good 
and as a central policy agenda at all levels of government, in addition to the recently proposed Biodiversity 
Strategy for 2030. An attribute of biodiversity that qualifies as a global public good is its inherent potential for 
provision of benefits – recognised or otherwise – to society at large (i.e., through ecosystem services). Activities 
that threaten biodiversity also threaten this capacity. The concept of public good-type ecosystem services can 
give more insight into use and non-use values, since human land use essentially influences and determines the 
extent of biodiversity and size of ecosystem services. 
• Extend the scope of the precautionary principle, by enshrining the principle of ecological non-regres-
sion and by establishing the primacy of the protection of biodiversity over economic imperatives. 
• Redefine the designation of “protected areas” as a major instrument to secure the supply of public 
goods of biodiversity while incorporating concerns for social justice
This would imply setting a legally binding biodiversity framework, similar to the Climate Law, which steers a 
path through a set of binding objectives for 2030, 2040 and 2050, and the commitments made at COP15. The 
Commission should make a legislative proposal to that effect without delay.
Establish a Biodiversity Law
Biodiversity proofing should be mainstreamed 
across all EU spending and programmes on the 
basis of the EU Taxonomy
with the precautionary and ‘polluter pays’ principles taking precedence in EU actions, taxation systems reori-
ented towards an increased use of environmental taxation and subsidies harmful to the environment eliminated 
by 2030 at the latest.
Scale up investment in biodiversity conservation, 
sustainable use and restoration
and put a price on biodiversity loss by setting biodiversity spending targets for COVID-19 stimulus measures 
and recovery plans and reform subsidies harmful to biodiversity.
Develop and incorporate pandemic and emerging 
disease risk health impact assessments 
in major development and land-use projects, while reforming financial aid for land-use so that benefits and 
risks to biodiversity and health are recognised and explicitly targeted.
5.3.3.  Address growing challenges to the 
sustainability of the food system 
Agriculture has achieved major success in fight-
ing hunger, feeding the world and contributing to 
economic development, including by providing 
employment to 28% of workers worldwide. However, 
this success has come at a heavy price. The agricul-
ture sector, together with forestry and other land 
uses, contributes to nearly a quarter of all anthro-
pogenic greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs).227 Half of 
this share comes from direct agricultural emissions, 
mainly from livestock, with most of the rest from 
deforestation of which agriculture is the main driver.
If unchecked, climate change impacts such as 
heatwaves, droughts and floods will threaten food 
security and the viability of current agricultural 
production patterns. Besides, due to the constant use 
of insecticides and pesticides, the soil may become 
infertile. At the same time, actors of food-produc-
tion system suffer from low incomes and are more 
exposed than others to harmful substances. Sectors 
such as the health system or the water system pay 
for the damage wrought by agriculture on food and 
the environment. Specifically, the food provided by 
the current system may have unwanted health out-
comes that are costly for the population and are not 
accounted for.228 
A shift in perspective is therefore needed to better 
integrate growing challenges to the sustainability of 
The agriculture sector, together 
with forestry and other land uses, 
contributes to nearly a quarter of 




227 IPCC - Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. 
Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
228 Globally, an estimated 820 million people suffered from malnutrition in 2018, up from 811 million in the previous year, which is the third year of increase in a row. At the same time, overweight and obesity 
continue to increase in all regions, particularly among school-age children and adults. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World - WHO - 2019 report. http://www.fao.org/3/ca5162en/ca5162en.pdf
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»Building a new environmental 
model would then require to 
address the sustainability of the 
food sector and re-examine the 
whole food value chain, 
including the demand side.«
the food system. The Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) should create a healthier society, safeguard 
our environment, and secure the future viability of 
EU farming and food businesses. 
Thus, it must ensure full policy coherence cover-
ing agricultural, food, environment, and climate 
policies. Moreover, budgetary support and stock 
regulation policies for wider enabling environment 
for biodiversity could also play an important role 
in making agro-food systems more sustainable and 
healthy, helping to reduce pressure on ecosystems. 
Building a new environmental model would then 
require to address the sustainability of the food 
sector and re-examine the whole food value chain, 
including the demand side. A truly sustainable 
food system then requires a broader perspective 
on policymaking. A comprehensive, multi-criteria 
approach would emphasise broader priorities, such 
as providing access to a healthy diet, ensuring a 
healthy and safe environment, mitigating the risks 
of climate change and sustainably managing natural 
and human resources.
Align the CAP with the European Green Deal 
objectives 
by dedicating sufficient and qualitative CAP funding to incentivise and reward farmers to deliver on the objec-
tives of the European Green Deal. This would include : reducing pesticides, fertilisers and antimicrobials use, 
increasing organic farming, agro-ecology and agroforestry, deploying high-biodiversity landscape features, 
cutting greenhouse gas emissions, preventing food loss and waste, improving the circularity of the agriculture 
sector, a.o. through better nutrients cycling, protecting and restoring ecosystems (especially in Natura 2000 
and protected areas), and by promoting sustainable and healthy diets.
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Enforce the precautionary, the “non-regression” 
and the “do no harm” principles 
in all aspects of food and farming policy.
Strengthen the management of agricultural 
market crises in the CAP 
via a sufficient dedicated budgetary reserve and genuine national and European sectoral regulators, akin to 
the energy sector. The aim would be to put in place regulatory levers and involve the private sector in the 
strengthening of European food security. The set up a stockpiling policy for food security like the ones existing 
in all EU countries for oil, should contribute to the implementation of the “contingency Plan for food security” 
in the Farm to Fork policy package. 
by proposing a legally binding framework to address soil degradation at the EU level, including reducing soil 
erosion, increase soil health and biodiversity, and tackling soil contaminants.
Fill the legislative gap on soil protection 
Promote the mainstreaming of agro-ecological 
farming in EU agriculture 
Overall, due to their impact on ecosystems and biodiversity, some agricultural practices and eating habits con-
tribute to the risk of chronic diseases and, as it has now become evident, to the emergence of new infectious 
agents. It is now essential to organise the transition towards production and consumption models that are, 
in the long run, generators of health. European agricultural policy can and must serve the objectives of the 
sustainable well being in all its components. To do this, we must propose ambitious political lines to guide the 
agricultural production of tomorrow by: 
• Reaching 50% of agro-ecological farming by 2040 (support maintaining and transition, with a special 
focus on the setting up of young farmers in agro-ecology). This would require a transformation of the 
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aid per hectare system (which creates rent effects on the land market) into aid per agricultural worker 
(more equitable for the purpose of employment support)
• Ring-fencing a specific financial support mechanism inside the pillar 1 of the CAP for smallholder farm-
ers, breeders and fishermen respecting the principles of agro-ecology,
• Encouraging the cultivation of plant proteins and supporting the conversion of livestock farming and 
the maintenance of permanent grasslands useful for biodiversity
• Banning GMO seeds by 2025, as well as the most damaging pesticides for the environment in 2035 and 
reducing nitrogen fertilisers. 
• Supporting small organic and local school canteens to help them absorb the additional costs gener-
ated by the transition 
5.3.4.  Zero Pollution
Air, water and soil pollution, as well as the use of haz-
ardous chemicals, can undermine the health of all 
citizens. 
Air pollution is considered the single largest envi-
ronmental risk in Europe. According to the latest 
estimates, exposure to fine particles (the pollutant 
with most serious impacts on human health) caused 
more than 400 000 preventable deaths in Europe in 
2018. Those deaths were mainly due to cardiovascular 
and respiratory diseases and cancer. But apart from 
these very serious diseases, there is growing evidence 
that exposure to air pollution is associated with other 
impacts on health. Among them, we can mention 
new-onset type 2 diabetes, systemic inflammation 
or mental disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease and 
dementia. Air pollution also affects the environment, 
for instance reducing biodiversity in certain ecosys-
tems and affecting the growth of vegetation and crops.
According to the latest report from the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) on water quality in 
Europe, only 40 percent of rivers, lakes, estuaries and 
coastal waters reach the ecologically acceptable stan-
dard outlined in the European directive on water.229 
The main pollutants present in surface waters are 
mercury, as well as residues from pesticides and 
wastewater treatment facilities. The main source of 
pollution for groundwaters are nitrates and pesti-
cides used in agriculture, as well as liquid discharges 
not connected to the sewer system, and abandoned 
industrial sites. Water of good quality for human con-
sumption and recreation is intrinsically linked with 
water that is good for the environment, and all are 
affected by similar pressures.
Healthy soils are critical not only for the sustain-
able production, but also to address climate change 
and the biodiversity loss. It is also in this space that 
nutrients are turned into forms that plants can take 
up, allowing biomass to form and store carbon. It is 
also here that our prospective drinking water starts 
its natural purification journey towards groundwater. 
The way we use land often introduces additional sub-
stances to these unique ecosystems in order to protect 
selected crops or add nutrients. Pollutants released 
from industry, transport and other economic activ-





229 European Environmental Agency - European waters - Assessment of status and pressures - 2018
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ities can also travel long distances and reach soils, 
where they become diluted and are temporarily 
stored. Soil, a component of land, is considered pol-
luted when contaminants adversely affect human 
health or the environment. Prevention remains the 
most effective and cheapest way to ensure healthy 
soils — and cleaner water and air — in the long term. 
Any initiative aimed at preventing and reducing pol-
lution — from product design, better recycling, waste 
management, crop rotation, precision farming and 
reduced pesticide and fertiliser use to cleaner trans-
port and industry — and at supporting authorities to 
implement effective measures will contribute to alle-
viating pressures on these vital ecosystems.
In may 2021, the European Commission published 
its much-awaited Zero Pollution Action Plan – one 
of the last missing pieces of the European Green 
Deal. However, the proposal falls short on ramping 
up action to prevent pollution at source and instead 
mainly lists existing legal obligations and ongoing 
reviews of EU laws.
Only 40 percent of rivers, lakes, 
estuaries and coastal waters 
reach the ecologically 
acceptable standard outlined in 
the European directive on water.
40%
There is currently no overarching framework 
at EU level that can address the complex inter-
linkages across policy domains relevant to 
environment and health 
Therefore, we call for the adoption of a comprehensive Environmental Health Strategy, to streamline health 
requirements across relevant EU policy proposals. The strategy should provide a coherent framework for envi-
ronment-related public health threats, including air, water and soil pollution. In this respect, the aim of a Zero 
Pollution Ambition Action Plan by the European Commission should be to urgently and drastically reduce 
the exposure of the entire population to products harmful to their environment and health. EU must focus on 
the most at-risk populations affected by one or multiple forms of biological or social vulnerability, for instance 
people living with serious health conditions, children, older people, and people living in poverty. It should as 
well address social imbalances in exposure to air pollution which are often much higher in deprived neighbour-
hoods, in particular local pollutants such as sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter and 
volatile organic compounds (VOC).
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Focus on co-benefits between the Zero-Pollution 
Action Plan 
and the Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, the Farm to Fork strategy, the EU’s2030 Biodiversity Strategy.
(EDCs) such as pesticides in complement to the chemicals strategy for sustainability published by European 
Commission, as part of the EU’s zero pollution ambition. This should be done by considering precautionary 
action in all relevant EU legislation.
Initiate a European strategy to propose concrete 
measure to reduce exposure to endocrine  
disruptor chemicals 
Systematically evaluate the life-cycle of hazard-
ous substances 
Develop digital solutions to help reduce pollution 
and their impact on air, soil and water resources, upstream and downstream, to carry out a holistic, evi-
dence-based well-being impact assessment of legislative proposals, and to consider the social, environmental 
and economic benefits of such an approach.
(air quality and emissions live monitoring and reporting, set-up of a harmonised alert system on pollution 
levels; centralisation of all available pollution related data to improve its traceability along the whole life-cycle, 
from production (integrating resource consumption), to use, to emissions and releases phases.)

Already at the end of 2019, 21% of the EU 
population, more than 90 million citizens, 
were considered to be at risk of poverty 
and exclusion. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has added to this further, with first 
projections estimating that especially low-
income earners are bearing the brunt of 
the crisis’ economic fallout. 
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Already at the end of 2019, 21% of the EU population, 
more than 90 million citizens, were considered to 
be at risk of poverty and exclusion. The COVID-19 
pandemic has added to this further, with first projec-
tions estimating that especially low-income earners 
are bearing the brunt of the crisis’ economic fallout. 
At the same time, 1% of households in Europe hold an 
approximate 25% of the continent’s net wealth, with-
out paying any tax on such assets in all but a single 
EU country. Such precarity and inequalities drive 
European societies apart and undermine their abil-
ity to cope with the testing effects of change that is 
inevitable in light of the climate crisis, demographic 
change, and digitalisation. Rebuilding European 
societies in line with the principles underlying the 
notion of sustainable well-being for all is thus a 
matter of urgency. 
Related work must commence by developing effective 
backstops against poverty. Despite the magnitude of 
the European poverty crisis, EU policy action to date 
has failed to address it with sufficient determination. 
To rectify this, a European anti-poverty law should 
be adopted that defines the full eradication of pov-
erty in Europe by 2050 as a legally binding target for 
EU policy in the same way as the EU climate law does 
in the field of climate action. 
Eradicating poverty requires that its drivers are 
being choked. Bolstering social security systems and 
re-regulating labour markets, which, at present, are 
rife with precarious and atypical forms of low-wage 
and insecure employment, is key in this regard. Solv-
ing the current housing crisis that forces families 
to overstretch their budgets due to a lack of afford-
able homes constitutes another necessity, as does 
action to bolster care infrastructure and capacity 
across the Union to stop workers, especially women, 
from being excluded from labour markets. Defining 
common policy strategies and supporting them with 
EU investment to bring these emergencies under 
control would amount to a forceful manifestation of 
the EU’s commitment to the well-being of its citizens. 
Next to poverty, inequalities in terms of incomes and 
wealth represent key dimensions of the European 
social crisis. As is becoming increasingly clear, tax 
and wage setting systems in Europe have evidently 
More than 90 million citizens, almost 21% 
of the EU population, are considered to 














lost their effectiveness in view of increasingly fierce 
global competition and footloose capital. Rebuilding 
collective bargaining systems, adapting them to new 
labour market realities, and fostering wage transpar-
ency are crucial steps that must be taken. Likewise, 
ensuring a fairer and effective taxation of private 
wealth and corporate income, through coordinated 
action at the EU and global levels, are necessary ele-
ments of an effective strategy to close the growing 
gap between the rich and the rest. However, relying 
on a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and 
income among the individual members of society 
has its limits, especially given the need to ensure a 
more efficient use of resources that stems from the 
ecological crisis. Building common wealth for the 
collective use of resources through the expansion of 
public services and support for citizen-led initiatives 
to build common wealth must therefore be central 
elements of social policy going forward. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted how our 
societies critically rely on the contributions of social 
groups that are in many respects left standing at the 
margins of our economic and social model. While 
women, ethnic minorities, migrants, the young, and 
others have had to deal with exceptional hardship 
to keep society running, their access to social, eco-
nomic, and political opportunities remains unequal. 
The post-COVID-era must therefore be an era of 
a concerted push of equality of opportunity for all 
members of society to turn sustainable well-being 
for all into an inclusive and non-discriminatory proj-
ect. This will require both targeted strategies, for 
instance to address the specific situation of women, 
youth, and migrants, as well as horizontal action to 
strengthen fundamental rights and the rule of law.
6.1.  Introduction 
After more than a year of living through the COVID-
19 pandemic, the European public has developed 
a clear sense of how the virus caused more than a 
public health crisis. In fact, evidence of how the 
pandemic and its impact on economic and social 
life amplified poverty and deprivation across the 
continent was quick to emerge. Reports of the sharp 
increases in the reliance of parts of the population on 
foodbanks to meet basics needs for nutrition, in some 
countries temporarily leading to almost a doubling of 
demand for such services, were noticed with shock 
and dismay across the continent already shortly after 
the emergence of the virus.230 And also the plight of 
frontline workers, risking their lives to keep society 
running by staffing supermarkets and caring for the 
ill under arduous working and low-pay conditions, is 
by now common knowledge. 
Such instances of social crisis are not caused by 
the pandemic but the logical consequence of the 
comprehensive dismantling of the European social 
model through market-driven reforms during the 
past four decades. Especially since the creation of 
the European single market in the early 1990s, cap-
ital in Europe is almost perfectly free to migrate to 
where its use promises the highest profits. Conse-
quently, governments across the continent are faced 
with pressures to limit the ‘burden’ they impose on 
footloose investors and have either chosen or seen 
themselves forced to lower corporate taxes, dereg-
ulate labour markets, and unwind social security 
systems. 
As a result, workers and society at large are left to the 
mercy of the markets. What this leads to was demon-
strated brutally by the global financial crisis and the 
ensuing great recession. When growth slows down or 
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The European Pillar of Social Rights
1. Education, training and life-long learning
2. Gender equality
3. Equal opportunities
4. Active support to employment
5. Secure and adaptable employment
6. Wages
7. Information about employment conditions and protection in case of 
dismissals
8. Social dialogue and involvement of workers
9. Work-life balance
10. Healthy, safe and well-adapted work environment and data protection




15. Old-age income and pensions
16. Healthcare
17.  Inclusion of people with disabilities
18. Long-term care
19. Housing and assistance for the homeless
20. Access to essential services
231 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/economy-works-people/jobs-growth-and-investment/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-social-rights-action-plan_en
The 20 principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights231
In 2012, at the height of the last economic crisis in 
Europe, more than a fifth of the EU population was 
recorded to suffer from severe material depriva-
tion,232 with the rate exceeding 60% in individual 
countries.233 Given that social security and social 
protection systems in most European countries have 
seen little change since this last episode of near social 
meltdown, fears that EU citizens might be faced with 
a repeat of such hardship as the full economic and 
social impact of the pandemic unfolds are hard to do 
away with unless sweeping policy change is happen-
ing soon.
Yet even when the economy is not stuck in crisis 
mode, workers and citizens have little benefits to 
expect from it. According to the OECD, Western econ-
omies have experienced an effective decoupling of 
productivity from wage growth since the turn of the 
new millennium at the latest. What this means is 
that even when the economy grows, those producing 
such greater wealth through their labour hardly par-
ticipate in it and instead see their wages stagnate.234 
This trend not only affects workers at the bottom of 
the income distribution but the entire wage spec-
trum, especially since the global financial crisis. 
Accordingly, the middle class, typically thought to 
represent the backbone of advanced economies, has 
been squeezed significantly in all but four EU Member 
States since financial turmoil hit the world more than 
a decade ago.235
As has been noted before in this report (see chapter 
1 in particular), such social decline and fragility is 
increasingly proving to be a self-defeating strategy for 
the European Union – especially in light of the mas-
sive transformation of Europe’s social and economic 
foundations that climate change and environmental 
degradation make inevitable. Because such erosions 
of the social fabric and the proliferation of hardship 
foster anxiety among the population at large, not only 
among the most deprived, society becomes increas-
ingly unable to deal with adversity and develop a sense 
of common purpose.236 The oft-quoted example of the 
‘gilets jaunes’ in France, where climate action policies 
that did not consider the social and economic strain 
those bearing their cost were already under sparked 
violent mass protests, provides a telling example 
of how impossible the transition to a more environ-
mentally sustainable economic model will unless it is 
flanked with social policies that radically break away 
from the orthodoxy of the recent European past. 
What is more is that societies marked by friction 
and inequalities are constantly found to perform 
badly along a wide variety of dimensions, includ-
ing in terms of economic efficiency. Countries in 
which workers are adequately protected and thus 
seen as a valuable component of the economy and 
not as disposable inputs, and where social invest-
ment in quality (health) care, work-life balance, and 
good living conditions are prioritised, generally also 
boast higher levels of employment, productivity, and 
stronger economic resilience than countries lagging 
behind on these accounts.237
Given that demographic change adds to the pressure 
weighing down on the European Social Model, the 
European Union urgently needs to wake up and act on 
these insights. 
In 2012, at the height of the last 
economic crisis in Europe, more 
than a fifth of the EU population 
was recorded to suffer from 
severe material deprivation, 




society at large 
are left to the 
mercy of the 
markets.«
232 In EU statistics, severe material deprivation is defined as citizens’ inability to afford at least three of the following nine items: to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; to keep their home adequately 
warm; to cope with unexpected expenses; to eat meat or proteins regularly; to go on holiday; a television set; a washing machine; a car; a telephone.
233 Figures retrieved from Eurostat
234 OECD (2018), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2018 Issue 2, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_outlook-v2018-2-en
235 Eurofound (2017): Europe’s shrinking middle class, available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/de/publications/blog/europes-shrinking-middle-class
236 See, in particular, Azmanova, A. (2020): Capitalism on Edge, Columbia University Press
237 For a good recent overview, see Andor, L. and Huguenot-Noël, R. (2021): The Janus’ face of Europe’s new social rulebook, available at: https://voxeu.org/article/janus-face-europe-s-new-social-rulebook
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As the European Commission’s recently published 
ageing report finds, Europe’s working age population 
is set to decline by more than 15% by 2070, even if the 
expected benefits of migration from third countries 
into the EU are taken into account. At the same time, 
the level of expenditure made necessary by an ageing 
population is set to reach almost 26% of GDP.238 Given 
that this estimate already factors in cost savings gen-
erated through significant pension cuts, which are 
neither socially sustainable nor politically tenable 
given their contribution to rising inequalities and 
poverty, it appears reasonable to assume that even 
this baffling figure underestimates the real magni-
tude of the challenge at hand. 
Against this backdrop, a general reset of social policy 
in Europe should not only count as an imperative of 
fairness but also as a matter of enlightened political 
rationality. Building a fair, cohesive, inclusive, and 
productive society, in which diversity and mutual 
respect are values that allow people of all ages and 
backgrounds to contribute to and experience the 
well-being of all under the conditions of sustainabil-
ity must therefore be the key objective of European 
social policy going forward. 
To date, the European Union is failing to deliver 
action on the scale needed. While finally acknowl-
edging the need for a strong ‘social Europe’ with the 
adoption of the European Pillar of Social Rights in 
2017 to assure citizens of the EU’s239 commitment to 
principles of equal opportunities, fair working con-
ditions, and social protection and inclusion for all, 
the Pillar is yet to prove its value. As illustrated by 
a recent Eurobarometer survey, there can, however, 
be little doubt that delivering on this ambition clearly 
is a firm expectation citizens have vis-à-vis the Euro-
pean Union. 
Nearly nine in ten Europeans (88%) say that a social 
Europe is important to them personally, with more 
than two thirds of citizens in every Member State 
holding this view. Almost three quarters of those 
being polled state that the EU should have more deci-
sion-making competence in the area of employment 
and working conditions, while significantly more than 
half of respondents think that social objectives, such as 
quality jobs and gender equality, are entirely unattain-
able unless supported by purpose-driven EU policy.240
Against this backdrop, the commitment to translate 
the Social Pillar from paper into action demonstrated 
at the informal Social Summit of the European Council 
on 7-8 May 2021 can be read as Member States’ tentative 
first step to respond to citizens’ call for a strong social 
Europe. Moreover, by acknowledging the need to adopt 
the Social Pillar as a compass to guide the post-COVID 
recovery and the implementation of the European Green 
Deal, EU leaders seem to understand that progress in 
Europe going forward needs to be defined in social-eco-
logical terms. Nevertheless, serious doubts as to the 
real strength of the boost for social Europe the summit 
delivered remain. By fixing targets of low ambition for 
key social challenges, such as limiting action to fight pov-
erty to the headline goal of pulling 15 of the 90 million 
Europeans currently considered to live at risk of poverty 
and social exclusion above the poverty line by 2030, EU 
action, once more, risks falling short of the mark. 
Europe’s working age 
population is set to decline 
by more than 15% by 2070.
15%
»Social decline and fragility is 
increasingly proving to be a 
self-defeating strategy for the 
European Union.«
238 European Commission (2021): The 2021 Ageing Report Economic & Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States (2019-2070), Institutional Paper 148, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/economy-finance/ip148_en_0.pdf
239 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/economy-works-people/jobs-growth-and-investment/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-social-rights-20-principles_en#documents
240 Special Eurobarometer 509, summary report available at: https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Special-Eurobarometer-509-Social-Issues.pdf
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Also, as numerous Member State governments 
appear to remain fiercely opposed to effective EU 
social and employment policy competence, national 
egoisms might lead to more beggar-thy-neighbour 
instead of real solidarity and coordinated action to 
achieve sustainable well-being for all. 
The ICSE therefore calls on the European Union and 
its Member States to create real momentum for social 
Europe and to fill the mandate received from citizens 
to vigorously translate the Social Pillar’s principles 
into concrete EU action with life. Rebuilding Europe’s 
economy after the pandemic and leading it onto an 
environmentally sustainable path without flanking 
such deeply transformative policy action with a social 
agenda of equal ambition not only risks aggravating 
poverty and inequality in Europe but will pit this 
endeavour at risk altogether. To avoid this, building 
a European social super-state, as feared by some, is 
not the only option. Yet cooperation and mutual sup-
port will be indispensable to ensure the imperative 
of fundamental change that is forced upon Europe 
by climate change and an unsustainable global eco-
nomic model can be combined with a strong social 
dimension. Considering that European nations con-
vened in the EU to build a community based on the 
values of democracy and universal human rights and 
given that high levels of social protection and wel-
fare are necessary to give citizens the opportunity to 
exercise such rights and freedoms, there can be no 
doubt that the EU possesses the mandate and indeed 
the obligation to deliver on this objective. 
The following is intended to provide a guide to the 
social dimension of this transformation and that 
identifies action on three levels as necessary to 
achieve sustainable well-being for all in Europe. 
As a first step on this journey, determined action 
to fight poverty, deprivation, and social insecurity 
will be necessary to fight the climate of anxiety and 
precarity that weighs down on the cohesiveness of 
today’s societies. To this end, targeted reforms of 
social security systems, labour markets, and a social 
investment offensive are indispensable to ensure 
no one in Europe is left behind. Secondly, build-
ing on the insight that equal societies deliver better 
outcomes for everyone, not only for those acutely 
suffering from deprivation, promises strong gains in 
terms of sustainable well-being for all and can also 
cover part of the cost of the transformational policies 
advocated by this report. As developed in more detail 
below, this should lead to reinforced collective bar-
gaining in the labour market and to a fairer and more 
taxation of corporate income and wealth. Finally, as 
sustainable well-being without equal opportunities 
for all would be neither sustainable nor inclusive, 
the discussion will go on to make proposals as to the 
empowerment of women and minorities who have, 
not only but especially in times of COVID, proven 
their critical importance for society.
»A general reset of social policy in 
Europe should not only count as 
an imperative of fairness but also 
as a matter of enlightened 
political rationality.«
6.2.  Secure livelihoods 
for all in Europe
Even before the pandemic struck, large parts of 
Europe were fraught with social misery at a scale 
clearly at odds with the EU’s promise of improving 
lives and nurturing cohesive societies. For the past 
decade, key variables of societal well-being, such as 
the incidence of monetary poverty and social exclu-
sion (affecting 20.9% of the population in 2019), 
in-work poverty (affecting 9.4% of the EU workforce 
in 2020), or financial vulnerability (31% of Europe-
ans are unable to deal with unexpected expenses, 
e.g., having to replace a washing machine) either 
increased or stubbornly persisted at worryingly 
high levels.241
Since the global financial crisis, EU policy not only 
proved inadequate in view of this social emer-
gency but often acted as its driver. By adhering to 
the teachings of neo-liberal economics and enforc-
ing comprehensive austerity packages and labour 
market deregulations on ailing Member States, 
EU economic governance served to hollow out the 
European social model from within, at the same 
time as an increasingly competitive and volatile 
world economy added to the pressure from without. 
Sadly, but unsurprisingly, Europe thus exhibits 
increasing tendencies of what chapter 1 of this 
report has described as precarity. As citizens are 
more and more exposed to the pressures of the glo-
balised economy and increasingly threatened by 
the spectre of impoverishment, anxiety and fearful 
perceptions of the future abound. In this climate, 
extremist views and support for anti-system parties 
grow exponentially, as the past decade of European 
politics at EU and national levels has sadly proved 
too often.242
Reversing such worrying trends and building the 
foundations on which a Europe that caters for the 
sustainable well-being for all can be built requires 
effective solutions that come in two guises. First, 
fighting poverty and social insecurity, the driv-
ers of precarity, depends on social backstops that 
ensure all citizens can trust in their ability to make 
ends meet. Rebuilding social security systems and 
ensuring they are both inclusive and poverty-proof 
will therefore have to be a key task for policymak-
ing in the EU going forward. Ensuring that labour 
markets are fair and reliably create quality jobs 
that cater for workers’ well-being and economic 
security likewise constitutes a challenge that can 
no longer be dodged. 
Secondly, ending the age of precarity will require 
targeted social investments to eliminate poverty 
traps. Next to investment in education (see chapter 
4 of this report), such policies should particularly 
target the areas of housing as well as long-term and 
childcare. If housing costs continue to eat up sub-
stantial parts of families’ monthly budgets, and as 
long as care duties prevent parts of the population, 
especially women, from joining the workforce, the 
fight against poverty will remain an uphill battle 
that can hardly be won. However, as has been proven 
time and again,243 such capacitating investment not 
only tends to pay for itself by decreasing spending 
on fighting social emergencies and increasing the 
productivity of the workforce, it also pays multiple 
dividends in terms of social and ecological progress 
that will be explored in more detail below. 
241 Eurostat
242 Azmanova, A. (2020): Capitalism on Edge, Columbia University Press. For a case study of how economic and social insecurity fosters extremist views and political populism, see Hilmer, R. et al. 
(2017): Einstellung und soziale Lebenslage – Eine Spurensuche nach Gründen für rechtspopulistische Orientierung, auch unter Gewerkschaftsmitgliedern, available at:  
https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_fofoe_WP_044_2017.pdf




6.2.1.  A comprehensive EU anti-poverty 
plan 
As it affects more than 90 million citizens, almost 
21% of the EU population, there can be no doubt 
that fighting poverty and social exclusion, next to 
the fight against climate change and environmental 
degradation, constitutes a key challenge that needs 
addressing if the much-praised European social 
model is to survive. Currently, however, a real sense 
of urgency seems suspiciously absent. While the 
EU is, thankfully, committed to the achievement of 
ambitious goals regarding the reduction of green-
house gas emissions, and has spent the best part of 
the past decade defining detailed target values for 
nearly all aspects of public finances and spending, 
objectives and indicators relating to poverty and 
deprivation remain at the margins of the policy-
making process to date. 
According to the United Nations’ Special Rappor-
teur on Poverty, this large-scale and persistent 
failure to resolve the European poverty crisis rep-
resents a clear sign of how the European Union, its 
current institutional framework, and policy orien-
tation is ‘not fit for purpose’.244 As the UN notice, 
the Sustainable Development Goals commit the 
global community to work towards the reduction of 
poverty by 50% by 2030. Despite this, EU Member 
States could only agree to aim at lifting 15 million 
Europeans out of poverty against the same horizon, 
not even 30% of the population currently affected 
by such hardship.245 If one of the world’s most afflu-
ent regions decides to undercut global goals for the 
reduction of poverty, there can be no doubt that 
insufficient political ambition lies at the heart of 
the problem. 
What is more is that current official statistics 
may not even give an adequate representation of 
the social conditions experienced by the EU pop-
ulation. This is due to the fact that such statistics 
assume that poverty within a given country is 
experienced by those who earn less than 60% of 
the national median wage. However, it is becom-
ing increasingly clear that such a simplistic and 
unspecific assumption fails to take into consid-
eration the actual cost of living experienced by 
citizens in their daily lives. Recent research indi-
cates that in particular in Southern and Eastern 
European countries, the 60% median income 
threshold may significantly underestimate the 
actual state of poverty. Accordingly, a couple with 
two children living in rented accommodation in 
Budapest would require income 50% higher than 
the 60% threshold not to live at the risk of poverty. 
Living in Athens, the same couple would need 
an income roughly twice as high as the median 
income threshold.246
Going forward, these twin problems of lacking 
political ambition and inadequate definitions 
must be overcome to prevent Europe from slip-
ping deeper into social crisis. Reforming and 
bolstering social security systems will be of key 
importance in this respect, driven by determined 
and well-funded policies policymaking at the EU 
and national levels.
Against this background, the ICSE issues the fol-
lowing recommendations:
31% of Europeans are unable to 
deal with unexpected expenses.
31%
The Sustainable Development 
Goals commit the global 
community to work towards the 




245 United Nations (2021): Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights on his visit to the European Union, available at: https://undocs.org/fr/A/HRC/47/36/Add.1
246 Goedemé, T. et al. (2017), What does it mean to live on the poverty threshold?, Lessons from reference budget research, CSB Working Paper series
216 
Use adequate definitions and indicators: the case 
for reference budgets
The EU anti-poverty law should be based on a definition of poverty and underlying indicators that adequately 
reflect the location and context-specific nature of poverty, which go unnoticed in the numeric poverty indicator 
used in EU statistics at present. To this end, definitions and indicators must focus on the ability of citizens to 
satisfy their well-being-related needs and to participate in society, which depends on strongly varying levels of 
income depending on citizens locality of residence. Moreover, as individual well-being is not only a matter of 
the satisfaction of immediate, material needs, such as access to housing, healthy nutrition, and healthcare, but 
also of immaterial and psycho-social factors,247 such as leisure time and access to a stimulating cultural sphere 
and societal discourses, the definition and measurement of poverty needs to cover these dimensions, too. 
To enable the EU anti-poverty law to capture the location-specific and multidimensional nature of poverty, its 
definition and measurement should be operationalised by means of ‘reference baskets’. Such reference baskets 
should contain the essential goods and services required to satisfy well-being-related needs and to participate 
in society and be used to determine the income necessary to access them.248 Such measurements should be 
carried out on a yearly basis and be sufficiently location-specific, hence at least cover the NUTS-3 level of EU 
statistics.249 Additionally, the composition of reference baskets should be revised in regular intervals, at least 
every five years and under the involvement of scientific experts and focus groups of affected individuals, to 
account for changes in the goods and services that may be required to live a life free of poverty. For instance, 
as more and more cultural and civic activities are becoming embedded in the digital sphere, access to higher 
quality broadband connections and digital devices may become necessary to prevent forms of ‘digital poverty’. 
In fact, a sophisticated reference basket methodology and a network of national scientific experts to provide 
guidance with the approach’s application in all EU Member States have already been developed as part of an 
EU-funded research project.250 As most questions regarding design as well as initial development costs there-
fore seem to be settled, the European Commission appears to be in a position to implement this new approach 
to the definition and measurement of poverty relatively swiftly, considering also that numerous relevant data-
sets are already covered by the Eurostat database. 
Adopt an EU anti-poverty law
To deliver a powerful manifestation of political will, to fill the European Pillar of Social Rights and the shared com-
petence of the EU and Member States in the social field based on Art. 151 TFEU with life, and to match Europe’s 
climate ambition with social ambition of equal magnitude, the European Commission should prepare a proposal 
for an EU anti-poverty law. The act should be introduced in the form of a regulation that commits the EU institu-
tions and Member States to eliminate poverty in Europe by 2050. To form the basis of a consistent EU anti-poverty 
strategy that is adequately taken into account across all stages and levels of EU policymaking, the anti-poverty 
law should also contain sufficiently ambitious intermediary goals. To this end and as called for by the UN Special 
Rapporteur for Poverty, the law should stipulate that poverty in Europe must be reduced by 50% by 2030 and 
include a provision to ensure the EU and Member States set another intermediary target for the reduction of pov-
erty by 2040 no later than in 2030 and not lower than 50% of the remaining incidence of poverty in 2030. 
247 See for instance: Gough, I. (2017) Heat, Greed and Human Need – Climate Change, Capitalism and Sustainable Well-being, Elgar, Cheltenham, chapter 2
248 For a quick overview, see: https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/research-groups/csb/data/featured-datasets/reference-budgets/, a more detailed discussion is provided in Goedemé, T et al. (2017),  
What does it mean to live on the poverty threshold?, Lessons from reference budget research, CSB Working Paper series
249 In the European statistical framework, NUTS-3 stands for ‘small regions’, see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background
250 https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1092&intPageId=2312&langId=en
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Embed the anti-poverty law and its targets in 
the European Sustainable Well-being Pact and 
well-being budgeting procedure
To ensure the objectives of the EU anti-poverty law are adequately taken into consideration across all relevant 
fields of EU policymaking, its binding targets and intermediary goals should be integrated into the updated EU 
policy objectives laid out in section 3.2. of this report. Related surveillance, policy coordination, and governance 
measures should be embedded centrally in the EU well-being budgeting procedure described in section 3.2. 
As part of this, the European Commission should ensure Member States implement sufficiently ambitious 
reforms in their social security systems, for instance in the form of adequate minimum or universal income 
schemes, and in the provision of public services. Additionally, to address the situation of vulnerable groups, the 
Commission should guide Member States towards the definition of targeted anti-poverty strategies for specific 
social groups exposing particularly high incidences of poverty, such as single-parent households, immigrants, 
and the disabled. Such targeted interventions could be modelled on the approach pioneered by the EU child 
guarantee, a scheme by which targeted budget support is made available to Member States to guarantee 
access to a set of essential goods and services, such as healthy school meals, adequate housing, and health 
services available to minors.252
Given the paramount importance of social security systems for preventing and tackling poverty, bolstering 
them must be considered key for the success of the EU anti-poverty law, especially as regards their ability to 
provide poverty-proof minimum incomes. While all EU Member States possess different systems of minimum 
income guarantees, their structure and effectiveness vary starkly.251 This calls for coordinated action at the EU 
level, where the European Commission should propose a framework directive to set related minimum stand-
ards. Such standards should stipulate that all citizens – whether employed or unemployed, being part of the 
working age population or being pensioners or students - have an enforceable right to minimum incomes, 
that these be set at a poverty-proof level using the aforementioned reference basket methodology, and that 
access modalities, for instance in terms of administrative burden, do not dissuade citizens from seeking access 
to them. The concrete design of such social security mechanisms should remain within the purview of national 
governments to avoid unnecessary resistance from Member States seeking to uphold the traditional structure 
of their social security systems. 
Set common standards for minimum income 
schemes
251 European Commission (2016): Minimum Income Schemes in Europe A study of national policies, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=7882&furtherPubs=yes 
252 Based on pressure by the S&D Group in the European Parliament, the current European Commission committed to the introduction of the of a European Child Guarantee scheme during its term of office. 
In February 2021, the Commission submitted a draft for European Council guidelines that would recommend the introduction of related measures to Member States. Related discussions in the European 
Council will also touch on the question of how the level of funding that should be earmarked in the current EU long-term budget to support the implementation of related measures at national level 
through EU co-financing provisions.
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Provide co-financing under the EU Social and 
Investment Funds
By defining an EU-level obligation to eliminate poverty across the Union by 2050, related measures are becom-
ing a matter of common concern to the EU and Member States and should therefore benefit from generous 
co-financing provisions under the EU social and Investment funds. To mobilise sufficient financial resources to 
finance related action, the European Commission should propose the introduction of an EU net wealth tax (see 
section 6.3.2.) that should, at least in part, be established as an EU own resource to finance the EU budget and its 
investment programmes. As estimated by a recent study, such a scheme for the progressive taxation of wealthy 
individuals, could generate as much as 4.3% of GDP in annual tax income and thus provide for ample fiscal space 
to invest in the elimination of poverty in Europe.253
Establish an EU re-insurance fund for minimum 
income schemes
To protect and maintain the sustainability of national minimum income schemes in times of economic crisis, an 
EU-level re-insurance fund to provide interest-free loans to social security providers at the national level should 
be established. To this end, the fund should possess a reserve filled by revenue generated from the EU net-wealth 
tax and be equipped with borrowing capacity to withstand large symmetric shocks where several Member States 
seek access to it simultaneously. Access to the fund should be temporary and automatic, based on pre-defined 
criteria. By invoking Art. 122 TFEU, the re-insurance scheme could be established without the need of treaty 
change and build on the experience gained by the European Commission as part of the establishment of SURE, 
a temporary re-insurance fund for short-time work or furlough schemes in reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic.254 
Establish an independent commission on the 
future of social security systems
To support cooperation between EU Member States in the future development and adjustment of their social 
security systems, especially in light of demographic and climate change, the European Commission should 
establish a permanent, independent commission on the future of European social security. The independent 
commission should comprise representatives of social security providers, social partners, civil society, scientific 
experts, as well as governments and parliaments representing all competent levels of policymaking. Its task 
should be to monitor economic and social trends with a potential impact on the adequacy and sustainability 
of social security systems and explore potentials for cooperation between Member States in addressing them, 
including through the development of common minimum standards for social security mechanisms and flank-
ing measures, for instance in child and social care. 
253 Kapeller, J. et al. (2021): A European Wealth Tax for a Fair and Green Recovery, available at: https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/a%20european%20wealth%20tax_policy%20study.pdf
254 For a similar proposal, see Guttenberg, L. and Hemker, J (2020): Corona: A European Safety Net for the Fiscal Response, Jacque Delors Centre Policy Brief, available at: https://hertieschool-f4e6.
kxcdn.com/fileadmin/20200313_Policy_Brief_Corona_Guttenberg.pdf
6.2.2.  Secure and poverty-proof jobs  
for all
Since the turn of the millennium, employment 
and labour market policy in Europe have become 
tough adversaries of working people. Based on the 
assumption that comprehensively liberalised labour 
markets would lead the EU economy to become 
more competitive in global markets, many of the 
EU’s Member States since the 1990s have been busy 
reviewing their labour codes with a view to fight-
ing ‘labour market rigidities’ that, allegedly, stem 
from provisions protecting workers against low 
wages and job insecurity. Since the global financial 
crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt 
crisis, the team of the labour market deregulators 
was joined by the European Commission, which, by 
working through the European Semester, took aim 
at the ‘over-protection’ of employees in its attempts 
to ‘revive sclerotic labour markets’.255 Admittedly, 
even many progressives bought into this promise, 
trusting that the more economic growth would auto-
matically translate into more, better, and higher 
paid jobs. 
Today, it is clear that the picture European workers 
are presented with is a different one. While economic 
growth has picked up and stabilised during the last 
decade, European workers, on average, remain 
worse off than in previous decades.256 Although aver-
age unemployment has gradually declined since the 
global financial crisis, and, in parts of Europe, even 
to lower levels than recorded during the first decade 
of the 21st century, several EU Member States con-
tinue to hover around the 10% line, with Greece and 
Spain continuing to post much higher figures, 16.3% 
and 15.5% respectively. Where the liberalisation 
of labour markets has led to employment growth, 
such growth has led to disproportionate increases in 
the incidence of atypical forms of employment that 
expose affected workers to one or several dimen-
sions of employment precariousness, such as low 
pay, low job security, or low levels of work-life bal-
ance. Especially part-time work, substantial parts 
of which are involuntary and thus represent a form 
of underemployment, fixed-term contracts, and solo 
self-employment, i.e., own-account work without 
employees, are mass phenomena in EU labour mar-
kets.257 As a result, in-work poverty affected 9.4% 
of the EU workforce in 2019 and has hovered at this 
level for the past decade.258 
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255 The European Trade Union Institute has assembled a comprehensive overview of the European Commission’s Country-specific Recommendations in the fields of employment and social policy that 
compiles a large number of concrete examples illustrating the deregulation-biased policy orientation applied in the European Semester since its establishment, which is available at:  
https://www.etui.org/publications/background-analysis/the-country-specific-recommendations-csrs-in-the-social-field
256 See Myant, M. and Piasna, A. (2021) for a detailed account, available at: https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/17%20Piasna%20Myant%20Employment%20deregulation%20WEB.pdf




Especially employment in services is affected by 
such trends, hence, in sectors whose importance for 
employment creation is likely to increase further 
as Europe makes progress towards decarbonising 
its economy. What is more is that new frontiers of 
labour market precariousness are constantly emerg-
ing. This is particularly the case with work and 
employment developing as part of the digital econ-
omy, where new forms of insecure and often low paid 
jobs abound. While it remains to be seen whether 
these sectors will be able to create enough jobs to 
compensate for the losses expected in other parts 
of the economy as part of the climate transition, it 
seems safe to assume that the current approach to 
employment policy in Europe is not up to the task. 
If unemployment, underemployment, and precari-
ous working conditions are not to become the new 
normal, nothing but a drastic re-orientation of 
labour market governance in Europe will do. 
Against this backdrop, the ICSE issues the following 
recommendations: 
»By adhering to the teachings of 
neo-liberal economics and 
enforcing comprehensive 
austerity packages and labour 
market deregulations on ailing 
Member States, EU economic 
governance served to hollow out 
the European social model from 
within.«
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To fight the spectre of unemployment, which is not only exposing citizens to high levels of poverty but also is 
known to be associated by serious social anxieties, the EU and its Member States should establish a European 
sustainable jobs guarantee. This scheme should incorporate the experience gained as part of the European 
Youth Guarantee and offer publicly funded education, re-skilling and upskilling, and job placement opportu-
nities to all long-term unemployed members of the EU workforce. 
The scheme should be introduced by means of an EU directive to ensure its availability in all Member States 
but leave sufficient room for governments to adapt it according to the structure of national labour market 
and industrial relations systems. Participation should be based on the principle of voluntariness and fair 
remuneration, considering participants’ prior experience in the labour market and account for their family 
situation and care obligations. To this end, it should be closely integrated with national social security sys-
tems to ensure that participants and their families are not at risk of poverty and social exclusion. Additionally, 
such national schemes should be co-financed under the EU budget, notably through the European Social 
and Just Transition Funds. 
Its implementation should be governed as much as possible at the local level. In this respect, it could draw 
inspiration from the ‘zero long-term unemployed territories’ model developed in France (see further insight 
box, next page), where job placement services collaborate with local communities to launch projects under 
the responsibility of local ‘employment creation enterprises’ catering for location-specific needs that would 
otherwise remain unmet, for instance in social care and environmental management. By fulfilling such local 
needs, participants of the sustainable jobs guarantee could thus carry out socially useful work, receive the 
training and experience needed, and thereby create local labour markets that are aligned with local needs 
and can, over time, potentially be transformed into regular labour markets and businesses. As experience in 
France indicates, such projects can be financed at minimally higher cost than would be necessary to finance 
benefits and administrative expenses of traditional social security or active labour market policies for the 
long-term unemployed.
As a separate strand, the scheme should also comprise a pillar allowing participants to engage in full-time 
education and training, including in tertiary education. This would allow workers having lost the prospect of 
employment in their previous occupation to rest their careers and gain access to sectors with a positive long-
term outlook in light of Europe’s transition to carbon-neutral and well-being-oriented economy.
Establish a European sustainable jobs guarantee 
scheme
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Adopt the EU directive on adequate minimum 
wages
As a result of relentless and forceful campaigning by trade unions and progressive political forces, the European 
Commission has tabled a legislative proposal aiming to ensure a statutory minimum wage is established in all EU 
Member States.259 Its adoption would amount to a sea change in EU employment policy and make sure labour 
markets are bound by binding wage floors applying to all workers in the economy and protect them against 
downward wage competition. The ICSE calls on the European Parliament and Council to engage in constructive 
discussions on the Commission proposal and to devise viable solutions for addressing their potential concerns. 
It trusts that, based on a spirit of cooperation and determination, the twin aim of ensuring that all workers in the 
EU economy are covered by adequate minimum wages and the protection of national industrial relations and 
collective bargaining practices can be achieved. Moreover, it calls on the co-legislators to consider the definition 
of the level of adequacy of the national minimum wages based on the reference basket methodology introduced 
in section 6.2.1. of this report to ensure minimum wages under the directive qualify as living wages, hence ensure 
income at a level that reflects the actual cost of living faced by workers. If agreement is only possible on the basis 
of numeric threshold values, progressives in the European Parliament and Council should consider the introduc-
tion of a review clause that allows the co-legislators to reconsider the definition of adequacy in the future. 
FURTHER INSIGHT: TERRITOIRES ZÉRO CHÔMEUR DE LONGUE DURÉE
The association "Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée” (TZCLD) - Zero Long-Term Unemployed 
Territories - was created to demonstrate that it is possible at the levels of small territories, without sig-
nificant extra cost to the community, to offer sustainable jobs to all private persons. 
This experiment is based on three hypotheses that suggest that it is humanly and economically pos-
sible to eliminate long-term unemployment at the territorial level: No one is unemployable when the 
job is tailored to people's abilities and skills; It is not the work that is missing because a large number 
of useful works, of great diversity, remain to be carried out; It is not the money that is missing because 
job deprivation costs more than job production. This is an innovative approach because typically job 
seekers position themselves on job offers from companies. In this project, the mechanism is reversed. 
First, the companies contracted identify the skills and desires of each individual wishing to integrate 
the approach. Then, depending on this supply of skills, they look for useful work in the territory that 
can match it.
In November 2016, 10 territories in urban and rural areas with a population of 5,000-10,000 citizens each 
were selected by the French Ministry of Labour to participate in a pilot project running for five years. 
Since the beginning of the experiment, 1,025 jobs have been created. In 2021, the 2nd phase of the exper-
iment opens with an extension to at least 50 new territories
One of the main missions of the TZCLD association is to learn from experimentation and stimulate the 
production of external scientific assessment and to promote the dissemination of this project by accom-
panying the territories that wish to implement the project and supporting the selected territories. 
259 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0682&from=EN
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To ensure labour markets in Europe create fair and poverty-proof forms of employment, an objective whose 
importance is further heightened in view of the large labour market shifts that must be expected to occur in 
the context of the transition to a carbon-neutral economy (see chapter 4 of this report), the European Commis-
sion should table a comprehensive strategy to fight and eliminate all forms of precarious employment in the 
EU. The strategy should be based on a legal commitment to the achievement of a 0% incidence of the most 
gregarious forms of precarious employment by 2030, including bogus self-employment and involuntary part-
time, and, as recently called for by the European Parliament,260 should work to ensure that 80% of job creation 
in the EU leads to growth in medium and high-income jobs. The ICSE proposes to include both legislative and 
non-legislative elements under the strategy, including:
• Measures to ensure the swift implementation of the ‘written statement directive’261 setting EU-wide 
minimum standards for 
 ▷ essential elements to be covered by employment contracts,
 ▷ information to be provided by employers to workers regarding working conditions and pay arrange-
ments, including overtime pay,
 ▷ workers’ right to request more working time in case of part-time employment,
 ▷ minimum rights to paid training for workers on atypical employment contracts, such as fixed-term 
or part-time contracts.
• Proposals to introduce enabling provisions at the disposal of part-time workers to facilitate the tran-
sition to full-time employment. Such proposals should include provisions to ensure workers have a 
right to return to full-time employment after a temporary reduction of working time to avoid them 
being locked part-time work. Other policy options should be explored, for instance as part of the EU 
sustainable jobs guarantee (see above), which could also be opened to part-time workers seeking to 
top up their working time. Additionally, the European Commission should engage Member States in 
exchanges of best practice to draw on experience gained in national labour markets.
• A uniform, EU-wide prohibition of zero-hour contracts and bogus self-employment arrangements. 
Additionally, the European Commission should ensure its Employment and Social Affairs possesses 
adequate monitoring capacity, for instance under the involvement of Eurofound, to screen EU labour 
markets for the emergence of new employment arrangements constituting high risks of precarious-
ness and to take remedial action, either through guidance provided to Member States or EU legislation. 
• The establishment of general joint and several liability provisions to ensure that lead firms, as an ultima 
ratio, are liable for worker rights and employment protection legislation infringements by upstream 
companies in their supply chains. 
• Measures to ensure a stricter penalisation of late payments of fees of self-employed workers, potentially 
flanked by codes of practice to be adopted by businesses procuring external services from self-em-
ployed contractors. 
Develop a European zero-precarious employment 
strategy




• A revision of the EU Temporary Work Agency Directive with a view to including 
 ▷ a requirement that all temporary work agencies operating in the internal market are listed in a  
European register and are in possession of the necessary certification to operate in the single market, 
 ▷ the possibility of imposing bans to operate in the single market on temporary work agencies not 
complying with applicable EU legislation, 
 ▷ a requirement for temporary work agencies to a guarantee a minimum number of hours per  
week/month, 
 ▷ guarantees to ensure equal treatment of temporary agency workers and workers in the same  
company (or sector in case working conditions are defined at the sectoral level) 
Strengthen the labour market position of the 
self-employed
Already today, almost 10% of the EU workforce is made up of self-employed workers without employees, i.e., solo 
self-employed workers. As new digital forms of employment and work mediation proliferate in the EU labour market, 
the share of solo self-employment is widely expected to rise. Although many workers seem to appreciate the flexibility 
and freedom self-employment offers, this employment status exposes workers to several vulnerabilities. Depending 
on the Member State of residence and the sector of activity, this may include lacking unemployment and public 
pension insurance cover, exclusion from working time regulations, and high burdens for access to justice in case of 
disputes with contractors and clients. Accordingly, approximately one quarter of the European solo self-employed 
workforce must be considered to suffer from low levels of income and high levels of financial vulnerability.262
Against this backdrop and in addition to its forthcoming engagement with questions of collective bargaining 
for self-employed workers (see section 6.3.1.), the European Commission should commence work, under close 
involvement of Member States and social partners, on devising an EU strategy for quality self-employment, 
addressing the main challenges for fair pay, social protection, and quality working conditions affecting this 
employment status. As part of this, the Commission should ensure to cover the following: 
• the possibility of opening existing social protection schemes, such as unemployment and accident 
insurance and pensions system, to (parts of) the self-employed workforce or the creation of dedicated 
systems for self-employed workers.
• the development of education and training offers for self-employed workers, who, unlike standard 
employees, do not enjoy the right to employer-paid training.
• the establishment of support services for solo self-employed workers, for instance as regards legal 
advice in cases of dispute with clients or as regards participation in public tenders. 
• support for the collective organisation of self-employed workers, for instance in the form of trade 
unions that pool resources to provide affordable office space, back-office capacity, and marketing 
services to the self-employed. Such support should also be provided to the creation of cooperatives 
among self-employed workers so that self-employment can be transferred into regular employment 
while preserving many of the characteristics of self-employed work. 
262 Eurofound (2017), Exploring self-employment in the European Union, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
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Continue to efforts to ensure fair cross-border 
labour mobility
While important improvements for ensuring fairness and avoiding social dumping through cross-border labour 
mobility in the European single market could be achieved during the last European parliamentary mandate, 
especially with the revision of the posting of workers directive and the establishment of the European Labour 
Authority, further work remains necessary. Unblocking negotiations on the revision of the EU regulation on the 
coordination of national social security systems to ensure transparency, non-discrimination, and the portabil-
ity of social security rights of citizens in the single market should constitute a priority for the Commission and 
the European co-legislators. Also, the Commission should finally make good on its promise issued in 2018 and 
deliver a proposal for an EU social security number and flanking measures to allow both workers and labour 
inspectorates to determine whether employers are making social security payments for cross-border workers 
in accordance with the applicable regulations. 
Given that individual Member States have already experimented with some of these proposals and developed 
significant experience, the benefits of cooperation in this regard are clear. The European Commission should 
therefore encourage Member States to draw on this body of knowledge and actively foster the identification 
of best practices and their exchange.
Ensure fairness in the platform economy
The last decade has seen rapid growth of the provision of services mediated through digital platforms, for 
instance in the transport sector, food delivery, and the outsourcing of programming and design work. Especially 
during the pandemic, many citizens have relied on platforms to gain access to services which were otherwise 
disrupted due to lockdown measures. Consequently, their significance as employers is growing: According 
to the European Commission, roughly 11% of the EU workforce have already provided services through a plat-
form.263
Although the digital mediation between service providers and recipients may be innovative, most tasks carried 
out as part of such arrangements are not and have traditionally been carried out by operators applying tradi-
tional business models. Unlike in such traditional business models, online platforms seldom provide formal 
employment to their workforce but operate under the assumption that such workers are self-employed. As 
a consequence, workers are not guaranteed a minimum amount of paid working hours, enjoy no protection 
against dismissal, do not possess entitlements to leave and sick pay, are not covered by public social security 
systems and bound by minimum wages and collective agreements. Additionally, some services that do not 
require the presence of providers and recipients in the same location, such as coding tasks, are easily out-
sourced across borders under the assistance of online platforms. This leads to a situation in which regulated 
employment in traditional businesses is at risk of displacement through labour carried out under radically dif-
ferent, less secure, and less costly working conditions, which amounts to an instance of social dumping. 
263 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_656
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Propose an EU fair telework package
According to Eurofound, close to 40% of the EU workforce adopted telework, hence remote work through digi-
tal appliances, as full-time work arrangement as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.265 Despite at times difficult 
adaptation processes, 78% of those being able to telework to perform their jobs would welcome the opportu-
nity to continue to do so after the pandemic ends, at least occasionally. By adopting a comprehensive set of 
quality standards for such work arrangements, the EU could demonstrate its responsiveness to labour market 
development and manifest its commitment to seizing opportunities for increasing the well-being at work of 
the EU workforce. To this end and as quickly as possible, the Commission should develop a proposal for an EU 
directive on minimum standards and conditions for fair telework. Such standards should serve to empower 
workers by creating a right to request telework, stipulate viable conditions for employers to engage with such 
requests, while at the same time ensuring that telework must not be required by employers to sustain its 
voluntary nature. Additionally, the directive should include provisions to ensure the respect for occupational 
health and safety standards, especially by way of an enforceable right to disconnect to avoid that telework leads 
to the delimitation of working time. Moreover, it should ban the use of automated working time tracking tools.
Laudably, the European Commission has announced the preparation of a legislative proposal to ensure fair 
competition between online and traditional services in terms of working and pay conditions, which is expected 
by the end of 2021. The Commission proposal should contain a rebuttable legal presumption of employment, 
hence should stipulate that, in principle, the mediation of work through an online platform constitutes an 
employment relationship between the operator of the platform and workers that leads to the applicability 
of standard employment regulations, including collective agreements. The employment assumption may be 
challenged by the operator of the platform but should prevail if the functioning of the platform includes activ-
ities that are typically performed by employers, such as setting the level of the fee to be paid by the service 
recipients, the processing of payments between providers and recipients, the execution of quality controls etc. 
Such criteria could be designed in a cumulative manner, hence be designed so that the employment assump-
tion can rebutted as long as no more than a given amount of an overall number of criteria are met. By building 
on this approach of a rebuttable assumption of employment, the Commission would also align with the rulings 
of courts in a number of Member States issued in recent months.264
Additionally, the Commission’s proposal should take adequate account of the cross-border dimension of such 
platform work. If a worker provides services to a recipient in another EU Member State, the standard rules for 
the cross-border provision of services, i.e., the posting of workers and services directive, should apply. By includ-
ing these provisions, the Commission would also work to ensure that platform work does not lead to a new 
dimension of social dumping in the European single market. 
264 See for instance: https://www.socialeurope.eu/old-rules-and-protections-for-the-new-world-of-work 
265 Eurofound (2020), Living, working and COVID-19, COVID-19 series, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
6.2.3.  A European Deal for Affordable and 
Sustainable Housing
Although comprehensive and reliable data is lacking, 
civil society organisations estimate that approxi-
mately 700,000 people in Europe must be considered 
to be homeless every given day. As homelessness is 
an emergency that frequently affects people tem-
porarily, FEANTSA, the European Federation of 
National Organisations Working with the Homeless, 
estimates that as many as 4.1 million Europeans 
might be affected by homelessness every year.266
According to Eurostat data, almost 10% of the EU 
population are currently suffering from housing 
cost overburden, hence, are obliged to spend more 
than 40% of monthly disposable income to pay for 
accommodation. More than 17% of the population 
live in overcrowded accommodation, i.e., in accom-
modation where, for instance, couples do not have 
their own bedroom, or more than two children are 
forced share one room, with high levels of variation 
between and within Member States.267 European 
housing markets can therefore be assumed to be key 
drivers of the deprivation experienced by large parts 
of the population: Income spent on accommodation 
that is overly expensive relative to families’ revenues 
is unavailable to satisfy other well-being-related 
needs, for instance for healthy nutrition, education, 
or participation in cultural activities. To break this 
vicious circle, bold policy action is needed to close 
the investment gap in affordable housing, which is 
at present estimated to amount to €57 billion annu-
ally.268
With its proposal for a ‘Renovation Wave for Europe’, 
the European Commission has made valuable pro-
posals for accelerating the modernisation of the EU 
building stock in line with the objective of achieving 
climate-neutrality by 2050.269 As buildings account 
for 40% of EU energy consumption and 36% of EU 
greenhouse gas emissions, the success of the reno-
vation wave is crucial to achieve the objectives set 
by the European Green Deal and the EU climate law. 
The ICSE also welcomes the attention paid by the 
Commission to the social dimension of the renova-
tion wave by committing it to contribute to the fight 
against energy poverty and making affordable and 
energy-efficient housing available, especially for 
medium and low-income earners. 
The Commission’s proposal is thus clearly informed 
by the objective of generating what chapter 1 of this 
report has identified as social-ecological progress 
and already integrates a number of proposals advo-
cated by progressives in recent years, including as 
part of the first ICSE policy report.270 Nevertheless, 
the ICSE recognises room for improvement. 
Almost 10% of the EU population 












266 FEANTSA (2020) Fifth Overview of Housing Exclusion in Europe, available at: https://www.feantsa.org/public/user/Resources/resources/Rapport_Europe_2020_GB.pdf
267 Eurostat, data for 2019
268 Fransen, L. et al. (2018): Boosting Investment in Social Infrastructure in Europe, Report of the High-Level Task Force on Investing in Social Infrastructure in Europe, p. 41, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/economy-finance/dp074_en.pdf
269 COM(2020) 662 final
270 ICSE (2018), p. 111
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This concerns for instance the temporary nature of 
the renovation wave as a policy strategy. By focus-
sing its actions on the years between 2020-30, it 
seems to limit itself to providing a temporary boost 
to the expansion of sustainable and affordable hous-
ing in the EU, which fails to reflect the structural 
importance of housing policy to fight poverty and to 
achieve sustainable well-being for all in Europe. 
Additionally, by limiting its ambition to doubling 
the annual renovation rate of the EU building 
stock, which currently remains at approximately 
1%,271 it follows a rather modest ambition. As recent 
estimates suggest, by expanding renovation and 
building activity to 3% of the existing EU building 
stock, Europe could not only reach its social and 
ecological objectives relating to the housing sector 
sooner, but also create up to two million new jobs 
in the buildings sector, thus creating even stronger 
social-ecological co-benefits.272 
While recognising the solid basis the EU renovation 
wave is constituting for veritable social-ecological 
progress in Europe, the ICSE calls on the European 
Commission to bolster its proposals and turn them 
into an ambitious and permanent European Deal for 
Sustainable and Affordable Housing. 
To this end, the ICSE issues the following recommen-
dations: 
Current projections expect the 
share of the population aged 
65 or older to increase to 29% 
by 2060. 
29%
271 COM(2020) 662 final, p. 2
272 Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Tirado-Herrero, S., Fegyverneky, S., Arena, D., Butcher, A. and Telegdy, A. (2010) Employment Impacts of a Large-Scale Deep Building Energy Retrofit Programme in Hungary; 
Janssen, R. and Staniaszek, D. (2012) How Many Jobs? A Survey of the Employment Effects of Investment in Energy Efficiency of Buildings The Energy Efficiency Industrial Forum.
273 European Parliament resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all (2019/2187(INI))
Integrate bolstered and binding housing indica-
tors in the European Sustainable Well-being Pact 
and well-being budgeting process
As part of the current European Semester, the Commission has begun to monitor social conditions in the Euro-
pean housing market, especially as regards the rate of housing overburden, hence citizens and families forced 
to dedicate more than 40% of their disposable income to housing costs. However, this threshold is widely 
believed to be set too high and should therefore be lowered to 25% of income, as proposed by the European 
Parliament.273 Additionally, while data relating to housing over-crowdedness and housing deprivation are 
sourced by Eurostat and partly considered in the surveillance of Member State policies, related Country-spe-
cific Recommendations are rarely issued - and even less frequently followed-up on. To match the pivotal role 
adequate housing plays for citizens’ well-being, the European Commission should include binding objectives 
and related indicators in its proposals for re-orienting its policy orientation and governance approach towards 
sustainable well-being for all (see section 3.2.). To this end, and in line with the EU anti-poverty law, it should 
fix target values of 0% regarding the incidence of housing deprivation, over-crowdedness, and overburden by 
2050 and act resolutely through the European well-being budgeting procedure to achieve this. 
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Improve public and private investment capacity
To close the €57 billion annual investment gap in affordable housing in the EU, the EU and Member States 
should take further decisive measures to mobilise public and private investment. To this end, complementing 
the EU green finance taxonomy with a social taxonomy, and taking bold steps to re-allocate capital within 
the financial system from ‘brown’ and unsustainable activities into these new investment classes, as outlined 
in section 3.3.1. of this report, is key. Additionally, EU fiscal rules should be reformed with a view to rewarding 
sustainable public investments in affordable housing and protecting such programmes from falling victim to 
fiscal consolidation measures. 
Given the pivotal importance of housing policy to achieve the objectives of both the EU-anti poverty law and 
the European Green Deal, the European Commission should develop greater and permanent capacity for 
the formulation of related policy strategies. To this end, the Commission should establish a specialised ser-
vice among its Directorate Generals to drive policy design and coordination on housing matters. Additionally, 
Eurostat, the European statistical authority, should be given a mandate to collect more and better data on the 
social and ecological dimensions of housing markets and policies, including in relation to housing deprivation, 
homelessness and housing exclusion, energy efficiency of buildings and housing investment. Such data should 
be sufficiently location-specific, hence cover at least the NUTS-3 level of EU regions.274
Develop real governance capacity in relation to 
housing
274 Nasarre-Aznar, S. et al. (2021): Concrete Actions for Social and Affordable Housing in the EU, FEPS study, available at:  
https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/social%20affordable%20housing_report_feps_2021.pdf, p. 138
Establish an EU housing guarantee
To establish an effective obligation on the EU and its Member States to take effective action in view of the Euro-
pean housing crisis, progressive forces in civil society and parliaments should work towards the establishment 
of an EU Housing Guarantee. The guarantee would grant all EU citizens an enforceable right to gain access to 
decent and affordable accommodation, hence, be granted an individual right to housing which tenants do 
not suffer from overcrowding (see above) and housing overburden (see next proposal). While national gov-
ernments should be responsible for ensuring that this obligation is met, the EU budget should make financial 
support available to this end through earmarked funds under the EU investment programmes. 
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Consider the housing needs of an ageing EU  
population
Given the projected rise in the share of elderly citizens among the EU population, providing adequate capacity 
for investment in age-friendly housing should be considered an important priority for EU housing policy going 
forward. EU investment under the housing deal should thus earmark funds for renovations and construction 
enabling elderly citizens to live independently and to make use of decentralised home care. 
275 Nasarre-Aznar, S. et al. (2021): Concrete Actions for Social and Affordable Housing in the EU, FEPS study, available at:  
https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/social%20affordable%20housing_report_feps_2021.pdf,
Stimulate exchanges of best practice in housing 
policy between national and local authorities 
Due to the diversity of housing markets in the EU, despite their common challenges, local and regional author-
ities are typically best placed to ensure to ensure high quality in the design and implementation of concrete 
policies to expand the availability of affordable housing for all. A recent study commissioned by the Founda-
tion of European Progressive Studies (FEPS) found a wealth of successful practices pioneered by sub-national 
and national governments, numerous of which lend themselves to inspiring policy action at equivalent levels 
of government in other EU Member States.275 Examples include guarantee schemes for first-time real estate 
buyers, points systems in the allocation of social housing, and rent freeze systems in localities affected by pro-
cesses of gentrification. To foster mutual learning and cross-fertilisation, the European Commission, together 
with the European Committee of the Regions, should devise a strategy for the exchange of best practices 
among national and sub-national authorities and establish a repository of successful policies to build a Euro-
pean knowledge hub for housing policy in the Union. 
6.2.4.  A European care deal
Despite their uneven distribution among the popula-
tion, significant advances in healthcare as well as living 
and working conditions during the past decades are 
allowing Europeans to live longer lives. Accordingly, 
current projections expect the share of the population 
aged 65 or older to increase to 29% by 2060. On average, 
however, senior citizens are able to live only half of the 
remaining years past 65 without relying on assistance 
and care.276 Already today, though, Europe is facing 
serious shortages of care capacity, in long-term care for 
the elderly and disabled as much as in childcare. Cur-
rently, the annual investment gap that would need to 
be closed in order to keep track of society’s increasing 
needs for care capacity is estimated to amount to €70 
billion annually.277
Beyond raising serious doubts as to the future-pre-
paredness of European society, this gap is, already 
today, being found to act as a driver of poverty and 
deprivation. As good quality, accessible, and affordable 
care capacity is lacking, citizens, especially women, 
withdraw from the labour market and close the gap 
through their own informal and unpaid work.278 Conse-
quently, women in Europe are at higher risk of poverty 
than men, with 20% of poverty-affected women being 
primarily engaged in informal and unpaid care work.279 
Yet even where care capacity is available, poverty too 
often remains the outcome, again mainly for women. 
With the professional care sector being not only one of 
the most feminised sectors but also being one in which 
low wages and arduous working conditions are the most 
common,280 care in Europe in Europe is probably best 
described as a poverty trap. 
Since the adoption of the EU 2020 strategy in 2010, 
questions relating to the availability of adequate care 
services and the reconciliation of care and professional 
duties have figured prominently in EU policy debates 
and are recognised as being of key importance for their 
resilience in view of demographic ageing. Despite this, 
EU policy and regulation in this field remain limited. 
In 2002, EU Member States agreed on the ‘Barcelona 
Objectives’ to achieve a 33% participation rate of chil-
dren below the age of 3 and 90% of children between 3 
and the mandatory schooling age in formal childcare 
services by 2010. In 2016, the last year in which the Euro-
pean Commission provided a comprehensive progress 
report, these targets, which were considered unambi-
tious by many experts and stakeholder at the time of 
their adoption, had only been partially achieved, with 
strong variance between EU Member States.281
In recent years, EU action in the fields of long-term and 
child care have focussed primarily on matters of labour 
market regulation. In this regard, the work-life balance 
directive adopted in 2019, which establishes EU-wide 
minimum standards for paternity and carers’ leave 
as well as the right of employees to request flexible 
working arrangements to fulfil care duties, certainly 
represents a first step on the way to a more care-friendly 
Europe.282 Nevertheless, such provisions only represent 
part of the puzzle to effectively ensure care duties do 
not lead to workers’, and in particular women’s, with-
drawal from the labour market and poverty.283
However, such policy action has so far failed to address 
vicious circles that evidently exist in the EU social care 
sector. With demand for care rising and funding for 
care capacity continuing to be insufficient, women and 
care workers continue to take the brunt of the ensu-
ing hardship. However, with the COVID-19 pandemic 
bringing them to the fore, awareness of these injustices 
and societal dysfunctionalities is increasing among the 
general population. Policymakers therefore can ill-af-
ford continuing to turn a blind eye to such problems, 
and should finally move towards decisive action that is 
coordinated on a European scale.
What would be required to this end is a comprehen-
sive European care deal. Such a deal would have to set 
ambitious targets for the development of high quality, 
accessible, and affordable care infrastructures that 
create quality jobs for their workforce. Next to reduc-
ing the risk of poverty and bad working conditions, 
this deal can be expected to have tangible economic 
benefits, too. As it is currently estimated that women’s 
under-involvement in the workforce is costing Europe 
no less than €370 billion a year, as compared to €70 bil-
lion estimated to be necessary to close the EU care gap, 
such a deal can be expected to pay for itself. 
Against this backdrop, the ICSE issues the following 
recommendations: 
276 Fransen, L. (2018): Boosting Investment in Social Infrastructure in Europe, Report of the High-Level Task Force on Investing in Social Infrastructure in Europe,p. 16, available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/economy-finance/dp074_en.pdf
277 Ibid. p. 41
278 Peña-Casas, R. and Ghailani, D. (2021): A European minimum wage framework: the solution to the ongoing increase in in-work poverty in Europe?, pp. 145-6, in: Vanhercke B. et al.. (eds.) (2021) 
Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2020. Facing the pandemic, Brussels, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and European Social Observatory (OSE)
279 European Institute for Gender Equality (2016): Poverty, gender and intersecting inequalities in the EU, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, p.43
280 Eurofound (2020), Women and labour market equality: Has COVID-19 rolled back recent gains?, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
281 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/bcn_objectives-report2018_web_en.pdf; http://www.coface-eu.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/COFACE-paper_Childcare.pdf
282 The directive grants working parents of children under the age of 8 an enforceable right of four months of paid paternity leave, of which two months cannot be transferred between parents, five days 
of carers’ leave per calendar year, as well as the right to request temporary part-time work to provide care to dependents and to subsequently return to the previous employment arrangement, the 
exact modalities of which are to be set by Member States.
283 Helfferich, B. (2021): Towards a Fairer, Care-Focused Europe, available at: https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/events/policy%20study_care4care.pdf
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Support good working conditions in the care 
sector
Depending on the modes of care services provision in their Member States, governments should review their 
bodies of regulation with a view to identifying potential needs for care-specific labour market policies, for 
instance as regards enlarged opportunities for education and training, or reforms in the structure of national 
care systems to ensure good working and wage conditions in the sector. Moreover, governments should work 
with social partners to achieve full collective bargaining coverage in the professional care sectors as quickly as 
possible. As a rule, payments to private care operators under national long-term care insurance systems should 
be conditional on the application of collective agreements.285 Such action should be flanked by an EU-wide 
qualification programme, supported by structural funds and Erasmus+. The EU should also offer avenues 
for exchange and peer-learning in care-work training and skilling and facilitate cooperation amongst public 
administration, private enterprises and other relevant stakeholders in taking action to fill staff shortages in the 
care sector.
Privilege responsible operators in the care sector
To ensure a high quality of care services and high job quality in the care sector, the ICSE considers that increased 
investment in care capacity should primarily lead to increased public sector involvement, hence care provision 
under the direct responsibility of public authorities and under the conditions of public sector employment. 
Given that outsourcing in this sector has exposed care institutions and their workforce to market pressure, 
which has often led to problems in terms of quality and working conditions, the use of private operators should 
be considered second choice. Where such arrangements cannot be avoided, legislation should be in place to 
establish adequate safeguards. This could, for instance, take the form of requirements for operators in the care 
sector to adopt the benefit cooperation statute proposed in section 3.4.2. of this report that ensures companies 
are committed and accountable to considerations of public interest. 
Member States, in whose area of competence the regulation and provision of childcare and long-term care 
services lies, should agree on a common set of quality standards for such services. These standards should 
entail specific provisions to ensure a high quality of the content of care services, their universal accessibility, and 
affordability irrespective of recipients and beneficiaries’ incomes. Importantly, such standards should adopt an 
‘ecosystem’ approach to allow for the seamless integration and cooperation between multiple forms of care 
provision, hence, between centrally or de-centrally administered care and informal care provided by family 
members.284
Define EU quality standards for childcare and 
long-term care services




Support Member States through EU co-financing 
provisions and access to finance
National policies for the provision and improvement of care infrastructures are already eligible for investments 
under the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the InvestEU programme and 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.287 Going forward, the programming of these funds 
should take due account of Member States’ investment gaps identified as part of the European Commission’s 
assessment of national care performance and ensure sufficient levels of funding are earmarked for care-related 
actions. Additionally, care services meeting the EU quality care standards should be included under the EU 
social sustainable finance taxonomy (cf. section 3.3.1.). 
Coordinate policy action through the European 
Well-being Budgeting Procedure
The above-mentioned quality standards for care services should be translated into specific indicators allowing 
the European Commission to the assess Member States performance in meeting the EU quality care stand-
ards.288 Such national performance reviews should be carried out as part of the European well-being budgeting 
procedure, include structured assessments of the working conditions in national care systems, and trigger 
country-specific recommendations for Member States to take into account in their preparation of national 
sustainable well-being plans if needs for further action have been determined. As a standard feature, Member 
States’ performance assessments should contain estimates of the investment gap persisting in the delivery of 
quality care services to enable informed public debate and targeted policy action. 
Introduce an EU care guarantee 
As part of the EU sustainable jobs guarantee, EU Member States should consider establishing care guaran-
tee schemes. As part of the scheme, workers wishing to exit their current hob to provide care for relatives 
could enter the care guarantee and receive poverty-proof wages. The guarantee should be combined with 
adequate education and training opportunities for the carer and could likewise be offered on a part-time basis 
to combine employment under the care guarantee with regular employment. In their preparation of such care 
guarantee schemes, Member States should be encouraged draw on the experience of fellow governments, of 
which several have already introduced similar models on their own initiative.286
286 Ibid.
287 Helfferich, B. (2021): Towards a Fairer, Care-Focused Europe, available at: https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/events/policy%20study_care4care.pdf
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6.3.  Fighting inequali-
ties in income and 
wealth 
While alleviating poverty and fighting precarity 
constitutes an indispensable step on the way to 
sustainable well-being for all, achieving this goal 
requires policy action to go further. Inequalities 
of income and wealth, the prime examples of ver-
tical inequalities that create social hierarchies 
within societies and drive social groups apart, are 
of particular concern in this respect (cf. chapter 
1). Unfortunately, it is especially this dimension of 
inequalities in which recent decades have seen major 
setbacks, in Europe as much as worldwide. Although 
the EU continues to count as the most egalitarian 
world region, the top 10% of the EU population cap-
ture no less of 37% of annual income. Across the 
European Union, and especially within the Euro-
zone, wealth inequalities have risen in recent years, 
to the extent that 1% of the EU population owns 25% 
of private wealth assets today.289
Unfortunately, the pandemic appears to have had 
further dramatic impacts on the distribution of 
income and wealth in Europe. As the full impact 
of the social crisis caused by the pandemic begins 
to show in official statistics, first analyses of such 
data suggest that low-income households in Europe 
are bearing the brunt of the economic slowdown 
and may have lost, on average, more than 16% of 
their monthly incomes.290 According to the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation, only four out of 27 EU 
Member States have been able to contain increases 
in the income inequality between those at the 
bottom of the labour market (the 10th percentile) 
and those at the top (the 90th percentile) to less than 
10% since the pandemic began.291 
As chapter 1 of this report has pointed out, policy 
action to reverse such inequalities amounts to more 
than a political choice rooted in the values of pro-
gressive politics but, in times of accelerating and 
increasingly life-threatening climate change and 
environmental degradation, constitutes a political 
necessity. As is becoming clear, inequalities, cli-
mate change, and environmental degradation are 
evidently interacting in the form of vicious circles, 
in which their detrimental impacts are mutually 
reinforced and aggravated. What is more is that, as 
the gilets jaunes movement in France has illustrated 
forcefully, climate action and environmental poli-
cies are at risk of being met with forceful resistance 
if they add to pre-existing inequalities. Against 
this backdrop, targeted action to fight inequalities 
must constitute a central element of action aiming 
to enable the sustainable well-being of planet and 
people. 
For the ICSE, fixing these structural disparities in 
the interest of sustainable well-being for all on a 
preserved planet requires urgent action along three 
dimensions. First, this requires action to bolster 
incomes generated from labour by strengthen-
ing the mechanisms and institutions that working 
people rely on to gain their fair share of the pie. 
Secondly, it will require that tax systems, especially 
for wealth and corporate profits, which, at present, 
are either non-existent or broken, are fixed on a 
European and global scale to end the current redis-
tribution of income and wealth from the bottom to 
the top. Thirdly, it requires a new approach to satis-
fying the well-being-related needs and aspirations 
of all members of society that works on a collective 
level, as opposed to individual income and wealth, 
and which thus report understands as common 
wealth. The following is intended as a guide for 
related policy action.
The top 10% of the EU 
population capture no less 
of 37% of annual income.
37%
289 Thomas Blanchet, Lucas Chancel, Amory Gethin (2019): Forty years of inequality in Europe: Evidence from distributional national accounts, available at:  
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290 Juan C.Palomino, Juan G.Rodríguez, Raquel Sebastian (2020): Wage inequality and poverty effects of lockdown and social distancing in Europe, European Economic Review, Volume 129
291 International Labour Organisation (2020): Global Wage Report 2020–21: Wages and minimum wages in the time of COVID-19, Geneva: ILO.
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6.3.1.  Good wages for all
Even if Europe can still be considered the most egal-
itarian world region in terms of income inequalities, 
the trend has certainly not to working people’s favour 
over the past 20 years. Since the start of the millen-
nium, the labour share of income has first declined 
and then remained at a subdued level in the EU, while 
profits from capital income increased.292 At the same 
time, the share of labour income going to the top 
end of the distribution increased, especially in the 
Eurozone,293 thus leading to greater wage polarisa-
tion in the EU labour market. In other words, then, a 
shrinking pie is increasingly unequally distributed. 
For the past decade, EU policy has contributed 
substantially to such growing disparity. Since the 
eruption of the European sovereign debt crisis and 
in an attempt to gain an edge over competitors in 
global markets, the European Commission’s Coun-
try-specific Recommendations issued as part of the 
European Semester repeatedly called on Member 
States to ensure greater flexibility for companies in 
setting wages for their workforce. Calls to disman-
tle collective bargaining systems, for instance by 
limiting possibilities for collective agreements to 
become extended to all workers in a given sector, or 
to decentralise them by restricting collective wage 
negotiations to the level of individual companies 
altogether, figured prominently among the Commis-
sion’s recommendations, especially during the early 
years of the crisis. Consequently, collective bargain-
ing coverage has dropped from 73% in 2000 to 61% in 
2018, while in 18 of 27 EU Member States 15% or more 
of the workforce earn less than 60% of the national 
median income, hence, less than the poverty thresh-
old currently used in official statistics, despite 
working full-time.294 The COVID-19 pandemic has 
heightened public awareness of the injustice and 
hardship such growing disparities cause even for 
workers in sectors of essential importance for the 
well-being and proper functioning of society, such 
as healthcare, retail, and logistics. First evidence in 
fact suggests that low levels of pay combined with 
increased levels of work strain as a result of the pan-
demic have led swaths of frontline workers to quit 
their jobs, illustrating how such inequalities under-
mine society’s ability to cope with adversity.295 
Against this backdrop, EU and national wage and 
labour market policy must embark on a new, rad-
ically different course if sustainable well-being 
for all is to become a reality in Europe. As part of 
such a new agenda, a U-turn as regards the inter-
action between EU policy and collective bargaining 
practices is a condition sine qua non. Instead of dis-
mantling and decentralising collective wage-setting 
systems, EU policy will have to work to reinforce 
and expand them. Based on the insights of recent 
research by the OECD, which found that a substan-
tial mitigation of wage inequalities in the labour 
market requires that collective bargaining occurs 
at a level not lower than at least the sectoral level,296 
building capacity for collective wage negotiations 
at this level of the economy should be actively sup-
ported through EU policy. 
To ensure policy effectiveness, related action must 
go beyond the mere reversal of past EU policy. As 
labour markets and the structure of employment 
are changing, not least through new forms of digital 
employment, for instance on online platforms, and 
given an increasing prevalence of atypical forms of 
employment, such as self-employment, EU policy 
must likewise serve to ensure that collective bar-
gaining practices and structures are modernised 
in a way that makes them fit for meeting the chal-
lenges at hand. 
 
Against this background, the ICSE issues the 
following recommendations: 
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Launch a European collective bargaining offensive
As suggested by a recent European Parliament report,297 the EU and Member States should work towards 
achieving the target of covering 90% of the EU workforce in collective bargaining by 2030. To this end, the offen-
sive should work to reinforce collective bargaining ‘from above and below’.298
In terms of strengthening collective bargaining ‘from below’, bolstering the role of trade unions, whose mem-
bership has declined to an EU-wide average of a mere 23% over the past decades, represents a first crucial 
step.299 To achieve this, Member States should engage with social partners to develop national strategies that 
set positive incentives for workers to join a union, such as the possibility of tax deductions for union dues. Addi-
tionally, the European body of EU and national company law should be revised so as to ensure that companies 
of all sizes must go beyond the mere acceptance of workers’ rights to trade union membership and allow trade 
unions to access workplaces. Similar organising approaches should be rolled out for the employers’ side, where 
membership in social partner organisations is often feeble, although membership in representative employers’ 
organisations, for instance sectoral associations, is often the most effective way to create forms of inclusive 
collective bargaining and social dialogue that also involve small and micro enterprises.300
To boost reinforce bargaining ‘from above’, the EU and Member States should create legal framework conditions 
that favour collective bargaining at the sectoral level. To this end, extensive provisions for the generalisation of 
collective agreements to ensure their binding applicability to all workers and companies within a given sector 
should be established. Collective bargaining at the level of companies should be constrained by non-regres-
sion clauses, hence allow lower-level negotiations to go beyond, but not to undercut sectoral agreements. 
Exemptions from such clauses, for instance to allow companies undergoing acute financial stress, should be 
carefully designed to avoid abuse. Additionally, the European Commission should issue a proposal for the revi-
sion of the EU public procurement directive to introduce a mandatory social clause that works to ensure that 
tenders from operators applying sectoral collective agreements are favoured. 
Encourage better collective bargaining outcomes 
for part-time workers
Social partners should be encouraged to take specific measures to address the situation of part-time workers, 
who often suffer from low wages and in-work poverty both because of low hourly wages and low amounts 
working time. In several countries, trade unions have already begun to adapt their negotiating strategies 
accordingly. Next to demanding pay increases in the form of percentages of hourly or monthly wages, they are 
becoming increasingly successful in securing wage rises in the form of lump sums, i.e., numerically defined 
minimum pay rises per worker. Due to their beneficial impact on reducing the poverty risk of such atypical 
workers, trade unions and employers make use of such practices more consistently. 
297 European Parliament Report on a Strong Social Europe for Just Transitions (2020/2084(INI))




Adopt a bolstered and effective EU pay transpar-
ency directive
Responding to calls from trade unions and progressive political forces, the European Commission issued a 
legislative proposal for an EU pay transparency directive in March 2021.303 Under the proposed measures, job-
seekers would have a right to information about the pay range of posts they apply for while employers would 
be prohibited from demanding information of an applicant's pay history. Employees would also have a right to 
ask their employer for sex-disaggregated information on the average pay of other workers doing the same or 
equal work. If a company employs at least 250 workers, an obligation to report publicly on the gender pay gap 
within the company and to set out remedial action if the gap exceeds 5% and cannot to be justified on objec-
tive grounds would apply. Where instances of pay discrimination are identified, victims would have a right to 
compensation, in particular through back payments. 
Binding rules for pay transparency and reporting are essential to boost the fight against wage discrimination, 
for instance between women and men, as well as to mitigate income inequalities more broadly by shedding 
light on excessive executive pay. The ICSE therefore commends the Commission’s initiative and calls on the 
European Parliament to make swift progress towards adoption. Nevertheless, the Commission proposal suf-
fers from a number of shortcomings that should be rectified by Parliament and Council as part of the ongoing 
legislative procedure. 
Due to their status as individual economic entities, self-employed workers, even if working ‘solo self-employed’ 
without acting as employers of other workers fall into the scope of EU competition law. Accordingly, collec-
tive wage-setting arrangements, for instance in the form of agreements on minimum fees among groups 
of solo self-employed workers, are frequently identified as anti-competitive forms of market distortion by 
competition authorities. This leads this part of the workforce to become particularly vulnerable, especially in 
terms of low pay and high work strain, causing approximately one quarter of the EU solo self-employed to be 
subject to highly problematic working conditions, without having access to effective remedies.301 Although 
some Member States have created exemptions for parts of the self-employed workforce, for instance for free-
lance musicians and other creative workers, the situation is uneven in Europe and suffers from legal certainty. 
In early 2021, the European Commission opened a public consultation to invite the views of stakeholders to 
prepare potential legislative action with a view to rectifying this situation. The Commission’s eventual propos-
als should work to ensure that solo self-employed workers are defined by a specific legal status that places 
them between that of dependently employed workers and incorporated businesses and exempts them from 
standard EU competition regulations. Additionally, the European Commission should, in close cooperation with 
social partners, consider issuing guidance to Member States on how to stimulate social dialogue and collective 
bargaining under the involvement of solo self-employed workers. To this end, it should draw on the experience 
of successful practices applied by OECD member countries, where different models of collective bargaining 
practices for the self-employed have been developed, for instance in the form of negotiations between ‘guilds’ 
and employers, class exemptions of self-employed workers in specific sectors from competition law, and super-
vised or pre-authorised negotiation processes.302 
Enable collective bargaining for the self-employed
301 Eurofound (2017), Exploring self-employment in the European Union, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
302 OECD (2019), Negotiating Our Way Up: Collective Bargaining in a Changing World of Work, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1fd2da34-en, pp. 239-40
303 Draft directive 2021/0050 (COD)
238 
Under the current proposal, the definition of criteria to determine what establishes work of equal value, hence, to 
establish the categories of jobs within which pay equality must be ensured, would fall entirely into the responsi-
bility of employers. This approach constitutes a serious weakness that risks turning the proposed measures into 
meaningless provisions. The proposal should therefore be amended to ensure that workers representatives in 
the form of works councils or trade unions are involved in the definition of such criteria and that similarity crite-
ria defined at a higher level than the company, for instance as part of sectoral collective bargaining, are applied. 
Moreover, public reporting on the gender pay gap should be made mandatory for companies of all sizes, not 
only for companies with a workforce of 250 or more as per the Commission’s proposal. Reporting obligations 
for small and micro enterprises could potentially foresee longer reporting intervals but should nevertheless be 
binding. If an unjustifiable pay gap has been established, the directive should further establish an unequivocal 
requirement that remedial action must be negotiated with works councils or trade unions. 
Crucially, the Commission’s proposal lacks provisions to ensure companies are also obliged to report on the 
levels of pay between different categories of employees, hence, to release data as to the pay gaps between 
workers, managers, and executives. Such data is however crucial to determine the level of income inequal-
ity within companies and should therefore be assessed and published alongside gender-disaggregated data. 
Such reports should likewise contain data as regards potential instances of pay discrimination on other grounds 
of discrimination recognised in EU legislation, such as ethnicity, faith, and sexual orientation. Such data should 
be recorded based on the voluntary self-identification of members of the workforce, with related instances of 
discrimination being made subject to the same provisions applying to cases of gender discrimination. 
6.3.2.  Make tax systems contribute to 
sustainable well-being for all
Embarking on a transition toward a new economic 
and social model doubtlessly requires the mobilisa-
tion of significant resources to finance the policies 
required to achieve the objectives of carbon-neutral-
ity and nurturing society’s well-being. Effective tax 
systems that generate sufficient income and distrib-
ute the associated financial burden in a way that is 
consistent with the aim of mitigating inequalities 
and nurturing societal well-being are indispensable 
in this respect. At present, tax systems in the EU are 
clearly failing to achieve this. By placing a dispropor-
tionate burden on low- and medium-income earners 
through the generation of 65% of overall tax revenue 
from labour and consumption taxes, while yielding 
only 7% from corporate income and 5% from prop-
erty, such systems act as drivers of inequality rather 
than fighting it.304 Far-reaching and coordinated 
reforms at the European and global levels therefore 
constitute key elements of an overall policy strategy 
to achieve sustainable well-being for all. 
Indeed, much of what is needed in this regard can 
be descried as fixing errors of the past. Cleary, such 
a reversal of past mistakes must engage with the 
taxation of private wealth. The current situation, in 
which a single EU Member State applies some form 
of taxation to the assets of wealthy households, i.e., 
Spain since 2018, constitutes a historical anomaly. 
Throughout much of the 20th century, similar levies 
formed an organic part of numerous European coun-
tries’ tax systems and were only repealed recently, 
mostly at the turn of the new millennium.305 In view 
of the challenges Europe is faced with today, and 
especially regarding their enormous financial impli-
cations, this is untenable on at least two accounts. 
First, today’s private wealth represents the product 
of an economy whose unsustainable externalities 
have begun to threaten the livelihood and well-be-
ing of future generations. Employing private wealth 
in fixing the damages its accumulation has been 
complicit with therefore constitutes a clear case of 
inter-generational justice. Second, as the sustainable 
transformation of Europe is not a matter of choice 
but inevitable given the life-threatening effects inac-
tion would have, drawing on existing capital stocks 
such as private wealth to finance it likewise classi-
fies as an inevitability. Yet, sourcing in such private 
wealth in the form of public debt and paying interest 
on its use would lead to further increases in inequal-
ity, and thus continue to undermine the social 
cohesion that is necessary to master the transition 
successfully. 
Next to the taxation of private wealth, the path 
towards sustainable well-being for all must include 
sweeping reforms in the taxation of corporate prof-
its, in Europe and worldwide. Over the past forty 
years, the global corporate tax system has developed 
into a powerful enabler of ruthless profit extraction 
which is skilfully played by multinational corpora-
tions to their favour. 
»Next to the 
taxation of 
private wealth, 
the path towards 
sustainable 
well-being for all 
must include 
sweeping 
reforms in the 
taxation of 
corporate profits, 
in Europe and 
worldwide.«
304 European Commission Communication (COM (2021) 251 final) on Business Taxation for the 21st Century of 18 May 2021, available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/system/files/2021-05/communication_on_business_taxation_for_the_21st_century.pdf




Governments across the world have been more than 
innocent bystanders in this reckless endeavour. By 
lowering corporate tax rates from an average of 40% 
in the 1980s to a mere 24% today, with many coun-
tries, including in the EU, applying lower rates and 
companies often enjoying generous allowances and 
deductions that lead to much lower effective rates 
of taxation than nominal rates might suggest, they 
have contributed actively to stripping their coffers 
empty.306 Additionally, by opening their economies 
to global markets and financial flows without closing 
loopholes that encourage aggressive tax planning 
and tax avoidance, they have often wilfully accepted 
being played by the greedy. Digital companies, 
which are certainly at the greatest ease to shift their 
profits across borders to jurisdictions in which tax 
rates are lowest, are paying on average no more than 
9.5% in corporate income tax, compared to 23.2% for 
‘traditional’ companies. A recent study compiled by 
the World Inequality Lab finds that close to 40% of 
multinational profits were shifted to tax havens in 
2015, with EU countries being the largest losers.307 
According to the European Commission, the cor-
porate tax revenue losses thus enabled are likely to 
amount to an annual € 50-70 billion.308 
Despite this dismal situation and the substantial 
amounts of public attention it received in recent 
years, government action, in Europe and worldwide, 
has been lagging. Given the need to reach unanim-
ity among the governments involved, initiatives to 
modernise corporate taxation frameworks and to 
ensure a fairer taxation of the digital economy have 
been stalled within the European Union as much 
as in global negotiations. While limited progress in 
Europe could nevertheless be achieved through the 
relentless work of progressive political forces in the 
European Parliament, for instance as part of the 
fight against tax evasion and avoidance and through 
the establishment of an EU Tax Observatory to create 
greater research and analysis capacity, structural 
shifts in the recalibration of EU tax systems have so 
far remained elusive. 
However, as the COVID-19 pandemic has led govern-
ment debt levels to surge, and as new transatlantic 
alliances for a fairer global tax system finally seem 
possible, the moment for change may have arrived. 
As a first manifestation of such newfound political 
will, the European Parliament and Council could 
find agreement in principle to enlarge the EU tax 
base, including by working towards the introduc-
tion of an EU Financial Transaction Tax and an EU 
digital levy (see below for more information) before 
the next European elections. What appears particu-
larly promising in this regard is that the agreement 
includes the fact that such new sources of public 
revenue should operate as own resources for the 
EU budget. Also, the European Commission’s recent 
announcement to hold a high-level tax symposium 
to reflect on necessary adjustments in tax systems to 
achieve the EU’s objective of building a climate-neu-
tral economy by 2050 can be read as an encouraging 
sign. 
The ICSE calls on the European Union and its 
Member States to seize and reinforce this momen-
tum and, against this backdrop, issues the following 
recommendations:
»The COVID-19 
pandemic has led 
government debt 
levels to surge.«
40% of multinational profits were 






Introduce an EU net wealth tax
Although research on wealth inequalities is notoriously challenging, due to the opacity of the economic and 
financial structures in which wealth assets are immersed, enquiries carried out over the past two decades 
have been able to determine a sufficiently accurate picture of the stock and distribution of wealth in Europe. 
Accordingly, it must be assumed that the top 1% of wealthiest individuals in Europe hold approximately 25% 
of combined EU private wealth. Targeting wealth taxes at this group and their net wealth assets, hence finan-
cial and physical assets, such as stocks and real estate, net of their owners’ debt, would mobilise significant 
amounts of tax income.310 Against this backdrop, a European net wealth tax model could combine a high 
threshold, which appears advisable to ensure broad support for the introduction of a wealth tax, with tax rates 
that progress strongly across a succession of relatively broad tax brackets. 
A recent study based on household survey data sourced by the European Central Bank estimates the revenue 
progressive wealth taxes applying to the richest households could generate (see table next page). 
To facilitate future negotiations on the harmonisation of tax systems at the level of EU, the decision-making 
process in the European Council needs to move away from the principle of unanimity and be made subject to 
decision-making by means of qualified majority voting. The current unanimity principle gives each EU Member 
State a veto right – a right that is vigorously used by some Member States to maintain tax systems that delib-
erately undercut those of fellow Member States to attract more foreign capital. Such beggar-thy-neighbour 
practices lock the European Union into a race to the bottom in terms of corporate taxation and therefore can 
no longer be tolerated. As long as Member States continue to either drag their feet or oppose changing the 
European Treaties to formally abolish the unanimity principle in the field of taxation, the European Commission 
should invoke Art. 116 TFEU, as it publicly considered already in 2019.309 As Art. 119 allows for the adoption of leg-
islation to rectify market distortions by way of the ordinary legislative procedure, hence with qualified majority 
in the Council and simple majority in the European Parliament, and given that the high degree of dysfunction-
ality particularly as regards the current EU corporate taxation framework must be considered such a distortion, 
the Commission should no longer refrain from using this option. 
Abolish the unanimity principle on matters of 
taxation in the European Council
309 cf. COM(2019) 8 final
310 Landais, C. et al. (2020): A Progressive European Wealth Tax to Fund the European COVID Response, available at: https://voxeu.org/article/progressive-european-wealth-tax-fund-european-covid-response 
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Tax brackets Tax rates
Model 1 Model 2
Below €1 million 0% 0%
From €1 million 
Targeting 5.4 million households (top 3% wealthiest) 1% 0%
From €2 million 
Targeting 1.9 million households (top 1% wealthiest) 2% 2%
From €5 million 
Targeting 550,000 households (top 0.3% wealthiest) 3% 3%
From €10 million 
Targeting 220,000 households (top 0.1% wealthiest) 5%
From €50 million 
Targeting 23,000 households (top 0.01% wealthiest) 7%
From €100 million 
Targeting 9,000 households (top 0.005% wealthiest) 8%
From €500 million 
Targeting 1,200 households (top 0.001% wealthiest) 10%
Estimated Revenue 
With tax avoidance €224 billion = 1.9%  of EU GDP
€357 billion = 3%  
of EU GDP
Without tax avoidance €316 billion = 2.7%  of GDP 
€505 billion = 4.3%  
of GDP 
Even if tax avoidance practices are factored in, such a taxation model could yield significant income. In case 
of model 1 quoted above, such income would amount to €224 billion a year, the equivalent of 1.9% of EU GDP 
and 4.1% of government revenue. Revenue from model 2 would amount to as much as €357 billion a year, the 
equivalent of 3% of EU GDP and 6.6% of current government revenue. If combined with strong and effective 
measures to limit the scope for tax avoidance, revenue would increase to €316 (model 1) or €505 billion (model 
2), thus 2.7% of GDP and 5.8% of current government revenue in the case of model 1 and 4.3% of GDP and 9.3% 
of current government revenue if model 2 were to be applied.311
To unlock this revenue potential and put the financing of the transition towards an economic and social model 
fostering the well-being of people and planet on a solid foundation, EU Member States should convene and 
agree on the progressive taxation of private wealth. As the model outlined above illustrates clearly, massive 
amounts of liquidity could be mobilised without encroaching on the resources of 99% of the population. Deliv-
ering this by means of coordinated EU action would have clear benefits by constituting the opportunity to 
design a common taxation system to face common challenges while at the same time allowing for coordinated 
measures to close cross-border loopholes for tax avoidance and fraud. 
311 Kapeller, J. et al. (2021): A European Wealth Tax for a Fair and Green Recovery, available at: https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/a%20european%20wealth%20tax_policy%20study.pdf
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To ensure multinational companies taking advantage of global and European economic integration pay their 
fair share of tax on the profits they generate, a common minimum corporate tax rate applied in as many coun-
tries as possible and common standards for the definition of the underlying tax base would be a game changer 
for global income and wealth equality. After a decade of inconclusive and frequently blocked negotiations 
under the auspices of the OECD, international agreement on a common framework between 130 countries 
representing 90% of global GDP could finally be reached in early July 2021.312
As part of the agreement, participating countries are required to ensure that the profits of multinational com-
panies registered in their jurisdictions are taxed at a rate of at least 15%. This rate would apply as an effective 
rate, hence ensure that overall corporate income is taxed at a rate of 15%, even if parts of corporations’ income is 
taxed at lower rates (for instance through incentive schemes) or not taxed at all (for instance as part of tax-free 
allowances).313 If a company is found to have paid less than an effective 15% in another country, the government 
of the country in which the corporations’ headquarters or parent company is registered would be obliged to 
collect additional taxes to cover the spread. Additionally, the agreement covers provisions to ensure a fairer 
distribution of the revenue derived from the taxation of very large multinational companies with more than 
$20 billion in annual turnover. To this end, the agreement contains an ‘apportionment formula’ that grants gov-
ernments in the countries where such profits are generated, and not only the governments of the countries in 
which the companies in question are registered, the right to tax a portion of such income. 
The agreement on this comprehensive set of rules as part of a multilateral process represents a crucial first 
step to fix the grave injustices and dysfunctionalities of the global tax system. By seriously limiting corporate 
tax competition between participating governments, restricting the ability of multinational corporations to 
capitalise on profit shifting strategies, and giving more governments a stake in the taxation of global mega-cor-
porations, the agreed provisions have truly game-changing effects. 
Against this backdrop, it is highly deplorable in the view of the ICSE that especially EU governments have 
worked to steer agreement towards a relatively modest tax rate of 15% rather than the previously discussed 21%. 
While welcoming the agreement and recognising its value, progressive political forces in the EU and globally 
should continue to campaign for the upward revision of the minimum tax rate over time. 
End the race to the bottom: global corporate taxa-
tion for the globalised economy
Therefore, the ICSE calls on the European Commission to launch an initiative to engage Member States in the 
joint and coordinated design of a consistent framework for an EU net wealth tax as soon as possible. With the 
forthcoming study of the EU Tax Observatory on wealth taxation, due for publication in November 2021, the 
Commission will be in possession of its own evidence base which it should use to build powerful and convinc-
ing arguments in favour of a greater contribution of wealthy households to the financing of the sustainable 
transition of Europe. Additionally, the Commission should ensure its legislative proposals contain earmarking 
provisions to ensure the revenue generated by an EU net wealth tax directly benefits citizens at large, espe-
cially by dedicating sufficient amounts of revenue to the financing of the policies proposed as part of the EU 
anti-poverty law and accompanying initiatives described in section 6.2. of this chapter. To support the Euro-
pean dimension of the anti-poverty law, such earmarked amounts should be structured as own resources for 
the EU budget. 
312 https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf
313 The final agreement reached between the 130 participating countries foresees a limited number of ‘carve-outs’ to this rule, implying that, for instance, incentives for investments in ‘tangible assets’, 
such as machinery, are exempted from the determination of the effective rate of taxation.
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Create a fully harmonised EU corporate taxation 
framework
The ICSE welcome the European Commission’s continued commitment to the aim of creating a fully harmo-
nised and fair EU corporate taxation system, as reiterated by its Communication on Business Taxation for the 
21st century of 18 May 2021. As proposed by the Commission, such a framework, going by the acronym BEFIT,315 
should consist of a uniform set of rules applying across the EU for the determination of taxable corporate 
income. Next to ensuring that companies active in the EU can no longer profit from mismatches between 
national taxation systems that lend themselves to exploitation through tax avoidance practices, such a frame-
work would also lower the tax compliance burden for companies active throughout the European Union and 
thus classifies as a win-win-opportunity. 
The ICSE also welcomes the Commission’s intention to introduce mechanism for the consolidation of corporate 
income as part of BEFIT. Such a mechanism would work to ensure that corporate profits in Europe would be 
taxed in the country in which they are generated, not in the country in which the company is registered. To this 
end, an apportionment formula will be developed to allocate taxation rights to the governments of the coun-
tries in which a given company conducts its business. The ICSE calls on the European Commission to ensure 
that this formula is developed in a holistic and sufficiently sophisticated way. Allocating taxation rights solely 
based on the geographic distribution of companies’ sales should be avoided. Instead, other factors, such as the 
creation of value-added and, crucially, employment, should likewise be considered. Additionally, the formula 
should be designed in a way that accounts for the digital presence of companies to ensure governments can 
tax the profits generated by foreign firms from digital transactions in their national markets. The introduction 
of such a consolidation mechanism would thus justify the suspension of the EU digital levy (see previous rec-
ommendation). 
As envisaged by the own resources roadmap agreed by the European Parliament and Council, parts of the tax 
income yielded as part of BEFIT should be directly allocated to the EU budget. This allocation should go signifi-
cantly beyond compensation for the revenue lost by the repeal of the then obsolete EU digital levy. 
Additionally, and as intended by the European Commission, the global minimum taxation framework should 
be transposed into national legislation in EU countries by means of an EU directive to adapt its provisions to the 
specific context of the European single market.314 Yet, as three EU Member States (Estonia, Hungary, and Ire-
land) have refused to sign on to the multilateral, related EU legislation risks being stalled due to the unanimity 
requirement in the European Council. 
The ICSE therefore encourages the European Commission to thoroughly assess the possibility of invoking 
Article 116 TFEU, which grants it competence to propose legislation to rectify distortions of the proper function-
ing of the European single market for adoption by way of the ordinary legislative procedure, i.e., by qualified 
majority in the Council and a simple majority in the European Parliament. As a last resort, the transposition of 
the multilateral agreement into national law by means of enhanced cooperation between EU Member States 
should be enabled. 
314 European Commission Communication (COM (2021) 251 final) on Business Taxation for the 21st Century of 18 May 2021, available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/default/files/communication_on_business_taxation_for_the_21st_century.pdf
315 Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT), cf. COM (2021) 251 final
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As part of the agreement on the current EU Multi-annual Financial Framework and to contribute to the financ-
ing of the jointly issued debt to roll out the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility, the European Parliament and 
Council agreed to a time-bound roadmap for the introduction of new EU own resources, including a Financial 
Transaction Tax (FTT), an EU digital levy, and a common EU corporate tax framework (see following recommen-
dation). To ensure adherence to this timeline, progressive political forces at the EU and national levels should 
prepare coordinated action and build effective transnational campaigns to create strong public pressure and 
hold national governments accountable, who have acted as a brake on related action in the past. 
As regards the introduction of an EU FTT by 2026 based on a proposal of the European Commission to be pub-
lished no later than June 2024, such campaigns should be based on the experience of previous failed or stalled 
attempts to introduce such a tax. To this end, highlighting how governments either withdrew from related 
legislative negotiations or could only manage to achieve a convergence of national positions on provisions with 
a severely limited scope and contrasting such policy failure with concrete examples of the benefits citizens can 
expect from investments in sustainable well-being for all should be a key theme in related work on the part of 
progressives. 
Relating to measures to ensure a fairer taxation of the digital economy, the ICSE recalls the urgency created by 
the dysfunctionality of the current taxation framework. As the digital economy operates in a way that allows 
companies to engage with customers without being physically present and incorporated in clients’ countries 
of residence, digital services providers typically do not pay taxes on the profits generated through such trans-
actions in these countries. Fixing this injustice requires the development of provisions that acknowledge that 
digital presence should, for tax purposes, be treated in the same way as companies’ physical presence and 
allocate the taxation rights for profits to the government in whose territory they are generated. As the appor-
tionment formula developed as part of the multilateral negotiations on a global minimum corporate tax rate 
applies only to companies with an annual turnover of more than $20 billion (see previous recommendation), 
it would cover only a limited sub-set of digital companies and therefore fail to provide an adequate solution. 
In view of the complexity of the problem of digital presence, the European Commission currently seems to 
aim at the taxation of digital companies’ turnover rather than profits as part of its work on a proposal for an EU 
digital levy, due for publication in July 2021. While acknowledging the need for swift action, the ICSE wishes 
to highlight that such an approach might constitute threats to the ability to invest and indeed the viability of 
affected companies, as it pays no regard to companies’ profitability. It is therefore recommended that such a 
taxation of turnover should only serve as an interim solution that should be in force only until a sounder and 
profits-focussed solution can be defined as part of a more comprehensive overhaul of EU business taxation 
(see following recommendation), the timeline for which should therefore be tightened. 
Introduce an EU FTT and digital levy: ensure 
adherence to the own resources roadmap
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Introduce a temporary excess profit tax to levy a 
contribution from the corporate sector to financ-
ing the cost of the COVID-19 pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic and related lockdown measures have plunged many businesses in Europe into deep 
financial difficulty as their business activities were disrupted, and partly even suspended altogether. Consequently, 
governments across Europe as well as the EU, through its Recovery and Resilience Facility, have prepared large-
scale support packages to provide stimulus and save temporarily ailing but otherwise viable businesses. Despite 
a number of shortcomings in the design and delivery of such stimulus packages, for instance as regards their 
insufficient orientation towards social and ecological policy objectives, such interventions have by and large been 
commendable. However, they have also led to new financial liabilities on the part of public coffers, having contrib-
uted to an increase in the amount of public debt relative to GDP by over 13% within one year.316
At the same time, some sectors and businesses in the EU have been able to flourish and increase profits during the 
pandemic, partly by ‘sucking up’ the business lost by companies that were affected by coronavirus-induced restric-
tions. Businesses finding themselves in this fortunate situation should now be asked to make an exceptional and 
temporary contribution to financing the cost of the public health crisis. The European Commission should therefore 
work with Member State governments to introduce a temporary excess-profit tax for the financial years affected 
by the pandemic. Such a tax could be designed to apply to large companies whose profits during the pandemic 
exceeded the average profits earned during the four years preceding the crisis, with a tax rate of 50% applying to 
the excess share of profit. Such a calculation should be made on a global or European annual return to prevent any 
profit shifting strategy. By targeting companies posting a higher-than-average income during the pandemic, the 
extra revenues collected would not harm struggling companies while ensuring that companies that performed 
well, such as online retailers, contribute fairly to the cost of the pandemic.
Adopt measures to create transparency and account-
ability with regard to corporate and wealth taxation
Recent tax scandals, such as LuxLeaks and Panama Papers revelations, were only brought to light thanks to the 
relentless efforts of journalists and activists. In some cases, such reports brought to light how EU governments 
actively collaborated with tax avoiders to cover up or even to enable their wrongdoings. This calls for comprehensive 
transparency measures to ensure governments, corporations, and wealthy individuals are accountable against the 
principles of good (corporate) tax citizenship. The recently concluded negotiations on a directive establishing public 
country-by-country reporting requirements for multinational companies active in the European single market 
relating to income and compliance with tax codes constitute an important step and a significant victory for the 
European Parliament. Additionally, the European Commission should make a proposal for a European financial 
transparency register in which multinational companies and wealthy individuals declare their global financial inter-
ests by registering the assets they are holding in extra-EU jurisdictions. This would allow for enquiries into whether 
such foreign holdings serve purposes of tax avoidance and evasion would thus enable further progress towards 
achieving tax justice in Europe and worldwide. 
316 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Government_finance_statistics
6.3.3.  Common Wealth: Expanding  
public services and supporting 
communities in achieving  
sustainable well-being for all 
Today’s unequal societies are often marked by the 
paradox that citizens are endowed with a set of fun-
damental, social, political, and cultural rights but 
lack the resources to exercise these rights effectively. 
This is the case, for instance, when citizens’ right to 
participate in society’s cultural sphere and heritage, 
which are increasingly shifting into the digital realm, 
is effectively denied to those who cannot afford a 
broadband connection. Another example would be 
where citizens in rural areas, de jure, enjoy the right 
to benefit from health care and higher education but, 
de facto, are unable to access such services because 
these are only provided in urban centres and metro-
politan regions. 
Traditionally, such problems of access and inequality 
of opportunity would lead to calls for the expansion 
of the individual income of the affected, so that, for 
instance, rural populations can afford the cost of 
individual transport, for instance in the form of car 
ownership, to access far-away services providers and 
amenities. While this strategy will remain a valid 
element of future policy and should therefore not 
be discounted, it cannot remain the only tool in the 
toolbox. A key reason for this is of course that climate 
change and environmental degradation oblige soci-
ety to shift to the more efficient and less intense use of 
natural resources, leading strategies of enhancing the 
well-being of citizens through the production of ever 
more goods that are then owned and used individu-
ally to become untenable. 
A different, more efficient, and sustainable strategy 
would be to build capabilities for the satisfaction of 
well-being-related needs and aspirations not at the 
individual level but at the collective level, so that 
the ‘common wealth’ embodied in such collective 
resources can be shared and co-used by all members 
of society on an equal basis. Naturally, this approach 
is not an innovation in itself. In fact, the well-estab-
lished concept of public goods and services already 
reflects such considerations and has been in oper-
ation for centuries. By providing a set of goods and 
services to the population, irrespective of income and 
social status, public services act as a kind of a social 
backstop that ensures citizens enjoy equal access to 
amenities and opportunities. According to research 
conducted by the OECD, the negative impact of income 
inequalities on citizens’ individual well-being would 
be approximately 20% stronger in OECD countries 
were it not for the availability of public services.317
After decades of neo-liberal austerity policies, how-
ever, public services in Europe frequently fail to 
mobilise their full potential for the mitigation of 
equalities in income and in an inclusive fashion. 
Across much of the European Union, the tightening 
of public budgets has resulted in declines both in the 
availability of public services, especially in rural and 
disadvantaged locations, and in their quality, espe-
cially as a result of lacking investment that would 
allow public services to keep up with the changing 
needs of a population undergoing processes of demo-
graphic change and ageing.318
To turn them into a veritable form of common wealth 
that acts in equalising and empowering ways, bol-
stering public services so that society possesses 
collective resources that allow all citizens to sat-
isfy their well-being-related needs and aspirations 
should therefore be a focal point for policymak-
ing for decades to come. Yet, such policy should not 
only work to reverse recent cutbacks and to rebuild 
traditional public services. Going forward, the devel-
opment and provision of public services in Europe 
should be firmly embedded in the logic of sustainable 
well-being for all and serve to guarantee access to the 
resources citizens rely on to reach a minimum level of 
individual well-being. 
The concept of Universal Basic Services (UBS), pio-
neered by progressives in the Anglo-American 
sphere, could provide useful guidance to this end.319  
The logic of UBS would oblige governments to ensure 
that the goods and services to necessary to fulfil the 
essential well-being-related needs of citizens within 
a safe, healthy, and cohesive society are accessible to 
all of its individual members. According to a proposal 
advanced by Gough, such needs, and the UBS they 
necessitate, can be summarised as in the table next 
page.
317 G. Verbist, M. Förster and M. Vaalavuo, ‘The Impact of Publicly Provided Services on the Distribution of Resources: Review of New Results and Methods’, (2012), OECD Social, Employment and Migra-
tion Working Papers 130: 35
318 Eurofound, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, has compiled a series of studies on related topics that can be accessed via  
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/topic/public-services



















Payment services (e.g., by establishing 
an individual right to have a bank 
account)
Table based on Gough, I. (2019): Universal Basic Services: A Theoretical and Moral Framework, p. 538, 
Political Quarterly, 90 (3). 534 - 542. p. 5
Essential well-being-related needs
Goods and services to be provided 
as part of Universal Basic Services 
Income 
security
Schooling and adult education
Phone, computer, and internet connection







Overview of universal basic services to be provided 
as part of common wealth
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Given the heterogeneity of public services systems 
in Europe, which have developed according to differ-
ent historical and political circumstances, defining 
a single, uniform approach to the delivery of UBS 
in the EU Member States does not appear desirable. 
Instead, the proponents of UBS suggest the defini-
tion of set of key features and principles that should 
apply in their provision:320
• Overall responsibility for meeting individuals’ 
essential well-being-related needs is exercised 
through democratically elected governments.
• Related decision-making powers of public 
authorities are devolved to the lowest appropri-
ate level. 
• Governments ensure equality of access, set and 
enforce standards, raise and invests funds, and 
coordinate functions between services.
• There are clear rules and procedures for fair 
and inclusive eligibility and entitlement. 
• Services can be delivered by a range of organi-
sations with different models of ownership and 
control. Yet, all participating organisations must 
adhere to a clear set of enforceable public inter-
est obligations, which would justify privileging 
social enterprises or benefit corporations (cf. 
chapter 3.4. of this report) in the delivery of UBS. 
• They are accessible and affordable for all, irre-
spective of citizen’s location of residence (urban 
or rural) and according to need not ability to 
pay (e.g., provision free of charge, application 
of regulated tariffs). 
• Service users participate in the planning and 
delivery of services, working in close partner-
ship with professionals and other front-line 
workers. 
A progressive agenda to develop common wealth 
that serves to foster the sustainable well-being of 
European societies should engage with the model 
of Universal Basic Services. This would serve to 
establish a common minimum floor for citizens’ 
well-being through the provision of collective 
resources that ensure equality of opportunity. 
However, further steps should be considered. 
Indeed, a comprehensive common wealth agenda 
should also strive to create room for communities 
of all sizes, from the local and beyond, to come 
together and translate their sense of common 
purpose into concrete projects that create 
common wealth that yields tangible improve-
ments for the well-being of their participants and 
the environment beyond the common minimum 
floor guaranteed by UBS. 
Related initiatives on the part of governments 
and public authorities can be expected to fall on 
fertile ground. Already today, even in the absence 
of a systematic public policy strategy at the EU 
level, examples of such citizen-led initiatives are 
constantly multiplying and include: 
320 based on Coote, A. and Percy, A., The Case for Universal Services, (2020), Cambridge: Polity Press
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The ICSE invites progressive governments in Europe to engage with the common wealth approach. In this vein, 
socialist and social democratic governments should consider drawing up a joint ‘Common Wealth Charter’ 
which commits them to reform national public services in line with the model of Universal Basic services and 
to support citizen-led initiatives for the creation of common wealth, especially through the provision of related 
public support measures and services as outlined above. Further avenues of action should be explored through 
participatory processes, involving policymakers, civil society, and academic experts. This charter could be open 
to other governments and thus, over time, develop into a pan-European and global network of mutual support 
and collaboration in implementing and further developing the common wealth approach. 
Take a progressive initiative to adopt a Common 
Wealth Charter
The creation of energy communities, where local 
communities cooperate to mobilise investment into 
the local production of renewable energy for their 
own consumption and to accelerate the decarboni-
sation of the local economy.321 Typically, such energy 
communities are incorporated as cooperatives that 
give all their stakeholders, including non-invested 
users, a say in the governance of the project. Fre-
quently, such schemes also follow explicit social 
aims, for instance by providing energy at discounted 
tariffs to low-income households, and sometimes 
even by allowing low-income households to purchase 
equity in the energy community at preferential rates 
to help them build up financial reserves. 
Urban farming projects, where derelict urban areas, 
for instance abandoned factory sites, are turned into 
urban gardens where families can cultivate their 
own food and gain access to green spaces. 
The establishment of local online services platforms 
that react to increasing reliance of citizens on such 
platforms to satisfy well-being needs, e.g., to buy 
meals when time is scarce or for mobility purposes 
when public transport is unavailable. By estab-
lishing such platforms under the responsibility of 
local communities or local public authorities, they 
can improve the availability of services to the local 
community – including ‘meals on wheels’ for elderly 
citizens, emergency childcare, or care for people 
with unpredictable needs for assistance – without 
having to rely on the offers of multinational corpora-
tions and the precarious employment arrangements 
they typically use. In fact, if integrated into the over-
all framework of UBS, such platforms might even 
lead to cost savings in public services by providing 
them on a just-in-time rather than on a just-in-case 
basis. Their combination into the overall UBS would 
further mean that fees could be structured in a way 
that ensures their availability irrespective of recip-
ients’ levels of income. Additionally, by involving 
social economy operators or local businesses in their 
provision, such platforms could contribute to the 
development of local economies.322
Instead of launching such projects by means of 
top-down state action, the role of governments in 
building such common wealth should be to support 
and enable such citizen initiatives. This could, for 
instance, take the form of public support services for 
the creation of cooperatives and social enterprises 
that act as the incorporated shells of the underlying 
common wealth projects. Likewise, governments 
could act as match makers between those with ideas 
and those with capital. To this end, community 
investment platforms could be set up, which could 
receive further public support through guarantee 
schemes offered by promotional banks.323
Based on these considerations, the ICSE issues the 
following recommendation:
321 Caramizaru, A. and Uihlein, A., (2020): Energy communities: an overview of energy and social innovation, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020.
322 https://progressivepost.eu/spotlights/turning-the-clock-forward
323 Such practices are, for instance, advocated by the Greater Manchester Independent Inequalities Commission under the chairwomanship of ICSE member Prof Kate Pickett.  
Their final report is available at: https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/media/4337/gmca_independent-inequalities-commission_v15.pdf
6.4.  Empowering 
women and 
minorities - the 
heroes of COVID
At the beginning of the global pandemic, the view 
that the virus would act as a ‘great equaliser’ that does 
not discriminate between men and women or people 
of different ethnic backgrounds was quick to emerge. 
In fact, many citizens found comfort in the idea that 
‘we are all in this together’. However, already a few 
months into the global crisis, such credulous asser-
tions were proven decisively long. 
As official data is becoming available, it is revealing 
how the brunt of the crisis is taken by distinct social 
groups that suffer disproportionately. Across Europe, 
citizens with minority or migration backgrounds are 
significantly more likely to contract the virus and 
to die from its effects.324 And while the economy is 
slowing down, employment losses for women are 
significantly higher than for men.325 Additionally, as 
stress and anxiety abound, first evidence suggests 
that women suffer from increased levels of domestic 
and sexual violence.326 This unequal impact of the 
pandemic is another symptom of the crisis European 
and Western societies are going through. Yet, curing 
these ills will require more than vaccines and effec-
tive treatments, as the virus itself is not their cause. 
What was brought to fore by global movements like 
‘Me Too’ or ‘Black Lives Matter’ in recent years, our 
societies continue to be fraught by deep divides and 
cleavages that cause injustices for large parts of the 
population that remain at the side lines of our eco-
nomic and social model. 
Cynically, the same citizens that are suffering from 
such inequalities have worked hardest to allow soci-
ety to make it through the public health crisis. 
The vast majority of those keeping society running 
by providing essential services in health care (76%), 
staffing supermarkets (82%), and domestic services 
such as cleaning (95%), are women, many of them 
with minority backgrounds.327 During the crisis, 
such frontline workers experienced an increased 
workload, with greater exposure to health risks 
and emotional demands than any other category of 
worker. Yet, despite such arduous working condi-
tions, these occupations are also some of the most 
undervalued—including under-paid—in the EU, 
where the gender pay gap currently stands at 14% in 
terms of hourly wages.328 
For minorities in Europe, discrimination appears 
to be an almost daily experience. As a recent report 













people of colour in the EU are twice as likely to work 
in professions for which they are over-qualified 
than non-minority Europeans. However, discrim-
ination not only occurs in labour markets. Nearly 
half of all people of colour (45%) live in overcrowded 
accommodation, while this only applies to 17% of the 
general population, with bias on the part of land-
lords being known to act as a significant obstacle 
towards the improvement of the housing conditions 
of the affected.329 Despite such blatant inequalities 
and despite its legislative competence in the field of 
fundamental rights and non-discrimination, EU leg-
islation to date mainly focusses on the enforcement of 
anti-discrimination principles in the labour market 
but not in economic and social life more broadly. 
Although significant advances towards greater equal-
ity in diversity could be reached in previous decades, 
not least through EU policy and regulation, the 
achievement of further progress is currently liable to 
serious risks. With the rise of nationalist discourses 
and the concept of illiberal democracy burgeoning in 
Europe, recent years have seen organised attacks on 
the rights of women, LGBTIQ+ people, ethnic minori-
ties, and migrants waged not by thugs at the margins 
of society but by governments whose democratic 
mandate it is to govern society in the interest of all 
its members. This clearly constitutes a breach of the 
values of human dignity, democracy, and the rule of 
law that lie at the heart of the European project. Yet 
it also constitutes a self-defeating strategy for a con-
tinent that relies on the contribution of all its citizens 
to successfully manage the transformation to a new 
model of development that respects the imperative of 
sustainability and nurtures the well-being of society. 
Progressives in Europe should therefore work to 
ensure the essential importance such marginalised 
groups assume for our societies remains visible 
once the public health crisis has been resolved. If 
sustainable well-being for all is to become a reality 
in Europe, the post-COVID era will therefore doubt-
lessly have to be marked by decisive action to boost 
the well-being of those suffering the most today. Next 
to decisive action to re-regulate labour markets and 
bolster social security systems to fight precarious 
employment and generalised precarity (cf. sections 
6.2.1. and 6.2.2. this chapter) as well as sectoral policy 
strategies to address the plight of social care and 
healthcare workers (see sections 5.3.1. and 6.2.4.), 
this will require decisive action to empower margin-
alised social groups, defend their rights, and ensure 
equality of opportunity for all members of society. 













329 European Agency for Fundamental Rights (2018): Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey – Being Black in the EU, see: https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/eumidis-ii-being-black
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Given the key importance of effective action to fight all forms of discrimination and to actively foster equality 
between citizens to cater for the fairness of society and its good functioning, the EU institutions should engage 
with related issues in a more structured and regular fashion. To this end, the European Fundamental Rights 
Agency (FRA) should be tasked to prepare an ‘Annual Report on Diversity and Inclusion in the EU’ which deliv-
ers a detailed account of the state of play in the EU and Member States as regards the fight for equality and 
against discrimination. The report should cover all grounds of discrimination recognised in EU anti-discrimi-
nation legislation and help tracking developments and trends over time. Based on this analysis, the European 
Parliament should host an annual plenary debate, with the participation of the European Commission and 
Launch an annual EU diversity and inclusion 
reporting procedure
A European assessment of the equality impact of 
COVID: convene an EU Equality Summit
Under the involvement of the specialised EU agencies engaging with questions of gender equality (European 
Gender Equality Institute), fundamental rights and anti-discrimination policy (European Agency for Funda-
mental Rights), and living and working conditions (Eurofound), the European Commission should develop 
a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on disadvantaged and vulnerable 
populations in the EU. The assessment should serve to determine and map, on a country-by-country basis, 
the causes leading disadvantaged groups, such as women, migrants, and ethnic minorities, to experience 
a disproportional exposure to health hazards, poverty risks, arduous working conditions, gender-based vio-
lence, and social exclusion during the pandemic. Given that different forms of inequality often interact and 
aggravate the hardship experienced by the affected, this mapping should pay ample attention to such inter-
sectionality.
Even if the causes of such particular disadvantage seem likely to relate to pre-existing social inequalities, 
such a comprehensive European mapping would serve to create an important moment of political account-
ability at the EU level that should translate into concrete policy action to be coordinated at the EU level. To 
this end, the European Commission, Parliament, and Council should convene a joint equality summit as a 
follow up to the Social Summit held under the Portuguese Presidency of the European Council in May 2021. 
While the May Social Summit served to define and update the long-term social policy strategy of the EU, the 
equality summit, which should be held no later than in the first half of 2022, should address the need for short 
and medium-term action to address the equality impact of the pandemic. Deliberations should be held in 
an inclusive format, hence under the involvement of social partners and civil society representatives of social 
groups having been exposed to particular stress and challenges as part of the public health crisis. In terms of 
output, the summit should serve to propose a detailed roadmap committing the EU institutions and Member 
States to implement concrete policies across various fields, such as labour market regulation, social security 
reform, and social investment policies, to fight and reverse inequalities further exposed and aggravated by 
the pandemic. 
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Council, to engage with the report delivered by FRA and to draw related conclusions. The procedure, the key 
objective of which is to create political accountability on the part of the EU institutions, should be adequately 
embedded in the European well-being budgeting procedure laid out in chapter 3 of this report to ensure that 
its conclusions are taken into account in the definition of EU policy priorities for the coming year.
Adopt a horizontal anti-discrimination directive
With the adoption of the directives on Racial and Ethnic Equality330 and Employment Equality331 in 2000, EU 
equality and anti-discrimination legislation grew from the ground of gender to other grounds such as ethnic 
and racial origin and age, disability, sexual orientation, and religion the labour market. The EU is thus progres-
sively protecting more and more citizens from discrimination, harassment, and violence in the labour market. 
Anti-discrimination outside the labour market, for instance as regards citizens’ access to public services, dis-
crimination through economic operators and services providers, such as in the housing market or through 
insurance companies, largely remains a matter of national legislation, which is uneven. At a time where the 
sources of inequality are multiplying, not least as a consequence of climate change and environmental degra-
dation-related shocks, this situation must be rectified to empower citizens and create equal opportunities for 
sustainable well-being for all in Europe. 
In fact, the European Commission tabled a proposal for a horizontal anti-discrimination directive in 2008, seek-
ing to ensure that all forms of inequality and discrimination across all domains of economic and social life 
can be combatted under a strong and uniform EU legislative framework. Since then, the directive has, how-
ever, been stuck in Council, where Member States failed to find common understanding. Progressives across 
Europe, in government, parliaments, and civil society should work to break this deadlock in order to make equal 
rights and effective remedies, which constitute indispensable prerequisites for sustainable well-being for all, a 
reality in Europe. 
To this end, progressive should champion the refinement and adoption of the European Commission’s 2008 
proposal. The directive should require Member States to:
• Ensure victims encountering instances of discrimination based on all grounds of discrimination recog-
nised in EU law are able to seek legal redress against their perpetrators, irrespective of whether these 
are public bodies (e.g., public service providers or police) or private entities (e.g., financial services pro-
viders). 
• Clarify that the initiation of legal proceedings does not necessarily require involvement of victims of 
discrimination to ensure civil society organisations and individual citizens, including journalists, are able 
to bring perpetrators to justice. 
• Impose effective and dissuasive sanctions on perpetrators in the public and private sectors.
• Collect standardised public equality data, detailing all instances of discrimination identified through 




The directive should further stipulate that Member States are obliged to formulate and implement national 
equality strategies under the involvement of Member State’s stakeholders and equality bodies (see follow-
ing proposal). Such strategies should be informed by in-depth research taking into account the intersectional 
nature of inequalities and define concrete and time-bound roadmaps for the rectification of systemic forms of 
discrimination and inequality, for instance through targeted support programmes and public services provi-
sion for marginalised social groups and frequent victims of discrimination. 
Develop a uniform statute for national equality 
bodies
In close coordination with the horizontal anti-discrimination directive, the European Commission should issue 
a proposal for a uniform statute of national equality bodies with a horizontal remit that are accessible to victims 
of all forms of inequality and discrimination. Such bodies should be charged with the delivery of public aware-
ness raising campaigns as regards the rights and remedies available and provide legal advice and support 
services for victims of discrimination. Additionally, they should be endowed with a watchdog function, hence 
be tasked to carry out research and investigation into potential forms, sources, and instances of discrimination 
and actively contribute to the formulation of anti-discrimination polices at the national and European levels. 
Although equality bodies already exist in all EU Member States,332 not least as a result of related requirements 
included in individual pieces of EU anti-discrimination legislation that oblige Member States to set up such 
bodies as a point of contact for victims of specific forms of discrimination, e.g., on the grounds of ethnic origin, 
their statute and remit differ across the Union. Some Member States have enabled their equality bodies to con-
duct work and provide assistance in relation to virtually all forms of discrimination and not only those where 
EU legislation requires this. Yet, most national equality bodies are still operating on a narrow mandate and are 
facing various challenges to their effectiveness, in particular because of inadequate resources, limited legal 
standing, concerns about independence, and little awareness of the equality bodies’ existence. To rectify this, 
the European Commission should issue a legislative proposal for a uniform and robust statute for national 
equality bodies so that such bodies with a broad remit and adequate capacity exist in all EU Member States. 
Close the gender pay and pensions gap by 2030
As part of its proposals for updated EU policy objectives and performance indicators, which are to be made 
legally binding by way of their inclusion in the European Sustainable Well-being Pact (see chapter 3 of this 
report), the European Commission should fix the target of closing the gender pay and pensions gaps by 2030. 
Related developments in EU labour markets and pensions systems should be closely monitored as part of the 
EU well-being budgeting process and lead to the issuing of Country-specific Recommendations in case of 
national underperformance vis-à-vis these targets. 
The formulation of these objectives should go hand in hand with the adoption of a comprehensive strategy to 
achieve these targets, including coordinated action regarding labour market and social security reform at the 
332 Equinet, the European Network of Equality Bodies offers an overview of current national practice on its website https://equineteurope.org/
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Unblock negotiations on the ‘Women on Boards 
Directive’
To improve the labour market situation of women, ensuring fair representation of women in decision-making 
roles within companies is key. While this principle has been widely accepted for long, EU Member States have 
so far failed to build sufficient agreement among them to adopt and transpose a related European Commission 
proposal tabled in 2012. To break this unacceptable deadlock in the European Council, the Commission must 
make good on its commitment to unblocking related negotiations. In this regard, its aim should be to mobilise 
support for the adoption of the draft directive as amended by the European Parliament. This would ensure 
that publicly listed and public companies would be obliged to ensure, after a transition period, at least 40% of 
women representation on supervisory boards. As proposed by Parliament, the legally binding representation 
threshold could be lowered to 33% if companies commit to reshuffling both supervisory and executive boards. 
Also as proposed by the European Parliament, companies failing to comply with these thresholds should not 
only receive financial penalties but should likewise be excluded from public tenders. 
Adopt quotas for women representation in public 
decision-making bodies
In view of the multitude of economic, social, and environmental challenges public policy will have to deal with 
in the coming decades and given that such policies will inevitably lead to a fundamental transformation of our 
societies, women representation in public decision-making bodies, i.e., governments and parliament, is key to 
avoid that policy outcomes add to the systemic inequalities encountered by women. The European Parliament 
should act as a role model in this regard. Ahead of the next European elections, the EU Member States, of which 
only seven have introduced gender quota requirements in national provisions governing the modalities of the 
European elections,333 should therefore introduce binding quota requirements for fully gender-balanced elec-
toral lists. 
national level. The strategy should also comprise specific measures to ensure higher-than-average wage rises 
in feminised sectors of the economy, such as health services, long-term care, hospitality, and entertainment. 
To this end, the European Commission should propose strategic partnerships between public authorities and 
social partners in these sectors. The Commission should further support the development of gender-neutral 
job evaluation tools and classification criteria that help to evaluate and remunerate jobs better and more fairly. 
Moreover, guidance should be issued to Member States as regards the use of public policy measures, such as 
specific social clauses in public procurement, to exert upward pressure on wages in feminised sectors. 
333 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/509980/IPOL-FEMM_ET%282014%29509980_EN.pdf 
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The deplorable fact that times of crisis tend to exacerbate gender-based violence, particularly sexual and 
domestic violence, has sadly been confirmed by the current pandemic.335 Violence against women is, however, 
not a fact of nature that should simply be accepted but a product of social attitudes and power relationships 
that can be addressed and modified. The Council of Europe Istanbul Convention therefore sets out a compre-
hensive agenda that seeks to ensure women are not only protected in cases of violence and that perpetrators 
are prosecuted. The convention also commits participating governments to develop policies to prevent vio-
lence against women and to build political and institutional capacity to improve the situation of women in 
society more broadly. At present, however, only 21 of 27 EU Member States have ratified the convention, while 
the Polish government, which is currently bound by the convention, having stated its intention to withdraw 
from it. 
As a result, the European Union remains stuck in a situation in which it does not possess an effective and uni-
form framework for combatting violence against women, despite its legislative competence in fundamental 
rights policy. To rectify this, the Commission should issue legislative proposals that translate the provisions and 
objectives of the Istanbul Convention into EU legislation and thus ensure Member States are bound by them, 
irrespective of their formal accession to the Council of Europe framework. This should be achieved by including 
gender-based violence under the list of EU crimes based on Art 83 (1) TFEU with a view to establishing common 
rules for the definition of criminal offenses and sanctions across the EU. 
Translate the Council of Europe Istanbul Conven-
tion into EU legislation
Make broader use of gender mainstreaming and 
gender impact assessments
To further improve the gender-sensitivity of EU policy and spending, the European Commission should include 
systematic gender impact assessments in all its policy and legislative proposals, unless an impact of the initi-
ative on the situation of women in society and the economy can be safely ruled out. The ICSE welcomes that 
the Interinstitutional Agreement, which was signed together with the MFF 2021-2027 foresees that gender 
mainstreaming, including by strengthening the assessment of gender impact in impact assessments and eval-
uations will become part of the Better Law-Making framework. It furthermore foresees that no later than 1 
January 2023, the Commission will implement a methodology for certain centrally managed programmes to 
test its feasibility and at mid-term, it will be explored whether the methodology can be extended to other pro-
grammes for the remainder of the MFF 2021-2027. While the European Commission possesses tools to assess 
gender impacts of policy proposals, such methodologies are at present applied in a restrictive and non-con-
sistent manner334 at the same time as every Commission proposal is being assessed as regards its impact on 
EU competitiveness and the administrative burden caused for small and medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, 
such assessments should be made available at an early stage in the policymaking process so as to allow the 
co-legislators to take its outcomes into account from the start of the legislative process.
334 https://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/toolkits/gender-impact-assessment/when-use-gender-impact-assessment
335 European Gender Equality Institute (2021): The COVID-19 pandemic and intimate partner violence against women in the EU, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union
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Make sexual and reproductive rights shock-proof
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a highly detrimental effect on women’s ability to exercise their sexual and 
reproductive health rights (SRHR), especially in terms of access to related support services. The pandemic has 
thus exposed the lacking crisis-preparedness of such essential services as well as of public infrastructures nec-
essary to give these rights meaning. This has added to the ailment of many women at a time of already high 
distress. The European Commission, together with its competent agencies, should carefully assess the SRHR 
situation in light of the pandemic and issue targeted guidance to Member States to make swift improvements 
to avoid repeats of the current deterioration during future pandemics and periods of crisis and environmental 
disasters. 
Ensure an effective implementation of the EU 
LGTBIQ Equality Strategy 
With its first ever LGTBIQ Equality Strategy, the European Commission has pledged to take effective action to 
ensure equality and non-discrimination for LGBTIQ+ people. By identifying critical needs for policy action to 
foster equality and non-discrimination, for instance as regards equal parental and adoption rights for same-sex 
couples, the ban of conversion therapies and the involuntary administration of ‘normalising’ medical treat-
ments, and to implement the principle of legal gender recognition to enable intersex people to find respect for 
their gender identity, the strategy indeed has the potential to unlock real progress. 
To tap into this potential, ensuring the right choice of instrument to implement related action is key. While the 
definition of action plans, cooperation mechanisms, and exchanges of best practices may certainly be able to 
make important contributions to the shifting of social attitudes, e.g., by providing guidance to Member States in 
the fight against bullying in educational institutions or against unconscious bias in public sector decision-mak-
ing, establishing a solid basis for the equality of LGBTIQ+ people will also require the use of legal instruments, 
which the Commission appears to be hesitant to employ. The European Commission should not be intimidated 
by the current attack against LGBTIQ+ rights waged by a minority EU Member State governments and prepare 
comprehensive proposals for legislation to ensure equal rights can become a reality for LGBTIQ+ people across 
all domains of public and private life. 
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Create the office of a European disability  
coordinator
Although EU legislation and international human rights commitments, such as the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, have been able to go to considerable lengths as regards the legal 
clarification of the rights of citizens with disabilities, significant challenges persist as regards their effective 
implementation and protections against their breach. With its ‘Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities 2021-2030‘,336 the European Commission has made important proposals for the development of related 
remedies. To bolster the effectiveness of related actions, the European Commission should further consider 
the creation of the office of an EU disability coordinator. Equipped with a mandate similar to that of the EU 
anti-racism coordinator, the disability coordinator’s role should be to relay specific concerns to the Commission 
and interact with Member States, the European Parliament, civil society and academia to strengthen policy 
responses in the field of the rights of persons with disability. Finally, the office should join forces with other 
Commission services to implement the Commission’s related policies, especially the 2021-30 strategy.
Establish a fair, consistent, and effective system 
for legal labour migration 
At present, the legal framework governing labour migration in the European Union is highly fragmented, with 
sectoral, national, and European provisions criss-crossing in unsystematic ways. This system neither allows for 
a systematic and holistic management of migration to meet Europe’s evident needs for skills and talent, nor 
does it provide the transparency and legal certainty that is needed to prevent third country nationals from 
opting for irregular, exploitative, and hazardous forms of migration. With the recent agreement on the revision 
of the EU Blue Card Directive, the European Parliament and Council have made a first step towards fairer and 
more consistent system that has the power to work better, both for Europe and those looking to contribute to, 
and participate in, the achievement of sustainable well-being for all. Yet, with the Blue Card Directive applying 
mainly to migration in high-skilled and high-wage occupations and sectors, more work is needed to achieve 
a comprehensive overhaul of the EU labour migration acquis, including in low- and medium-income sectors. 
The ICSE therefore recommends fully harmonised provisions as regards application procedures, grounds for 
admission and refusal, procedural safeguards, equal treatment, access to the labour market, and family reuni-
fication procedures across EU labour migration legislation. Moreover, an EU talent pool should be created as 
a central element of a more transparent and effective labour migration, hence an online platform to match 
existing opportunities in all segments of the EU labour market with third country nationals possessing the 
required skills and talent. The introduction of such talent pool should be accompanied by efforts to ensure the 
swifter recognition of skills and qualifications as well as by active cooperation between EU governments and 
third countries to build trust and acceptance. 
336 The text of the strategy is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=8376&furtherPubs=yes 
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Support local communities in integrating 
migrants and refugees
The reception of migrants and refugees does not occur at the level of centralised government but in the com-
munities in which they live. It is therefore at this level that the success of integration is determined and where 
support is needed to ensure diversity goes hand in hand with equality and is turned into an asset for commu-
nities by enriching them with talent and a plurality of views and experiences in defining new ways of living and 
working together to achieve greater sustainability and well-being for people and planet. Targeted action to 
support local communities in accommodating and integrating migrants and refugees should therefore repre-
sent a central pillar in related policy approaches going forward. 
As part of negotiations on the EU Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), progressives in the European 
Parliament have been able to achieve a first important win in this regard by earmarking a share of the over-
all funding for actions at the level of local authorities. Moreover, adopting a partnership approach to enable 
greater participation of civil society, the fund incorporates important elements of a more collaborative and 
inclusive approach that is key to the success of reception and integration measures and migration policy more 
broadly. Going forward, progressives should consider ways to further strengthen such elements and to make 
the benefits of migration and diversity palpable for local communities. To this end, engagement with pro-
posals for additional European funds that finance investments in regions and municipalities that go beyond 
their legal obligations in the reception of refugees, for instance to finance community services, infrastructures, 
and amenities, should be considered.337 Such reflections should also ponder the possibility of adopting similar 
frameworks for the financial support of local stakeholder and authorities in bringing EU migration policy to 
success at the local level. 
Get tough on the defence of the rule of law 
Despite the numerous examples in recent years of EU Member States waging infamous attacks on key pillars 
of the rule of law, for instance by encroaching on the independence of the judiciary or through attacks on 
independent media, the European Commission remains overly cautious in holding national governments to 
account over such blatant breaches of the values enshrined in the EU Treaties. With the procedures set out in 
Art. 7 TFEU and the newly established rule of law conditionality under the current EU Multi-annual Financial 
Framework, which allows for the suspension of EU funds if their proper use cannot be guaranteed due to rule of 
law deficiencies in the Member States benefitting from them, the European Commission has effective means 
at its disposal. 
As requested by the European Parliament on numerous occasions, the Commission should cease to view the 
activation of such procedures as an option of last resort and move towards their offensive use. Not only would 
such a less passive approach better reflect the crucial importance of the rule of law for equality and justice in 
Europe, but also would it work to raise the pressure on Member States. The introduction of an annual rule of 
law reporting procedure under the responsibility of the EU Justice Commissioner is a welcome first step in this 
regard but needs to be complemented with the stringent use of the other available instruments in this area to 
deliver the necessary strengthening of the European institutions’ defence of the rule of law. 
337 Schwan, G. (2016): Europäische Flüchtlingsintegration als gemeinsame kommunale Entwicklung, available at:  
https://www.governance-platform.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/HVGP_Europ.-Fl%C3%BCchtlingspolitik-DE_20170316.pdf 
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Introduce a European statute for independent 
civil society organisations
In view of the rise of forms of ‘illiberal democracy’ and the associated shrinking civic space in parts of the Euro-
pean Union, the European Commission should prepare a legislative proposal for the establishment of a uniform 
EU statute for independent civil society organisations. This legal act should serve to ensure that the creation of 
non-governmental organisations committed whose purpose and intended forms of civic engagement are in 
clear alignment with the European Fundamental Rights Charter is enabled in all EU Member States according 
to criteria that are not dependent on the legal system of the Member State of establishment. Moreover, the EU 
framework should ensure the organisations falling under the statute are recognised as public benefit organ-
isations and are able to issue donation receipts, including to donors located in a different EU Member State. 
The final adjudication of whether an organisation is in breach of the European civil society organisation statute 
should be ultimately left to the European Human Rights Court, which should act as the court of final resort in 
this respect.
Establish a dedicated equality formation in the 
Council
Unlike the European Commission and Parliament, where specific structures for equality policy exist with the 
Parliamentary Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality and the European Commissioner for Equal-
ity, the Council lacks such specialised structure. Accordingly, policies and legislative procedures in the field of 
equality policy are mostly discussed in sectoral council configurations, such as the Employment, Social Policy, 
Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO). This practice does not adequately reflect the truly horizontal and 
cross-sectoral nature of equality policy. To rectify this, the internal organisation of the European Council should 
be reformed so as to establish a dedicated equality configuration to mirror related structures in the European 
Parliament and Commission.

At the time of publication, the world 
continues to struggle with a global 
pandemic of unprecedented scale since 
a century, which already killed over 4.5 
million people and infected more than 100 
million. Despite the on-going vaccines roll-
out, the future remains uncertain as the 
virus continues to mutate and as vaccine 
production, their global accessibility and 
their reliability remain a challenge. 
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Summary
A helicopter view of today’s global policy landscape 
is not one of a well engaged and on-going global 
transformation, but of a transit zone in which cer-
tain areas are being re-shaped while others remain 
untouched, and where activity in one area is not 
clearly related to activity in another area. There is 
no clear and unifying sense about where exactly this 
transit zone leads towards.
In this politically unpredictable and unstable con-
text, the pandemic has shed new light on the global 
ecological and social consequences of an economic 
system in which prosperity is equal to short-term 
minded economic growth, instead of long-term 
minded sustainable well-being; and it has made one 
point clearer than ever before: the billions of human 
destinies on our planet are more intertwined than 
they have ever been. 
This must help us understand the real meaning of 
human well-being (the well-being-environment 
nexus), the fact that well-being policies fare better 
on all fronts than growth policies and finally the 
fact that we should take care of welfare states, in the 
EU and elsewhere, because it is the backbone of our 
societies and our shield to face ecological shocks.
The multiple economic and social damages induced 
by the pandemic are very far-reaching even in the 
richest parts of the world and are already devastat-
ing in more vulnerable countries and world regions. 
At any rate, they will take many years to overcome. 
This is also a major set-back for the sustainable devel-
opment agenda embodied by the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), as crit-
ical progress achieved since their launch in 2015 is 
being reversed for several goals at a critical point in 
time.
The pandemic has hit a world already entangled 
in a global meta-crisis, in which climate change, 
the large-scale loss of biodiversity, entrenched 
poverty and gaping inequalities increasingly inter-
act. The global meta-crisis can eventually only be 
addressed as one. It requires a new generation of 
cross-sectional and multi-crisis approach policies - 
in particular along the social-ecological nexus - as 
much as it demands policies and regulations that are 
powerful enough to reset the prevailing economic 
model’s underlying logic, from the discredited and 
unsustainable post-war growth/progress concept to 
a new and sustainable well-being/progress concept.
In a global strive towards sustainable well-being, EU 
leadership will be critical and its own (positive and 
negative) experiences in addressing challenges that 
are global as much as they are European is essen-
tial, for instance when it comes to climate change or 
poverty. Including through much more vigorous and 
targeted EU actions at global level, game-changing 
global policy change must address solidarity in the 
global pandemic, achieve a new boost for UNSDGs, 
re-launch the fight for the 1.5 climate change target, 
develop a global approach to a green deal, build 
a global social contract, set the activity of global 
corporations within a rules-based frame, achieve 
truly sustainable global trade, turn development 
aid into a sufficiently powerful lever for sustainable 
development, rethink global governance and open 
innovative pathways for human and planetary devel-
opment such as through global common wealth.
»The pandemic has hit a world 
already entangled in a global 
meta-crisis.«
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7.1.  What is at stake? 
At the time of publication, the world continues to 
struggle with a global pandemic of unprecedented 
scale since a century, which already killed over 3 
million people and infected more than 100 million. 
Despite the on-going vaccines roll-out, the future 
remains uncertain as the virus continues to mutate 
and as vaccine production, their global accessibility 
and their reliability remain a challenge. Even if, in 
the best-case scenario, the pandemic were to come 
under control by the end of this year in richer coun-
tries, many low- and middle-income countries will 
continue to struggle well into next year and beyond, 
unless a major breakthrough could be achieved in 
global vaccine equity. 
The multiple economic and social damages induced 
by the pandemic are very far-reaching even in the 
richest parts of the world and are already devastat-
ing in more vulnerable countries and world regions. 
At any rate, they will take many years to overcome. 
This is also a major set-back for the sustainable 
development agenda embodied by the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), 
as critical progress achieved since their launch in 
2015 is being reversed for several goals at a critical 
point in time.
The pandemic is a planetary crisis testing humani-
ty’s collective capacity to fight a common threat, and 
it has painstakingly revealed our current limits to do 
so. Pre-existing vulnerabilities have been even more 
revealed and have already led to an unprecedented 
worsening of extreme poverty in poorer parts of the 
world. Where health systems were already fragile, 
the pandemic has had catastrophic effects. But even 
supposedly solid health systems in richer countries 
have been pushed to extremes and we can see that 
under such pressure they are much less solid than 
we may think or hope. 
Global solidarity in the face of a global crisis - a 
moral obligation as much as in everyone’s self-in-
terest - clashes with short-minded national 
self-preservation in rich countries, as global 
vaccine equity called for by the United Nations 
remains a struggle. This in itself must be taken as 
a fundamental lesson for our future resilience in 
the face of other, potentially more frequent and 
even more severe crises, in particular from cli-
mate change. 
The pandemic has shed new light on the global 
ecological and social consequences of an eco-
nomic system in which prosperity is equal to 
short-term minded economic growth, instead of 
long-term minded sustainable well-being; and it 
has made one point clearer than ever before: the 
billions of human destinies on our planet are more 













It must help us understand the real meaning of 
human well-being (the well-being-environment 
nexus), the fact that well-being policies fare better 
on all fronts than growth policies and finally the 
fact that we should take care of welfare states, in the 
EU and elsewhere, because it is the backbone of our 
societies and our shield to face ecological shocks. We 
must protect and strengthen welfare states because 
they protects us.
7.2.  The Global Meta-
Crisis
The multilateral post-war world we live in, embed-
ded in the United Nations Charter signed in 1945, 
notably vowed to promote “social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom” for all human 
beings. The increasingly globalised economic and 
financial system that was developed over the subse-
quent decades was meant to provide the necessary 
prosperity to achieve this, fuelled by ever freer trade 
and the gradual liberalisation of capital flows. 
However, and after over six decades, we did not 
exactly reach this “promised land”. 
Indeed, despite indisputable benefits, economic 
globalisation has by now pushed our planet and our 
humanity beyond sustainable boundaries and into 
a global meta-crisis in permanent and intensifying 
activity.338 Its different components interact con-
stantly and feed into each other.
The biggest crisis of all, climate change, is set to 
defy our common capacity to confront life-threaten-
ing dangers for decades to come. On a current path 
to increase to at least 3°C by the end of this century, 
human-induced global warming has already reached 
between 0.8°C and 1.2°C above pre-industrial 
levels,339 and its consequences are felt all over the 
globe. The effects of global climate change include 
more frequent wildfires, longer periods of drought in 
some regions and an increase in the number, dura-
tion and intensity of tropical storms. They all weigh 
heavily upon animal and human life in the areas 
that are affected, as we can witness increasingly 
around the globe. Global climate change has already 
had observable effects on the environment. Glaciers 
have shrunk, ice on rivers and lakes is breaking up 
earlier, plant and animal ranges have shifted and 
trees are flowering sooner. Effects that scientists 
had predicted in the past would result from global 
climate change are now occurring: loss of sea ice, 
accelerated sea level rise and longer, more intense 
heat waves and storms.
338 For a discussion of this concept, the reader will refer to this report’s introduction
339 https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
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The pandemic demonstrates that human health 
depends on the health of living things, and human 
survival depends on the survival of our biodiver-
sity.340 There should be no doubt that our life-support 
system, the world we live in, is in crisis mode. 
In close interaction with climate change and under 
decades-long and relentless pressure from human 
activity at large, global biodiversity is at its worse. 
Available data is staggering. In Europe and Central 
Asia only 23% of species and 16% of its habitats are 
in good health. In North America, nearly 3 billion 
birds were lost in the past 50 years and 30% of its 
plant-pollination network has disappeared. In Latin 
America, 94% of its species population disappeared 
since 1974, notably driven by relentless deforestation. 
While being by far the worst performance among 
world regions, Africa ranks second-worst with a dis-
appearance rate of 65% of its species population.341 In 
addition to the constant damages generated by human 
activity since decades, the other major human-in-
duced environmental disaster - climate change 
- feeds into the biodiversity loss in many ways, fur-
ther accelerating its decline. Australian wildfires in 
2019 and 2020 killed nearly 3 billion animals.342 A new 
study343 has found that 92% of all endemic species on 
land and 95% of those in the ocean will decrease in 
numbers or even disappear under current emissions 
levels, which will increase global temperatures by 
3 degrees Celsius by 2100. 
The United Nations recently stated that the COVID-19 
pandemic has confirmed that by threatening biodi-
versity, humanity is threatening the conditions for its 
own survival. 
A major feature of the persistent global social crisis, 
humanity’s biggest longstanding plague, poverty, 
remains a huge challenge in its own right despite 
decades of significant, while insufficient, prog-
ress in reducing it. Most people in the world still 
live in poverty. 85% of the world live on less than 
$30 per day, two-thirds live on less than $10 per day, 
and every tenth person lives on less than $1.90 per 
day344 in extreme forms of poverty. In fact, the big 
success over the last generation was that the world 
made rapid progress against the very worst pov-
erty. The number of people in extreme poverty has 
fallen from nearly 1.9 billion in 1990 to about 650 
million in 2018, but the effects of the pandemic have 
already reversed this downward trend by adding over 
100 million people to this number. 
Due to lower global growth rates, which are expected 
to continue low compared to pre-2008 period, extreme 
poverty was expected to stagnate at around 500 mil-
lion by 2030, according to the World Bank realised 
before the pandemic345 (which would nevertheless 
already fail SDG 1 aiming to end extreme poverty by 
2030). 
340 https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1088212





» The pandemic has shed new light 
on the global ecological and social 
consequences of an economic 
system in which prosperity is equal 
to short-term minded economic 




The projections suggest that, even without account-
ing for the pandemic effects on extreme poverty, 
over the coming decade the stagnation at the 
bottom would become very clear. The majority of 
the world’s poorest today live in economies that are 
not growing and half a billion face the prospect to 
remain stuck in extreme poverty. These projec-
tions date from before the pandemic hit our globe 
and they rely on prudent expectations regarding 
climate change. This leads to believe that an aggra-
vation of the globe’s meta-crisis, notably in the 
field of climate change, could result in a major new 
and entrenched rise of extreme poverty, moving 
backwards and well above the 650 million mark 
achieved in 2018.
These numbers are compelling in their own right, 
but they still mask the realities of the human 
despair on the ground. “Extreme poverty” means 
hunger, water and food insecurity, lack of access to 
the most essential services (health, education, shel-
ter, energy) and lack of existential perspective for 
hundreds of millions of people, deprived of their 
basic human rights.
A second feature of the global social crisis are the 
gaping global economic inequalities. 
They translate into breathtaking global differences 
in living conditions and exposure to different forms 
of precarity on the lower end, despite significant 
progress in recent decades. Place-based injus-
tice is predominant - individual well-being on our 
planet remains primarily determined by where 
you are born and where you grow up. The average 
income gap based on GDP per capita between the 
poorest (Central African Republic) and the richest 
(Qatar) is 172-fold, the mortality rate of children 
under the age of 5 is 60-fold between Somalia and 
Iceland, and while you may live to the age of 84 in 
Japan, you can only hope to live until the age of 52 
in Sierra Leone.346 These huge differences in living 
conditions go pair with high inequalities in income 
and wealth. Although global income inequalities 
decreased in recent decades, they remain high in 
all countries of the world. 
The share of the richest 10% represents between 
30% and 70% of total income depending on where 
you live.347 This share would be even higher if based 
in wealth instead of income. The poorest 50% own 
almost nothing, even in the world’s most egalitar-
ian countries, such as Sweden.348 
346 ourworldindata.org
347 World Inequality Database https://wid.world 
348 https://www.lemonde.fr/blog/piketty/2020/11/17/global-inequalities-where-do-we-stand/ 
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The income share of the world’s poorest 50% 
of the world’s population has clearly increased 
from 7% of total world income in 1980 to around 
9% in 2020, thanks to the growth of emerging countries. 
However, this progress must be put into perspective, 
as the share of the world’s richest 10% has remained 
stable at around 53%, and that of the richest 1% has 
risen from 17% to 20%. The losers are the middle and 
working classes of the North, which is fuelling the 
rejection of globalisation and populist/nationalist 
political forces.349 
The third feature of the global social crisis lies at the 
heart of the global labour market. While many of 
the world’s multinational corporations have seen 
profits and market value soar thanks to expanding 
global markets, more than half the global labour 
force is in informal markets and many more are in 
precarious and short term work. In global supply 
chains, 94% of the global workforce is a hidden 
workforce with no protection and no representa-
tion, which facilitates exploitation and oppression. 
The ILO sees poor working conditions as the main 
global employment challenge. A majority of the 
3.3 billion people employed globally have inadequate 
economic security, material well-being and equality 
of opportunity. What’s more, progress in reducing 
unemployment globally is not being reflected in 
improvements in the quality of work.350 In any case, the 
global economy fails to provide enough jobs to people, 
despite a low employment rate of 60%. Nearly 200 mil-
lion are unemployed, many of whom in countries in 
which there is no social protection. Add to this that, in 
the next 10 years, the world will need to create more 
than 600 million jobs to avoid an increase in unemploy-
ment and to absorb youth entering the labor market,351 
in particular in Africa and South Asia - a global social 
time bomb in the making. Yet, demands put on work-
ers by the global economy are higher than ever, in 
particular due to the multiple changes that will affect 
labour markets in the years to come from an array of 




352 In a joint statement, the Secretary General of the OECD and of the Chairman of the World Economic Forum claim that 50% of currently employed workers will need reskilling by 2025 to meet the 










































The international migrant population globally has increased in size but remained
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Regional and local armed conflicts and violence, 
extreme poverty, high unemployment and lack of 
perspective, and climate change are among the 
multiple causes that bring large numbers of people 
across the world to leave their homes in the hope for 
a better future. 
As migratory flows continue to develop within 
inadequate policy frames, they tend to become 
humanitarian crises and a direct while dire conse-
quence of the crisis-ridden world we live in. Today, 
international migrants come close to 300 million, 
nearly 4% of the world’s population. About half 
of migrants are considered labour migrants and 
10% of migrants are considered refugees. Around 
70 million individuals were forcibly displaced 
worldwide due to persecution, conflict, generalised 
violence, human rights violations, or other rea-
sons. Numbers continue to rise alongside the rise 
of the world’s population. Since 2000, the number 
of migrants nearly doubled worldwide. According 
to the IOM,353 over 30.000 migrants lost their lives 
trying to reach other countries since 2013, of which 
more than half in the Mediterranean Sea trying 
to reach Europe. During that period, nearly 2.000 
migrants died along the US-Mexican border. 
Beyond the more traditional factors driving migra-
tion, climate change is set to push migration numbers 
into unprecedented territory if global warming 
increases beyond Paris goals. In fact, significant 
climate-induced migration has already begun from 
regions such as South East Asia and the African 
Sahel. If climate migration were to reach much 
higher levels during this century, it would amount 
to a vast remapping of the world’s population, for 
which - at this stage at least - none is prepared.354
Beyond these crises of ecological, human and social 
character, the world has to cope with a twin crisis 
of global governance politics and of democracy. 
Unlike what citizens in democratic states may think, 
less than one person out of ten in the world lives in 
a full democracy,355 which the Democracy Index 
attributed in 2020 to only 23 countries. An additional 
52 countries rank as “flawed democracies”.356 More 
than half of the world’s nations are ranked as either 
hybrid or authoritarian regimes, representing about 
40% of the world population. Even in nations qual-
ified as full democracies, broader issues relating to 
the legitimacy of political representation, to citizens’ 
involvement in policy definition and decision-mak-
ing, and the role of civil society organisations are 
often seen as requiring significant reform towards 
more transparency and participation.357 
Furthermore, the role of populist and nationalist 
political parties in a number of (full or flawed) dem-
ocratic states across the world, including inside the 
EU, worsens this crisis of democracy - simultane-
ously as a cause and a consequence. The diversity 
of, and contradictions in, the type of political gover-
nance that prevail at nation state levels feed into the 
prevailing crisis of global governance politics. This 
crisis, borne out of the Cold War and also of a geopo-
litical nature, remains unresolved today. It is also a 
crisis of global governance, as the interactions of a 
multilateral system in longstanding need of reform 
with a conflictual geopolitical landscape create 
a very challenging policy environment to tackle 
whichever global crisis one may chose to address.
Why is it so difficult to address any of these global 
crises individually? This is not only due to, for 
instance, weaknesses in the multilateral system and 
its complex and fragile global governance, which is 
often pointed at, or resistance from different global 
pressure groups against necessary policy action in 
the interest of humanity as a whole (although such 
resistance is a major problem in its own right). 
• To start with, permanent interactions between 
interrelated crises can severely limit the effec-
tiveness of, still dominant, crisis-specific or 
silo-based global policy solutions. Prevailing 
policies have only started to reflect these 
interrelations and interactions. This is, for 
instance, starting to be more recognised at the 
level of global climate policy. The UN notably 
tries to move national governments towards 
a better integration of nature-based solutions 
to address the climate and biodiversity crises 
simultaneously. It is increasingly evident in the 
field of migration, the future development of 
353 The International Office for Migration started to tracking the numbers of people dying on migratory routes worldwide in the wake of the death of hundreds of people when two boats sank near the 
Italian island of Lampedusa in 2013.
354 For an enlightening discussion of this matter, see https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/23/magazine/climate-migration.html
355 Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit, https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/
356 The EIU defines “flawed democracies” as nations where elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honoured but may have issues (e.g. media freedom infringement and minor suppression 
of political opposition and critics). These nations have significant faults in other democratic aspects, including underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in 
the functioning of governance
357 We regard this to be particularly relevant in the framework of a social-ecological transformation of our societies 
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which will increasingly depend on place-based 
adaptation and resilience policies in vulnerable 
territories across the globe. The bi-directional 
interrelations between the ecological and the 
social crises are, in this regard, particularly 
important but remain marginally applied in 
global mainstream politics.  
 
Sound climate policy will need to integrate 
social concerns much more (notably through 
just transition and climate justice solutions). 
Social policies, in particular within develop-
ment policy, aimed at vulnerable groups must 
be tuned in with climate and biodiversity objec-
tives, in order to support each other mutually 
and generate new forms of social-ecological 
progress worldwide.
• Beyond this factor, the global economy’s intrin-
sic logic fosters powerful negative dynamics 
behind the different components of the global 
meta-crisis.358 This has multiple root causes. 
Among these, and at the bottom of it all, is the 
illusionary notion that human progress equals 
economic growth, cemented in the global reli-
ance on GDP as the embodiment of prosperity 
and good policy. Another more prosaic cause is 
the influence of a hypertrophic global financial 
sector - even more short-termist than the real 
economy itself - which has succeeded (and has 
been let to succeed) in putting the real econ-
omy at its service, instead of serving it. These 
dynamics have also for decades been permitted, 
if not supported, by national and global regula-
tory environments across the planet favourable 
to an increasingly globalised corporate sector 
allowed to massively shift social and, in partic-
ular, huge ecological costs to society as a whole, 
while committing large scale tax abuse. 
This leads to understand that the global meta-crisis 
can eventually only be addressed as one. It requires 
a new generation of cross-sectional and multi-crisis 
approach policies - in particular along the social-eco-
logical nexus - as much as it demands policies and 
regulations that can reset the prevailing economic 
model’s underlying logic, from the discredited and 
unsustainable post-war growth/progress concept to 
a new and sustainable well-being/progress concept.
7.3.  A world on the 
threshold of 
transformation?
Ambitious global initiatives led by the United Nations 
and its agencies have been struggling to uncover and 
to address planetary challenges for many years. 
The 2030 Agenda of sustainable development 
goals form, for the first time in human history, a 
broad-based and ambitious political agenda to be 
simultaneously addressed by the world’s nations. Its 
Achilles heal, though, is that it continues to catego-
rise what are essentially “outcome” goals along the 
traditional pillars of sustainable development with-
out putting enough stress on their interconnections, 
and that it refrains from confronting the very nature 
of the economic model’s built-in logic it ambitions to 
transform (which, admittedly, would not have been 
politically feasible at the time). 
In the environmental field, the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
the United Nations Biodiversity Conference aim at 
reaching an effective level of global governance to 
address planetary threats. In the field of climate 
action, the national commitments made in the wake 
of the 2015 Paris Agreement, with its core objective 
of keeping the global average temperature rise to 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels while pursu-
ing efforts to keep it to below 1.5°C, were insufficient 
to meet that goal. Hence, the Glasgow COP26 in 
November 2021 will determine the seriousness and 
relevance of global climate action, as countries are 
coming forward with revised and hopefully more 
ambitious commitments for the coming five years 
and beyond. If COP26 were to fail due to insufficient 
new commitments, it would be a nail in the coffin of 
the Paris Agreement, as it would thereafter become 
impossible to reach its objectives. This would de 
358 This report already argued in its chapter 1 that at the heart of the global meta-crisis lies a flawed economic system, predominantly geared towards short-termism, profit and rent-seeking, and living 
off the externalisation to the community of the social and ecological costs it generates
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facto set the world on a course of over 2°C global 
warming, the consequences of which, according to 
the IPCC’s research,359 would be increasingly dra-
matic as average temperatures would move above 
2°C in the course of the century, and even beyond. 
The efforts at environmental level are critically 
important - but they also stand in contrast with the 
weakness in global efforts to address social and eco-
nomic challenges beyond poverty alleviation. The 
last major global initiative in the social field dates 
back to 1995 - the World Summit for Social Devel-
opment in Copenhagen. The Summit concentrated 
on four core issues - poverty alleviation, unemploy-
ment, social exclusion and an enabling environment 
for social development. 
It pledged to make the conquest of poverty, the 
goal of full employment and the fostering of social 
integration overriding objectives of development. 
Subsequent initiatives were mainly rooted in intense 
ILO action360 but no major global event or initiative 
was reconvened to address the broad spectrum of 
global social dimensions head on, including global 
employment issues, labour rights, social protection 
as well as, income and wealth inequalities. Only the 
issue of tax evasion managed to attract major atten-
tion, led by ongoing initiatives at the level of the G8/
G20 and the OECD (Global Forum on Transparency 
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes) 
- now overtaken by the recent US government pro-
posal for a global minimum corporate tax of 21%. 
All ongoing global efforts in taking on major global 
challenges take place within a complex and antag-
onised geopolitical context, which gradually shaped 
up after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This renders such 
global efforts particularly difficult, and can severely 
limit their chances of success. The tensions in today’s 
multipolar world, not least between democratic and 
autocratic states, generate a global political context 
in which common cooperative action by a multi-
tude of governments, and in particular involving all 
major economic powers, is much less likely to take 
place effectively. It certainly weakens the capability 
of the United Nations to organise global responses to 
global problems. In present times, this is extremely 
worrying because time for global action is running 
out, first and foremost with regard to climate action. 
In this respect, already dated initiatives to reform 
the global governance system to make it both more 
effective and more representative have led no where.
Consequently, a helicopter view of today’s global 
policy landscape is not one of a well engaged and 
on-going global transformation, but of a transit zone 
in which certain areas are being re-shaped while 
others remain untouched, and where activity in 
one area is not clearly related to activity in another 
area. There is no clear and unifying sense about 
where exactly this transit zone leads towards. This 
is maybe deliberate, because the UNSDGs - still the 
most ambitious global initiative aimed at setting a 
new direction for humanity - had to be formulated 
and framed in such a way as to satisfy and engage all 
»Ambitious global initiatives led 
by the United Nations and its 
agencies have been struggling to 
uncover and to address 
planetary challenges for many 
years.«
359 The latest findings are in the IPCC Special Report “Global Warming of 1.5°C”, and the next full report (6th Assessment Report) is due in 2022; https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ 
360 Notably through the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the launch of the Decent Work agenda in 1999 (now also a goal within the UNSDGs), or the proposals of the 
ILO’s World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization: A fair globalization: Creating opportunities for all. ILO, Geneva, 2004
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kinds of different constituencies facing a variety of 
constraints and difficulties and conflicting interests 
across the globe. This was very useful for their adop-
tion, it is less so for their implementation. Hence, 
the challenge remains to find the right pathway 
towards global transformation, to give it full and 
engaging meaning that can be widely supported and 
shared, and to ensure that all necessary actions are 
taking coherently and jointly. The world is not on the 
threshold yet, but coming close to it.
7.4.  The Case for 
European 
Leadership in a 
global quest for 
well-being
With a world in transit zone, one would wish for the 
European Union to play a prominent geopolitical role 
in championing effective global governance through 
the United Nations and to lead on truly progres-
sive policies capable to inspire and to lead the way 
for others. However, the EU’s international weight 
remains severely hampered by its institutional 
architecture and by its longstanding reputation of 
being an economic giant but a political dwarf. But 
the EU cannot just follow its own path or stay in a 
regional niche. The preservation and, even more so, 
the advancement of European standards of living 
towards sustainable well-being will only be possi-
ble if global challenges are effectively addressed 
globally and if European sustainable norms and 
standards of living are being shared across large 
parts of the world, and at least with Europe’s major 
trading partners.
This is not exactly the pathway on which the EU 
is engaged at present. Europe’s global weight is 
shrinking, and with it its ability to shape future glo-
balisation. Thirty years ago, Europe represented 
a quarter of the world’s wealth. It is foreseen that 
in 20 years, it will not represent more than 11% of 
world GNP, far behind China which will represent 
double that, below the 14% of the United States and 
on a par with India. Hence, there is a serious risk 
that, regardless about whether the EU would choose 
more or less openness towards the rest of the world 
in future years, it would gradually regress into a 
province of ever larger and more powerful players, 
whose (different) norms and standards it would have 
no choice but to gradually accept.
Thirty years ago, the EU was cast as “global regula-
tory power” exporting its standards worldwide, but 
this appears to be an abstract and technical vision, 
lacking finality and purpose. The European origi-
nal purpose is peace, always and forever, but peace 
has changed in nature, it is not so much between 
nation-states anymore but within them, in the face 
of unequal and polarised societies, and with the Bio-
sphere. The economic system is not a safeguard for 
peace anymore as it was when the first European 
communities were built. Instead, it is destroying the 
foundations for peace by increasing inequality and 
un-sustainability.
The major contribution of the EU as a well-being 
power would be to make the planet safe for well-be-
ing. The EU has the historic legitimacy to embrace 
this role: it is where well-being was invented as a 
public policy goal with the welfare state foundation 
at the end of the 19th century (Europeans invented 
»The world is not on threshold 
yet, but coming close to it.«
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361 The spirit of which has now been recaptured in the recent conclusions of the Porto summit and the Porto Declaration, May 2020
362 For a discussion on the concept of European strategic autonomy by Josep Borrell, see here  
https://eudebates.tv/debates/special-debates/future-of-europe/josep-borrell-eudebates-european-strategic-autonomy/
well-being while Americans invented GDP in the 
1930s). The EU was the place in contemporary his-
tory where well-being was rediscovered, well before 
the UNSDGs in 2015, with the Beyond GDP confer-
ence in 2007.361
The EU has a direct interest in promoting well-being, 
because well-being is a vector of peace worldwide. 
Its very identity is about well-being, in contrast with 
the US (economic wealth) and China (political con-
trol).
This European well-being identity remains visi-
ble in comparison when simple indicators are used 
to characterise the world’s three major economic 
regions (see infographic). The EU is only slightly less 
developed than the US based on the new HDI index 
(and much more than China) but in comparison it 
remains more equal, more democratic and more 
sustainable.
The Nobel Peace Prize 2012 was awarded to Euro-
pean Union "for over six decades contributed to the 
advancement of peace and reconciliation, democ-
racy and human rights in Europe." What about the 
next 50 years ? They should be about promoting 
well-being worldwide.
Well-being diplomacy should be at the heart of EU’s 
global policy, especially regarding sustainability. 
Therefore, the EU needs to learn how to affirm a 
sufficient degree of strategic autonomy362 at inter-
national level, but it also needs to become more 
effective in promoting a global agenda centred on 
sustainable development and sustainable well-being 
for all. This alone could also protect its own model of 
development in the course of this century by simul-
taneously addressing global problems effectively 
and by spreading global standards and norms com-
patible with its own values and aspirations.
The stronger political commitment that occurred 
since 2019 in the environmental field with the pinch 
of the European Green Deal, and which has now 
been reinforced in the social field thanks to the Porto 
Summit, provide the EU with a level of credibility on 
the global stage that it should fully use to promote 
a global transformation in line with its own. 
In particular, the European Green Deal (EGD) is, 
despite its shortcomings, a unique agenda in this 
regard, which at a geopolitical scale combines ambi-
tious and transformative climate policy with a wider 
range of environmental and industrial sustainabil-
ity policies, as well as with a concrete commitment 
towards a just transition. The EGD still needs to move 
further into a resolute social-ecological approach, 
which it has so far underexploited. The initial inte-
gration of UNSDGs into the EU’s European Semester 
process in 2020 - which came to a halt in the midst of 
the Resilience and Recovery Fund’s launch - would 
further strengthen this global credibility, provided 
this will now be relaunched and reinforced. 
»With a world in 
transit zone, one 
would wish for 
the European 









As an important part of this approach towards global 
well-being, the EU must engage much more with its 
neighbourhood, and especially so with North Africa, 
aimed at enriching existing initiatives and fram-
ing them within a sustainable well-being regional 
cooperation strategy. The relationship between the 
European Union and the countries of North Africa 
has a long history, starting with the Barcelona Pro-
cess almost a quarter century ago. Initiatives such 
as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy, and the Union for the 
Mediterranean have not, however, proved adequate 
to stabilise the EU’s southern neighbourhood. The 
results of these cooperation frameworks have not 
been as successful as anticipated, and they need to 
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EU 0,90 20 91 14,2
US 0,93 13 83 18,6
China 0,76 14 9 24,7
Sources: United Nations, WID, Freedom House, OECD
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EU initiatives for global leadership towards  
sustainable well-being 
Several global policy initiatives by the EU could be taken so as to mark its clear commitment towards 
sustainable well-being on the world stage:
• The EU should be the key player in global climate justice moving toward COP 26: the US climate 
summit has shown that climate justice is the key to solving the climate crisis. China will not 
concede new efforts without the OECD countries (especially the US) recognising it their histor-
ical responsibility,363 and the summit has seen multiple calls for serious commitment in climate 
financing to which the US has responded by “technology is the answer”. 
• The EU should actively support the COVID-19 vaccines waiver, and promote and support a global 
strategy towards the fastest possible safe vaccination of the world population (see section 7.5.1).
• The EU should convene an international summit on sustainable development and global well-be-
ing, as detailed below in section 7.5.2.
• The EU should be the key player in the 30 by 30 conservation movement, giving priority to justice 
toward indigenous communities that are critical in preserving ecosystems and biodiversity.364 
• The EU should adopt its first well-being budget in 2022, leading by example and by experiment on 
well-being policies, as detailed in chapter 3. 
• As a significant symbolic move, the EU should change its “infrastructure” banknotes (which is an 
image the EU projects worldwide) and adopt instead images or scenes representing dimensions 
of well-being (health, education, culture, environment) with European figures (Pasteur, …).
• The EU should actively promote global governance reforms to strengthen the world’s collective 
capacity to prevent and to address global crises
363 See China’s President Xi Jinping statement: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/22/c_139899289.htm
364 See new Report here: http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/1391139/icode/ 
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7.5.  Global 
Recommendations
As and when humanity will eventually emerge from 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the world’s common core 
policy focus may shift back primarily to the fight 
against climate change and to making a success out 
of the forthcoming COP26 in Glasgow in November 
2021.
While stepping up the fight against climate change 
is indeed a vital concern, we strongly argue for the 
world’s common core policy focus to become much 
broader. Humanity must now address the full width 
and depth of the global meta-crisis including the sys-
temic causes of our multiple and intertwined global 
problems.365 We believe that there can be no way 
back to the pre-COVID-19 world, because that world 
is discredited and has, in that sense, already ceased 
to exist. 
This broader focus would, as a start, pay a tribute 
to the millions of lives lost to the pandemic. These 
are lives that were not lost because of a virus, but 
because of the kind of world we so far chose to build. 
More than anything else, it is the pre-condition for a 
transformed world in which each and everyone has 
access to sustainable well-being on a healthy planet. 
This should now become humanity’s common 
endeavour for the 21st century. 
In the preceding policy chapters of this report, rec-
ommendations concentrated essentially on what the 
EU and its member states should now do amongst 
each other. However, many of these recommenda-
tions only make sense if they can be undertaken in a 
world that would choose to follow a similar path. This 
is, of course, far from clear today because despite 
huge efforts by the UN system of governance, includ-
ing through the UNSDGs, the world will emerge from 
the pandemic potentially more fragile and more 
divided than ever since the immediate post-war. A 
crisis in itself never leads to a better future by itself, 
it only reveals our vulnerabilities or strengths. It is 
what we will make of it, in particular in the few years 
to come, that will influence our common future.
The magnitude of global challenges is, however, 
only set to increase further and the complexity of the 
issues at stake is such that the full range of global 
policy needs cannot possibly be addressed in all of 
its scope and detail in the frame and mandate given 
to this report. 
Beyond our first recommendations, we therefore see 
the need for a truly comprehensive and fully articu-
lated global progressive policy agenda to be defined.
»Humanity must now address 
the full width and depth of the 
global meta-crisis including the 
systemic causes of our multiple 
and intertwined global 
problems.«
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This should happen through an inclusive, open and 
intense process of global dialogue among progres-
sives from different sectors across the globe on the 
full set of global challenges. Such a process should 
achieve the necessary diversity, inspiration, quality 
and global traction to a policy agenda that should 
provide progressives worldwide with a new global 
roadmap for change.366
We sketch out a first set of concrete global policy 
recommendations aiming at critically needed global 
solidarity in COVID times, the necessary achievement 
of the UNSDGs as the only available global solution to 
keep moving the world in a better direction, a new 
global regulatory approach towards global corpo-
rations, a 1.5 degree global climate policy, a global 
green deal, a global social contract, a rules-based 
framework for global corporations, fair and sustain-
able world trade, global development and solidarity 
for sustainable well-being, global governance fit for 
the 21st century, and the opening of new policy path-
ways to well-being, notably through a global common 
wealth charter.
7.5.1. Global solidarity in COVID times
The ICSE fully supports the call for a patent waiver 
for coronavirus vaccines made recently by more than 
100 former world leaders and Nobel Prize winners 
and sponsored by the People’s Vaccines Alliance,367 
and subsequently also claimed for by the European 
Parliament368 in June, in order to give the fastest pos-
sible access to COVID-19 vaccines for every human 
being on the planet. Such a waiver on patents, 
which remains fiercely opposed by the pharmaceu-
tical giants, will boost vaccine manufacturing and 
will speed up the global response to the pandemic, 
especially in poorer countries - but needs to be 
accompanied by initiatives to boost manufacturing 
and distribution capacity globally. It also echoes the 
earlier call by the UN Secretary General to declare 
COVID-19 vaccines as a “global public good”.369 
For instance, by mid-April 2021, only 70,000 people in 
Africa – which has a population of 1.2 billion – had 
been fully vaccinated. In the absence of decisive 
action, many poorer countries could only hope for 
widespread vaccination campaigns to develop by 2024. 
Such a global gap in access to vaccines would not only 
put at risk humanity as a whole, as it would notably 
allow continuing virus mutations at a very large scale. 
It would also wipe out years, if not decades, of often 
slow and fragile economic and social development in 
large parts of the developing world. This would push 
back many millions of people into extreme poverty.
The waiver on vaccine intellectual property rights 
should be accompanied by global coordination in 
the establishment of new manufacturing sites. This 
should include international investment instruments, 
the monitoring of supply bottle necks and transfer of 
stockpiles to where they are most needed, and coop-
eration between manufacturers to rapidly organise 
technology transfers. Crucially, this would presume 
lifting the current export restrictions in place for 
vaccines and intermediary products. This should be 
flanked by a global multi-year burden-sharing plan 
to finance vaccines for the poorest countries, which 
otherwise will have to wait several years before 
massive vaccination could be performed in those 
countries - putting their own populations and the rest 
of the world at prolonged and new risk. The size of 
such a plan has been estimated to be in the range of 
€30 billion a year and it could rapidly be set up among 
G7 countries.370 The Global Fund has estimated that 
a global vaccination plan would amount to $20 bil-
lion.371 These measures would make way for a much 
faster and decisive progress in the global fight against 
the pandemic, and should be coordinated with the 
already on-going COVAX initiative.372, 373 
The Global Fund has estimated that a 
global vaccination plan would amount 
to $20 billion
366 In this regard, the S&D Group has launched a cycle of policy dialogues involving multiple global stakeholders in the framework of its Global Progressive Forum initiative  







373 COVAX aims to distribute at least 330 million COVID-19 vaccine doses in low- and middle-income countries – including nearly 90 million doses for countries in Africa – in the first half of 2021 to cover, 
on average, 3.3% of the total population of the 145 participating countries receiving doses. By the end of 2021, COVAX aims to provide up to 600 million doses to countries in Africa. To complement 





The COVID-19 pandemic has caused the 
first increase in global poverty recorded  
in decades
176.000.000
The UN estimates that 176 million people will be plunged into extreme poverty due to the pandemic
25.9%
Food insecurity has risen and now affects one out of four 
people on our planet (25.9%).
The pandemic is massively disrupting healthcare systems 
and health service delivery in Africa and Asia for HIV, TB and 







The pandemic has had a limiting effect on greenhouse gas 
emissions; the total drop still falls short of what would be 
required to meet the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement.
Widening 
Wealth Gap
The world has seen a 7% increase in extreme  
poverty, while boosting billionaires’ wealth  
by 27.5% at the peak of the crisis, between  
April and July 2020 alone.
Two-thirds of the planet’s nations remain off 
track in developing national biodiversity plans.
Hundreds of thousands 
additional deaths of children 
under five years old.
A doubling of malaria deaths 








7.5.2.  The 2030 Sustainable Development 
Goals
While the world approaches the mid-point of the 
UNSDGs in 2023, progress towards their realisation 
is put in jeopardy as the global fight against the pan-
demic occupies centre-stage and its consequences 
directly undermine several goals. Many nations 
also remain insufficiently engaged in the process, 
whether out of political choice, lack of financial 
resources or fragile governance. The latest United 
Nation’s report on progress towards the SDGs warns 
of the devastating impacts of COVID-19 on a range of 
goals and targets,374 as the world faces the worst eco-
nomic recession since the Great Depression. It shows 
that on many goals and targets, the world is off track 
and the challenges remain huge while we have less 
than a decade left to implement the changes the 
UNSDGs call for. 
These negative developments (cf. box, next page) are 
alarming because the UNSDGs are the only broad-
based available global agenda that can right now 
move the world in a better direction. They offer a 
historic opportunity to improve the lives of billions 
of people by opening the necessary perspective 
towards a lasting new focus on sustainable human 
and planetary well-being in the 21st century. New 
global political impetus in favour of the UNSDG is 
needed at all levels - which the United Nations alone 
are not in a capacity to generate - as the world will 
gradually emerge from the immediate health chal-
lenges posed by the pandemic.
In this field, the European Union is perhaps uniquely 
placed to make a difference and to provide global 
leadership. 
In order to do so, the European Union should take 
the initiative to host, together with like-minded 
global partners and in close partnership with the 
United Nations, during the second half of 2022 (ahead 
of the UNSDG’s mid-point in 2023) an International 
Summit on Sustainable Development and Global 
Well-Being based on a multi-level and multi-stake-
holder approach, with countries, regions, cities 
and non-state actors (including trade unions, civil 
society organisations and engaged multinational 
corporations) committed to the UNSDGs. 
A backbone for the summit could be the UN’s Climate 
Ambition Alliance: Net Zero 2050375 which already 
brings together an array of state and non-state actors 
most engaged in decarbonisation efforts. 
These European initiatives with their global out-
reach, in order to be fully credible, must rapidly 
build on a renewed engagement by the EU itself 
towards successfully achieving the UNSDGs across 
its Member States by relaunching the transforma-
tion of its own economic governance process as only 
initiated in 2020 (the “European Semester”) into 
an explicit and effective UNSDG policy process as 
called for in detail in chapter 3, and by developing 
a well-being budgetary approach for the European 




376 including at the level of the United Nations (notably the new System of Environmental-Economic Accounting—Ecosystem Accounting (SEEA EA) recently adopted by the UN Statistical Commission), 
the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD (Report on Measuring what counts) and the European Commission (Beyond GDP initiative). Also see: the Canadian well-being index  
(https://uwaterloo.ca/canadian-index-wellbeing/), the Welsh government’s approach (https://gov.wales/wellbeing-wales-2020-html), and recent work in different international institutions:  
https://www.oecd.org/publications/beyond-gdp-9789264307292-en.htm, https://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/background_en.html, IMF Measuring economic welfare, May 2020,  
https://www.un.org/en/desa/un-adopts-landmark-framework-integrate-natural-capital-economic-reporting
377 https://budget.govt.nz/budget/pdfs/well-being-budget/b20-wellbeing-budget.pdf
In view of this International Summit, the European Union should take an initiative to propose a global blueprint 
for “beyond GDP” well-being indicators in the framework of the United Nation’s system of national accounts and 
a new governance approach promoting “Well-Being Budgeting” from national to local governance levels across 
the globe. Such a proposal could rely on an array of work already carried out by different public and private 
institutions and organisations on indicators and measurement, as well as already existing national and regional 
initiatives in this area.376 It should reflect the need for new critical indicators and data necessary to measure, 
understand and shape human and planetary well-being policies across the economic, social and environmental 
fields (such as inequality and income/wealth distributional indicators, economic welfare indicators including in 
terms of health, environmental sustainability or natural capital, human capital, social and decent work indica-
tors…). Well-being budgeting initiatives should be seen as closely connected to the measurement of well-being, 
because they can make the necessary connection between measurement and policies focussing on well-being.377 
To provide a rapid picture relative to several key 
goals,378 we would highlight that the pandemic 
has caused the first increase in global poverty 
recorded in decades. The UN estimates that 176 
million people will be plunged into extreme pov-
erty due to the pandemic. Inequality has risen 
sharply, with reports suggesting the pandemic 
has led to a 7% increase in extreme poverty, 
while boosting billionaires’ wealth by 27.5% at 
the peak of the crisis, between April and July 
2020. Food insecurity has also risen and now 
affects one out of four people on our planet 
(25.9%). The pandemic is massively disrupting 
healthcare systems and health service delivery 
in Africa and Asia379 for HIV, TB and malaria, 
with the worst consequences expected in more 
fragile countries, leading for instance to a dou-
bling of malaria deaths in sub-Saharan Africa 
in just one year. Hundreds of thousands addi-
tional deaths of children under five are another 
dramatic consequence of the healthcare disrup-
tions in the developing world. Cases of domestic 
violence against women and girls are estimated 
to have increased by 30% since the start of the 
pandemic, while women are on the frontlines 
of fighting the virus. Global unemployment is 
set to explode, as several hundred million work-
ers globally are losing their jobs in a context in 
which half of the world’s population still lacks 
any form of social security. 
Global resource flows for development380 may 
continue to suffer from the world’s recession 
and from immense pressure on developed’ 
countries budgets, following a downward trend 
since a decade. 
Within this flow of resources, official development 
aid provided by public institutions represents an 
ever-lower share compared to private flows (less 
than half of total flows in 2019). However, part 
of private flows in the form of remittances - an 
economic lifeline to many million poor house-
holds in the developing world - are also expected 
to decrease in the short to medium term due to 
the economic effects of the pandemic in richer 
countries. With respect to environmental goals, 
the global materials footprint continues to rise, 
alongside fossil fuel direct and indirect subsidies 
- which even increased by 30% in 2019 in OECD 
countries.381 While the pandemic has had a limit-
ing effect on greenhouse gas emissions, the total 
drop still falls short of what would be required 
to meet the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement. 
Instead, at current trends (which the forthcom-
ing COP26 in Glasgow must imperatively and 
significantly change), the world remains set for a 
haunting global temperature rise projected at up 
to 3.2°C by 2100. Two-thirds of the planet’s nations 




380 The sum of official development assistance, other official flows and private flows (https://data.oecd.org/drf/total-official-and-private-flows.htm#indicator-chart)
381 https://www.oecd.org/fossil-fuels/
»The European Union is perhaps 
uniquely placed to make a 
difference and to provide global 
leadership for SDGs.«
The pandemic’s impact on the Sustainable Development Goals
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7.5.3. Global Climate Policy 1.5
The cumulative effect of greenhouse gas emissions 
threaten to derail our climate and, with it, our very 
livelihood as we know it. Public responses remain 
insufficient, despite the ambitious 2015 Paris Agree-
ment. Much has been written and debated about the 
possible or likely consequences of climate change, 
nourished by ever more elaborate scientific research, 
in particular through the IPCC’s global scientific net-
work. Our planet could see a greater temperature 
increase in the next 50 years than it did in the last 
6,000 years combined. By 2070, the kind of extremely 
hot zones, like in the Sahara, that now cover less than 
1% of the earth’s land surface could cover nearly a 
fifth of the land, potentially placing one of every three 
people alive outside the climate niche where humans 
have thrived for thousands of years.382 Many will 
dig in, suffering through heat, hunger and political 
chaos, but others will be forced to move on. By 2100, 
temperatures could rise to the point that just going 
outside for a few hours in some places, including 
parts of India and Eastern China, “will result in death 
even for the fittest of humans.”383
Global recognition that climate change is happening 
and that something very serious had to be done about 
it took the United Nations, the scientific community, 
and in particular the IPCC, as well as many NGOs and 
climate activists, many years, if not decades, of efforts. 
However, nearly six years after the ground-break-
ing Paris Agreement in 2015,384 the world remains in 
practice still on course for a temperature rise around 
3°C (which would have well beyond catastrophic con-
sequences). And we now know the Paris targets did 
not go far enough to begin with. Today, the science 
is unequivocal: We need to keep the Earth’s warm-
ing to no more than 1.5°C to avoid catastrophe.385 
The recently leaked IPCC draft report (which is for-
mally due in February 2022) should alarm humanity 
further,386 stating that: Life on Earth can recover from 
a drastic climate shift by evolving into new species and cre-
ating new ecosystems…humans cannot.
National commitments made alongside the Paris 
Agreement were well below the proclaimed goals 
and require a three- to sixfold increase at COP26 
depending on the level of ambition within the Paris 
Agreement goals of 1.5 to 2°C. 
In the run-up to the 26th Conference of the Parties 
(COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change in Glasgow in November 2021, 
countries are gradually committing themselves to 
Climate pledges in the run-up to COP26
The European Union just agreed an ambitious Climate Law that paves the way towards EU’s carbon 
neutrality by 2050 and considerably steps up European efforts in the meantime. Through its Green 
Deal, the EU intends to raise a whole range of legal commitments applying to countries and the private 
sector across the board. It is also preparing a revision of its Emissions Trading Scheme to raise the 
price of carbon. In order to limit carbon imports, it also intends to set up a carbon border adjustment 
mechanism. Alongside its climate summit held on 22 April, the new US administration has pledged a 
new US emissions reduction target of between 50-52% cut by 2030, including a zero-emissions elec-
tric grid by 2035, and a carbon-neutral nation by 2050. China, now the world’s largest emitter (28% of 
global emissions) will aim to peak emissions by 2030 and to reach carbon neutrality by 2060.387 Ahead 
of the Earth Day Climate summit, the US and China agreed on climate cooperation in a joint state-
ment.388Among the leading industrial nations, Japan also committed to a 2050 carbon neutrality goal 
although its current implementing plans have already been criticised. The UK, host country for COP26, 
has committed itself to a reduction of 68% by 2030 and to carbon neutrality by 2050. Overall, more than 
a hundred countries already pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.
382 C. Xu e.al., Future of the human climate niche, May 2020, US National Academy of Sciences, https://www.pnas.org/content/117/21/11350 
383 E.S. Im e.al., Deadly heat waves projected in the densely populated agricultural regions of South Asia, 2017, Science Advances, https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/3/8/e1603322
384 At which 196 countries agreed a core objective of keeping the global average temperature rise to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels while pursuing efforts to keep it to below 1.5°C.
385 https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
386 This leaked draft report has been commented on extensively in the media. For main take-aways from his draft see https://earth.org/ipcc-draft-report-warns-of-accelerating-climate-tipping-points/
387 From 1990 to 2020, China increased its emissions from 2.4 billion tonnes to over 10 billion tonnes, making it the country with the largest absolute greenhouse emissions and also surpassing the EU 
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The European Union just agreed an ambitious Climate Law that 
paves the way towards EU’s carbon neutrality by 2050 and 
considerably steps up European efforts in the meantime.  Through 
its Green Deal, the EU intends to raise a whole range of legal 
commitments applying to countries and the private sector across 
the board. It is also revising its Emissions Trading Scheme to raise 
the price of carbon.  In order to limit carbon imports, it also intends 
to set up a carbon border adjustment mechanism. 
Japan also committed to a 2050 carbon neutrality goal although its 
current implementing plans have already been criticised
European Union
Japan
Alongside its climate summit held on 22 April, the new US 
administration has pledged a new US emissions reduction target of 
between 50-52% cut by 2030, including a zero-emissions electric 
grid by 2035, and a carbon-neutral nation by 2050.United States
China, now the world’s largest emitter (28% of global emissions) will 
aim to peak emissions by 2030 and to reach carbon neutrality by 
2060.348 Ahead of the Earth Day Climate summit, the US and 
China agreed on climate cooperation in a joint statement.China
The UK, host country for COP26, has committed itself to a reduction 
of 68% by 2030 and to carbon neutrality by 2050.
United Kingdom
Overall, more than a hundred countries already pledged to achieve 
carbon neutrality by 2050.
Global
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more ambitious greenhouse gas emission reductions 
than what they were prepared to do in Paris. How-
ever, as long as these far-away pledges are not backed 
up by credible implementing plans and legal engage-
ments, they may raise hope but need to be considered 
with great caution (see box); for instance, recent 
developments in the US linked to the new infrastruc-
ture package, following the administration’s initial 
climate pledges, raise new concerns about the actual 
reality of those pledges on the ground. 
Today, it is widely recognised that climate change is 
not only about environmental concerns. About every 
other global problem we face will be made worse by 
climate change: the destruction of our biodiversity, 
migration, inequalities and poverty, food security, 
insecurity and conflicts, threats to health, unemploy-
ment, and we could go on. Even at 1.5°C warming, 
this will happen, albeit less so than if expected global 
decarbonisation efforts were just good enough to stay 
a slice below 2°C. The IPCC estimates that countries 
would need to commit broadly to halving global emis-
sions from current levels by 2030 to put the world on 
track for 1.5°C and reach global carbon neutrality 
between 2045-2055. In order to reach 2°C, they would 
have to be cut by a quarter by 2030 and reach carbon 
neutrality by 2075. 
Despite its indisputable merit, the Paris Agree-
ment created an in-built dilemma or temptation for 
countries when defining their decarbonisation com-
mitments in its aftermath. Is the agreement respected 
if warming reaches somewhere below 1.5°C (consid-
ering warming has already reached an estimated 
average 1°C) or also if it reaches up to 1.99°C? It can be 
argued that it would be respected in both cases. For 
many countries the temptation is to chose the road 
that is less steep. 
However, there is a huge difference between the two 
“poles” of the Paris Agreement. Holding warming to 
1.5°C could mean 11 million fewer people exposed 
to extreme heat, 61 million fewer people exposed to 
drought, and 10 million fewer people exposed to the 
impacts of sea level rise. 
In addition to these human benefits, it could also half 
the number of vertebrate and plant species facing 
severe range loss by the end of the century. With stud-
ies showing that the value of services provided by a 
functioning biosphere averages approximately $125 
trillion a year, it is clear that restricting warming 
to 1.5°C could also shield us from severe global eco-
nomic losses.389 
Climate change impacts amplify rapidly between 
1.5°C and 2°C.390 The effects are exponential, instead 
of proportional, to varying extents depending on 
what is affected, in response to the difference in tem-
perature rise. 
In the fight against climate change, every decimal, 
every fraction of a degree will matter. Policy efforts 
are significantly more intense if global warming 
is to stay within 1.5°C, then if they are to allow sev-
eral decimals more, given that emission reduction 
requirements are twice as important in the first case. 
However, these greater policy efforts are counterbal-
anced by more limited adaptation policy efforts than 
would be required to survive in a close to 2°C climate. 
Plus, much of what humanity stands to lose for each 
additional decimal or even fraction of global warm-
ing beyond 1.5°C in terms of biodiversity, land, living 
conditions or even political stability, will be lost for a 




We need to 
keep the 
Earths̓ 
warming to no 
more than 
1.5°C to avoid 
catastrophe.«
389 Data assembled from different reliable sources at https://sciencebasedtargets.org/blog/1-5-c-vs-2-c-a-world-of-difference 
390 https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/resources/infographic-the-difference-between-1-5-and-2-degrees-warming/ AND  
https://www.wri.org/insights/half-degree-and-world-apart-difference-climate-impacts-between-15c-and-2c-warming 
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Our planet could see 
a greater 
temperature 
increase in the next 
50 years than it did 




rise to the point that 
just going outside 
for a few hours in 
some places, 
including parts of 
India and Eastern 
China, will result in 
death even for the 
fittest of humans.
By 2070, the kind of 
extremely hot zones, like in 
the Sahara, that now cover 
less than 1% of the earth’s 
land surface could cover 
nearly a fifth of the land, 
potentially placing one of 
every three people alive 
outside the climate niche 
where humans have thrived 
for thousands of years.
We also do not know today where potential tipping 
points may lie in terms of local, national and global 
governance in the disruptive climate times ahead, e.g. 
the capacity of public authorities at all levels (their 
capacity in crisis management terms and in financial 
terms) to cope with extreme climate events. Recent 
climate-induced events have made one point clear: 
they are very costly. One study concluded that in 2020 
weather disaster across the world added up to a total 
cost of $150 billion.391 This is an equivalent amount to 
total official development assistance to the develop-
ing world by all OECD member countries. The US was 
hardest hit in 2020, with cost estimates close to $100 
billion. This is twice the cost average estimated in the 
US since 1980.392 Between 2016 and 2020, the recorded 
cost for the US amounted to $600 billion. 
This indicates that extreme weather events will 
potentially have a global cost somewhere between $1 
to up to 2 trillion for this decade. As average tempera-
tures will continue to increase (which they will do to 
a certain extent due to the already existing carbon in 
the atmosphere and to the carbon that will continue 
to be emitted in the years to come even along the most 
optimistic emission forecasts), it is no wild guess to 
consider that these costs will eventually settle at 
above $2 trillion for the next decade.
With China already set to become carbon neutral by 
2060 and the US and Europe by 2050 (the three adding 
up to roughly half of global emissions), it is never-
theless hard to see how COP26 could achieve a global 
carbon reduction plan below 1.5°C, unless the rest of 
the world were to pledge much more ambitious com-
mitments, which is highly unlikely.
However, COP26 will not only be about achieving 
increased national contributions. A whole range of 
other aspects determine effective climate policy, not 
least its framing within the UNSDG approach and 
within a social-ecological understanding of ecologi-
cal changes.
We recommend the following broad policy approach 
in view of COP26 and beyond, in order to ensure that 
global climate policy can still achieve a maximum 
of 1.5°C global warming within a social-ecological 
approach leading to the necessary transformation of 
our global economy:
391 Source: Report by UK Christian Aid
392 https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/calculating-cost-weather-and-climate-disasters
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387 Source: Report by UK Christian Aid
388 https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/calculating-cost-weather-and-climate-disasters
At COP26, the EU and other climate-committed 
nations should defend an ambitious 15-point plan 
for a 1.5°C climate ambition to
• ensure that national contributions together provide for accelerated climate action as close as possible 
to, and if possible below, the 1.5°C global warming set in the Paris Agreement
• agree that national contributions will be enshrined in law, and backed up by detailed credible imple-
mentation plans across all sectors of the economy and by credible finance plans to back them up; this 
means to include currently left-out sectors such as aviation, marine transport or the burning of biomass
• open a global “climate justice process” on determining a universal method for the fair allocation of 
national emission reduction efforts among all countries and within countries393
• ensure that all countries develop proper adaptation and resilience strategies capable to protect the 
most vulnerable as a matter of priority. COP26 should agree on a clear set of indicators and bench-
marks to frame and to evaluate efficient, just and well-financed national and regional adaptation 
strategies in economic and social terms
• put the need for a just transition and its financing at the heart of the climate agenda, to ensure that 
nobody is left behind in the ecological transition, and climate action generates positive social change 
and progress for all 
• agree on a global phasing-out plan for direct and indirect subsidies to fossil fuels
• adopt a “Nature package” highlighting and fostering existing nature-based climate solutions, in coordi-
nation with the UN Biodiversity Conference for more integrated solutions to confront both the climate 
and the biodiversity crisis
• confirm the need for all existing coal-fired power plants to be phased out and for no new coal-fired 
power plant projects to be developed after 2021
• confirm the gradual exit from oil and gas when they are not accompanied by adequate carbon capture 
and storage capacities
• ensure multinationals set ambitious carbon neutrality targets, in particular the top 100 emitting com-
panies (responsible for over 70% of global GHG emissions)
• set up funding for climate action in developing countries, also taking into account the negative eco-
nomic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, by doubling the $100 billion goal and secure a 
re-capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund
• foster faster development of land- and sea-based renewable energy production capacities, especially 
in lower-income countries as a priority and ensure that global, regional and national development 
banks provide sufficient financing to support necessary infrastructure investment 
• ensure that the global financial system integrates climate and carbon risks into investment decisions, 
and that the recommendations of the Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure become man-
datory
• recognise the need for global legislative approaches to sustainable production and consumption, 
including lengthened life-cycle of products 
• The EU to promote a Global Green Deal (see section 7.5.4. hereafter)
93 The richest ne percent of the world’s population are responsible for more than twice as much carbon pollution as the 3.1 billion people who made up the poorest half of humanity during a critical 
25-year period of unprecedented emissions gr wth (h tps://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/carbon-emissions-richest-1-percent-more-double-emissions-poorest-half-humanity)
Beyond COP26 
COP26 needs to produce the best possible outcome for climate action as will be achievable by then. However, 
the global community should not yet give up on ultimately achieving a high enough decarbonisation pathway to 
limit global warming to below 1.5°C, if the result of COP26 would not be at that level. Instead, it should start plan-
ning ahead for the next window of opportunity. The sixth Assessment Report from the IPCC is due for 2022. This 
report will provide even more reliable evidence and new findings about climate change at different warming sce-
narios, and may well provide the ammunition to call for greater climate action than what COP26 commitments 
will consist of. In 2023, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
(CMA) will perform the first global emissions stocktake, referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement. 
A strong new global climate policy initiative led by the United Nations would then be conceivable by 2024, and if 
possible already in 2023, to considerably step up COP26 commitments across the globe and improve the global 
decarbonisation pathway. This could, in particular, aim at anticipating the achievement of global carbon neu-
trality to at least 2045 (and 2040 for the largest possible number of countries able to do so) and at setting new 
ambitious goals in terms of negative emissions beyond neutrality and towards a zero emissions' world in a “Post-
Paris agreement”.
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7.5.4. A Global Green Deal
The European Union is the first political entity that 
translated the idea of a “green deal” into a more com-
prehensive policy strategy around climate action per 
se. Following its launch in early 2020, the European 
Green Deal (EGD) remains a benchmark in a world 
searching for an exit strategy from the ever more 
daunting climate crisis and from the wider ecolog-
ical catastrophe threatening our societies and our 
planet.
The European Green Deal is not a perfect achieve-
ment. Its innovation has been to associate, in an 
integrated and legally binding policy framework, cli-
mate action with wider ecologically-minded actions 
across a large field, as well as certain labour market 
and socio-economic adjustment policies within 
an agenda of just transition. Its related limitations 
include: 
• An only loose connection with wider social 
policy action (in particular the European Pillar 
of Social Rights and its action plan), although 
on paper this is a commitment that is part and 
parcel of the EGD. This deprives the EGD from 
developing a systemic and firmly in-built policy 
interrelation between social and ecological 
goals and actions across the whole range of its 
policies, and thus from exploiting the full pos-
sible range of social-ecological progress that 
resides in (and is necessary for the success of) 
a transformative process towards far-reaching 
sustainability.
• An attachment to economic growth (as mea-
sured by GDP) as the EGD’s actual meaning or 
purpose394 rather than overriding well-being 
goals, such as health or justice. This concep-
tual limitation is reinforced by the fact that the 
European Semester process, the far-reaching 
reform of which towards a sustainability gov-
ernance process dedicated to the achievement 
of the UNSDGs has not been completed. It 
essentially continues as a macro-economic sur-
veillance process now geared towards the EU’s 
economic rescue plan.395
»The value added of a Global 
Green Deal must be much more 
far-reaching. It should bring the 
various economic, 
environmental and social policy 
dimensions of global climate 
policy under one roof.«
394 “Europe needs a new growth strategy that will transform the Union into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy”,  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en 
395 Although on paper this reform is also a commitment that is part and parcel of the EGD’s initial plan, and was started by the European Commission in 2020 in its first Annual Sustainable Growth 








Towards a modernised and
simplified CAP
















A new Circular Economy Action Plan
Strategy on the sustainable use of chemicals
Clean Air and Water Actions Plans
Vision for Inclusive Rural Areas
Africa Europe agenda
Just Transition Instrument, including the Just Transition Fund
Mainstreaming the Just Transition in the MFF
European Investment Bank as European Climate Bank
Sustainable Europe Investment Plan
Green Financing Strategy
Mainstreaming climate transition and sustainability in the MFF
Review Energy Legislation
European Framework for gas
Review Energy Taxation directive





TBD with the commissioner-
designate
Biodiversity Strategy for 2030
CAP reform proposal
Farm to Fork Strategy
295 
The European Green Deal
The recent announcements by the new Biden admin-
istration to make the US climate neutral by 2050 do 
not use the same terminology but follow a similar 
concept along a growth/technology/employment 
nexus, although at this stage they are less compre-
hensive.
Global action against climate change is already 
moving in a similar direction aiming at a broader 
policy approach, and COP26 may take this further. 
In particular, COP26 may see a better integration of 
climate and biodiversity action (nature-based cli-
mate action), an extension of decarbonisation efforts 
to sectors that are currently outside of its scope, or 
by supporting further action for a just transition, in 
addition to other processes such as on resilience and 
adaptation.
However, global climate policy would gain signifi-
cantly from embedding its broader action more 
formally into a wider global policy strategy, taking 
inspiration from an improved European approach, 
while building on the on-going progress in this 
direction.
This is where a Global Green Deal comes in. Such an 
idea was already floated end of March 2021 by the 
Presidents of the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Investment Bank in an op-ed before an EC/EIB 
event entitled “Investing in Climate Action”.396 This 
version of a Global Green Deal is very much unlike 
even its European version. It solely focusses on the 
technology dimension of climate action, essentially 
presenting the idea as one dedicated to massive tech-
nology investment along four pillars - renewables, 
adaptation, green breakthrough technologies such 
as hydrogen or CCS, and circular economy technol-
ogies - along their following statement “The Green 
Deal is not just an environmental policy; it is an eco-
nomic and geopolitical necessity”.397
While investment is an indisputable and even criti-
cal dimension for a successful climate policy every 
on the planet, this is not anywhere close to a Global 
Green Deal.
The value added of a Global Green Deal must be much 
more far-reaching. It should bring the various eco-
nomic, environmental and social policy dimensions 
of global climate policy under one roof, including 
investment, in coherence with the UNSDG frame-
work. This should then lead national climate plans 
to integrate the full range of necessary policy actions 
into a coherent strategy, with a clear attention given 
to the social-ecological dimension inside each spe-
cific policy. This would provide a global compass by 
which climate policy is not instrumentalised to save 
the prevailing global economic system and its inher-
ent flaws, but serves a more noble goal of achieving 
sustainable planetary and human well-being.
A Global Green Deal
Instead of having a narrow technology/invest-
ment-based proposal be promoted solely by two of its 
institutions, the European Union as a whole should 
assume more enlightened global climate leadership 
by advancing an ambitious, comprehensive and 
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7.5.5. A Global Social Contract
There are many ways to show that the course taken 
years ago by economic and financial globalisation 
has since long outpaced global social progress and 
justice. This is not a new but an already old challenge 
which remains unresolved. 
Twenty-six years ago, at the World Summit for Social 
Development, held in March 1995 in Copenhagen, 
governments reached a consensus on the need to 
put people at the centre of development. The Social 
Summit was the largest gathering ever of world lead-
ers at that time.398 It pledged to make the conquest 
of poverty, the goal of full employment and the fos-
tering of social integration overriding objectives 
of development. It adopted a range of quantitative 
targets within its action plan, including on poverty 
eradication, health and gender equality. The Summit 
re-convened five years later in New York in the year 
2000, during the UN’s General Assembly, but only in 
the form of a special session. On targets, WSSD+5 
noted a general lack of progress. It also adopted an 
extensive list of additional recommendations in a 
wide range of areas related to social development, 
but the immediate global political momentum had 
already been lost.
Soon after that, in 2002, the ILO made a new attempt 
to push an ambitious global social agenda on top of 
the international agenda through its World Commis-
sion on the Social Dimension of Globalization. The 
Commission delivered its conclusions in 2004, call-
ing for fair and inclusive globalisation to become 
a worldwide priority. It defined the global social 
dimension of globalisation the following terms:
The social dimension of globalisation refers to 
the impact of globalisation on the life and work of 
people, on their families, and their societies. Con-
cerns and issues are often raised about the impact of 
globalisation on employment, working conditions, 
income and social protection. Beyond the world of 
work, the social dimension encompasses security, 
culture and identity, inclusion or exclusion and the 
cohesiveness of families and communities.399 
Its vast amount of recommendations notably included 
to make decent work for all a global goal, action to 
strengthen core labour standards across the world, 
fair rules for trade, a minimum level of social protec-
tion (a social floor), more development assistance in 
line with the 0.7 GDP target, measures to reduce tax 
evasion, or improving the quality of global gover-
nance to achieve global policy coherence. 
398 The WSSD was at the time co-hosted by the ICSE’s co-chair Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in his capacity as Prime Minster of Denmark and by United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali.
399  https://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/globali/globali.htm 
»There is a very strong case for a 
much more intense and engaged 
global agenda on global social 
challenges, backed up by the 
2030 agenda, and which should 
also be closely inter-twined with 
the global environmental and 
climate agenda.«
In the wake of the report, and emboldened by the 
conclusions of the United Nations World Summit in 
2005,400 the ILO Conference adopted a landmark “Dec-
laration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalisation”401 in 
2008. The main goal of this declaration was to institu-
tionalise the Decent Work agenda the ILO had been 
developing since 1999, and placing it at the core of its 
mission.
As the wider notion of sustainable development 
gained new traction inside the United Nations in the 
aftermath of these initiatives, a new level playing field 
was achieved through the social goals included inside 
the 2030 Agenda of UNSDGs. Depending on how broad 
social development, or a social dimension of globali-
sation, wold be defined, more than half of the SDGs 
are directly or indirectly relevant.402 This provides a 
strong basis and clear legitimacy for further concrete 
global action at social level.
Furthermore, the socio-economic impact of the pan-
demic has already been severe in many parts of the 
world, deteriorating already challenging social and 
labour realities, and even reversing longstanding pos-
itive trends, notably on extreme poverty. This in itself 
creates a new global social emergency.
Another point to make here is that there is, in our 
view, no convincing argument that would justify the 
huge gap between the very intense global focus and 
political/institutional activity on climate change (and 
to a lesser extent on biodiversity) and the, in compari-
son, much lower level global engagement in the social 
field at large. This should be an even less convincing 
or acceptable situation to those who rightly believe 
that ecological and social imperatives are ever more 
closely interrelated and that it is impossible to last-
ingly and effectively resolve one without the other.
There is a very strong case for a much more intense 
and engaged global agenda on global social chal-
lenges, backed up by the 2030 agenda, and which 
should also be closely intertwined with the global 
environmental and climate agenda.
The four strategic 
objectives of the ILO 
Decent Work 
agenda
Promoting employment by 
creating a sustainable 




of social protection – 
social security and 
labour protection – 
which are sustainable 
and adapted to 
national 
circumstances
Respecting, promoting and 
realising the fundamental 
principles and rights at 
work, which are of particular 
significance, as both rights 
and enabling conditions that 
are necessary for the full 
realisation of all of the 
strategic objectives.
Promoting social dialogue 
and tripartism
400 “We strongly support fair globalisation and resolve to make the goals of full and productive employment and decent work for all, including for women and young people, a central objective of our 
relevant national and international policies as well as our national development strategies.” , in: Final declaration of the UN World Summit, 2005
401 https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/declaration%20on%20social%20justice%20for%20a%20Fair%20Globalization.pdf
402 UNSDG 1 No poverty, 2 Zero hunger, 3 Good health and well-being, 4 Quality education, 5 Gender equality, 6 Clean wa-ter and sanitation, 7 Affordable and clean energy, 8 Decent work and economic 
growth, 10 Reduced inequalities, 13 Cli-mate change
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Together, and in connection, with a Global Green Deal 
(section 7.5.4.), we recommend a Global Social Con-
tract. 
This Global Social Contract could notably include and 
promote the following five policy initiatives, but may 
subsequently be enlarged to additional actions:
• An empowerment of the ILO in its standard-set-
ting and governance role in order to ensure the 
achievement of several key targets within SDG 8 
on Decent Work, notably including the eradica-
tion of forced labour and child labour, the global 
enforcement of core labour rights.
• A “Global social label” awarded to countries 
which show comprehensive respect for funda-
mental labour rights and principles and which 
agree to submit to reliable and legally auton-
omous international inspections. It would be 
perfectly feasible to provide for such a system of 
inspection under an international Labour Con-
vention which, because of its voluntary nature, 
would allow each State to decide freely whether 
to give an overall social label to all goods pro-
duced on its territory - provided that it accepts 
the obligations inherent in the Convention and 
agrees to have monitoring on the spot.403
• A “Global policy initiative on informal work in 
the global economy”404 led by the ILO and sup-
ported by other UN agencies and the World Bank 
to notably accelerate the transition of workers 
and economic units to the formal economy, to 
promote the creation, preservation and sus-
tainability of enterprises and decent jobs in the 
formal economy and to prevent the informalisa-
tion of formal economy jobs.405
• A Global Social Protection & Health Fund, as 
notably advocated in similar forms by the Inter-
national Trade Union Confederation and the 
United Nations special rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights.406 This Fund could 
help to bridge financing gaps for social protec-
tion and promote health coverage and access to 
quality health care for the world’s poorest coun-
tries, who lack sufficient fiscal space to build up 
social protection floors and affordable health 
services in the short-term on their own. It could 
also be accompanied by technical support to 
support States build up their capacity to finance 
social protection and to build health service 
structures over the medium-long term. In this 
connection, the EU should actively promote 
universal health coverage and access to qual-
ity health care for all in the framework of the 
United Nations’ Resolution adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly on 10 October 2019 on universal 
health coverage and SDG 3 on ensuring healthy 
lives and promoting well-being for all at all ages.
• A Global Common Wealth Charter, recom-
mended in section 7.5.10 below.
A Global social label
Global policy initiative on informal 
work in the global economy
A Global Social Protection & 
Health Fund




403 The idea of a global social label was first proposed by the then Director-General of the ILO, Michel Hansenne, in 1997, but it failed to to opposition from employers’ representatives and a range of 
governments (https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_008013/lang--en/index.htm).
404 By the ILO’s own estimates, the informal economy comprises more than half of the global labour force and over 90 per cent of micro- and small enterprises worldwide. The informal sector is also 
associated with higher occurrences of abuse of workers’ rights and insufficient social protection (that is to say, the area in which the organisation is most needed in today’s world). V. Jakovleski, et. al., 
2019, https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/3026#ftn25
405 The ILO has by now extensive experience in working with private governance initiatives in the social field, notably through the UN’s Global Compact Initiative; hence, consideration could be 
given additionally to create a “global corporate social label” certified by the ILO under clear conditions and in cooperation with national government authorities - in the expectation of a regulatory 
approach as advocated by this report (section 7.5.6.).
406 https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc_campaign_brief_-_a_global_social_protection_fund_en_v3.pdf and United Nation’s report of the special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, 
reference document A/HRC/47/36 (6 April 2021)
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7.5.6.  Rules-based and tax-abiding Global 
Corporations 
In today’s global economy, corporate wealth (and 
the economic power it yields) and the share of multi-
nationals in global trade and investment are highly 
and increasingly concentrated, making multination-
als a critically systemic component of our planetary 
human society. 
This underlines, in our view, the strategic importance 
of embedding corporate and, in particular, multina-
tional corporate behaviour much more firmly within 
the boundaries of a global pathway towards sustain-
able development and of mobilising their resources 
in the pursuit of human and planetary sustainable 
well-being. Their economic importance and their 
global outreach (including by being able to shape 
what happens through their global value chains) 
provide enormous and truly transformational poten-
tial that could in theory contribute considerably to 
increased global sustainable well-being, as much 
as it has until now been at the heart of the global 
meta-crisis we must confront. 
It is also becoming ever more evident that multi-
nationals have a growing self-interest in becoming 
sustainable, both to limit the negative consequences 
of, in particular, climate change to their own busi-
ness, and to remain competitive and relevant in a 
world that is increasingly in search of sustainable 
products and services. Across the private economy, a 
growing number of companies are indeed engaging 
in more responsible forms of business conduct, such 
as through the B-corporation initiative.407
However, such approaches remain too scarce and 
slow. We need to see a tectonic shift in the still dom-
inant and inherently short-term, profit-seeking and 
tax-avoiding corporate logic. Provoking such a shift 
lies beyond the scope and capacity of traditional 
global policy approaches towards corporations.
» In today s̓ global economy, 
corporate wealth (and the 
economic power it yields) and 
the share of multinationals in 
global trade and investment are 
highly and increasingly 
concentrated, making 
multinationals a critically 
systemic component of our 
planetary human society.«
407 https://bcorporation.net 
Many multinationals do not only make such 
money thanks to successful business strategies. 
They also do so by paying little, if any, tax on their 
earnings. A major, longstanding and well-known 
critique is that multinationals have long ceased to 
pay their fair share of taxes, thanks to tax compe-
tition among countries, and to large-scale global 
tax avoidance and tax evasion practices. Although 
the world’s biggest corporations only employ a 
fraction of the world’s workers and employees 
(200 of the largest global firms only employ less 
than 1% of the global workforce; but all multina-
tional firms together employ a quarter408), their 
aggregated sales account for about 30% of the 
world’s GDP, similar to their share in world pro-
duction.409 The world’s 500 largest corporations 
generate annual revenue above $30 trillion and 
profits above $2 trillion.410 They also control over 
two-thirds of global trade f lows, of which more 
than half occurs within the world’s multinational 
corporate network. 
Another way to grasp an idea of the weight of 
mega-firms in the global economy is to consider 
their relative number among economic entities 
in terms of revenue - being formed by countries 
and companies alike, and comparing government 
revenues with corporate turnover.411 Over the last 
decade, companies increased their share in the 
list of the world’s biggest 100 economic entities 
from 50% to 70% today.412 Right after the 9 biggest 
nation-state economic entities (ranging from the 
US and China to Brazil and Canada), the largest 
corporate economic entity is Walmart, ranking 
as the 10th most valued economic entity on the 
planet, well ahead of all other countries.413 It is 
equally telling to note that the total value of only 
the ten largest mega-firms in the world is compa-
rable to the bottom 180 countries. 
»Many 
multinationals 






also do so by 
paying little, if 





411 It should, however be acknowledged that while such different value-based comparisons can provide a certain idea of the comparative economic sizes of nation states and major corporations, they are 
to be taken with a pinch of salt as they do not rest on identical value concepts.
412 See https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/12/global-justice-now-study-multinational-businesses-walmart-apple-shell and https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/the-worlds-top-100-economies-31-
countries-69-corporations/
413 www.globaljustice.ork.uk; Walmart also features the world’s highest annual corporate revenue, above $500 billion.
301 
302 




less than 1% 
of the global 
workforce
They also control over two-thirds of global trade flows, of which more than half 
occurs within the world’s multinational corporate network.
Over the last decade, companies 
increased their share in the list of the 
world’s biggest 100 economic 
entities from 50% to 70%
$30 trillion 
50-70% Right after the 9 biggest nation-state economic entities (ranging from the US 
and China to Brazil and Canada), the 
largest corporate economic entity is 
Walmart, ranking as the 10th most 
valued economic entity on the planet
generate annual revenue above generate profits exceeding 
30% 
2/3 
The total value of only the ten largest mega-firms in the 
world is comparable to the bottom 180 countries.
their aggregated 
sales account for 
about 30% of the 
world’s GDP
The 200 largest global companies in the World
The world’s 500 largest corporations
Corporations compared to countries
18 
A recent study by the Tax Foundation414 has shown that 
the worldwide average statutory corporate tax rate has 
consistently decreased since 1980 and it also declined 
in every world region, with the largest decline occur-
ring in the early 2000s. The fall is very significant 
- from an average rate of 40% in 1980 to the current 
rate of 24%. These percentages mask enormous differ-
ences between countries, even inside the European 
Union, and are an expression of decades-long corpo-
rate tax competition, as many countries trie to attract 
and retain firms in a long-lasting race to the bottom. 
This global downward trend in corporate taxation in 
fact represents a decades-long transfer of wealth gen-
erated by global economic activity from citizens at 
large to corporations and to their shareholders.
In addition to benefitting from decreasing corporate 
tax rates, multinational firms have also been able to 
pay even lesser tax over the years through aggres-
sive tax planning strategies, in exploiting legal tax 
reduction and avoidance schemes offered by a range 
of countries, and through tax evasion, in particular 
artificial offshore profit shifting. Just in the field of 
tax avoidance, governments lose much needed funds: 
conservatively estimated at around 4-10% of global 
corporate income tax revenues, or $100-240 billion 
annually.415 
All in all, an estimated 40% of foreign profits are 
diverted to tax havens and, according to the IMF, 
global profit shifting adds up to an annual loss in cor-
porate tax revenue of more than $500 billion416 - vast 
amounts of money that could be spent on fostering 
sustainable well-being in many ways, not least in 
developing countries, as they rely more heavily on 
corporate tax as a source of government revenue. A 
critical point to note here, though, is that multina-
tionals are not alone to be blamed for this global tax 
injustice. In a recent analysis, OECD countries and 
their dependencies were revealed to be complicit 
in 68% of the world’s corporate tax abuses, actively 
enabling such abuse.417 
It has been equally denounced and documented that 
multinationals bear vast responsibility in the depletion 
of our natural resources, the damages to our biosphere 
through multiple pollutions or deforestation, and 
climate change. One study found that only 100 mega-
firms are responsible for 71% of all carbon emissions. 
Since 1965, a mere 20 fossil fuel corporations contrib-
ute more than 1/3 of global emissions.418 Another study 
has calculated that about 20% of carbon emissions 
come from multinationals’ globalised supply chains.419 
It has found that multinationals actively shift carbon 
emissions across their supply chains from developed 
countries (where emission norms are increasingly 
tight or expected to be tightened) to developing ones. 
Other important criticism against multinational 
behaviour concern a vast array of labour and social 
problems,420 including child labour and forced labour, 
»The worldwide average statutory 
corporate tax rate has consist-
ently decreased since 1980 and it 
also declined in every world 
region, with the largest decline 




417 According to new analysis by the Tax Justice Network, the world’s top 10 biggest enablers of global corporate tax abuse today are in descending order the British Virgin Islands (British Overseas Territory), the 




420 For instance, the ILO has estimates that more than 20 million workers are working in forced labour conditions in the global economy  
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/feb/20/trafficking-labour-corporations-compliance-human-rights
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human rights abuses in poor countries, and corrup-
tion, as regularly documented.421
For too long now, global corporate profits have been 
internalised while environmental and social costs 
have been shifted to society. In order to address this, 
global public initiatives aimed at influencing cor-
porate behaviour as much as possible in line with 
stated policy goals have essentially adopted voluntary 
approaches inspired by corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) concepts (see Box). 
While public institutions involved with such “soft 
law" initiatives naturally tend to present them in posi-
tive terms, there is no solid and independent evidence 
on the real societal impact of CSR initiatives, on how 
far they truly make a difference in tackling today’s 
global challenges and, in particular, in achieving 
UNSD goals. 
Despite the existence of global CSR initiatives, 
research has also shown that national definitions of 
CSR remain very diverse across the globe.422 Many 
multinationals today manage highly complex value 
chains around the globe, across developed and devel-
oping countries, each with their own social and 
environmental regulations, which makes indepen-
dent tracking of actual corporate behaviour and the 
accuracy of sustainability reporting (where it occurs) 
extremely difficult. 










The United Nations have since a while sought to engage the private sector in contributing to global 
policy goals, and since 2015 to the SDGs. The United Nations Global Compact, initiated in the year 
2000 under Kofi Annan, is such a voluntary initiative (and the most prominent one globally) 
based on CEO commitments to implement universal sustainability principles and to undertake 
partnerships in support of UN goals. The initiative involves 13.000 companies across 160 devel-
oped and developing countries “to embed SDG-aligned practices deep into business operations 
and across the value chain to accelerate progress and impact for the 2030 Agenda”.423 In addition, 
the UN seeks to involve private companies in the fight against climate change through its Global 
Climate Action initiative, aimed at countries, cities, regions, businesses and investors.424 The 
ILO has also been seeking private sector involvement to promote labour standards, in particular 
through its Enterprises Initiative launched in 2013.425 CSR initiatives also emerged long ago at 
the OECD (OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Global Forum for Responsible 
Business Conduct, as well as the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes) and by the European Commission, although less actively. The OECD and World 
Bank also launched in 1999 the Global Corporate Governance Forum, aimed at the private sector 
in emerging economies. The International Organisation for Standardisation has its own CSR 
initiative called ISO 26000.426 In order to shed more light on company-internal CSR activities, 
the independent Global Reporting Initiative was launched in 2000, establishing standards for 
sustainability reporting427 which are now the most widely used globally. In the field of human 
rights, the UN promotes its “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”.428 CSR has also 
led to and continues to generate an array of private initiatives at national and international level, 
notably in the climate and human rights fields (such as the recent Investors for Human Rights 
initiative429). A specific approach is that of the US-based “B Corporation”,430 run by a private firm, 
which currently includes nearly 4.000 firms in 74 countries. It is based on a certification system 
of standards of verified social and environmental performance, public transparency, and legal 
accountability to balance profit and purpose.
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promote labour standards, in particular through its Enterprises 
Initiative launched in 2013.387 CSR initiatives also emerged long ago 
at the OECD (OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the 
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The OECD and World Bank also launched in 1999 the Global 
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emerging economies
The International Organisation for Standardisation has its own CSR 
initiative called ISO 26000. In order to shed more light on 
company-internal CSR activities, the independent Global Reporting 
Initiative was launched in 2000, establishing standards for 
sustainability reporting389 which are now the most widely used 
globally.
Box 3. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) concepts
It can be assumed that a certain number of companies 
involved in global CSR initiatives are so genuinely, but 
how many, to which extent, and with which measur-
able positive impact on society and planet? 
Furthermore, CSR approaches do not require coher-
ence in company policy, for instance based on a 
comprehensive adherence to sustainability goals - a 
given corporation may well engage with the Global 
Climate Action initiative to only use renewable energy 
(and be able to claim so publicly), but may still treat 
its employees contrary to ILO goals. The sheer multi-
plication of public CSR initiatives is also questionable 
in its own right, as multinationals may participate 
in several unrelated schemes at the same time on a 
cherrypicking basis at their own choice. A World 
Bank publication noted that “CSR with its diverse and 
diverging interpretations seems to be too uncertain 
to genuinely serve as an accurate and secure guide in 
the shift of capitalism that we are experiencing and 
whose final direction is unknown”.431
Decades of soft law initiatives have certainly to some 
extent improved the global corporate landscape in 
terms of sustainability. However, progress through 
CSR approaches appears slow, fractured, fragile and 
at the sole will of multinational company boards 
and their management. In comparison, our global 
challenges are ever more pressing, interactive and 
destabilising. 
Today, a tiny minority of global corporations may 
be regarded as very advanced in terms of their own 
sustainability and of their deep-rooted engagement 
towards social and environmental responsibility in 
solidarity with society as a whole, not to speak of the 
private sector more generally. Time has come to move 
on. The gulf between soft law practices inherited 
from the last century and the expected dismal conse-
quences of some of our multiple global crises is, in our 
view, wide open.
How can the private sector, and in particular multina-
tional enterprises, become a major vector for positive 
change towards a truly sustainable world? How can 
global governance approaches best build on new 
trends and developments in this respect and move 
even further?
• Breaking with past practices, some countries 
have already moved towards mandatory rules 
to govern certain aspects of private economic 
activity in the field of CSR, in particular with 
a focus on increasing business transparency 
through obligatory rather than voluntary 
reporting, such as in the EU432 (on non-financial 
reporting obligations) or the UK (mandatory 
companies act 2006). In the field of corporate 
philanthropy, Mauritania enacted legislation 
back in 2009 already, and India adopted man-
datory CSR provisions in this field in 2013 in the 
frame of its Company Act,433 creating the obli-
gation for companies above a certain size and 
profitability to contribute 2% of their profits to 
social development. France broke new ground 
in 2017 with its duty of vigilance law. Corporate 
governance structures set towards pursing 
responsible corporate policy have also been 
enacted, such as in South Africa.434 However, 
such approaches are state-centred, remain 
globally scarce and still tend to not be reaching 
far enough to ensure the transparency and rel-
evance of detailed information companies have 
to provide, or the involvement of trade unions. 
Nor do such approaches cover smaller and 
medium-sized firms, or resolve the gap between 
what may be mandatory in certain countries 
but voluntary in others, while financial flows, 
value chains and markets are global.
• Following decades of soft law approaches and 
relative laissez-faire, the pressure exerted by 
the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement has now 
started to shift the focus for multinationals 
from soft to hard law, essentially in view of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by forc-
ing accelerated industrial and technological 
change. However, while legislation is being 
brought forward in developed countries (such 
as the European Green Deal and its “Fit for 55" 
package of legislation), carbon-intensive activ-
ities may still increasingly be relocated to less 
well regulated places across the planet, in the 
absence of a global framework. In the EU, the 
planned carbon border adjustment mechanism 
(CBAM) will notably try to address this with 
regard to trade. 
431 http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/731511468325284128/pdf/661030BRI0Box365730B00PUBLIC00PSO0240CSR.pdf
432 On 20 April 2021, the European Commission made an important proposal for the revision of the existing Directive on Non-financial Reporting. The new proposal would require large EU companies 
and companies listed on an EU-regulated exchange to use the same set of standards to report on environmental, social and governance matters every year. They would also be required to report not 
only retrospectively but also on their sustainability strategies and targets and the due diligence processes used to identify negative impacts and risks - including in their supply chains.
433 http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf
434 For a review see Lin Li-Wen, Columbia Law School’s Blog, November 20, 2020, https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/11/20/mandatory-corporate-social-responsibility-legislation-around-the-world/
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• In the field of global corporate taxation, the 
recent US proposal for an effective global min-
imum corporate tax rate of 21%, alongside a 
28% rate inside the US and provisions to make 
it harder for US companies to move profits 
overseas, is a land slight change and opens up 
a totally new perspective in this critical field 
of global policy, and possibly beyond. If well 
articulated, a global minimum corporate tax 
rate of this magnitude could recover more 
than $640 billion in underpaid tax from multi-
nationals each year435 and provide significant 
new revenue not only to reduce inequalities 
and address the impact of COVID-19, but to 
finance a sustainable ecological and social 
transformation across the globe. However, 
depending on how the proposal would be 
articulated globally, it could disproportion-
ally favour richer countries, members of the 
OECD, at the detriment of poorer non-OECD 
countries,436 which the OECD agreement on a 
15% global minimum corporate tax may lead 
to. In an alternative Tax Justice Network (TJN) 
proposal, lower income countries in partic-
ular, where half the world’s population lives, 
would see the amount of underpaid tax they 
recover almost double from $16 billion under 
the OECD proposal to $31.3 billion under the 
TJN/METR proposal. The $31.3 billion would 
be equivalent to 36% of the combined public 
health budgets of lower income countries.437 
While the progress towards a common global 
minimum rate has been praised by many as 
a historic achievement, the level of the rate 
has also come under strong criticism - while a 
15% minimum rate could at best eliminate the 
worst excesses of current corporate tax avoid-
ance practices and end race-to-the-bottom 
tax competition among jurisdictions, it would 
also de facto legitimise a system where capital 
earnings from corporate activity are far less 
taxed than other sources of revenue, especially 
labour.
• The United Nations’ “High Level Panel on 
International Financial Accountability, Trans-
parency and Integrity for Achieving the 2030 
Agenda (FACTI)”438 issued in February this 
year its final recommendations in a highly 
commendable report - calling for a global 
system of financial integrity for sustain-
able development - to address global illicit 
financial flows from tax abuse, cross-border 
corruption, and transnational financial crime 
that drain resources from sustainable devel-
opment. FACTI argues that the magnitude 
of the resources the world stands to gain by 
creating financial integrity for sustainable 
development is enormous. As much as 10% 
of the world’s GDP might be held in offshore 
financial assets. An estimated $7 trillion of the 
world’s private wealth is funnelled through 
secrecy jurisdictions and haven countries.439 
One of its important recommendations, a 
global minimum corporate tax rate, has been 
proposed by the US weeks later (see previous 
point). A major recommendation of the panel 
is that international tax norms, particularly 
tax-transparency standards, should be estab-
lished through an open and inclusive legal 
instrument with universal participation; to 
that end, the international community should 
initiate a process for a UN Tax Convention.440 
The Convention should also provide for effec-
tive capital gains taxation. It could create a 
legal foundation for a new intergovernmental 
body on tax matters within the United Nations.
• In the area of human rights, work is ongoing 
since 2014 inside the UN system with a view to 
achieve an international legally binding treaty 
on “Business and Human Rights”. The elabo-
ration of this instrument, originally mandated 
by a resolution of the UN Human Rights Coun-
cil, aims to complement and go beyond the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business on Human 
Rights (UNGPs) of 2011 with the objective to 
eliminate major gaps remaining in the protec-
tion of human rights against corporate abuses. 
The prospect of such a treaty is strongly sup-
ported by global human rights organisations in 
order to provide for worldwide uniform human 
rights standards, jurisdiction and applicable 
law as well as fair and effective access to jus-





438 FACTI report, February 2021, https://www.factipanel.org/explore-the-report
439 FACTI op.cit.
440 UN conventions are legally binding treaties that may be ratified by its member states
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The need for genuine international rules to shape 
a universal framework of corporate responsibility 
for sustainable development
International law, as a determinedly state-centred 
system, does not provide ready-made solutions to 
the social and environmental problems posed by 
multinationals. Many experts point to a ‘mismatch’ 
between the international legal system – built 
around the notion of a society of ‘sovereign equals’, 
each with jurisdiction over a defined patch of ter-
ritory – and the reality of transnational corporate 
activities. How can such a system provide an ade-
quate framework for the international regulation of 
CSR?
Certainly, multinationals pose real challenges to the 
international legal system. But these challenges are 
by no means insurmountable. As far as needs and 
opportunities for international regulation are con-
cerned, we may recall several significant arguments:
• The global community needs to address the gulf 
between the limited capacity of global CSR soft 
law approaches and the magnitude of the global 
net of mega-crises, calling for accelerated 
worldwide policy responses;
• Triggered by the Paris Climate Agreement, 
a growing body of, primarily, binding envi-
ronmental and energy regulations is already 
redefining how the corporate sector, and in par-
ticular larger firms and multinationals, must in 
future respect societal imperatives and policy 
goals - however, this is essentially taking place 
in this field and in OECD countries, with the EU 
as a frontrunner through the European Green 
Deal;
• A major pillar of global voluntary CSR 
approaches - social and environmental sustain-
ability reporting - is set to be far more regulated 
than in the past, in particular in the EU via 
the newly made proposal on the revision of its 
non-financial reporting directive. Once more, 
this creates divergent levels of global practices 
while multinationals operate globally, includ-
ing through globalised value chains;
• A truly historic breakthrough in moving from a 
global soft law/CSR approach (through the OECD-
led Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes) to a legally 
enforceable approach is about to occur in the field 
of global corporate taxation, following the US 
government’s proposal for a global minimum cor-
porate tax. This policy change is not only a game 
changer in the fight against inequalities and tax 
abuse. It also demonstrates that legally binding 
and enforceable policies are possible at a global 
level to address a major global problem (in this 
case tax abuse by corporations in the hundreds 
of billions every year), provided key governments 
have the political will to take action.
• The United Nations are potentially moving 
towards two innovative global and legally bind-
ing initiatives to address two global problems 
connected to corporate behaviour: human rights 
abuses and illicit financial flows (which the 
proposed global minimum corporate tax would 
also party address). This would break additional 
ground towards legally binding governance to 
address the mis-functioning inside the global 
economy via a “Business and Human Rights” 
treaty (in negotiation) and a UN Tax Convention 
(as proposed by the FACTI Panel).
After a first and decades-long phase during which vol-
untary CSR approaches flourished globally as the “soft” 
backbone of the global economy, this brings the world 
and its multinationals into a second phase in which pri-
vate regulation has to concede some significant ground 
to new government regulations. However, it is neither 
likely nor desirable that this second phase would last for 
an equally long time because it still leaves many issues 
unaddressed. It should rather be seen as a necessary step 
towards a new model of global regulatory governance.
Therefore, we call for a third and lasting phase made 
of genuine international rules to shape a universal 
framework of corporate (economic, environmental and 
social) responsibility for sustainable development. This 
could build on existing global governance progress, as 
detailed above, and on solid policy goals in all these 
fields, embodied by the UNSDGs. 
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This would mark a fundamental turning point for glo-
balisation. It would have the ability to re-direct the 
enormous economic capacity of the global corporate 
sector towards collective societal goals and interests, 
while preserving and even fostering a new kind of 
entrepreneurship, innovation and sustainable form 
of progress through private activity.
In addition to this rules-based approach to global 
corporate activity, firms need to be their fair share 
in taxes wherever they have an economic activity 
and earn a profit across the globe. The breakthrough 
towards a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15% 
is an important achievement in its own right - how-
ever, it is far from the 21% rate initially advocated by 
the US (creating an unjustified tax gap in favour of 
corporate taxation versus other revenues and income, 
in particular labour) and it does not sufficiently take 
account of the tax justice dimension towards poorer 
countries, as the previously cited TJN proposal does. 
Hence, a global progressive agenda on taxation 
should continue to push for a higher and fairer 
future rate of at least 20%, including a fairer alloca-
tion of tax revenue helping poorest economies.
»A global progressive agenda on 
taxation should continue to push 
for a higher and fairer future 
rate of at least 20%, including a 
fairer allocation of tax revenue 
helping poorest economies.«
441 We recall that UN conventions are legally binding treaties that may be ratified by its member states
A United Nations Convention on Corporate  
Responsibility
It could take the form of a United Nations Convention on Corporate Responsibility.441 This would provide a 
legally binding minimum common global standard for corporate responsibility. It would, of course, not prevent 
companies to aim higher in terms of their sustainability engagement, and this could be the future goal of more 
ambitious global voluntary initiatives.
Content-wise, the Convention could use elements from the existing set of voluntary global initiatives and from 
the body of global policy such as notably framed within the UNSDGs, the Paris Climate Agreement, the ILO 
Conventions and its Decent Work agenda, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the CITES Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Global Compact, and a future UN Tax 
Convention and Business and Human Rights Treaty. It could also reflect elements from best-practice national 
and European regulations that aim to shape corporate policy, such as through the European Green Deal. In 
doing so, the Convention would, for the first time ever in the history of globalisation, define a basic set of world-
wide ground rules for corporate activity in the global economy and a corporate level-playing field across global 
value chains embedded, where necessary, in enforceable national laws across the globe.
7.5.7.  Fair and sustainable world trade 
Debates focussing on trade policy have reached the 
mainstream of political discourse in Europe. As is 
documented by growing controversy surrounding the 
negotiation and adoption of Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), large parts of the European public possess 
critical awareness of how international trade and 
investment policy today not only coincides but actively 
contributes to the global meta-crisis described in 
section 7.2. 
In their demands for greater consistency between 
trade and sustainability objectives, citizens are sup-
ported by a growing body of evidence. As noticed 
by a recent analysis, the trading relationships of 
the majority of countries participating in the global 
economy are structured by frameworks that impose 
significantly lower trade barriers on ‘brown’ indus-
tries and their carbon-intense products than are in 
place for ‘green’ goods and services. This amounts to 
an implicit subsidy of several hundred billion dollars 
annually that distorts global markets and accelerates 
climate change.442 At the same time, the global trad-
ing system is found to increase inequalities within the 
countries that form its constituent parts,443 and must 
therefore be seen to produce detrimental externali-
ties in both the social and the environmental fields. 
Working towards the sustainable well-being of people 
and planet thus necessitates a fundamentally different 
approach to trade policy. Defining a truly progressive 
policy agenda to this end, however, requires more 
than fixing the negative impacts of trade on societies 
and ecosystems. 
As one of the most prolific sources of international 
law, trade policy that incorporates sustainability 
objectives at its core has the power to become not only 
a companion but in fact an active driver of sustain-
able social and economic change on a global scale. 
With the exclusive competence for the conduct of 
trade and investment policy having been transferred 
from the level of Member States to the EU institutions, 
EU action that builds on the European Green Deal and 
the social-ecological policies advocated by this report 
has the opportunity to become truly pioneering in 
this regard. 
The change needed to achieve this aim must, how-
ever, be considered to be considerable, as social and 
environmental aspects are so far being addressed at 
the margins rather than centrally in the EU’s trade 
policy. Although the EU’s latest trade agreements 
encompass chapters dedicated to ‘Trade and Sus-
tainable Development’ (TSD), their level of ambition 
and effectiveness are criticised by civil society and 
recently also Member States.444 Typically, such criti-
cism points to the fact that TSD chapters refrain from 
stipulating concrete and actionable commitments for 
the contracting parties in the social and environmen-
tal fields and lack robustness, not least as result of 
weak enforcement provisions.445
Although the European Commission, with the recent 
appointment of its first ever Chief Trade Enforce-
ment Officer, has taken a first step to build greater 
institutional capacity to ensure compliance with the 
sustainability-related and other commitments stip-
ulated in EU FTAs, more and deeper policy change 
remains urgently needed. 
442 Shapiro, J. (2020): The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy, Energy Institute Working Paper 305, available at: https://haas.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/WP305.pdf
443 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2019): Trade policies and their impact on inequalities, available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdb66_d4_en.pdf
444 Non-paper from the Netherlands and France on trade, social economic effects and sustainable development (8 May 2020) available at  
https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/documents/publications/2020/05/08/non-paper-from-nl-and-fr-on-tradesocial-economic-effects-and-sustainable-development
445 See for instance: Harrison, J. and Paulini, S. (2020): The trade and Sustainable Development Chapter in the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement – Is it fit for purpose? Study Commissioned by ClientEarth, 
available at: https://www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2020-07-15-the-trade-and-sustainable-development-chapter-in-the-eu-mercosur-association-agreement-ext-en.pdf
»Working towards the sustainable 
well-being of people and planet 
thus necessitates a 
fundamentally different 
approach to trade policy.«
310 
311 
Laudably, such needs are recognised by the Euro-
pean Commission itself. Acknowledging a mismatch 
between its traditional trade policy approach and 
the objectives set out be by the European Green 
Deal, the European Commission has launched a 
review process to ensure trade policy contributes to 
the aims of achieving greenhouse gas neutrality by 
2050 and building more environmental and social 
sustainability into global supply chains.446 
In order to turn this review into a real opportunity 
to end the global meta-crisis, progressives should 
engage with the European Commission to define 
a new and holistic vision of international trade. By 
defining an innovative policy strategy that trans-
forms trading relationships with third countries 
into comprehensive sustainability partnerships that 
commit both sides to policy action in the interest of 
a progressive economic and social transformation, 
EU trade policy should assume global leadership 
and act as a role model for broader social-ecological 
policy change in the global arena. Such trade and 
sustainability partnerships should be based on the 
principles of mutual support and accountability, 
and be designed in a participative fashion, hence 
with interaction and cooperation extending beyond 
the level of governments to include parliaments and 
civil society and by leveraging a contribution from 
businesses benefitting from the openness of global 
markets. 
Striving for global and domestic co-benefits must 
be a key concern in fashioning this new approach 
for EU trade policy. At the same time as building 
cooperation and mutual commitment to change in 
the interest of sustainable well-being, maintain-
ing the autonomy needed to safeguard high levels 
of employment, industrial competitiveness, and 
societal well-being in the face of adversity is key. 
EU trade policy must therefore remain compatible 
with the strategic development of industrial capac-
ity in Europe and the aim of building resilience into 
related supply chains. The flipside of such a strategy 
of open strategic autonomy, for which the European 
Commission has made first, albeit not sufficiently 
clear, proposals as part of the launch of its trade 
policy review, should be a commitment to support 
partner countries in achieving similar domestic 
objectives, which should take the form of aid and 
active development cooperation where this concerns 
developing countries. 
The case for reforming the structure and function-
ing of the international trade system has become 
even more pressing in light of the COVID-19 pan-
demic. With supply chains for essential medical 
products breaking down and the global trade rule-
book hampering global solidarity and fairness, 
especially as regards the development of an effective 
global vaccination campaign, there can be no doubt 
that redefining the nexus between public health and 
trade policy is urgently needed, both to bring the 
coronavirus pandemic to an end and to prepare for 
future public health crises. 
Bringing such change to fruition will require more 
than political action at the EU level. Ensuring sus-
tainability, resilience, and fairness in international 
trade without considering the role of multilateral 
institutions, and the World Trade Organisation in 
particular, would be doomed to failure. Together 
with a new United States administration that 
appears to reinstate this crucial partner’s commit-
ment to the multilateral system, the European Union 
should take the initiative to modernise the multilat-
eral trade architecture and ensure its consistency 
with environmental and social policy objectives, and 
ensure its effectiveness.
To this end, the ICSE issues the following recommen-
dations:
446 Cf. COM(2021) 66 final, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/february/tradoc_159438.pdf
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Flank trade negotiations with clear and action-
able sustainability roadmaps
When engaging in trade negotiations with partner countries, the European Union should, together with their 
counterpart, define clear and actionable sustainability roadmaps to ensure key standards in policy fields, such 
as human and labour rights, environmental protection, corporate social responsibility, and good governance, 
are respected and enshrined in domestic legislation by both parties before the ratification and entry into force 
of trade agreements. Such roadmaps should be defined through participative processes, involving parliaments 
and representatives of civil society on both sides. Their application should be consistently monitored and 
enforced, on the EU side under the responsibility of the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer. As a minimum, such 
roadmaps should contain the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the eight International Labour Organ-
isation Core Conventions,447 Multilateral Environmental Conventions, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles on Businesses and Human Rights, and the multilateral standards for the 
effective minimum taxation of corporate income described in chapter 7.5.6. of this report. 
Improve the robustness of Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapters
Going forward, EU FTAs should contain more effective and enforceable Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) 
chapters that stipulate clear and actionable commitments for the contracting parties. A more robust approach 
to such chapters should therefore form the basis of future EU FTAs. Where possible, the European Commission 
should actively work towards the activation of review clauses in existing FTAs to ensure their alignment with this 
new set of criteria.
To render them more effective, TSD chapters should commit the parties to the achievement of the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals and define quantified targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sions, deforestation, and poverty. Given that trade liberalisation is frequently associated with negative impacts on 
gender equality, TSD chapters should likewise contain specific chapters relating to the improvement of women’s 
rights and the enhancement of women’s ability to reap the benefits of trade and related economic opportuni-
ties.448 The provisions of TSD chapters should include purpose-built cooperation mechanisms to bolster their 
effectiveness and feasibility.
The monitoring of the contracting parties’ compliance with the provisions laid out in TSD chapters should fore-
see a strong role for civil society. Such chapters should therefore foresee civil society complaints mechanisms as 
well as the establishment of Domestic Advisory Groups, comprising representatives of civil society organisations, 
trade unions, and employers’ representatives, whose work should be fully financed by the contracting parties. 
Disputes arising under TSD chapters should be adjudicated and settled by recognised experts in relevant fields, 
for instance in labour or environmental law. Established cases of non-compliance should lead to the collaborative 
definition of concrete action to address them. In cases of continued non-compliance, TSD chapter should foresee 
deterring sanctions, as an ultima ratio in the form of the repeal of trade preferences agreed under the FTA.
447 The eight ILO core conventions relate to: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, Forced Labour, Abolition of Forced Labour, 
Minimum Age, Worst Forms of Child Labour, Equal Remuneration, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
448 United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE) (2011): Gender Equality & Trade Policy, available at:  
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/trade/gender_equality_and_trade_policy.pdf
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Make better and more timely use of sustainabil-
ity impact assessments
Although the European Commission already makes use of sustainability impact assessments as part of its 
current trade policy, related practices should be improved considerably. Whereas the Commission’s current 
approach foresees the compilation and publication of sustainability impact assessments at the end of the 
adoption process of FTAs, hence between the conclusion of negotiations and ratification, such policy evalu-
ation should in the future be commenced alongside the negotiation process and feed into negotiations on a 
rolling basis. Additionally, the assessment of sustainability impacts should continue also after the entry into 
force of FTAs to monitor impacts of the trade relations thus established. As a general rule, sustainability impact 
assessments should be compiled by not-for-profit organisations, such as public universities, to avoid client bias. 
Additionally, the European Commission should develop scientific methodologies to assess the overall impact 
of its trade policy strategy. As the cumulative and interdependent impact of individual FTAs may be different 
than the individual effects of singular FTAs, more encompassing assessment methodologies seem necessary 
to fully understand such interrelated policy outcomes. 
449 The group consists of New Zealand, Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, further information is available at:  
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/trade-and-climate/agreement-on-climate-change-trade-and-sustainability-accts-negotiations/#bookmark1
450 Werner Raza, Bernhard Tröster et al, ‘How can international trade contribute to sustainable forestry and the preservation of the world’s forest through the Green Deal’ (October 2020), p.23, available 
at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603513/EXPO_IDA(2020)603513_EN.pdf
Rebalance trade from brown to green goods and 
services
To put EU FTAs at the service of the transition to climate-neutral models of production and consumption, the 
European Commission should ensure EU FTAs systematically lead to lower barriers for trade in green goods 
with proven benefits for the green transition than for carbon-intensive brown goods. To ensure such provisions 
do not lead to the leakage of carbon-intensive goods and services into other markets, they should be flanked 
by mutual commitments to the reduction of the carbon-intensity of the contracting parties’ economies, includ-
ing through the phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies. Related policy development on the part of the European 
Commission could take inspiration from ongoing negotiations between a group of countries on an Agreement 
on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS)449 and ensure consistency with ongoing work within the 
World Trade Organisation on an Environmental Goods Agreement. 
Such a rebalancing from brown to green products should eventually lead to the adoption of broader sustain-
ability assessments in the reduction of trade barriers. To this end, trade preferences, such as the reduction 
or abolition of tariffs and quotas, could be made conditional on the compatibility of the traded goods and 
services with a broad set of social and ecological sustainability objectives, for instance by offering low or no 
tariffs for products that have undergone effective sustainability certification while applying higher tariffs for 
non-sustainable products. First models of how such tariff systems could work in practice have been proposed 
by scientific experts and should be explored to this end.450
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Align EU trade policy with domestic sustainabil-
ity objectives
EU trade policy must be formulated in the broader context of the sustainable transformation of Europe, and 
therefore support action to build a productive and climate-neutral economy that supports high levels of 
employment and broadly shared societal well-being. The EU’s revised trade strategy must therefore create 
synergies with ambitious industrial, environmental, and social policies and embed the EU economy in fair and 
resilient global value chains that enable sustainable and inclusive economic development in Europe. 
As part of its beginning work on a new strategy of ‘open strategic autonomy’, the European Commission should 
conduct a comprehensive mapping of key sectors, goods, and services, that are crucial to achieve the aims of 
the European Green Deal and policies to foster well-being and sustainability in Europe more broadly. Where 
vulnerabilities are identified, for instance in terms of access to critical goods and raw materials, concrete action 
to address them should be proposed, if necessary, through diversification, stockpiling, near-shoring, or the 
exclusion of critical sectors and products from EU FTAs. Europe’s future trade framework must ensure EU policy 
is able to actively drive the sustainable transformation through active interventions in markets, for instance by 
using public procurement to achieve public policy objectives, the control of Foreign Direct Investment, and 
trade defence instruments that work alongside the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (cf. chapter 
5.2.1.) to create a level playing field in the pursuit of environmental and social sustainability objectives. 
Support developing countries in developing more 
sustainable supply chains
Future EU trade relations with developing countries must be embedded in broader frameworks that support 
such partners in driving domestic sustainable transformation strategies. As the proposed revision of EU trade 
policy in line with sustainability and well-being-related objectives, including through the rebalancing of trade 
from brown to green goods, is likely going to increase the difficulty of developing countries to trade with the 
EU, failure to include such a dimension in EU trade policy would likely lead to further widening gaps between 
Europe and poorer countries. Forging strategic partnerships with developing countries to allow them to seize 
development opportunities in key value chains for a sustainable economy, for instance in relation to recycling 
and the circular economy, as well as technology transfers and investment support for green technologies 
should therefore form part of partnerships between the EU and developing countries. 
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Assume sustainability leadership in the World 
Trade Organisation
EU leadership for a progressive overhaul of international trade in line with sustainability and well-being-re-
lated policy objectives must be associated with a strong commitment to the multilateral trade framework 
and its modernisation. The European Commission should therefore work with international partners to create 
momentum for necessary reforms of the World Trade Organisation to ensure its work and rulebook is con-
sistent with, and supports, trade in the interest of global sustainable development and the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals. Ensuring greater permanent links between the WTO and other international 
organisations and conventions in key fields, such as the United Nations, International Labour Organisation, 
the World Health Organisation, and Multilateral Environmental Agreements should be a priority in this regard. 
Reforms to strengthen the parliamentary dimension of the WTO and enhancing the participation of non-state 
actors, such as representatives of local communities affected by trade-related challenges and of civil society 
organisations should also be undertaken with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of global trade policy. Cru-
cially, work within a reformed WTO should serve to revive initiatives relating to issues of trade and environment, 
including negotiations on a ‘Climate Waiver’ that ensures WTO rules do not obstruct policies in the interest of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, an Environmental Goods Agreement, guidelines for the implemen-
tation of circular economy approaches, and the phase out of harmful subsidies, for instance for fisheries and 
fossil fuels. 
Additionally, such partnerships should work to 
leverage a contribution from the private sector 
EU trade agreements with developing countries should therefore contain provisions to ensure that companies 
subject to the due diligence requirements discussed in chapter 3.4.1. do not roll over related costs to firms 
operating ‘upstream’ in such supply chains, and thus outsource the related financial burden to producers in 
developing countries. Related provisions should also ensure that local civil society has the means and capacity 
to participate in due diligence processes, including through the identification of potential risks and the filing of 
complaints. Related measures could take the form of aid for trade measures as well as the active support pro-
grammes carried out under the responsibility of EU delegations in partner countries. Moreover, partnerships 
with developing countries should include incentives for EU companies to establish sustainability initiatives in 
which serious and long-term commitments lead firms to improve social and environmental outcomes in supply 
chains. This would ensure that the costs of sustainability initiatives undertaken in supply chains are equitably 
shared between lead firms (typically registered in developed countries) and firms operating ‘upstream’ in the 
supply chain.451
451 Richard M. Locke, The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global Economy (CUP 2013)
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Develop greater multilateral capacity to ensure 
trade contributes to global public health policy
The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare how the current multilateral trade system is incapable of producing fair 
and effective outcomes in the face of global public health crisis. Further to the actions laid out in section 7.5.1. 
of this chapter, action to permanently reform and capacitate the multilateral trade framework in this regard 
is therefore urgently needed. This should include permanent cooperation between the WTO and the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), which, as a first step, should lead to the definition of joint strategy to prevent 
disruptions of trade in essential medical products and to map and expand global supplies and production 
capacity and ensure its equitable geographic distribution. The WTO and WHO should further build joint and 
permanent capacity to deliver crisis management in the event of future global public health crisis, including 
by coordinating action to swiftly ramp up global production capacity for vaccines and treatments. Within the 
WTO, a newly established Trade and Health Committee should be established to prepare the revision and 
amendment of the WTO rulebook to ensure its improved functioning during future pandemics. This should 
include a targeted assessment of the current framework for waivers in the TRIPS agreement to determine the 
need for further flexibility elements. 
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7.5.8.  Global Development and Solidarity 
for Sustainable Well-Being 
The COVID-19 pandemic acted as a shockwave 
across the developing world. It has brutally exposed 
and increased pre-existing vulnerabilities in health 
infrastructures, but also in access to clean water, to 
food, or even to online education facilities in lock-
downs, and others. It has already rolled back years of 
progress in reducing extreme poverty and in creat-
ing even basic economic structures for employment. 
The pandemic may increase extreme poverty by up 
to 200 million, and it has disrupted the education of 
hundreds of millions of children. Many of them may 
never return to school, in particular among girls.
This happens in many areas already struggling ever 
more with the effects of climate change on their 
livelihoods and on their natural environment, espe-
cially in rural areas.
It shows the extent to which global development 
policy, in its different forms, is engaged in a war 
against the world’s meta-crisis. This is not the right 
path. The UNSDGs have opened a different per-
spective, and they notably engage richer nations 
to provide more global solidarity to economically 
weaker countries, notably through enhanced devel-
opment cooperation in order to provide adequate 
and predictable means for developing countries 
(UNSDG 1). 
Development assistance and the financial and non-fi-
nancial support it provides are more critical than 
ever, in a world that moves towards an increasingly 
disruptive climate and towards deteriorating bio-
diversity. To these, many developing countries are 
more exposed and less capable to adapt compared to 
rich countries. But development aid cannot become 
the world’s fire brigade, shifting its limited resources 
increasingly to different forms of emergency aid, as 
the pressure from health, climate or other shocks 
will increase. Nor can it be left by and large alone in 
trying to build a fairer global community.
As much as there is only some time left for the world 
to limit climate change to manageable levels, there is 
only an equivalent amount of time left for the world 
to ensure - as much as this is still possible - that 
poorer countries can “take the shock” and that they 
can find their own pathway to sustainable develop-
ment and well-being as soon as possible.
• Development policy and environmental policy, 
notably through climate policy and through 
policies to protect and re-develop biodiversity, 
are starting to come closer together, notably 
through initiatives such as the Green Climate 
Fund and the financing of adaptation in poorer 
countries. This evolution needs to go much fur-
ther and it should coalesce into an integrated 
approach around a new social-ecological under-
standing and practice of development policy 
in combination with other policies, with the 
notion of sustainable well-being at its core, on 
which the Eu should take a global initiative. 
Hence also our preceding proposal for a Global 
Green Deal (7.5.4).
• Development policy and social policy, whether 
in the field of work or more generally with 
regard to well-being through access to food, 
health, housing, energy, or education need to 
come under one roof from the local to the global 
levels. Hence also our preceding proposal for 
»Development assistance and the 
financial and non-financial 
support it provides are more 
critical than ever.«
a Global Social Contract (section 7.5.5). For 
instance, a better enforcement of labour rights 
by a stronger ILO, the fostering of socially pro-
gressive trade or the development of a global 
fund for social protection and health would 
critically enrich development cooperation. This 
would be further enriched by creating the set 
of binding rules for global corporate activity, as 
recommended in section 7.5.6.
• Financing for development is more critical 
than ever, for at least two reasons. The unprec-
edented investment efforts being ever more 
deployed in the EU and now also in the US 
cannot be allowed to create a vast new develop-
ment gap between richer and poorer nations. 
However, the technological advances this will 
unleash in those countries that invest early 
and strongly risk doing exactly that. Further-
more, the economic and social consequences of 
the pandemic on poorer countries have made 
development assistance even more important 
than before. The United Nations are looking 
for solutions, notably through the Financing 
for the Development in the Era of COVID-19 
and Beyond Initiative (FFDI).452 The EU should 
forcefully support this initiative in coming 
months. It must also increase its own global 
solidarity. While the EU is the world’s largest 
donor reaching a collective peak of 66.8 billion 
euros in 2020 and representing nearly half of 
global official development aid,453 still only 
four of its member states now provide official 
development assistance of at least 0.7% of GNI 
annually454 (Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark 
and Germany, in this order). The collective 
share for the EU stood at 0.50% of its GNI in 
2020, while in fact, only 2 additional member 
states provide just above 0.50%. This is despite 
the EU’s commitment taken in 2005 to reach the 
0.7% target by 2015, and again by 2030…Hence, 
fulfilling a renewed commitment by the EU 
and its member countries towards achieving 
a collective 0.7% ODA target by 2030 remains 
critical to global development resources, and 
should be accelerated given the already exist-
ing new and pressing challenges indicated 
earlier on. The EU must also use its diplomacy 
at highest level to bring other rich donors to 
significantly step up their financial assistance, 
as well as developing complementary financial 
sources such as those discussed by the FFDI 
initiative. 
7.5.9.  Global Governance for the  
21st Century
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the inter-
national institutional breakthroughs that occurred 
provided the momentum for decades of sustained 
economic growth and geopolitical stability sufficient 
for the transformation of the world economy, the 
shift from the cold war to a multipolar order, and the 
rise of new communication and network societies. 
However, what worked then does not work as well 
now, as gridlock freezes problem-solving capacity in 
global governance. The search for pathways through 
and beyond gridlock is a hugely significant task – 
nationally and globally – if global governance is to be 
once again effective, responsive and fit for purpose.
The global governance architecture largely inher-
ited from the immediate post-war phase, or even 
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452 https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/liquidity_and_debt_solutions_to_invest_in_the_sdgs.pdf





from earlier on as for the ILO, has been in need of an 
overhaul since many years. A number of initiatives 
tried to promote change in the Nineties and up to the 
ILO’s World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalisation back in 2004.455 
The latter noted at the time that one reason for 
instance social goals, such as employment, fail to 
receive priority at the global level, is because inter-
national organisations with different mandates do 
not work together sufficiently well. Hence, it rec-
ommended that "Policy Coherence Initiatives" be 
launched by the relevant international organisations 
to develop more balanced policies for achieving a 
fair and inclusive globalisation. The objective would 
be to progressively develop integrated policy pro-
posals on specific issues which balance economic, 
social, and environmental concerns. Today, indeed, 
greater coherence has become more of a mainstream 
approach across the global institutions, which is 
also driven by the comprehensive character of the 
UNSDGs.
However, global governance goes well beyond 
incremental improvements in how the existing insti-
tutions work together. Furthermore, the quality of 
global governance is an issue for us all, across the 
world. The governance of our global commons - such 
as peace, decent work for all, a healthy environment, 
or social equity - is more critical than ever. 
Today’s system of global and multilateral governance 
- made of a whole constellation of global, regional, 
national, but also urban (cities) and local public 
institutions and stakeholders is multilevel and mul-
tilayered. It has to function horizontally as much as 
vertically, for any global problem it has to address. 
It has a certain capacity to adapt to challenges, in 
the search for pathways out of these problems. The 
climate negotiations are a good case in point. But to 
say the least, even where progress over major global 
problems occurs, it can be painstakingly slow, com-
plex, limited and fragile. In front of it, those global 
problems can become ever more severe, and difficult 
to solve, potentially creating a dangerous and grow-
ing gap between the two for us all. 
This system does not seem fit for the 21st century. 
Many of the global problems that need an answer 
remain unanswered or only partially so. There is 
no need to provide much more of an argument here. 
Humanity is in the middle of a global pandemic and 
we can see in front of our very eyes how the global 
governance system struggles to cooperate and to 
find common answers. Instead, national instincts 
dominate global policy-making.
This is not surprising. The multipolar world of today 
clashes with the growing complexity of and interde-
pendence among global challenges, and with what 
would be the best policies to address those challenges. 
455 Such initiatives notably included the Commission on Global Governance (1995), the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations (1995), Idris and Bartolo (2000), the Global Gover-
nance Reform Project (Camilleri et al., 2000), the Zedillo Report (2001) and the ILO World Commission for the social dimension of globalisation (2004).
»The global governance 
architecture largely inherited 
from the immediate post-war 
phase, or even from earlier on 
as for the ILO, has been in need 
of an overhaul for many years.«
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National leaders and governments remain trapped 
in logics of national legitimacy and accountability, 
and global institutions are not accountable at all to 
the world’s citizens in democratic terms. The clash 
is most acute in the field of climate change, and it 
has, understandably so, brought peaceful revolt onto 
the planet’s streets, in particular from younger gen-
erations who find it hardest to accept the limits of 
global governance and action as it gets more exposed 
than ever before. But it can also be witnessed in the 
implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Develop-
ment Agenda, which has to deploy enormous efforts 
at global institutional level to push an agenda that 
can only rely on repeated incantation and volun-
tary reporting processes and is now already being 
derailed by a global pandemic crisis which itself 
clashes with the limits of good global governance.
However, it is admittedly very difficult to conceive of 
a readymade solution to the gridlock in which global 
governance finds itself. Any future reform would at 
least need to consider the following elements:
• An objective re-assessment of the roles and 
powers of each global body in the UN system 
and beyond, leading to a more effective 
governance architecture in tackling global 
challenges, and based on clear missions
• An assessment of the financial resources neces-
sary to confront global challenges at common 
global level with a view to provide a more reli-
able and sufficient budgetary capacity to the UN 
system
• A review of the democratic participation, rep-
resentation and decision-making processes 
within each global institution
• A transition towards the development of dem-
ocratic legitimacy and accountability of global 
institutions towards the world’s citizens and 
global civil society
• A greater involvement of the world's cities in 
global governance policy and decision-making 
processes, as the share of citizens living in 
cities will exceed two-thirds of the world popu-
lation by mid-century.456
In order to make progress towards both forward-look-
ing and credible proposals for a a global governance 
system fit for the 21st century, we recommend to first 
open a new and open process of reflection among 
experts and we would encourage an initiative to 
create a “World Commission for 21st Century Global 
Governance”, the work of which could be supported 
by even a small number of countries or public insti-
tutions as a start, such as the European Commission.
7.5.10.  New Pathways to Well-Being:  
A Global Common Wealth Charter
We advocate in chapter 6 a European approach to 
“common wealth”, which could be extended to the 
global level. 
Sustainable well-being cannot, in practice, 
only be achieved by aiming to improve material 
resources at individual level. First of all, in many 
countries there are political and economic limits 
on how far changes in tax systems can occur to 
make society much fairer. This does not mean 
that income tax systems should not become more 
progressive, or that wealth should not be taxed. It 
certainly has to be the case, but it should not be 
the only pathway. 
This is not least so because a sustainable society 
cannot possibly be one that would essentially aim 
to achieve more well-being in a sustainable way 
by increasing purchasing power for the many, in 
a never ending and unsustainable race towards 
economic growth and material consumption. 
There is a scientifically documented imperative 
to move away from today’s excessively materi-
alistic and consumerist economic system.457 To 
do so requires a different approach to tackling 
inequalities, then one only focusing on monetary 
inequality.
Also, tax reforms aiming at the reduction of 
inequality are potentially unstable, because they 
depend on political choices of governments that 
can be reversed due to changing majorities.
456 https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html
457 See notably https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-16941-y
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In order to address these two concerns, re-distribu-
tional tax policy should be combined with a more 
far-reaching and more stable approach aimed at a 
common/collective base of non-monetary wealth 
accessible to and at the disposal of all, and acting 
as a driver for sustainable development goals. This 
approach could also provide significant support to 
the fight against poverty, and in particular extreme 
forms of poverty. Using the “common wealth” pro-
posal made in the European context in chapter 6, 
a global approach would equally ensure that every 
person would be guaranteed free-of-charge access 
to a set of basic and essential services, such as edu-
cation, medical treatment, public transport, or 
culture, and an access at low cost to a set of basic and 
essential goods, including food and water, energy, 
land and housing. This would at the same time allow 
public authorities to ensure that such services and 
goods are environmentally sustainable.
In order to frame this approach, a Global Common 
Wealth Charter could grant a set of sustainable 
well-being rights to all citizens, which could for 
instance include:
• Free quality education and training from early 
childhood throughout life
• Free quality healthcare
• Energy-efficient decent housing, land, clean 
energy and healthy food at low cost
• Affordable and non-polluting public transport























Making EU policymaking fit for 
sustainable well-being for all 
01Reform the foundations of EU policymaking through the adoption of a Sustainable Well-being Pact that stipulates actionable policy commitments relating to sustainable human and planetary well-being.
04Align the EU fiscal policy framework with sustainable well-being-related policy objectives.
Establish uniform EU green and 
social bonds standards for investment 
instruments based on the green and 
social taxonomies.
Enlarge the EU Budget through 
new own resources to turn it into a 
powerful driver of the transition to 
a new model of society based on the 
principles of sustainable well-being 
for all.
Uphold the original timeline for the 
implementation of the EU green 
finance taxonomy. 
02Develop institutional fitness in the EU through a Futures Capacity in the European Commission, a Sustainable Well-being Board in the European Parliament, and a Sustainable Well-being Council.
05Establish a meaningful EU fiscal capacity to provide stabilisation for Eurozone economies.
Improve the availability of sustainability 
information in financial markets 
through comprehensive, stringent, and 
comparable sustainability reporting 
standards.
Ensure greater consistency between 
sustainable well-being objectives and 
monetary policy by revising the European 
Central Bank’s mandate.
Complement the green taxonomy with a 
social taxonomy focussing on the social 
dimension of sustainability and well-
being.
03Adopt an interinstitutional agreement on cooperation and strong parliamentary involvement in the governance of the sustainable well-being pact.
06Align the EU budget with more balanced sustainability and well-being objectives.
Penalise ‘brown’ investments through 
targeted revisions of prudential 
financial sector regulation.
Ensure policy coherence at the EU 
and national level through a European 
Sustainable Well-being Budgeting 
procedure.
12Define a horizontal ‘do no significant harm’ principle to ensure green investments do not compromise social objectives and vice-versa. 
Make finance and the digital economy 
work for sustainable well-being for all
Living in an economy dedicated to sustainable well-being for all










Submit the financial sector to 
carbon stress tests to determine its 
vulnerabilities stemming from climate 
change and the transition to a climate-
neutral economic model.
19Platform regulators’ mandate must mirror the scope of platforms to ensure the digital economy can be regulated and governed properly.
25Establish a European framework for data altruism to enable forms of data sharing that serve the public good.
Ban targeted advertisement to stop the 
maximisation of profits through the 
manipulation of consumers.
Make the use of AI transparent 
and empower citizens to challenge 
instances of discrimination.
Require banks and financial firms to 
define comprehensive carbon net-zero 
strategies to ensure the green transition 
does not lead to financial market turmoil.
20Apply stricter control to mergers in the digital economy and punish violations of related conditionalities.
26Define stringent rules to ensure AI is bound by ethical standards that ensure respect for fundamental rights.
Regulate user engagement techniques that 
manipulate users and have increasingly 
detrimental impacts on democracy.
Develop an ambitious industrial policy  
for ethical AI made in Europe. 
Update the EU Credit Rating Agencies 
Regulation to ensure sustainability 
issues are taken into account and 
create a public EU agency.
21Ensure interoperability across digital services and market places to prevent digital services operators from locking in users to monopolise data and increase their profits.
27Make conformity checks for AI applications mandatory to ensure they comply with ethical standards.
Foster diversity in the online 
marketplace for goods, services, and 
content break the dominance of a 
handful of online giants.
Establish national expertise centres for 
ethical AI to provide advice and support 
for businesses. 
31 32 33Require large and high-risk corporations to define comprehensive sustainability strategies that ensure businesses contribute to the transition to a new economic model focussed on sustainability and well-being. Adopt a European Directive on mandatory corporate due diligence to make businesses accountable in for their impact on society and the environemnt. Condition state aid and access to public procurement on good corporate governance. 
Turn companies into agents of 
sustainable well-being for all 
















Include the social economy in the 
future EU social sustainable finance 
taxonomy to improve access to finance 
for social economy operators.
Strengthen employees’ right to 
board-level representation to give 
key company stakeholders a say in 
corporate strategy.
Build cross-sectoral capacity in 
the European Commission for the 
governance of mission-oriented 
innovation processes.
Introduce incentives and provide 
support services to promote the uptake 
of the benefit corporation statute.
Limit the voting rights of 
large shareholders to limit the 
concentration of power in corporate 
decision-making.
Support the digitalisation of the social 
economy.
Bolster workers’ rights to information 
and consultation, especially with regards 
to the management of change and 
restructuring.
Use the experiences made as part of the 
turn towards a mission-oriented approach 
to innovation in the European commission 
to assist public authorities at all levels to 
follow suit.
Develop an EU social economy action 
plan that addresses key challenges and 
nurtures this sector that can play an 
outstanding role in a sustainability and 
well-being-focussed economic model.
Reward patient shareholding to mitigate 
the pressure on companies to focus on 
short-term profit.
Foster collaboration between social 
enterprises and conventional businesses 
to enable mutual learning.
Eliminate incentives for company directors 
to focus excessively on shareholder 
interests so that considerations of long-term 
value creation can prevail in corporate 
decision-making.
Establish European innovation hubs 
that create networks between public 
research infrastructures, public and 
private companies to pool their expertise 
and potential and enable knowledge and 
technology transfers.
Establish a dedicated Commission 
service for coordinating policy for the 
social economy.
Adopt an EU directive establishing a 
benefit corporation statute in all EU 
Member States that promotes public 
purpose-driven forms of business.






Resilience: an inclusive definition to 
implement transformative policies
Develop broad vulnerability indicators 
for the EU, Member States and regions 
(NUTS 2 level).
Create a comprehensive dashboard of 
resilience indicators for the EU and its 
Member States.
Build “integrated” climate resilience 
impact assessments, which would 
combine different types of modelling 
tools to uncover the interlinkages across 
the envi-ronmental, economic and social 
dimensions of development, targeting 
the im-portance of bringing inequalities 
to the fore.
Inclusive governance and open 








Build several ‘Citizen conferences’ 
on a Pan-european scale including 
a panel of citizens, experts and 
decision-makers discussing the 
respective importance of the different 
dimensions of well-being and agreeing 
on a scoreboard common to be 
implemented. 
The concept of a Just Transition 
process as well as the role of social 
partners in its governance must be 
enshrined in the legislation. Social 
dialogue and the role of trade unions 
should be explicitly mentioned in the 
Climate Law, the European Green Deal 
and the Adaptation strategy.
Foster the engagement and active 
participation of all stakeholders, 
including youth, in accelerating the 
shift towards a more sustainable  
Europe.
At sectoral and workplace levels, 
extend the scope of collective 
bargaining to green transition issues 
to discuss the impact on employment 
and wages of the decarbonisation 
process and the impacts on skills 
needs and health and safety at work.
Involve citizens in deliberative and 
participatory settings to discuss desired 
and concrete pathways to sustainable 
well-being for all, developing the concepts 
of community placemaking conversations.
Invite Member States to produce national 
“Just Transition Strategies” as part of 
their National Energy and Climate Plans 
(NECPs).
Developing Inclusive and local 
frameworks on a just and inclusive 
Transition with stakeholders, especially 
the one representing the most vulnerable 
(CSOs including NGOs and various 
stakeholders).
Negotiate agreements at sectoral and 
company level to map the future evolution 
of skills needs and the creation of 
sectoral skills councils within a global 
commitment to retention, retraining and 
redeployment of workers, and ensure and 
support skills development, particularly 
for vulnerable workers.
Ensure that the information on 
investments and reforms financed 
by the EU – expenditures, physical 
implementation and procedures –are 
properly accessible to all citizens in 
an open and verifiable way, and that 
participative monitoring is facilitated 
at local level.
Create a European Green Deal advisory  
board with trade union representations.
Introduce a European association 
statute to strengthen freedom of 
association, assembly and expression. 
Develop and strengthen a network of 
Trade Union representatives at the 
workplace level and involve workers 
in concrete actions aiming to assess 
the environmental footprint of their 
company.
Living in a society of change: the imperative of a just transition
Living in a society of change: the imperative of a just transition
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The EU should be more ambitious 
in order to ensure sustainable 
investment to high quality and 
inclusive education and to invest 
more in order to facilitate innovation 
with the best learning and teaching 
equipment in schools.
Strategic foresight will be an essential 
tool to predict and prepare policies 
to leave no one behind and to avoid 
severe skills shortages in Europe’s 
technologically advanced industries 
and support older workers to 
acquire significant new knowledge, 
particularly in the field of new 
technologies.
The European Commission should 
explore innovative ways to effectively 
engage with citizens to source 
ideas, co-create solutions, and seize 
opportunities provided by digital 
government tools.
Taking into consideration the needs 
of all key stakeholders in education 
(including teachers, school leaders, and 
other education personnel, students, 
parents, and the wider community), 
is important for inclusive education 
creating democratic school culture.
Introduce a skills-based compensation 
systems in companies accessing 
public funds for upskilling workers 
and in agreement with workers’ 
representatives, as this system would 
ensure that there is a return on that 
public investment.
Protect holistic education as a public 
good and protect the social role of 
schools and education.
Ensure adequate, long-term funding at 
both European, national, regional and 
local level, to unlock the full potential of 
sustainable development skills across all 
learning sectors.
Civic education promoting equitable, 
inclusive, and fair societies needs to be 
mainstreamed through all education from 
early ages to later on in adult life.
Build a European Model for local and 
regional practices on climate-sensitive 
participatory budgets.
The European Commission should 
carry out thorough research and impact 
assessment, and adjust the targets based 
on trustworthy data on the impact of the 
COVID-19 crisis on education, students 
and teachers.
The Digital Education Action Plan should 
help advance the digital transition in 
education with a view to help training 
according to the learner’s needs and reach 
out to people from remote areas.
The European Union should launch a 
broad consultation on the Future of 
education and skills in a in an ever-
changing and interconnected world.
Establish that the “European skills 
strategy for sustainable competitiveness, 
social equity and resilience” from the 
EC must guarantee the right to lifelong 
learning for all and in all areas.
Promote a green mind-set in skills, 
education and training programmes, 
beyond the labour market, as 
an important area of citizenship 
competence.
Safeguard appropriate funding to 
Education and teachers (funding 
education should be regarded as an 
investment rather than a cost for society 
and national budgets).
EU member states should better connect 
environmental policies to education 
policies and the European Commission 
should support to set up national green 
skills and competence strategies.
The European Education Action Plan 
should implement the European Pillar 
of Social Rights and should require the 
member states to present their national 
strategies and adopt a clear monitoring 
on national actions and reforms in line 
with its goals.
Living in a society of change: the imperative of a just transition
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Incorporate Sustainable Development 
in education and training policies and 
programmes such as the European 
Education Area, Digital Education 
Action Plan, aligning with Sustainable 
Development Goals.
Just transition and place-sensitive 
policies for sustainable cohesion 
Climate justice: the need for a fair 






Data need to be systematically 
collected and used at place level on 
exposure to environmental hazards 
by socio-professional or income group 
and on cumulative vulnerability and 
health risks across social groups due 
to the distribution of the burden of 
environmental inequality.
Support and encourage investments in 
sectors with high employment creation 
and environmental protection potential, 
such as energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, with particular attention being 
paid to energy poverty, sustainable 
mobility, and the upgrade of transport 
infrastructures among other investments.
Promote public and open scrutiny at 
place level to strengthen the role of 
organisations representing economic 
and social interests and civil society 
affected by the transition in integrated 
territorial strategies.
A European Climate Justice Governance 
Regulation. The ecological progress cannot 
lead to social regression, and lower income 
households should not bear the costs of 
this ecological transformation, whether 
through higher prices or taxes, or through 
labour market changes that may leave 
them unemployed. Equally, this should 
not leave exposed or vulnerable regions 
and communities behind. Even more 
so, wherever possible, policies aimed at 
decarbonisation should be used to generate 
social progress, to improve economic and 
social well-being for all. Despite a range 
of important EU initiatives to address this 
(such as the Just Transition Fund or the 
forthcoming Climate Social Fund), a lot 
will depend on how national and regional 
governments will address the social 
risks and opportunities of the ecological 
transformation. Hence, alongside the Fit 
for 55 initiatives, the European Commission 
should bring forward a Climate Justice 
Governance Regulation, notably inspired 
by the existing Energy Governance Union 
approach, to develop and monitor national 
climate justice plans.
Data need to be systematically collected 
as well on issues such as opportunities, 
institutional quality, well-being and 
welfare at local level, as well as on 
the impact of trade, globalisation and 
automation, among other processes, at a 
fine subnational level.
Mainstream attention to the needs of the 
most vulnerable regions across all EU 
policies, including to support the energy, 
digital and industrial transitions, which 
tend to adopt a top-down approach and are 
not well aligned with their needs.
Mapping the perturbations in labour 
market caused by the economic 
transition to a new production system 
and of the transition towards a low 
carbon economy.
Ensure that structural reforms entail  
a place-based sensitivity.
Living in a society of change: the imperative of a just transition





















The EU should pilot more closely 
policy to assist local communities 
develop and implement adaptation 
plans, and support urban-planning, 
investment in resilient infrastructure 
and housing.
Ensuring a just transition will require 
an adaptation of vocational and 
educational systems but also active 
labour market policies targeting 
employment creation, training and 
life-long learning.
Strictly monitor the development and 
implementation of national adaptation 
strategies, with regards, in particular, 
to the assessment of climate change’s 
socio-economic impact and make sure 
trade unions are involved.
Develop a strong social dimension, 
which would put people first. The 
adaptation strategy should include 
meaningful indicators to monitor 
its socio-economic impacts and to 
assess the value of the prevention and 
management of risks linked to climate 
change.
Promote the adoption of integrated 
industrial policies that would 
be consistent with sustainable 
development goals, providing industry 
with clear strategic objectives, a 
stable regulatory, financial, fiscal and 
legal framework and allowing for the 
creation of green and decent jobs.
Design a Climate risk insurance for low-
income households as one fundamental 
element of the social-ecological welfare 
state.
The EU adaptation strategy to climate 
change must be legally binding.
The EU needs to plan for the consequences 
and to invest in public services, 
infrastructure, social protection and 
insurance schemes, so that our societies 
are ready to handle the challenges.
In regions dependent on carbon-intensive 
activities, the transition process should 
lead to support workers with measures 
aiming at creating requalification and 
redeployment of workers, from declining 
sectors to growing sectors.
Provide sufficient funding for adaptation 
through a rise of the amounts dedicated 
to adaptation by the different European 
Structural and Investment funds. 
Support social protection policies to 
protect lower-income groups against the 
threats of climate hazards.
Promote investment in sustainable 
technologies. Promote European and 
national public and private investment 
in green technologies through European 
R&D, as well as the creation of European 
technological platforms dedicated to low 
& zero carbon technologies.
Introduce legislative instruments that 
recognise the increased safety and health 
risk faced by workers due to climate 
change and create obligations to protect 
them.
Mainstream climate adaptation in, and 
maximise the co-benefits with, all relevant 
EU policies towards a more sustainable 
future, such as agriculture and food 
production, forestry, transport, trade, 
energy, environment, water management, 
buildings, infrastructure, industrial, 
maritime and fisheries policies, as well as 
cohesion policy and local development, 
and social policies, and the need to ensure 
that other European Green Deal initiatives 
are consistent with climate adaptation and 
mitigation measures.
Public policy will have to play a critical 
role in providing public goods for 
adaptation and ensuring that social 
processes and institutions are flexible 
enough to learn and assess policy 
options.
Identify both challenges and 
opportunities: In sectors and regions 
that are the most affected by the 
change, identify both challenges 
and opportunities linked to the 
decarbonisation process and promote 
initiatives aiming at retraining and 
relocating workers in developing sectors.
European trade unions and European 
employer’s organisations should 
establish a strong and stable social 
dialogue on the implications climate 
change may have on the health and 
safety of workers in order to issue 
guidance for companies on how they 
should act to protect their workers.
Adaptation measures must promote and 
not undermine gender equality. This 
means women should participate in the 
‘gender-screening’ of all proposals, to 
assess their specific impact.
In regions and industries most affected 
by the transition, promote economic 
diversification as well as the adoption of 
policies and measures that will allow a 
just transition for workers.
Establish social protection mechanisms  
at European level to support Member 




Set criteria for a significant minimum 
percentage of energy efficiency 
obligation schemes to target energy-
poor citizens. A “European Energy 
Poverty Observatory” that would 
bring together all stakeholders would 
help define European energy poverty 
indicators.
Promote the integration of adequate 
social protection measures into national 
climate change policies including 
measures specifically targeting those 
who are going to be negatively affected, 
and in particular workers largely 
dependent on natural resources or 
facing major structural changes.
Public subsidies in favour of fossil fuels 
must be phased out as soon as possible.
The EC should launch without any 
delay a “Just transition strategy for the 
automotive sector “so as to anticipate 
and manage the changes.
Promote mechanisms, including public 
money, economic instruments and 
incentives to ensure that infrastructure 
and appropriate supports exist for 
consumers wishing to choose a low carbon 
lifestyle.
Increased EU funding should help 
local, regional, national authorities to 
overcome current obstacles to make 
renovation accessible to all so that 
high upfront costs are not borne by 
vulnerable people.
Adding a provision to ensure that access 
to energy services is a basic social right. 
Along these lines, a broad European 
definition of energy poverty, refined 
by Member States according to their 







A fair path to decarbonisation: beyond 
carbon pricing, the need for carbon value 
and a consistent political agenda
Set broader political objectives 
for carbon pricing : The European 
Commission must provide more 
comprehensive, complete and detailed 
assessments on quality jobs and 
employment. The aim would be to 
integrate the overall social benefits of 
increased climate ambitions policies, 
notably in terms of well-being and 
quality of life.
Make the ETS more efficient. the cap of 
the EU ETS will have to be significantly 
adjusted in view of the prominent role of 
emissions from installations regulated by 
the EU ETS.
Make the ETS fairer. Free allocation 
should be abolished and replaced by 
auctioning of all emission allowances. 
This measure would make the EU ETS 
fairer to citizens, since it would divide 
the costs of the low-carbon transition 
more equally between citizens and 
industry.
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The Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism must be part of a broader 
EU industrial strategy and goes hand in 
hand with a full phase out of all current 
measures aimed at mitigating carbon 
leakage, including free ETS allowances. 
It should be designed in a way that limits 
the risk of offshoring of manufacturing 
activities downstream the value chain.
Aim for a net decoupling taking 
greenhouse gas consumption 
emissions, not only production 
emissions, as a reference and promote 
on this basis and other equity criteria 
as a comprehensive global collective 
climate justice strategy.
Allocate revenues of carbon pricing 
(reformed ETS and CBAM) to just 
transition and mitigation policies. Options 
should be explored for pricing carbon 
through a contribution payable in non-
ETS sectors, with part of the resulting 
revenue to fund assistance for workers, 
communities and regions.
Establish a European carbon budge to 
quantify the amount of GHG emissions 
that can be emitted in total over each 5 
year period through 2050 and to define a 
fair distribution of the emissions space 
among countries by equity principles.
Carbon dividends: an equitable use 
of the revenues. Carbon pricing 
revenues should be used to counter 
potential negative social and 
economic consequences resulting 
from the decarbonisation process, 
and that these revenues collected 
due to increased pricing of C02 
should redistributed to citizens. One 
use of revenues that is likely to be 
fair everywhere is to use transfer 
payments to lessen the impact on the 
households whose cost of living is 
disproportionately affected by carbon 
pricing.
Living a healthy life on a decarbonised and preserved planet
Align policies and regulatory frameworks 
with the objective of achieving climate 
and sustainable well-being goals 
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Set European platforms for 
cooperation such as shared 
infrastructure for sustainable process 
technologies and organisation of 
industrial symbiosis.
Provide a comprehensive framework to 
put the EU industry on track to reach 
climate neutrality by 2050. Massive 
investment in the development and 
deployment of low carbon breakthrough 
technologies are needed.
Support re-adjustment programmes for 
SMEs in the EIIs value chains that are 
specialised in conventional technologies, 
in order to help them to redefine their 
value chain positioning and to redirect 
their core competencies while preserving 
jobs.
Set a comprehensive renewable strategy. 
Increasing the renewable energy 
target could help secure and develop 
an industrial value chain in the EU for 
renewable technologies and therefore 
create new quality jobs.
Improve synergies between Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency. The 
transformation to a sustainable energy 
system with high shares of renewables would 
meet climate goals and pay for itself. It would 
lead to massive job creations between now 
and 2050, and the health, environmental and 
climate benefits would save up to six times 
more than the additional costs associated 
with reconfiguring the energy sector. 
Support cross-sectoral technologies 





Promote and extend the Ecodesign 
framework. In order to make 
sustainable products the norm, 
support an extension of the scope 
of products covered by ecodesign-
type minimum performance 
requirements, including material 
and chemical contents, durability, 
reparability and recyclability, carbon 
and environmental footprinting 
and sustainable sourcing (recycled 
contents notably).
Build new infrastructures to support 
new technologies and processes. 
Carefully co-ordinated planning 
coupled with targeted incentives will 
be needed to en-sure that the right 
infrastructure is built at the right time. 
Renewable hydrogen, for instance, will 
require a strategic and quick upgrade 
of both production and distribution of 
renewable electricity and will have to 
be dealt with in the framework of the 
Energy Union governance.
Address growing waste management issues. All packaging must be designed for reuse and 
recycling, provide transparency on the chemical composition, be separately collected and 
materials must be sustainably sourced.
Establish effective economic incentives 
for resource-saving strategies. 
Establishing incentives to create a vibrant 
market for repair would reduce costs and 
encourage users to repair.
Address with a serious focus the 
limitations of Carbon Capture and Storage 
technologies. The EU should adopt a 2030 
emission reduction target supplemented 
by a separate target for removals to 
ensure both advance at the necessary 
scale independent of each other, 
while avoiding confusion and counter-
productive incentives. Mixing emissions 
and removals in a single target would 
allow other countries to do the same and 
undermine the transparency and trust 
that is needed to accelerate the transition 
towards climate neutrality.
Develop new eco-design requirements 
for digital and electronic products with 
the implementation of an EU Extended 
Producer Responsibility (EPR), whereby 
the manufacturer would be responsible 
for the entire life-cycle of products. 
Re-design mobility systems around 
accessibility, i.e. ensuring that people are 
able to easily reach jobs, opportunities, 
goods, services and amenities by giving 
priority to sustainable modes and 
creating proximity between people and 
places in order to contribute to enlarging 
mitigation potential, while also 
improving life quality through delivering 
better equity, health, economic, road 
safety, and wider environmental 
outcomes.
Living a healthy life on a decarbonised and preserved planet
The crucial contribution of 





Only biomass that adheres to 
sustainability criteria should be 
considered carbon neutral in the EU’s 
climate legislation. The greenhouse 
gas emissions from burning biomass 
that do not meet these criteria must 
be accounted for in the carbon pricing 
mechanisms.
The CAP must set concrete targets 
against conversion to cropland and fund 
restoration of damaged carbon sinks.
Propose a wide-ranging restriction on 
microplastics in products placed on the 
EU/EEA market to avoid their release in 
the marine environment after a highly 
polluting life-cycle.







“One” Planetary and Human Health
Mainstream the ‘One Health’ 
approach458 in Europe to build 
pandemic preparedness, enhance 
pandemic prevention programs, and 
to investigate and control outbreaks 
across sectors.
Prevention can have a significant impact 
on the achievement of sustainable 
well-being goals and the sustainability 
of healthcare systems, particularly in 
relation to the growing burden of chronic 
diseases linked to environmental causes. 
Welfare systems need to better target 
populations in vulnerable situations. 
Providing universal healthcare coverage 
should be a key element in such efforts, 
levelling the playing field in terms of 
access and utilisation of health services.
Include a strengthened chapter in 
the European Pillar of Social Rights, 
which would underline the right to a 
healthy environment as essential to 
ensure adequate living and working 
conditions and promote well-being.
Stress-test the capacity of Member states 
Health Systems to manage in socially 
equitable ways existing diseases and 
forthcoming climate change-related 
shocks and stresses.
Align policies that aim to reduce the 
effects of climate change on human health 
– for example, by strengthening health 
services – with the objectives of reducing 
poverty and inequalities.
Secure the recognition of biodiversity 
as a global public good and as a 
central policy agenda at all levels 
of government, in addition to the 
recently proposed Biodiversity 
Strategy for 2030.
458 One Health’ is an approach promoted by the United Nations to design and implement programmes, policies, legislation and research in which multiple sectors communicate and work together to achieve better public 
health outcomes.
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Enforce the precautionary, the “non-
regression” and the “do no harm” 
principles in all aspects of food and 
farming policy.
Initiate a European strategy to propose 
concrete measure to reduce exposure 
to endocrine disruptor chemicals such 
as pesticides, as part of the EU’s zero 
pollution ambition.
Adopt a comprehensive Environmental 
Health Strategy, to streamline health 
requirements across relevant EU policy 
proposals. The strategy should provide 
a coherent framework for environment-
related public health threats, including 
air, water and soil pollution.
Fill the legislative gap on soil protection 
by proposing a legally binding framework 
to address soil degradation at the EU level, 
including reducing soil erosion, increase 
soil health and biodiversity, and tackling 
soil contaminants.
Systematically evaluate the life-cycle of 
hazardous substances and their impact 
on air, soil and water resources, upstream 
and downstream, to carry out a holistic, 
evidence-based well-being impact 
assessment of legislative proposals, and 
to consider the social, environmental and 
economic benefits of such an approach.
Focus on co-benefits between the Zero-
Pollution Action Plan and the Europe’s 
Beating Cancer Plan, the Farm to Fork 
strategy, the EU’s2030 Biodiversity 
Strategy. 
Strengthen the management of 
agricultural market crises in the CAP 
via a sufficient dedicated budgetary 
reserve and genuine national and 
European sectoral regulators, akin to 
the energy sector.
Develop digital solutions to help 
reduce pollution (air quality and 
emissions live monitoring and 
reporting, set-up of a harmonised 
alert system on pollution levels; 
centralisation of all available 
pollution related data to improve 
its traceability along the whole life-
cycle, from production (integrating 
resource consumption), to use, to 
emissions and releases phases.)
Promote the mainstreaming of 
agroecological farming in EU 
agriculture to organise the transition 
towards production and consumption 
models that are, in the long run, 
generators of health. European 
agricultural policy can and must serve 
the objectives of the sustainable well 
being in all its components.
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Establish a Biodiversity Law. Biodiversity 
loss and climate change are challenges of 
a similar magnitude and urgency, and are 
fundamentally interlinked. They must be 
addressed together as part of a broader 
green and inclusive recovery. Instead 
of incentivising activities that harm 
biodiversity, governments and the EU 
should redirect subsidies to activities that 
deliver socio-economic outcomes and 
have a positive impact on biodiversity. 
This would imply setting a legally binding 
biodiversity framework, similar to the 
Climate Law, which steers a path through 
a set of binding objectives for 2030, 2040 
and 2050, and the commitments made at 
COP15. The Commission should make a 
legislative proposal to that effect without 
delay.
152
Biodiversity proofing should be 
mainstreamed across all EU spending 
and programmes on the basis of the 
EU Taxonomy, with the precautionary 
and ‘polluter pays’ principles taking 
precedence in EU actions. 153
Scale up investment in biodiversity 
conservation, sustainable use 
and restoration and put a price on 
biodiversity loss by setting biodiversity 
spending targets for COVID-19 stimulus 
measures and recovery plans and reform 
subsidies harmful to biodiversity.
154Develop and incorporate pandemic and emerging disease risk health impact assessments in major development and land-use projects.
155
Align the CAP with the European 
Green Deal objectives by dedicating 
sufficient and qualitative CAP funding 
to incentivise and reward farmers to 
deliver on the objectives of the European 
Green Deal. This would include : 
reducing pesticides, fertilisers and 
antimicrobials use, increasing organic 
farming, agroecology and agroforestry, 
deploying high-biodiversity landscape 
features, cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions, preventing food loss and 
waste, improving the circularity of 
the agriculture sector, a.o. through 
better nutrients cycling, protecting 
and restoring ecosystems (especially in 




















Secure livelihoods for all in Europe
Adopt an EU anti-poverty law that 
commits EU and national policy to 
work towards the full eradication of 
poverty in Europe by 2050.
Establish an independent commission 
on the future of social security 
systems to provide advice for the pro-
active adaptation of social security 
systems to future challenges.
Ensure fair working conditions in 
the platform economy by adopting 
EU legislation that establishes a 
rebuttable assumption of employment 
for workers on online platforms.
Set common standards for minimum 
income schemes to ensure all citizens, 
regardless of their age or employment 
situation have access to poverty-proof 
minimum incomes.
Adopt the EU directive on adequate 
minimum wages to ensure wage floors 
exist in all segments of the EU labour 
market.
Establish an EU Housing Guarantee that 
gives citizens an enforceable right to 
decent and affordable housing.
Embed the anti-poverty law and its 
targets in the European Sustainable 
Well-being Pact and well-being 
budgeting procedure to foster policy 
coherence at EU and national level.
Develop a European zero-precarious 
employment strategy to eradicate the 
most harmful forms of precarious 
employment by 2030.
Integrate bolstered and binding 
housing indicators in the European 
Sustainable Well-being Pact and well-
being budgeting process.
Provide co-financing for the 
implementation of the anti-poverty law 
under the EU Social and Investment Funds.
Strengthen the labour market position of 
the self-employed by tackling their social 
vulnerabilities and providing targeted 
support services.
Develop real governance capacity in 
relation to housing policy at the EU level.
Establish an EU re-insurance fund for 
minimum income schemes to ensure 
these are adequately financed, also in 
times of economic crises.
Continue efforts to ensure fair cross-border 
labour mobility in the EU labour market 
through, especially through the improved 
coordination of social security systems.
Improve public and private investment 
capacity to ensure demands for affordable 
housing are met.
Use adequate definitions and indicators, 
hence measure the exposure of citizens 
to poverty by taking into account the real 
cost of living through the definition of 
reference baskets.
Establish a European sustainable 
jobs guarantee that provides gainful 
employment to the long-term unemployed 
and supports local communities to fulfil 
their needs.
Propose an EU fair telework package that 
establishes flexibility for employees and 
protects their worker rights and health 
and safety.





















Consider the housing needs of an 
ageing EU population and address 
them in EU and national housing 
policy.
Support Member States in meeting 
the targets of the European care deal 
through EU co-financing provisions 
and access to finance. 
Adopt a bolstered and effective EU pay 
transparency directive that allows 
workers to fight wage discrimination 
and excessive pay inequalities. 
Introduce a temporary excess 
profit tax targeting businesses with 
higher-than-average profits during 
the COVID-19 pandemic to levy a 
contribution from the corporate sector 
to financing the cost of the public 
health crisis.
Define EU quality standards for childcare 
and long-term care services to ensure 
sufficient and good quality care services 
are available to all Europeans.
Introduce an EU net wealth tax that 
ensures the wealthiest households in the 
EU contribute to the financing of policies 
that foster sustainability and well-being.
Take a progressive initiative to adopt a 
Common Wealth Charter that serves to 
strengthen public services and supports 
communities in launching projects with 
social and environmental co-benefits.
Support good working conditions 
in the care sector through targeted 
measures to improve wages and 
education and training for the care 
workforce.
Launch a European collective 
bargaining offensive to achieve a 
collective bargaining coverage of 90% 
of the EU workforce by 2030.
End the race to the bottom in global 
corporate taxation by implementing 
the international agreement on a 
minimum effective corporate tax 
rate.
Privilege responsible operators in the care 
sector by expanding the role of public 
sector providers and public purpose-
driven businesses.
Deliver better collective bargaining 
outcomes for part-time workers by 
building on good practices developed at 
the national level.
Introduce an EU financial transaction tax 
and a digital levy as own resources for the 
EU budget.
Introduce an EU care guarantee that 
ensures informal carers have adequate 
income.
Enable collective bargaining for the self-
employed through targeted reforms of 
competition law.
Create a fully harmonised EU corporate 
taxation framework that ends corporate 
tax competition in the EU and lowers 
compliance cost for businesses operating 
in the European single market.
Stimulate exchanges of best practice in 
housing policy between national and 
local authorities.
Coordinate policy action in relation to the 
European care deal through the European 
Well-being budgeting procedure.
Abolish the unanimity principle on 
matters of taxation in the European 
Council that makes effective progress 
towards tax justice virtually impossible.
Adopt measures to create transparency 
and accountability with regard to 
corporate and wealth taxation. 
Fighting inequalities in income 
and wealth  


















Empowering women and minorities 
- the heroes of COVID
Unblock negotiations on the ‘Women 
on Boards Directive’ to ensure women 
have equal access to decision-making 
roles in the economy.
Create the office of a European 
disability coordinator charged with 
the mainstreaming of disability-
related issues and concerns across  
EU policy.
Establish a dedicated equality formation 
in the Council to mirror related 
structures in the European Parliament 
and Commission.
Make broader use of gender 
mainstreaming and gender impact 
assessments in EU policymaking and in 
EU investment programmes. 
Support local communities in integrating 
migrants and refugees by making 
financial support available for local 
authorities.
Adopt a horizontal anti-discrimination 
directive to ensure citizens have acess 
to effective remedies at hand with 
regards to all forms of discrimination 
and inequality in all sectors of society. 
Translate the Council of Europe 
Istanbul Convention into EU 
legislation to develop a consistent 
EU framework for fighting violence 
against women, including by 
declaring gender-based violence an 
EU crime.
Get tough on the defence of the rule 
of law by using existing instruments 
available to the European 
Commission.
Develop a uniform statute for national 
equality bodies that contribute to the 
shifting of social attitudes, provide 
assistance to victims of discrimination, 
and support the preparation of effective 
policy action.
Make sexual and reproductive rights 
shock-proof by assessing the impact of 
the COVID-19 crisis on the availability 
of related services and resources an 
preparing effective remedies.
Introduce a European statute for 
independent civil society organisations 
to foster a vibrant civic space in all EU 
countries and help civil society fend off 
attacks of national governments.
Establish a legally binding commitment to 
closing the gender pay and pensions gap by 
2030 through effective social security and 
labour market reform.
Ensure an effective implementation of the 
EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy, especially 
by using legislative instruments to achieve 
real change.
Launch an annual EU diversity and 
inclusion reporting procedure to enable 
a structured and regular engagement of 
EU policy with manifest challenges and 
trends. 
Adopt quotas for women representation in 
public decision-making bodies.
Establish a fair, consistent, and effective 
system for legal labour migration to 
fight incentives for migrants to resort to 
irregular forms of migration and to help 
meet Europe’s needs for skills and talent. 
Develop a European assessment of 
the equality impact of COVID, to be 
presented at an EU Equality Summit, 
to create political accountability 
for the distress experienced by 
marginalised social groups and to set 
priorities for future policy action.
















A waiver on patents to accelerate and 
to spread the manufacturing and 
distribution of COVID-19 vaccines 
across the globe.
An EU initiative for a Global Green 
Deal by the start of COP26.
Rebalanced EU Foreign Trade 
Agreements from brown to green 
goods and services.
An EU initiative to propose a global 
blueprint for “beyond GDP” well-being 
indicators in the framework of the United 
Nation’s system of national accounts and 
a new governance approach promoting 
“Well-Being Budgeting” from national to 
local governance levels across the globe.
A Fair Global Minimum Corporate 
Tax Rate of at least 20% and a fair 
distribution of corporate tax income for 
poorer countries.
An EU trade policy aligned with domestic 
sustainability objectives.
An EU initiative to host an 
International Summit on Sustainable 
Development and Well-Being to 
be held during the second half 
of 2022, based on a multi-level 
and multi-stakeholder approach, 
with international institutions, 
countries, regions, cities and non-
state actors (including trade unions, 
civil society organisations and 
engaged multinational corporations) 
committed to the UNSDGs.
A United Nations Convention on 
Corporate Responsibility.
An ambitious 15-point plan for a 1.5 °C 
climate ambition for COP26 in Glasgow.
EU trade negotiations flanked with clear 
and actionable sustainability roadmaps.
A new global climate policy initiative to be 
developed by the United Nations for 2023 
aimed at achieving global carbon neutrality 
already by at least 2045 (and by 2040 for 
those countries which can achieve it) and at 
setting ambitious negative emission goals 
towards a zero-emission world.
More effective and enforceable Trade and 
Sustainable Development Chapters in EU 
Foreign Trade Agreements.
A USD 30 billion global multi-year burden 
sharing plan to finance vaccines for the 
poorest countries.
A Global Social Contract including four 
initiatives: 
  an empowerment of the ILO on standard-
setting and governance in relation with 
the UNSDG implementation
  a global social label
  a global policy initiative on informal 
work in the global economy
  a global social protection & health fund.
Better and more timely use of 
sustainability impact assessments in EU 
trade talks, with policy evaluation to be 
commenced alongside the negotiation 
process and feed into negotiations on a 
rolling basis.
Living in a world dedicated to planetary 





240Develop greater multilateral capacity to ensure trade contributes to global public health policy. An increase of development assistance, notably through the United Nation’s Financing for the Development in the Era of COVID-19 and Beyond Initiative (FFDI) and by achieving the 0.7% ODA target for 
the EU by 2030.
A World Commission for 21st Century 
Global Governance. A Global Common Wealth Charter.
An EU initiative to promote an integrated 
approach around a new social-
ecological understanding and practice 
of development policy in combination 
with other policies, with the notion of 
sustainable well-being at its core (linkages 
with the recommendations for a Global 
Green Deal and for a Global Social 
Contract).
236 237235Strategic EU partnerships with developing countries to allow them to seize development opportunities in key value chains for a sustainable economy. EU Foreign Trade Agreements to leverage a contribution from the private sector. A reform of the World Trade Organisation to ensure its work and rulebook is consistent with, and supports, trade in the interest of global sustainable development and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
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»  The “Great Shift” is the result of dedicated work by the Independent Commission 
for Sustainable Equality, co-chaired by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and Teresa Ribera 
Rodríguez. It is about ensuring we are equipped to cope with the demanding times 
that we live in by pursuing a new, forward-thinking, ambitious and realistic set 
of policy proposals within a shared vision for a progressive society, where carbon 
neutrality and sustainable equality are at the heart of our strategy.« 
Iratxe García Pérez, 
President of the S&D Group in the European Parliament 
»  We need to shape a common future built on solidarity, human dignity and respect 
for nature, where economic activity is firmly framed within societal needs and 
planetary boundaries. This model must lead to widespread sustainable human 
and planetary well-being. This is most critical for our youth, to whom we owe a 
different and better future.« 
Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, 
Deputy Prime Minister of Spain
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, 
former Prime Minister of Denmark and former President of the Party of European Socialists
Co-Chairs of the Independent Commission for Sustainable Equality 
 
»  The most critical message of this policy report is that progressives must 
build a new alliance between ecological and social progress. The fight for the 
environment and the fight for a more equal and fair society are part of the 
same battle.« 
Eric Andrieu, 
Vice-President of the S&D Group in charge of Progressive Society
